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THESIS	ABSTRACT	
Since	the	government	paper	“An	organization	with	a	memory”	the	National	Health	Service	
has	sought	to	prevent	healthcare-related	harm.	It	is	unclear,	a	decade	later,	whether	
patients	are	now	“safer”.	One	of	the	principal	problems	in	this	developing	field	is	the	
imprecision	with	which	harm	is	measured.	All	methods	contain	epidemiological	flaws	that	
reduce	their	utility.	The	current	methods	such	as	retrospective	case	note	review	or	
voluntary	safety	reporting	systems	are	cumbersome	or	prone	to	non-responder	bias.	
	
This	thesis	reviewed	the	success	of	innovations	to	reduce	surgical	adverse	events.	It	
assessed	methods	of	measurement	of	patient	safety	in	healthcare	with	a	focus	on	voluntary	
reporting	and	retrospective	case	note	review.	It	evaluated	the	utility	of	the	National	
Reporting	and	Learning	System	(NRLS)	to	increase	the	understanding	and	learning	from	the	
available	data.	A	mixed	method	approach	was	used	with	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	
techniques.	Methods	for	measuring	avoidable	death	at	a	hospital	level	involving	explicit	
retrospective	case	note	review	were	developed	
	
In	a	systematic	review	current	methods	for	preventing	surgical	harm	were	found	to	be	
limited	in	their	efficacy	to	statistically	reduce	morbidity	and	mortality.	The	NRLS	data	were	
found	to	be	unable	to	correlate	with	existing	measures	of	hospital	quality.	A	system	of	
improved	classification	of	surgical	adverse	events	was	developed.	International	expert	
review	delineated	the	future	role	of	reporting	systems.	A	novel	tool	for	performing	case	
note	reviews	in	a	reproducible	fashion	was	validated	and	shown	to	elucidate	efficiently	the	
avoidability	of	hospital	deaths.		
	
By	tailoring	and	improving	reporting	systems	and	retrospective	case	note	review	methods,	
this	thesis	has	been	able	to	demonstrate	improved	measurement	of	harm	and	avoidable	
death.	This	will	provide	a	better	understanding	of	the	scale	and	nature	of	healthcare-related	
harm.	 	
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THESIS	HYPOTHESIS	AND	AIMS	
Thesis	aims	to:	
1. Investigate	surgical	adverse	events	and	effective	methods	to	prevent	them		
2. Explore	the	measurement	of	adverse	events	in	surgery	and	healthcare		
3. Understand	and	assess	voluntary	reporting	through	the	National	Reporting	and	
Learning	System	(NRLS)	
4. Establish	whether	there	is	potential	for	increasing	the	utility	of	NRLS	data	
5. Explore	methods	for	measuring	avoidable	death		
	
Null	hypothesis:	
Tailoring	and	improving	reporting	systems	and	retrospective	case	note	review	
methods	will	have	no	effect	on	measurement	of	harm	and	avoidable	death.		
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1 INTRODUCTION	TO	THE	MEASUREMENT	OF	ADVERSE	EVENTS	
IN	HEALTHCARE	
	
Surgical	adverse	events,	healthcare	related	harm	and	avoidable	death	are	unfortunately	
prevalent	in	hospitals	worldwide,	and	methods	to	measure	them	are	inaccurate	and	
inadequate.	This	thesis	will	focus	on	two	methods	voluntary	reporting	systems	and	case	
note	review	to	explore	their	biases	and	the	potential	for	augmenting	them.	It	will	draw	
together	different	challenges	with	reporting	and	reviewing	methodology	using	a	variety	of	
approaches,	to	assess	and	develop	the	tools	so	that	their	epidemiological	value	is	increased.		
	
1.1 CHAPTER	OVERVIEW	
This	chapter	describes	the	background	to	measuring	adverse	events,	defines	key	terms	that	
will	be	used	in	this	thesis	and	details	the	current	approach	to	the	measurement	of	harm	and	
a	few	of	the	challenges	that	the	thesis	will	endeavour	to	explore.	
1.2 ADVERSE	EVENTS,	KEY	DEFINITIONS	AND	CHALLENGES	TO	MEASUREMENT	
The	principle	of	primum	non	nocere	or	having	intent	not	to	harm	patients	through	health	
care	interventions	is	an	established	priority	for	medical	practice.	The	origins	of	the	phrase	
may	be	debated	but	the	importance	of	balancing	risk	and	benefit	for	treatment	of	patients	
is	a	central	medical	ethics	tenet.	[1]	When	healthcare	processes	are	inspected,	to	assess	
how	well	patients	are	safeguarded	from	healthcare	related	harm,	investigators	are	met	with	
many	obstacles	to	the	accurate	observation	of	safety.	Lucian	Leape	described	modern	
healthcare	as			
“the	most	complex	safety	challenge	of	any	activity	on	earth”.	[2]	
	Some	of	the	obstacles	to	measuring	healthcare	safety	shall	now	be	described.	1.2.1 Defining	adverse	events		
The	World	Health	Organisation	(WHO)	defines	patient	safety	as:	
“the	prevention	of	errors	and	adverse	effects	to	patients	associated	with	health	care”	
	 28	
To	assess	how	safe	a	process	is	one	must	measure	failure	of	safety,	as	a	denominator	of	
successes.	The	first	obstacle	is	in	defining	the	point	at	which	a	patient	suffers	as	a	result	of	
healthcare	management	or	mismanagement.	The	natural	course	and	progression	of	disease	
adds	complexity	as	patients	may	deteriorate	with	or	without	medical	intervention.	What	
constitutes	direct	harm	caused	by	medical	processes,	rather	than	by	the	disease	itself,	is	not	
simple	to	delineate,	and	can	be	subjective.	Almost	all	interventions	have	a	negative	as	well	
as	positive	consequence,	for	example	surgery	resulting	in	unsightly	scars.	What	is	an	
acceptable	adverse	reaction	for	one	patient	may	not	be	true	for	another,	for	example	
nausea	with	certain	analgesia	medications.		
There	are	sometimes	distinct	errors	of	commission	whereby	the	incorrect	treatment	was	
given,	leading	to	harm,	such	as	medication	overdose.	Added	to	this	is	the	more	difficult	
challenge	of	identifying	patient	harm	due	to	failure	to	recognize	a	disease	pattern	or	act	
appropriately,	the	error	of	omission,	where	a	negative	must	be	proved,	such	as	delay	in	
diagnosis	of	cancer.[3]		
It	is	important	at	this	stage	to	establish	some	key	definitions	to	enable	consistency	of	
dialogue,	as	shown	in	Table	1.1.	
Table	1.1	Key	patient	safety	event	definitions	
Term	 Description	
Adverse	
event	
Incidents	in	which	a	patient	is	unintentionally	harmed	due	to	health	care	management	and	
not	as	a	result	of	the	patient’s	pathology.	[4	5]	
Error	 An	action	or	omission	that	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	patient	harm.	A	term	to	include	
“near	miss”	or	“no	harm”	events	where	patient	harm	was	averted,	or	where	the	incident	
did	not	develop	to	the	point	of	injury.	[6	7]	
Harm	 An	outcome	of	error.	Physical	injury	or	complication	that	requires	either	further	treatment,	
prolonged	hospital	stay,	morbidity	or	mortality.		This	does	not	include	psychological	harm.	
[8]		
Patient	
safety	
incident	
An	event	during	patient	care	that	has	the	potential	to	or	does	cause	injury	or	harm	to	the	
patient.	This	term	groups	both	error	and	adverse	events	[9]	
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The	Donabedian	model	is	a	useful	framework	to	understand	the	various	types	of	
measurement	discussed	in	this	thesis.	The	model,	that	enables	evaluation	of	quality	of	
health	care,	describes	three	characteristics:	structure,	process	and	outcomes.[10	11]	
“Structure”	describes	the	environment	of	care	delivery	such	as	staffing	and	equipment.	
“Process”	applies	to	the	delivery	of	healthcare,	and	“outcomes”	refers	to	the	effects	of	the	
healthcare	on	the	patients.	For	the	purposes	of	safety	measurement,	errors	can	be	viewed	
as	failures	in	processes	of	care.	These	process	failures	may	themselves	be	due	to	structural	
failures,	for	example,	medication	error	due	to	poor	staffing.	Harm	can	viewed	as	a	negative	
outcome,	resulting	from	the	failure	in	the	process	of	care.	An	adverse	event	comprises	a	
harmful	outcome,	leading	from	one	or	many	process	errors.	
There	are	pros	and	cons	to	measuring	an	adverse	event	versus	measuring	an	error.	The	
advantage	of	measuring	adverse	events	is	that	they	are	often	discrete	entities	(such	as	a	
post	operative	bleed)	and	therefore	more	easily	counted.		Even	the	process	of	counting	
these	adverse	events	is	complex	and	will	be	explored	throughout	this	thesis.	It	has	been	
argued	that	incidents	leading	to	harm	are	a	limited	subset	of	a	wider	picture	of	failures	in	
patient	safety.	[12]	The	vast	majority	of	errors	or	process	failures	do	not	lead	to	patient	
injury	because	either	the	magnitude	of	error	was	low,	or	the	problem	was	mitigated.	[13]	As	
aptly	described	in	James	Reason’s	“Swiss	cheese”	model	of	error	causation,	many	layers	of	
defence	in	hospital	must	be	penetrated	through	a	series	of	holes	or	errors	for	an	adverse	
event	to	occur.	[14]	The	only	way	to	truly	prevent	future	injury	is	to	individually	examine	
previous	events	at	a	process	level.	Failure	to	do	this	can	lead	to	false	conclusions	about	the	
cause	of	events	and	prevent	the	creation	of	meaningful	solutions.[12]	If	one	focuses	on	
counting	instances	of	intra-operative	organ	injury,	it	may	be	assumed	that	a	particular	
surgeon	is	technically	unsound.	Whilst	this	may	be	true,	investigators	may	miss	the	systemic	
problems	of	disruptive	theatre	environment,	inadequate	or	faulty	equipment	and	operative	
delay	that	may	lead	to	technical	failure.		
The	measurement	of	errors	is	even	more	challenging	than	measuring	adverse	events.	
Mapping	the	number	of	interactions	a	patient	has	from	the	moment	they	enter	the	hospital	
and	the	number	of	opportunities	for	error	quickly	becomes	an	insurmountable	task.	For	
certain	procedures	process	measures	are	easy	to	define.	In	cardiology	practice	the		“door	to	
balloon	time”	is	a	commonly	used	process	measure.	This	metric	is	defined	as	the	length	of	
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time	taken	for	a	patient	to	have	a	percutaneous	angioplasty	in	the	event	of	an	acute	
coronary	event.	For	other	errors,	such	as	diagnostic	delay,	it	is	much	harder	to	set	
parameters	for	measurement.	Focusing	on	errors	is	a	less	pejorative	approach	as	it	shifts	
emphasis	away	from	performance	(i.e.	final	outcome)	toward	improving	systems	and	this	
negates	some	of	the	undesirable	effects	of	measurement,	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	
However	measuring	error	is	fraught	with	denominator	bias	at	an	even	greater	rate	than	
outcome	measurements	due	to	the	complexity	of	clinical	events	and	standardizing	many	
processes	nationally	is	challenging.	There	is	often	poor	inter-rater	reliability	in	agreeing	
when	an	error	has	occurred	[15]	
This	thesis	will	focus	on	adverse	events,	rather	than	errors,	simply	because	although	they	
are	the	tip	of	the	patient	safety	iceberg,	they	are	perhaps	the	most	important	endpoints-	i.e.	
the	event	at	which	a	patient	is	injured.	Measuring	errors	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	
In	no	way	does	this	imply	that	measuring	and	eliminating	errors	before	harm	is	caused	is	not	
a	useful	approach.	The	analogy	often	used	is	that	if	one	can	find	smoke,	one	can	put	out	or	
prevent	the	fire.	The	counter	premise,	for	the	focus	on	adverse	events	in	this	thesis,	is	that	
if	there	are	large	fires,	they	should	be	extinguished	before	further,	less	damaging	smoke	
signals	are	detected.		
There	are	a	large	proportion	of	adverse	events	already	occurring	in	health	care	and	
therefore,	focusing	on	the	prominent	areas	of	damage	is	an	appropriate	place	to	start	with	
respect	to	measurement.		
This	thesis	will	focus	where	possible	on	surgical	adverse	events	for	two	reasons:	firstly	
because	surgical	adverse	events	are	of	personal	interest,	as	a	surgical	trainee,	and	secondly	
because	surgical	harm	has	the	greatest	potential	for	disastrous	impact	on	patients	and	
therefore	merits	closer	inspection.[16]	A	study,	by	Hogan	and	colleagues	that	examined	
preventable	death	in	hospitals	suggested	that	patients	who	experienced	a	problem	in	care	
were	significantly	more	likely	to	be	admitted	under	surgical	specialties	as	an	elective	
admission	and	there	were	more	avoidable	deaths	detected	in	surgical	patients	than	other	
specialties.	[17]	
In	surgery	negative	post-operative	outcomes	are	more	clearly	defined	as	being	adverse	
events.		Elective	patients	may	enter	hospital	“well”	and	can	potentially	be	harmed	by	an	
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operation.	This	increases	the	impetus	for	understanding	how	to	measure	and	prevent	these	
adverse	events.	Chapters	3	and	5	will	focus	on	these	events.	
Mortality	is	the	most	definitive	end	point	of	all,	although,	as	will	be	discussed	further,	
determining	the	burden	of	avoidable	death	due	to	patient	safety	incidents	in	not	
straightforward.	Surgical	adverse	events	and	mortality	caused	by	adverse	events	will	be	
explored	in	this	thesis	in	chapter	7.	1.2.2 Setting	safety	standards	
Some	adverse	events	are	potentially	easier	to	identify,	for	example	in-hospital	pressure	
sores	that	develop	as	a	result	of	poorly	positioned,	vulnerable	patients	in	hospital.		Pressure	
sores	are	recognized	as	preventable	harm	arising	from	incidents	of	hospital	care	
omission.[18]For	other	events,	for	example	long-term	post-operative	outcomes	such	as	
hernia	recurrence,	or	mortality	from	sepsis	in	elderly	co-morbid	patients,	it	is	more	difficult	
to	identify	true	lapses	in	safety	or	healthcare	related	harm.	One	way	to	measure	safety	is	to	
formalize	standards	below	which	if	practice	falls,	then	patients	have	been	mistreated.	This	
subject	area	is	dealt	with	in	more	detail	in	chapter	7	where,	when	assessing	avoidable	death	
and	quality	of	care,	the	question:	“would	this	harm	have	occurred	if	an	acceptable	level	of	
care	had	been	delivered”	is	asked	to	establish	whether	an	adverse	event	has	occurred.		
A	set	standard	is	appropriate	when	it	is	specialty	specific,	and	agreed	by	an	established	
expert	body	of	peers,	who	actively	practice	in	the	field.	Since	1934	cardiothoracic	surgeons	
in	the	United	Kingdom	(UK),	through	the	Society	for	Cardiothoracic	Surgery,	have	collected	
data	for	all	cardiothoracic	procedures	performed	and	since	2005	have	endeavoured	to	
ensure	standards	are	set	and	met	through	public	disclosure	of	outcomes	and	professional	
regulation.	There	is	a	pre-set	acceptable	complication	or	mortality	rate	for	specific	
procedures	that	take	into	account	the	risk	of	the	procedure.	[19]	Set	standards	are	
advantageous	in	surgery	as	it	is	often	not	possible	to	have	a	completely	harm	free	
intervention	for	every	patient	and	therefore	a	threshold	is	set	that	is	agreed	by	the	body	of	
experts.	One	disadvantage	is	that	as	medical	science	progresses,	for	many	diseases	the	bar	
for	the	acceptable	standard	of	care	rises.	As	a	medical	community	this	creates	the	
opportunity	to	identify	new	instances	of	error	and	potential	patient	harm	that	can	be	
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mitigated.		However	it	does	mean	that	contemporaneous	patient	safety	measures	are	
anachronistic	if	used	retrospectively.	1.2.3 Choosing	denominators	for	safety	measurement	
To	observe	the	rate	or	proportion	of	harm	or	the	percentage	of	patients	experiencing	
adverse	events,	one	must	quantify	the	population	that	is	at	risk	as	well	as	the	time	period	
for	exposure.[20]	When	these	denominators	are	not	well	established	it	introduces	bias	
when	comparing	the	relative	safety	of	hospitals	or	healthcare	systems.		For	rare	events,	one	
can	consider	the	entire	population	at	risk	such	as	every	surgical	patient	in	the	hospital	over	
a	year	when	measuring	wrong	site	surgery.	For	more	frequent	events	such	as	medication	
errors,	the	“error	rate”	is	more	complex	to	determine.	Professor	Charles	Vincent	
summarized	this	problem:	
“A	patient	is	given	10	different	drug	doses	per	day,	stays	in	hospital	for	ten	days	and	
sustains	one	adverse	drug	event	form	an	overdose.	You	could	say,	well	that’s	100	doses	
over	the	admission,	that’s	a	rate	of	1%.	Certainly	serious,	but	it	doesn’t	look	too	bad.	
However	calculate	by	the	day	and	the	rate	is	10%,	and	by	the	admission	the	average	
becomes	100%.	Suddenly	what	looks	like	a	technical	issue	for	statisticians	takes	on	new	
life.”	[21]	
A	pertinent	question	to	add	to	this	example	is:	was	the	patient	harmed	by	this	event?	One	
patient	could	sustain	ten	drug	errors	but	suffer	no	harm	in	the	ten	days,	and	have	a	10%	
error	rate,	whilst	a	second	patient	suffers	only	one	drug	error,	but	has	an	anaphylactic	
reaction,	yet	is	measured	as	having	a	1%	error	rate.		
Certainly	for	clinicians,	and	patients	alike	events	where	patients	are	harmed	warrant	greater	
inspection	and	the	second	patient	may	certainly	feel	they	have	experienced	less	“safe”	care,	
if	they	require	emergency	treatment	for	an	error.	Alternatively	if	viewing	the	incidents	
through	the	lens	of	a	systems	approach	then	more	process	failures	occurred	for	the	first	
patient	and	their	care	was	less	“safe”.	 	
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Table	1.2:	Prospective	methods	for	measuring	errors	
Measurement	
Method	
Focus	of	
measurement	
Examples	 Pros	 Cons	
Direct	
observation	of	
selected	care	
processes	
Errors	and	
adverse	events	
NHS	Thermometer	
Observation	of	
medical	rounds	[22]	
Trials	assessing	
complication	rates	
Focused,	accurate.	
Data	reliable	
Can	pick	up	active	
errors	
Can	track	train	of	
events	and	
consequences	[23]	
Expensive	
Difficult	to	reproduce	
in	different	settings	
Prone	to	Hawthorne	
effect	
Assessor	dependent	
Difficult	to	power	
studies	for	rare	
events	
Voluntary	
reporting	
systems	
Errors	and	
adverse	events	
National	Reporting	
and	Learning	
System	
	
National	
participation	(UK)	
Large	volume	of	data	
Staff	led		
	
Can’t	use	for	detailed	
analysis	
Many	adverse	events	
not	reported	
Incidence	of	reports	
reflects	hospital	
culture	rather	than	
true	incidence	of	
harm	
Data	inaccuracy		
Mandatory	
reporting	
systems	
Adverse	events	 Never	events	
reporting	
Hospital	Acquired	
Infections	
Focussed,	good	for	
detecting	rare	events	
Data	more	reliable	as	
penalties	for	not	
reporting	
Can	track	
improvement	over	
time	
Subject	to	gaming	as	
high	profile	reports	
cause	negative	
response	for	hospital	
outliers	
Doesn’t	capture	
process/	errors,	only	
adverse	events	
Only	suitable	for	
selected	discrete	
events.	
Patient	reported	
outcomes	
Patient	
experience,	
adverse	events	
Patient	reported	
outcome	measures	
for	hip	
replacement,	knee	
replacement	and	
inguinal	hernia	
repair.	[24]	
Detect	adverse	
events	not	picked	up	
through	other	
methods.	
Detect	clinically	
meaningful	adverse	
events,	experienced	
by	patients.	[25]	
Focused	
Prone	to	non-
responder	bias	due	to	
poor	patient	
participation		
Emergency	
admissions	not	
covered	[26]	
Only	suitable	for	
selected	adverse	
events	which	patients	
understand	and	
report.	
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Table	1.3	Retrospective	methods	for	measuring	errors	(part	1)	
Measurement	
Method	
Focus	of	
measurement	
Examples	 Pros	 Cons	
Medical	case	
note	review	
Errors	and	
adverse	
events	
Global	trigger	tool	
PRISM	trial	
Detailed	and	thorough	
Can	examine	process	
and	outcome	
Expensive,	Time	
consuming	
Poor	inter-rater	
reliability	
Hospital	
database	
analysis	
Adverse	
events	
Surgical	outcome	
reporting	[27]	
Standardised	
Hospital	Mortality	
Index	
Hospital	
Standardised	
Mortality	Ratio	
Patient	Safety	
Indicators	(Agency	
for	Healthcare	
Research	and	
Quality)	
Not	subject	to	
assessor	bias	
Relatively	inexpensive	
Allows	longitudinal	
view	of	safety	
Allows	for	case	mix	
variation	
Allows	inter-hospital	
comparison	
Prevents	type	II	errors	
due	to	large	sample	
size	
	
Concern	over	data	
accuracy	and	reliability	
of	coding	
Doesn’t	capture	
process/	errors,	only	
adverse	events	
True	case	mix	
adjustment	difficult	to	
achieve	as	not	all	patient	
demographics	recorded	
Mortality	ratios:	can	
detect	higher	than	
expected	death	rate	but	
not	whether	death	was	
due	to	adverse	
events/avoidable	
Lower	face	validity	of	
results,	as	clinical	staff	
not	involved	in	data	
capture.	
Litigation	claim	
analysis	
Adverse	
events	
NHS	Litigation	
authority	data	
Detects	adverse	
events	of	importance	
to	patients	
Data	collected	is	
complete	and	
accurate	
Provides	perspectives	
from	different	parties	
(legal,	administrative,	
clinical,	patient)	[7]	
Does	not	capture	all	
adverse	events,	only	
events	patients	detect.	
Selected	patient	groups,	
bias	in	population	
Claims	reflect	hospital	
culture	rather	than	
safety	profile	
Subject	to	hindsight	bias	
Local	clinical	
surveillance[28]	
Errors	and	
adverse	
events	
Local	audit	
Morbidity	and	
Mortality	
meetings	
Staff	led,	self	
examination	of	
processes	of	care	and	
adverse	events:	can	
lead	directly	to	change	
in	practice	
Mandated	by	
accrediting	groups	and	
therefore	routinely	
carried	out	
Subject	to	hindsight	bias	
[29]	
Reporting	bias	
No	external	
accountability	for	
change	[7]	
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Table	1.4	Retrospective	methods	for	measuring	errors	(part	2)	
Measurement	
Method	
Focus	of	
measurement	
Examples	 Pros	 Cons	
National	audit	 Adverse	
events	
National	
Confidential	
Enquiry	into	
Patient	Outcomes	
and	Death	
(NCEPOD)	
Maternal	and	child	
death	reviews:	
Centre	for	
Maternal	and	Child	
Enquiries	(CMACE)	
Focussed	measurement	
of	specific	adverse	
events	
Data	accurate	and	
reliable	
National,	standardised	
data	collection	
Expensive	and	time	
consuming,	requires	
expert	review	
Does	not	detect	all	
adverse	events	or	
errors.	
Subject	to	hindsight	bias	
National,	
clinician	
reported	
outcome	
reports	
Adverse	
events	
National	Bowel	
Cancer	Audit	
Program	(NBOCAP)	
	
Focussed	measurement	
of	specific	adverse	
events	
Data	accurate	and	
reliable	
National,	standardised	
data	collection	
Adjusts	for	case	mix	
variation	
Concern	over	data	
accuracy	and	reliability	
of	coding	
Detect	complications,	
not	necessarily	caused	
by	error.	
Doesn’t	capture	
process/	errors,	only	
adverse	events	
Reliant	on	voluntary	
data	submission.	
	
	
	1.2.4 Data	collection	challenges	
There	are	numerous	methods	for	measuring	harm;	which	are	detailed	later	on	in	this	
chapter.	There	is	no	one	perfect	measure	and	each	metric	has	advantages	and	
disadvantages.	Safety	data	are	notoriously	difficult	to	collect.	(Tables	1.2-1.4)		Prospective	
methods	are	costly,	as	projects	require	additional	resources	employing	observers	to	assess	
for	outcomes	that	may	or	may	not	occur.	Longitudinal	studies	of	this	nature	can	be	difficult	
to	power	especially	if	rare,	but	serious	events	are	being	focused	upon.	These	studies	are	
subject	to	the	Hawthorne	effect,	whereby	in	this	context	the	care	processes	become	safer	
as	a	result	of	being	observed.[30]		
Retrospective	methods	such	as	case	note	review	have	to	allow	for	inconsistency	in	
reviewers’	opinions,	the	skewing	of	results	due	to	hindsight	bias,	and	the	voluminous,	
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disorganized,	and	sometimes	incomprehensible,	nature	of	medical	notes.	This	is	particularly	
applicable	within	NHS	hospitals	where	in	the	majority	of	cases	notes	are	hand	written.	
Improving	methods	for	case	note	review	will	be	an	area	of	experimentation	in	this	thesis.	
Voluntary	reporting	data	are	subject	to	non-responder	bias,	but	despite	this	there	are	
millions	of	reports	a	year,	many	involving	staff	complaints	rather	than	patient	harm.	Data	
inaccuracy	and	inappropriate	use	of	reporting	data	will	be	a	topic	of	investigation	within	this	
thesis.	
Routinely	coded	data	have	the	advantage	of	being	prospective	and	less	subject	to	
assessment	bias,	however	incomplete	data	(leading	to	unknown	case-mix	variation),	data	
inaccuracy,	and	fears	over	reliability	of	coding	mean	that	they	are	the	topic	of	debate	when	
used	to	understand	incidence	of	harm.[31]	In	addition	the	dataset	is	not	specifically	
designed	to	collect	safety	data.	The	positive	aspect	is	the	vast	quantities	of	data	available	to	
use,	so	sample	size	is	not	a	hindrance,	although	for	rare	events	this	remains	an	issue.	
National	audit,	such	as	the	National	Confidential	Enquiry	into	Patient	Outcome	and	Death,	is	
useful	as	in	depth	expert	review	processes	are	used	that	take	a	broad	view	of	events,	
however	these	are	inevitably	prone	to	hindsight	bias,	are	assessor	dependent,	costly	and	
time	consuming.	Serious	event	analysis,	at	a	hospital	level,	is	crucial	for	understanding	why	
adverse	events	such	as	wrong	site	surgery	take	place.	A	thorough	root	cause	analysis	that	
takes	into	account	written	records,	staff	reports	and	clinical	team	review	is	an	excellent	
method	for	comprehending	errors	leading	to	harm	and	the	process	can	often	lead	to	
simultaneous	problem	solving.	However	these	analyses	can	be	extremely	onerous	and	are	
site,	team	and	event	specific,	reducing	the	potential	for	scalable	interpretations	of	incidents.	
Another	problem	for	measurement	in	general	is	that	hospital	systems	are	often	flooded	
with	safety	data	from	multiple	sources	but	these	data	are	difficult	to	interpret	meaningfully	
and	in	a	coordinated	fashion.	The	report	into	the	Bristol	Inquiry	found	that	mortality	after	
paediatric	cardiac	surgery	was	twice	as	high	compared	with	other	hospitals.	Experts	noted	
that	there	were	plenty	of	data	available,	but	these	data	were	not	utilized	to	detect	safety	
gaps	and	prevent	harm.	[21	32]	
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1.2.5 Data	interpretation	challenges	
Within	any	field	there	will	be	variation	in	outcomes	and	if	one	individual,	department	or	
hospital	is	a	negative	or	positive	outlier,	statistically	their	results	will	regress	towards	the	
mean	in	subsequent	years.	Regression	toward	the	mean	is	a	statistical	phenomenon	
whereby	if	a	variable	is	extreme	on	its	first	measurement	it	will	tend	to	be	closer	to	the	
average	when	it	is	measured	a	second	time	and	vice	versa.[33]	Using	a	yardstick	either	
annually	or	over	a	short	time	frame	gives	the	potential	for	hospital	regulators	to	use	
punitive	measures	for	results	that	may	have	occurred	through	chance	alone.	[34]		
Another	factor	is	that	case	mixes	vary	regionally	and	temporally.	For	rare	events	such	as	
death	a	patient	with	multiple	comorbidities	who	dies,	despite	a	clinician’s	best	efforts,	can	
make	a	big	impact	on	safety	rankings.	Heterogeneity	in	patient	populations	is	a	common	
factor	influencing	mortality	rates.	When	understanding	case	mix,	the	known,	and	
measurable	variables	affecting	the	outcome	of	interest	(that	are	available),	such	as	age	or	
existing	comorbidities	are	adjusted	for	in	a	statistical	model.	However	it	is	not	always	the	
case	that	every	patient	variable	is	known	or	measured	and	therefore	models	can	vary	in	
their	accuracy.	[35]	
There	are	statistical	methods	to	overcome	this.	In	cardiothoracic	surgery	in	the	UK	the	
surgeons	compare	individual	teams’	risk	adjusted	mortality	data	against	a	national	
standards.	[19]	They	define	divergence	from	standards	statistically	by	setting	low-level	
outlier	confidence	intervals	at	95%	and	99%	using	funnel	plots.	The	use	of	funnel	plots	
attempts	to	reduce	the	chance	of	poor	results	being	due	to	chance	alone	and	correct	for	
over	dispersion	due	to	case	mix	variation.	[36	37]		Over	dispersions	where	there	is	greater	
variability	in	a	data	set	than	would	be	expected	based	on	the	given	statistical	model.		
Funnel	plots	help	in	this	respect,	in	two	senses.	They	can	help	to	understand	whether	a	
mortality	rate	is	too	high	or	not.	For	example	an	observed	mortality	index	(i.e.	a	mortality	
rate	with	adjustment	for	case	mix)	can	be	plotted	on	a	funnel	plot	against	the	expected	
mortality	index	with	control	limits	forming	a	funnel	around	the	target	outcome,	(in	this	
example	it	would	be	1).	Secondly	they	can	provide	a	visual	representation	of	the	distribution	
of	the	data	to	clearly	identify	outliers.	If	the	data	are	too	over	dispersed,	(and	therefore	the	
model	is	perhaps	not	correct	for	population)	this	too	is	visually	evident,	and	would	prompt	a	
change	in	statistical	methods.	
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A	concern	is	incomplete	or	misleading	data	collection	processes	that	can	convey	overly	
negative	or	positive	results	with	inappropriate	sequelae.	Often	when	a	particular	indicator	
or	target	is	placed	under	surveillance	the	detected	“incidence”	increases.	[38]	As	healthcare	
professionals	become	alerted	to	incidents	of	interest	the	reported	rate	of	the	incident	is	
merely	more	accurate	but	can	represent	a	relative	increase	in	rate.	It	would	be	
inappropriate	to	react	negatively	to	the	consequences	of	a	unit	merely	getting	better	at	
measuring	their	own	harm.	
Even	if	data	are	accurate,	the	variable	being	measured	can	be	inappropriate	and	does	not	
actually	convey	an	unsafe	process.	Then	the	focus	can	be	to	improve	the	value	of	this	
variable;	which	does	not	address	the	safety	issue.		As	the	sociologist	William	Cameron	
stated:	
“Not	everything	that	can	be	counted	counts,	and	not	everything	that	counts	can	be	
counted.”	[39]	
For	example	readmission	of	patients	within	28	days	of	discharge	is	used	as	a	surrogate	
patient	safety	measure	of	unsafe	discharge,	failure	of	diagnosis	or	failure	of	management.	
This	may	be	appropriate	in	certain	circumstances	however	not	all	readmissions	are	
preventable	and	using	readmission	rates	as	an	indicator	of	safe	discharge	may	be	a	faulty	
marker.	[40]	Indeed	reducing	readmission	rates	may	even	be	counter-productive,	in	
instances	when	readmission	is	the	safest	course	of	action.	Poorly	applied	safety	
measurements	have	the	potential	to	negatively	impact	decision	making	and	practice	in	
healthcare	and	this	needs	to	be	considered.	1.2.6 Negative	effects	of	safety	measurement	
There	are	potential	negative	repercussions	resulting	from	measuring	patient	safety.		These	
relate	to	misuse	of	data,	poor	interpretation	of	results	and	also	the	unintended	changes	in	
behaviour	resulting	from	measurement.		
Ranking	hospitals	and	published	safety	data	is	of	particular	concern	in	surgical	fields	for	
elective	work,	where	patients	are	chosen	in	advance	and	national	or	international	
reputation	is	important	to	allow	units	to	stay	funded	and	retain	patient	confidence.	[41]		
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This	may	lead	to	deleterious	consequences	such	as	staff	“gaming”	the	system,	or	
manipulating	the	rules	of	the	system	to	achieve	the	desired	safety	profile.	Healthcare	
professionals	may	select	only	low	risk	patient	populations	for	elective	treatment,	to	ensure	
decreased	numbers	of	complications,	as	patients,	for	example	with	fewer	comorbidities	
such	as	diabetes	are	less	likely	to	suffer	post	operative	infections.	Surgeons	may	engage	in	
risk-averse	behaviour	such	as	not	allowing	trainees	to	learn	in	theatres,	and	not	embracing	
innovation.[42	43]	
A	widely	publicized	example	of	gaming	with	mortality	data	is	the	controversy	over	the	
hospital	standardised	mortality	ratios	(HSMRs).	These	mortality	ratios	are	used	to	compare	
hospitals	and	rely	on	diagnostic	codes	applied	for	a	patient’s	inpatient	stay.		It	is	possible	to	
improve	HSMRs,	although	no	hospital	has	been	conclusively	proved	to	be	deliberately	doing	
this,	by	applying	palliative	codes	to	patient	deaths,	which	are	then	not	taken	into	account,	
giving	the	appearance	that	the	hospital	has	fewer	deaths	than	expected.	[44]	
Even	if	data	are	accurate,	the	metric	is	valid,	the	risk	adjustment	is	sound	and	the	result	
truly	shows	unsafe	processes	there	is	still	danger	in	organizations	responding	by	punishing	
individuals,	which	is	discussed	further	in	the	next	section.	Rather	than	this	improving	safety	
profiles,	it	can	actually	increase	error	rates	by	preventing	further	error	disclosure	or	failing	
to	assess	and	correct	entrenched	system	failures.	James	Reason	described	this	response	as	
the	“person	approach”	to	human	error:	
“Blaming	individuals	is	emotionally	more	satisfying	than	targeting	institutions.	People	are	
viewed	as	free	agents	capable	of	choosing	between	safe	and	unsafe	modes	of	behaviour.	If	
something	goes	wrong,	it	seems	obvious	that	an	individual	(or	group	of	individuals)	must	
have	been	responsible.	Seeking	as	far	as	possible	to	uncouple	a	person's	unsafe	acts	from	
any	institutional	responsibility	is	clearly	in	the	interests	of	managers.	It	is	also	legally	more	
convenient,	at	least	in	Britain.”	[45]	
Reason	advocates	the	“systems	approach”	to	error	that	appreciates	the	fallibility	of	human	
operators	and	seeks	to	safeguard	processes	by	assessing	where	areas	are	error	prone	and	
design	out	faults.	The	balance	must	be	tilted	towards	organizational	learning	rather	than	
individual	punishment.	
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1.2.7 Cultural	barriers	to	measurement	
Despite	rigorous	attempts	to	ensure	fairness	the	potential	for	negative	effects	of	
measurement	remain	a	concern	for	many	healthcare	professionals	and	are	one	of	the	key	
cultural	barriers	to	safety	assessment.	[46]		
One	of	the	founders	of	the	American	College	of	Surgeons,	Ernest	Codman	created	the	End	
Result	Hospital	in	1911	in	a	conscientious	attempt	to	examine	and	learn	from	healthcare	
errors.	His	transparency	and	enthusiasm	for	quality	led	to	widespread	professional	rejection	
by	his	peers	and	the	public.	[47]	This	response	is	repeated	throughout	history.	Although	
healthcare	professionals,	managers	and	commissioners	would	like	to	be	reassured	that	
hospitals	and	community	practices	are	safe,	it	is	an	extra	step	to	probe	for	failures	in	care.	
To	improve,	first	one	must	measure	where	the	gaps	in	safety	are.	
There	are	cultural	reasons	that	make	measuring	safety	difficult	in	healthcare.	These	can	be	
broadly	divided	into:	cultural	barriers	to	measurement	and	lack	of	facilitators	to	
measurement.	
The	biggest	barrier	is	the	negative	staff	impression	of	introducing	new	safety	assessments.	
Staff	may	view	safety	measurement	as	time	consuming,	carrying	the	potential	for	punitive	
consequences	and	showing	limited	rewards.	These	views	encompass	measuring	safety,	
compliance	with	new	safety	practice	and	evaluation	of	practice.	As	an	example	the	World	
Health	Organisation	Surgical	safety	checklist	has	been	empirically	proven	to	reduce	adverse	
events	in	the	operating	theatre,	with	acknowledged	limitations.[48]	Despite	the	evidence,	
and	great	efforts	to	implement	the	checklist	into	theatres	globally,	there	is	varied	success	
and	participation,	ranging	from	12%	to	100%[49]	A	systematic	review	by	Bergs	and	
colleagues	found	that	staff	often	expressed	concerns	about	legal	implications	of	checklist	
use,	its	time	consumption,	and	subsequent	reduction	of	theatre	efficiency.[50]	
The	fear	of	punishment	and	stigmatism	as	a	result	of	identifying	safety	failures	has	been	
alluded	to	earlier.	[51]	The	possible	negative	outcomes	include	professional,	legal	and	
personal	consequences.	When	errors	are	detected,	healthcare	professionals	can	feel	
blamed	by	their	peers,	can	be	sued	by	their	patients	and	lose	confidence	in	their	decision-
making.	This	has	been	shown	to	produce	a	defensive	response	from	individuals	and	
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organizations	including	ordering	unnecessary	imaging	studies,	avoiding	procedures	that	are	
more	prone	to	complications	and	not	disclosing	errors.	[52-54]		
There	is	also	the	perceived	futility	of	measurement	that	reveals	poor	performance	without	
demonstrating	how	practice	can	be	improved.		Focusing	on	improving	the	outcome	data	
and	manipulating	statistics	without	implementing	meaningful	quality	improvement	
programs	is	a	potential	response	to	a	negative	safety	report.	[55	56]	More	intrinsic	is	the	
conviction	that	because	harming	patients	is	the	antithesis	of	the	medical	profession	that	
adverse	events	are	unpardonable	failures.		A	study	by	Pinto	and	colleagues,	assessing	
surgeons	who	had	been	involved	in	a	major	complication	showed	that	a	third	of	those	
assessed	reported	clinically	concerning	traumatic	stress	for	a	month	after	the	incident.[57]	
Diagnosis	and	management	decisions	can	sometimes	be	a	“best	judgment”	call	on	the	basis	
of	equivocal	evidence.	Measuring	diagnostic	inaccuracy	can	therefore	be	construed	as	a	
personal	attack.	This	doctrine	prevents	open	discussion	and	compromises	measurement	of	
safety	and	learning	from	mistakes.	However	allowing	doctors	and	nurses	to	explore	why	
certain	decisions	were	reached	and	how	to	improve	decision-making	will	ultimately	improve	
resilience	in	the	profession.	[58]	
To	create	an	environment	where	teams	are	actively	focused	on	measuring	safety	requires	
leadership	and	coordination.	Resistance	is	often	found	at	a	senior	clinician	level.[59]The	
perceived	irrelevance	of	some	safety	evaluations	and	the	differing	motives	between	
management	and	clinicians	for	their	use	cause	non-compliance	or	resentment	towards	data	
collection.[50]	For	a	while	in	the	NHS,	despite	safety	being	recognized	as	a	priority,	it	was	
not	a	subject	of	health	policy	precedence	until	‘An	Organization	with	a	Memory’	was	
published	in	2000	(and	is	described	later	in	this	chapter).[60]	From	this	important	report	the	
impetus	for	cultural	change	was	created.	Clinical	leaders	need	further	encouragement	to	
facilitate	the	process	so	that	safety	evaluation	becomes	embedded	in	UK	hospitals.	
1.3 METHODS	FOR	MEASURING	ADVERSE	EVENTS	
Eight	original	methods	for	measuring	adverse	events	have	been	described	broadly	by	
Thomas	and	Petersen	(2003)	[7].	Their	paper	classified	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	
of:		Morbidity	and	mortality	conferences,	malpractice	claims	analysis,	administrative	data	
analysis,	chart	review,	electronic	record	review,	observation	of	care	and	clinical	surveillance.	
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Since	this	paper	further	methods	of	measurement	have	been	developed	and	therefore	to	
aid	delineation	of	methods	for	this	thesis,	the	classification	has	been	modified	and	
expanded	in	Tables	1.2,	1.3,	1.4.	
Different	methods	have	different	aims,	either	to	capture	incidence	of	harm	or	to	capture	
the	root	cause	of	the	problem	[6]	
The	Health	Foundation	produced	a	thorough	review	of	safety	measurement:	‘The	
measurement	and	monitoring	of	safety’.	[61]	A	key	conclusion	was	that	there	was	no	single	
method	sufficient	to	measure	patient	safety.	Retrospective,	prospective	and	predictive	
measures	are	all	required	to	learn	from	error	and	prevent	future,	adverse	events.	Most	
methods	are	prone	to	some	kind	of	bias.	The	field	of	patient	safety	is	relatively	new.	Initial	
initiatives	focused	on	care	improvement	projects	and	changing	safety	culture	from	
individual	blame	to	system	thinking.	With	increased	government,	public	and	professional	
focus	on	patient	safety,	the	emphasis	is	shifting	to	empirical	measurement,	but	this	is	in	its	
infancy	
1.4 CURRENT	HEALTH	POLICY	CONTEXT	FOR	IMPROVING	MEASUREMENT	OF	
ADVERSE	EVENTS	IN	THE	UK	
Patient	safety	policy	in	the	NHS	has	rapidly	evolved	during	the	21st	century	in	England.	The	
cornerstone	of	development	was	with	the	key	health	policy	document:	An	organisation	with	
a	memory	published	by	the	Chief	Medical	Officer	Sir	Liam	Donaldson	in	2000.	[60]	In	this	
seminal	report	the	agenda	for	the	next	few	decades	was	set	out	with	a	focus	on	clinical	
governance,	increasing	awareness	of	failures	in	care	and	a	willingness	to	learn	from	these	
failures	and	share	solutions	to	prevent	mistakes	being	repeated.	Sir	Liam	emphasized	
modernising	the	approach	to	learning	and	made	four	recommendations	for	development,	
quoted	below:	
“The	NHS	needs	to	develop:	
• Unified	mechanisms	for	reporting	and	analysis	when	things	go	wrong;	
• A	more	open	culture,	in	which	errors	or	service	failures	can	be	reported	and	
discussed;	
• Mechanisms	for	ensuring	that,	where	lessons	are	identified,	the	necessary	changes	
are	put	into	practice;	
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• A	much	wider	appreciation	of	the	value	of	the	system	approach	in	preventing,	
analysing	and	learning	from	errors.”	
	
Subsequent	to	this	the	National	Patient	Safety	Agency	(NPSA)	was	created	as	a	quasi-
autonomous,	non-governmental,	organization	to	fulfil	the	above	aims	and	one	key	
achievement	was	the	establishment	of	the	National	Reporting	and	Learning	System	(NRLS)	
in	2003.	This	is	a	national	reporting	system	designed	to	facilitate	voluntary	reporting	by	staff	
of	errors	and	adverse	events	witnessed	in	hospitals.	This	system	has	remained	a	
cornerstone	of	patient	safety	learning	and	measurement	in	the	UK,	and	thus	forms	the	basis	
of	focus	for	this	thesis.	A	background	to	the	NRLS	shall	be	detailed	in	the	next	chapter.	
The	creation	of	the	NPSA	was	a	catalyst	for	a	larger	number	of	national	safety	initiatives	as	
shown	in	Figure	1.1.	Outcome	assessment	reached	the	foreground	of	public	consciousness	
with	the	publication	of	the	first	Dr	Foster	‘Hospital	Guide’	in	2001.	[62]	This	was	a	book,	
accessible	to	the	public	that	independently	detailed	individual	hospital	performance,	
particular	mortality	rates,	using	the	Hospital	Standardised	Mortality	Ratio	(HSMR)	
developed	by	Professor	Brian	Jarman.	The	HSMR,	as	discussed	earlier,	adjusts	for	variations	
in	patient	populations,	so	that	hospitals	in	regions	where,	for	example	there	is	more	
cardiovascular	disease	the	mortality	rate	would	be	expected	to	be	higher,	and	so	the	HSMR	
adjusts	for	this.	The	results	were	used	to	display	extreme	outliers	rather	than	ranking	
hospitals.	Despite	fears	of	data	accuracy	and	the	potential	negative	sequelae	of	league	
tables,	these	data	publication	paved	the	way	for	further	independent	assessment	of	hospital	
quality	and	safety	measurement.		
The	UK	Health	Foundation	also	began	to	address	safety	at	an	organisational	level	with	the	
Safer	Patients	Initiative	in	2004	focusing	on	improvement	of	mortality,	adverse	events,	such	
as	ventilator-assisted	pneumonia,	methicillin-resistant	Staphylococcus	aureus	(MRSA)	
infection,	surgical	site	infection	and	a	range	of	other	specific	harm	areas.	[63]	The	project	
was	shown	to	improve	performance	in	monitoring	vital	signs	in	hospitals,	but	for	most	other	
measures	and	outcomes	there	was	no	measurable	benefit	of	the	Safer	Patient	Initiative.	
[64]	As	patient	safety	has	evolved	over	the	decade	this	theme	of	difficulty	in	proving	the	
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measurable	benefit	of	initiatives	has	recurred.	This	was	identified	to	be	due	to	challenges	in	
measurement	of	complex	care	processes.		
The	review	High	quality	care	for	all	from	the	Health	Minister	Lord	Darzi	in	2008	focussed	on	
setting	standards	and	indicators	for	quality	and	safety	in	healthcare	with	an	emphasis	on	
measurement,	introducing	indicators	for	comparison	across	hospitals.	From	this	report,	a	
year	later,	certain	financial	incentives	were	created	that	hospitals	could	apply	for,	provided	
they	successfully	performed	well	against	self	selected	metrics.	This	scheme:	the	
Commissioning	for	Quality	and	Innovation	(CQUIN)	payment	framework;	allowed	hospitals	
to	choose	safety	targets	to	focus	on	with	compensation	for	good	performance,	and	for	
further	targets	to	be	developed	as	care	improved.	[65]	Particularly,	as	is	the	case	with	
venous	thromboembolism	(VTE)	prophylaxis,	financially	driven	schemes	have	a	high	profile	
and	faster	adoption	than	research	led	initiatives.	
Patient	Reported	Outcome	Measures	(PROMs)	began	to	be	collected	nationally,	which	
although	give	a	composite	score	based	mostly	on	quality	of	life	and	patient	experience,	ask	
a	few	key	questions	regarding	adverse	events	such	as	allergy,	infection	and	re-operation.	
[24]		
With	the	coalition	government	in	2010	the	white	paper:	Equity	and	Excellence:	Liberating	
the	NHS	was	published,	and	one	of	its	leading	statements	was	a	commitment	to:	“relentless	
focus	on	clinical	outcomes”.		[66]	The	creation	of	the	NHS	Outcomes	Framework	spelled	out	
clear	outcomes	of	interest	including	safety	outcomes.	Although	the	methods	for	measuring	
these	markers	of	safety	are	still	challenging,	the	government	shifted	the	focus	from	process	
targets	to	clinical	outcomes.		
The	NHS	Safety	Thermometer	program	chose	four	simple	measures	of	harm	for	data	
collection:	falls,	VTE,	catheter	associated	urinary	tract	infection	(UTI)	and	pressure	ulcers.	A	
CQUIN	payment	was	attached	to	the	measurement	and	reduction	of	these	events.	The	aim	
was	to	provide	monthly	data	on	the	prevalence	and	incidence	of	these	harms	using	a	low	
cost,	efficient	method.	Whilst	helpful,	as	is	the	case	with	many	safety	measurements,	the	
data	are	not	sufficiently	robust	to	allow	comparisons	between	hospitals	or	teams,	however	
the	focus	on	single	measurable	safety	events	was	a	significant	step	forward	in	refining	
measurement	methodology.	[67]		
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From	2010	the	Mid	Staffordshire	Hospital	Inquiry	was	launched	and	as	a	result	of	the	inquiry	
report	published	in	2013	by	Sir	Robert	Francis	the	NHS	was	confronted	with	evidence	of	
systemic	poor	quality	and	unsafe	care.	[68]	Some	of	the	causes	of	the	failings	included	poor	
methods	of	measuring	safety	standards,	and	standards	that	did	not	focus	on	the	direct	
effect	to	patients,	and	a	failure	of	communication	between	many	agencies	of	concerns	
regarding	care.	His	recommendations	included	setting	further	standards	(29	in	total),	with	
an	evidence-based	means	of	showing	compliance	and	accountability	from	staff	and	
organisations	for	standards	set.	[69]	
From	this	inquiry,	in	August	of	2013	Don	Berwick	published	a	review:	“A	promise	to	learn-	a	
commitment	to	act”	in	which	the	lessons	learned	from	Mid	Staffordshire	were	distilled.	[70]	
There	was	a	particular	focus	on	patient	safety,	with	recommendations	of	removing	a	blame	
culture,	focussing	on	system	failures	and	learning	from	error	in	a	transparent	environment.	
One	of	the	recommendations	was	for	safety	measurement,	and	described	the	situation	thus	
in	Section	VII:	
“Most	health	care	organisations	at	present	have	very	little	capacity	to	analyse,	monitor	or	
learn	from	safety	and	quality	information.	This	gap	is	costly	and	should	be	closed”	
The	emphasis	was	placed	on	local	leaders	understanding	local	problems	and	detecting	early	
warning	signals	of	safety	crisis,	such	as	mortality	measurement	and	local	incident	reporting.	
At	the	same	time	as	the	Francis	report,	in	response	to	mortality	outliers	Sir	Bruce	Keogh,	the	
NHS	Medical	Director	for	England	began	an	investigation	of	14	hospital	trusts.	[71]	These	
hospitals	were	detected	as	being	outliers	for	two	consecutive	years	based	on	either	the	
HSMR	or	a	newer	metric	the	Summary	Hospital-Level	Mortality	Indicator	(SHMI).	Both	of	
these	indicators	shall	be	compared	in	a	later	chapter.	Whilst	mortality	statistics	were	seen	
by	some	as	a	good	smoke	signal	for	potential	intrinsic	safety	concerns	within	hospitals,	
there	was	and	continues	to	be	criticism	of	using	SHMI	and	HSMR	to	identify	poor	
performance.[34].	In	spite	of	this	criticism	death,	as	previously	mentioned,	is	a	discrete	
measurement	and	unexpected	death	is	a	useful	starting	point	in	understanding	adverse	
events.		
The	dialogue	surrounding	measurement	of	safety	has	perhaps	not	evolved	much	during	the	
last	15	years,	but	centred	around	the	two	areas	of	tension:	blame	free	learning	and	
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measurable	accountability.		What	is	clear	is	that	publically	reported	outcomes	are	here	to	
stay.	This	is	particularly	prevalent	in	surgery.	In	2013	surgical	consultants	became	the	first	
medical	specialty	to	publish	their	own	morbidity	and	mortality	rates	as	outcome	data	that	
are	freely	available	to	patients.	These	cover	over	5000	surgeons	for	more	than	28	
procedures,	available	on	the	NHS	choices	website.	The	objective	is	transparency,	and	
accountability	to	the	public.	Some	data	is	audited	over	3	years	to	improve	statistical	validity	
of	results.	[72]	
Whether	these	publications	or	league	tables	will	directly	improve	safety	is	yet	to	be	
determined	and	as	discussed	raises	many	valid	questions	and	concerns	from	the	profession,	
but	it	is	encouraging	that	safety	and	measurement	of	safety	remain	at	the	top	of	the	
national	agenda.	
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Figure	1.1	Timeline	of	important	safety	health	policy	documents	and	initiatives	in	England	2000-2014	
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1.5 OVERVIEW	OF	CHAPTERS	WITHIN	THIS	THESIS	
This	thesis	shall	focus	on	two	types	of	safety	measurement:	reporting	systems	and	case	note	
review,	and	on	two	types	of	adverse	event:	surgical	harm	and	avoidable	mortality.	
Reporting	systems,	specifically	the	NRLS	will	be	introduced	in	the	next	chapter.	Reporting	
systems	have	formed	the	cornerstone	of	safety	measurement	for	over	a	decade.	Chapter	2	
identifies	the	basis	for	reporting	as	a	safety	tool	and	addresses	the	advantages	and	
disadvantages	of	voluntary	reporting.		
Chapter	3	focuses	specifically	on	surgical	harm	and	assess	whether	the	known	adverse	
events	in	surgery	have	any	evidence-based	solutions	that	can	be	implemented.		
Chapter	4	provides	a	quantitative	assessment	of	reporting	data,	and	highlights	the	
deficiencies	in	using	aggregated	reporting	data	to	compare	hospitals.		
Chapter	5	explores	the	performance	of	the	NRLS	classification	of	adverse	events	in	surgery.	
It	determines	whether	the	detection	of	surgical	serious	harm	incidents	can	be	improved	and	
the	subsequent	learning	that	can	be	derived.		
Chapter	6	captures	international	expert	consensus	regarding	reporting	systems	and	
determines	their	future	role	in	patient	safety.	
Chapter	7	identifies	mortality	as	a	measure	of	safety	and	develops	and	validates	a	new	tool	
to	assess	whether	death	is	avoidable	in	a	reproducible	and	efficient	way	In	Chapter	8	the	
limitations	of	the	studies,	methodological	lessons	learned	and	opportunities	for	future	work	
will	be	discussed.	 	
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2 THE	NATIONAL	REPORTING	AND	LEARNING	SYSTEM	
2.1 CHAPTER	OVERVIEW	
This	chapter	aims	to	explore	reporting	in	England;	its	background,	aims,	advantages	and	
disadvantages	as	a	prelude	to	the	research	questions	addressed	by	the	studies	in	chapters	
3-6	As	discussed	in	chapter	1	this	thesis	focuses	on	reporting	as	a	key	method	for	
understanding	harm	in	hospitals.	The	NRLS	is	a	large	and	potentially	underutilized	
resource.[73]	This	chapter	deals	with	the	various	tensions	related	to	its	role	and	where	
reporting	currently	fits	in	the	field	of	patient	safety.	
2.2 HISTORICAL	ROLE	AND	REMIT	FOR	REPORTING	
Patient	safety	reporting	systems	tended	to	be	the	initial	starting	point	for	patient	safety	
programs	internationally.	In	Australia	the	Australian	Patient	Safety	Foundation	was	formed	
in	1987	and	one	of	its	10	aims	was	to	immediately	create	the	Advanced	Incident	
Management	System	(AIMS)	a	first	of	its	kind	national,	voluntary	reporting	system.	This	had	
the	aim	of	being	a	source	of	information	about	“things	that	go	wrong	in	health	care.	[74].	In	
the	United	States	(US),	incident	reporting	was	the	first	safety	program	funded	by	the	Agency	
for	Healthcare	Research	and	Quality	(AHRQ).	This	was	in	response	to	the	landmark	patient	
safety	report	in	1999:“To	Err	Is	Human:	Building	a	Safer	Health	System”	by	the	Institute	of	
Medicine	which	emphasized	the	importance	of	reporting	errors.	[75]		
Similarly	in	England,	following	the	report	“An	organisation	with	a	memory”,	one	of	the	first	
mechanisms	established	to	foster	safer	healthcare	by	the	newly	formed	National	Patient	
Safety	Agency	(NPSA)	was	the	National	Reporting	and	Learning	System	(NRLS)	in	2003.		
As	denoted	by	its	name	the	NRLS	has	a	two-fold	aim;	the	first	to	collect	incident	reports	at	a	
national	level	and	the	second	to	provide	a	system	to	learn	from	these	reports.	The	original	
intent	for	the	NRLS	was	to	collect	enough	reports	to	understand	what	the	common	risks	are	
to	hospital	safety,	to	analyse	these	reports	and	to	provide	feedback	and	guidance	to	
healthcare	workers	to	improve	practice.	[76]	
The	national	patient	safety	program	in	the	UK	relied	on	the	NRLS	to	provide	data	on	what	
safety	problems	existed,	why	they	occurred	and	possible	solutions.	[77]	The	program	rapidly	
grew	and	by	2005	all	NHS	organisation	were	able	to	report	to	the	NRLS.	
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There	have	been	numerous	successes,	perhaps	the	earliest	being	the	recognition	and	
problem	solving	involved	with	vincristine	injection.	Vincristine	is	a	chemotherapy	medicine	
that	is	used	intravenously.	Since	1975,	when	it	was	introduced,	14	people	in	total	have	died	
due	to	intrathecal	administration.	These	rare	but	significant	adverse	events	were	collated	by	
the	NPSA	and	through	the	NRLS	there	were	multiple	effective	investigations	of	the	system	
failures	that	led	to	the	error	and	to	design	solutions	to	prevent	further	incidents,	including	
changing	drug	packaging	and	labelling	to	prevent	intrathecal	administration.	The	NRLS	also	
worked	with	international	reporting	systems	to	pool	evidence	from	vincristine	incident	
reports	and	safeguard	against	future	events.	[78	79]	
The	NPSA	has	published	multiple	rapid	response	reports	to	incidents	to	provide	practical	
solutions	to	safety	problems	such	as	wrongly	sited	nasogastric	tube	placement,	injury	due	to	
errors	in	supra-pubic	catheter	insertion	and	early	detection	of	surgical	complications	
following	laparoscopic	surgery.	[80]	[81]	[82]		
Lankshear	and	colleagues	conducted	a	multi	method	study	in	2011	that	involved	focus	
groups	with	pharmacists	and	a	survey	of	Medical	Directors,	Nursing	Directors	and	Chief	
Pharmacists.	Nurses	and	pharmacists	felt	that	medication	alerts,	issued	through	the	NPSA,	
had	a	major	impact	on	patient	safety	by	increasing	awareness	of	safe	and	unsafe	practice.	
The	Medical	Directors	were	less	aware	of	alerts.[83]	In	another	qualitative	study	it	was	
demonstrated	through	interviews	that	healthcare	practitioners	felt	incident	reporting	had	a	
positive	effect	on	safety	practices.	[84]	Despite	these	successes	the	NRLS	was	criticised	as	
being	overambitious	as	a	stand-alone	solution	for	patient	safety.	[85]		
It	soon	became	apparent	that	reports	were	not	detailed	enough	to	be	the	only	source	of	
information	about	an	adverse	event	to	learn	from	incidents	and	meet	the	second	aim	of	the	
programme.	In	an	editorial,	in	the	early	days	of	the	NRLS,	Charles	Vincent	commented	that	
incident	reports	do	not	adequately	explore	incident	causation	due	to	their	brief	and	
disjointed	nature.	Incidents	require	a	more	detailed,	in	depth	analysis	to	fully	understand	
why	adverse	events	occur.	To	comprehend	causality	requires	focused	examination	of	notes,	
discussions	with	clinical	teams	and	understanding	of	the	infrastructure	relating	to	the	case.	
[77]	The	NPSA	tried	to	create	more	detail	in	the	reports	by	encouraging	reporters	to	
categorise	incidents	based	on	their	cause	such	as	“diagnostic	error”	or	“treatment	delay.	
However	it	is	rarely	abundantly	clear	to	the	frontline	healthcare	professional	exactly	why	a	
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complex	event	such	as	post-operative	death	has	occurred	without	detailed	review	and	
reflection.	Indeed	rarely	is	there	one	“root	cause”	for	an	event,	but	rather	a	chain	of	errors,	
as	per	Reason’s	model.	Professor	Vincent	suggested	that	reports	should	be	used	as	a		
“window”	on	the	system	and	reports	should	merely	be	used	as	case	studies	to	engage	staff	
to	understand	and	address	system	failures	in	more	depth.		This	approach,	however,	was	at	
odds	with	the	sheer	volume	of	data	being	amassed	through	reporting,	to	a	scale	of	over	1	
million	report	per	annum	by	2010.		It	was	and	remains	an	impossible	task	to	read	all	reports	
submitted	at	a	national	level.		There	are	simply	not	enough	human	resources	to	mine	the	
data	particularly	the	free	text	descriptions	of	events.		
The	original	aim	was	to	use	key,	isolated	events	of	significant	impact	to	engage	teams.	This	
aim	became	dwarfed	by	the	possibility	of	using	aggregated	data	to	understand	which	
hospitals	were	more	or	less	safe.	
In	one	respect	the	large	volume	created	the	possibility	of	truly	understanding	the	incidence	
of	hospital	harm.	However	counting	incident	reports	and	using	the	rate	of	report	to	
measure	hospital	safety	is	fraught	with	measurement	bias,	chiefly	due	to	
underreporting.[86]	This	is	a	topic	for	investigation	and	discussion	in	later	chapters.	By	
regulators	using	reporting	rates	as	a	monitoring	tool,	there	was	over	emphasis	by	the	NPSA	
on	the	data’s	ability	to	detect	safety	problems.	[87]	[88]	
The	2006	report	by	the	House	of	Commons	Committee	of	Public	Accounts	criticised	the	
NRLS.	This	report	suggested	that,	although	the	NPSA	had	improved	the	safety	culture	in	the	
NHS,	the	NRLS	did	not	provide	adequate	feedback	to	staff,	analysis	of	reports	and	sharing	of	
lessons	learned	was	sporadic	and	limited,	the	taxonomy	of	incidents	was	poor	and	the	NRLS	
was	unable	to	monitor	the	incidence	of	harm	in	hospitals.	[88]	In	2012	the	NPSA	was	closed	
and	its	functions	including	the	running	of	the	NRLS	were	moved	to	the	NHS	Commissioning	
Board,	now	NHS	England.	A	need	for	research	and	development	of	this	valuable	tool	was	
recognised.		
The	NRLS,	as	the	first	platform	for	patient	safety	in	England,	has	a	difficult	role	to	fulfil.	As	a	
system	for	monitoring	it	needs	to	efficiently	capture	all	incidents,	or	key	incidents	that	are	
pre-determined	in	a	way	that	is	epidemiologically	sound.	The	rate	of	reports	has	increased	
greatly	and	some	no	harm	incidents	are	captured	very	comprehensively	such	as	falls.	
However	as	will	be	detailed	below	there	are	some	substantial	difficulties	in	understanding	
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the	incidence	of	harm	using	voluntary	reporting.	As	a	system	for	learning,	the	focus	needs	to	
be	different,	enabling	fewer	incidents	to	be	captured	with	greater	detail,	and	focussed	on	
feedback	and	solution	generation	rather	than	data	gathering.		
The	challenge	in	rationalizing	measurement	for	improvement	versus	judgment	is	not	limited	
to	reporting.	Raleigh	and	Foot	describe	characteristics	of	indicators	used	for	monitoring	
versus	learning	in	their	2010	report	for	The	King’s	Fund	on	quality	measurement.		(Table	
2.1)[89]	
Table	2.1:	Characteristics	of	indicators	used	for	judgment	and	improvement,	Raleigh	and	
Foot,	2010	
Indicators	for	judgement	 Indicators	for	improvement	
Unambiguous	interpretation	 Variable	interpretation	possible	
Unambiguous	attribution	 Ambiguity	tolerable	
Definitive	marker	of	quality	 Screening	tool	
Good	data	quality	 Poor	data	quality	tolerable	
Good	risk	adjustment	 Partial	risk	adjustment	tolerable	
Statistical	reliability	necessary	 Statistical	reliability	preferred	
Cross-sectional	 Time	trends	
Used	for	punishment/reward	 Used	for	learning/changing	practice	
For	external	use	 Mainly	for	internal	use	
Data	for	public	use	 Data	for	internal	use	
Stand	alone	 Allowance	for	content	possible	
Risk	of	unintended	consequences	 Lower	risk	of	unintended	consequences	
	
The	controversies	regarding	the	role	of	reporting	shape	the	debate	around	what	model	of	
reporting	data	capture	is	the	most	appropriate,	and	were	described	by	Professor	
Runciman	when	he	appraised	AIMS	in	2002.	He	described	the	tensions	between	
monitoring	and	learning,	and	the	issues	are	still	relevant	to	the	NHS	today.	(	 	
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Figure	2.1)[74]	
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Figure	2.1	Reporting	system	issues	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
There	is	debate	over	voluntary	models	versus	mandatory	models.	[87]	Voluntary	systems	
are	the	type	preferred	by	physicians.	[90]It	is	argued	that	there	is	more	potential	for	in	
depth	analysis	and	more	near	miss	reporting,	without	having	a	reporting	agenda	imposed	
on	staff	with	fear	of	repercussions.	Advocates	of	voluntary	systems	suggest	that	mandatory	
systems	are	designed	to	identify	failing	staff	and	that	those	at	fault	must	report	an	error.	
This	deters	candid	disclosure	of	safety	problems.	[91]	However	epidemiologists	would	
suggest	that	meaningful	data	could	only	be	collected	by	a	mandatory	system.	[92]	Similarly	
there	is	academic	disagreement	over	whether	reports	should	be	anonymous	or	not.		
As	described	by	Raleigh	and	Foot;	if	the	system	is	designed	for	monitoring,	it	should	be	
streamlined,	and	unambiguous,	with	a	minimum	dataset	and	with	specific	clear	instructions	
on	which	mandatory	adverse	events	should	be	captured,	that	are	discrete	and	
unambiguous.[89]	There	should	be	real	time,	national	upload	to	allow	for	speedy	data	
aggregation.		
If	alternatively	the	system	should	be	for	learning:	it	should	be	broader,	with	a	focus	on	
fewer	numbers	of	reports	captured,	but	more	detail	and	depth,	allowing	for	helpful	
feedback	to	staff	locally.	Reporting	should	be	voluntary,	confidential	rather	than	anonymous	
(to	allow	for	personal	feedback),	specialty	focused	and	perhaps	deal	with	events	that	lead	to	
harm	or	in	identifying	unknown	areas	of	risk	in	order	to	maximise	clinician	engagement	with	
reports.[88]	Currently	the	approach	by	the	NRLS	is	mixed	to	try	and	satisfy	both	learning	
and	monitoring	which	creates	some	challenges.	Which	direction	the	balance	should	be	
shifted	in	is	the	subject	of	Chapter	6.	
• Voluntary	reporting	versus	mandatory	reporting	
• Anonymous	versus	confidential	reporting	
• Local	or	national	data	collection	
• Focus	on	nursing	staff	or	doctors	
• Free	text	narrative	or	tick	box	data	collection	
• Specific	event	capture	or	inclusive	approach	
• Encourage	high	volume	of	reports	for	monitoring,	or	low	quantity	high	quality	reports	for	learning	
• Specific	feedback	at	a	local	level	or	generic	feedback	at	a	national	level			
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2.3 THE	REPORTING	PROCESS	IN	ENGLAND	2.3.1 Data	collection	
In	England	reporting	data	from	health	care	professionals	in	secondary	care	is	collected	
through	three	processes.	There	are	hospital	managed,	digital	platforms,	hospital	managed	
paper	forms	and	an	internet-based	electronic	or	e-form,	that	is	completely	anonymous	that	
reports	nationally	directly.	
The	most	commonly	used	reporting	process	is	via	a	hospital	based	intranet	platform,	and	
70%	of	the	software	is	provided	through	Datix.[93]	This	company	provides	a	digital	form	
through	which	healthcare	professionals	are	able	to	report	patient	safety	incidents.	The	
forms	are	then	submitted	to	a	variety	of	hospital	managers,	and	safety	staff,	screened	and	
then	passed	on	to	the	NRLS,	as	shown	in	Figure	2.2.	The	forms	are	modified	by	individual	
hospitals	to	meet	their	specific	needs.	There	is	a	desired	minimum	dataset	however	
implementation	of	this	varies	widely	between	organisations.	Reporters	are	any	healthcare	
worker	or	ancillary	staff	within	the	hospital	as	well	as	ambulance	staff,	primary	care	and	
community	staff.	Patients	may	also	report	via	the	e-form.	Reporters	are	encouraged	to	
report	incidents	contemporaneously.	There	are	no	limits	to	what	can	be	reported	using	the	
NRLS,	as	it	is	in	use	as	a	“catch-all’	system.		
The	NRLS	is	a	voluntary	reporting	system	and	members	of	staff	are	not	duty	bound	to	report	
incidents.	
2.3.1.1 Mandatory	data	collection	
There	are	adverse	events	designated	for	mandatory	reporting.	(Figure	2.2)	These	include	
“never	events”	or	serious	untoward	incidents,	and	specific	hospital	acquired	infections	such	
as	methicillin-resistant	Staphylococcus	aureus	(MRSA)	infection	and	Clostridium	difficile	
infection.		Hospitals	are	required	to	report	these	adverse	events	for	monitoring	purposes.	
Hospitals	must	report	these	incidents	to	other	agencies	or	systems	as	well	as	the	NRLS	with	
an	overlap	in	potential	function	and	government.	These	include	the	Medicines	and	
Healthcare	products	Regulatory	Agency	for	device	incidents	and	medicine	reactions	and	the	
Health	Protection	Agency	for	hospital	acquired	infections	such	as	Methicillin-resistant	
Staphylococcus	aureus	(MRSA).	(Figure	2.3.)	
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Figure	2.2	Diagram	to	describe	NRLS	reporting	data	flow	
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Figure	2.3	The	reporting	landscape	for	incidents	in	the	NHS	
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Serious	incidents	are	reportable	to	the	Strategic	Incident	management	system		(STEIS).	The	
term	serious	incident	encompasses	a	range	of	patient	events.[94]	These	include:	
§ Avoidable	death	(including	suicide	and	homicide	in	patients	recently	under	the	care	
of	mental	health)	
§ Avoidable	injury	resulting	in	severe	harm	
§ Avoidable	injury	requiring	treatment	to	prevent	death	or	serious	harm	
§ Serious	case	reviews	or	safeguarding	adult	review	cases	of	abuse	
§ A	Never	Event	
§ Incidents	that	prevent	organisations	delivering	acceptable	quality	of	healthcare:	e.g.	
security	problems,	property	damage,	major	incidents	
A	current	list	of	Never	Events	is	shown	inTable2.2.	Some	never	events	can	be	detected	
through	other	methods	of	data	capture,	for	example	there	is	regular	prospective	monitoring	
for	ABO	blood	incompatibility.	Some	never	events	cannot	be	detected	through	other	
measures	and	only	through	reporting,	such	as	incorrect	insulin	prescription.	Therefore	
although	the	reporting	of	these	incidents	is	mandatory,	there	is	no	clear	way	to	enforce	
reporting	of	them	and	monitor	compliance.		
Table2.2:	Never	events	list	2015/2016	for	mandatory	reporting	
Number	 Never	Event	
1.	 Wrong	site	surgery	
2.	 Wrong	implant/prosthesis	
3.	 Retained	foreign	object	post-procedure	
4.	 Incorrect	selection	of	a	strong	potassium	containing	solution	
5.	 Wrong	route	administration	of	medication	
6.	 Overdose	of	insulin	due	to	abbreviations	or	incorrect	device	
7.	 Overdose	of	methotrexate	for	non-cancer	treatment	
8.	 Incorrect	selection	of	high	strength	midazolam	during	conscious	sedation	
9.	 Failure	to	install	functional	collapsible	shower	or	curtain	rails	
10.	 Falls	from	poorly	restricted	windows	
11.	 Chest	or	neck	entrapment	in	bedrails	
12.	 Transfusion	or	transplantation	of	ABO-incompatible	blood	components	or	organs	
13.	 Misplaced	naso-	or	oro-gastric	tubes	
14.	 Scalding	of	patients	
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2.3.2 Data	description	
The	data	collected	by	the	NRLS	will	be	further	described	and	assessed	in	Chapter	2.	
Demographic	information	such	as	age	and	gender	and	information	regarding	the	setting	of	
the	incident:	the	date	and	time,	where	it	took	place	and	the	member	of	staff	reporting	and	
the	specialty	of	the	team	caring	for	the	patient	are	requested,	as	shown	in	an	example	Datix	
form	in	Figure	2.4.	These	data	are	not	consistently	collected	in	every	hospital	and	not	all	
fields	are	mandatory.	(Table	2.3)	
Figure	2.4	Example	of	a	Datix	form	
	
Hospitals	can	tailor	the	information	collected	to	suit	their	needs.	However	when	the	forms	
are	then	merged	at	a	national	level	there	is	variability	in	completeness	of	the	dataset.		The	
	 60	
reporter	is	also	asked	to	categorise	the	incidents	using	the	NRLS	incident	classification	
system.		
The	reporter	is	invited	to	subjectively	judge	the	level	of	harm	the	patient	experienced	as	a	
result	of	the	incidents.	Hospitals	are	able	to	moderate	the	level	of	harm	assessed	if	for	
example	it	is	overstated,	prior	it	being	fed	to	the	national	system.		
The	most	important	details	from	a	learning	perspective	are	the	narrative	of	the	incident	and	
these	details	are	captured	through	a	free	text	section	of	the	reporting	form	where	the	
reporter	can	describe	the	events	that	occurred.[91]	This	description	can	range	from	two	
words	“patient	fell”,	to	a	detailed	chronicle	of	the	episode.	The	reporter	can	use	any	style	of	
prose	they	want	and	are	encouraged	to	give	as	much	detail	as	possible.	
There	are	no	national	lists	of	desired	incidents	for	reporting	apart	from	the	never	events	list.	
Reporters	are	not	specifically	encouraged	to	report	either	errors	or	adverse	events,	but	
rather	any	circumstance	where	safety	was	or	could	have	been	threatened.	This	means	the	
type	of	incident	reported	can	range	from	staff	complaining	about	the	manner	in	which	their	
colleagues	spoke	to	them,	to	a	serious	incident	causing	a	preventable	death.		
There	are	incidents	that	are	relevant	at	a	local	hospital	level	that	may	or	may	not	be	useful	
to	collect	at	a	national	level.	This	is	one	of	the	topics	assessed	by	experts	in	a	Delphi	panel	in	
Chapter	6,	where	the	future	role	of	reporting	systems	is	determined.	
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Table	2.3:	Overview	of	data	collected	by	hospitals	for	input	into	NRLS	
Hospital	specific	
reporting	data	(e.g.	
captured	on	DATIX)	
Who	inputs	data?	 Hospital	able	to	change	
data	prior	to	national	
upload?	
Mandatory	fields?	
Patient	demographics	
(age,	gender	etc.)	
Reporter:	member	of	
staff	
Yes	 No,	although	policy	in	
place	to	increase	
mandatory	fields	
Specialty	delivering	
care	
Reporter:	member	of	
staff	
Yes	 No	
Reporter	details	
(Profession	of	reporter)	
Reporter:	member	of	
staff	
Yes	 No		
Location,	date	and	time	
of	incident		
Reporter:	member	of	
staff	
Yes	 Yes	
NRLS	Classification	of	
incident	
Reporter:	member	of	
staff	
Yes	 Yes	
NRLS	Classification	of	
level	of	harm	
Reporter:	member	of	
staff	
Yes	 Yes	
“Free	text”	description	
of	incident	events	
Reporter:	member	of	
staff	
Only	able	to	redact	
patient	and	staff	
identifiers.	
Yes	
2.3.3 Data	protection	and	confidentiality	
At	a	hospital	level	clinical	and	non-clinical	managers	and	safety	staff	are	able	to	see	which	
member	of	staff	reported	the	incident,	the	identity	of	the	patient	as	well	all	the	details	of	
the	event.		This	enables	local	investigation	of	concerning	events,	and	facilitates	feedback	but	
does	mean	that	health	care	professionals	do	not	have	anonymity	through	reporting,	at	a	
local	level.	Some	hospital	systems	give	staff	the	option	not	to	identify	themselves,	although	
it	is	possible	to	establish	whom	the	reporter	is	through	the	identity	of	the	patient	named	
and	the	staff	caring	for	them.	Lack	of	anonymity	for	reporters	has	potential	repercussions	if	
members	of	staff	report	incidents	that	occur	through	error	related	to	human	factors	such	as	
misdiagnosis,	delayed	or	wrong	treatment.	It	also	may	prevent	staff	from	reporting	unsafe	
staffing	levels	or	system	concerns,	i.e.	“whistleblowing”	if	they	fear	repercussion	from	line	
managers.	Reluctance	to	report	in	these	circumstances	persists	and	prevents	full	
disclosure.[95]	
Once	the	reports	are	passed	to	the	NRLS	they	are	redacted	with	respect	to	patient	and	staff	
related	identifiers	and	given	pseudo-identifiers.	The	NRLS	keep	hospital	identifiers	as	a	
unique	code.	No	patient	or	staff	data	are	published	or	released	to	third	parties.	This	acts	to	
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keep	the	NRLS	as	a	learning	system	rather	than	a	regulator	or	monitoring	body	and	prevents	
data	being	used	for	litigation	at	a	central	or	national	level.		
The	disadvantage	of	not	identifying	patients	is	that	is	impossible	to	truly	understand	the	
proportion	of	incidents	that	occur	that	are	reported,	i.e.	the	sensitivity	and	specificity	of	the	
system.	Also	the	same	incident	may	be	reported	several	times	leading	to	an	over-counting	
of	that	type	of	error.	It	can	be	argued	that	not	identifying	reporters	prevents	transparency	
with	respect	to	error	disclosure	and	confers	a	special	privilege	on	staff	to	disclose	without	
repercussions.	Reporting	systems	as	a	means	of	holding	staff	to	account	has	been	strongly	
condemned	by	safety	experts	as	being	counterproductive	to	the	learning	process.[95]	
2.4 REPORTING	AS	A	METHOD	FOR	MEASURING	ADVERSE	EVENTS	
“In	the	UK,	the	measurement	of	harm,	so	important	in	the	evolution	of	patient	safety,	has	
been	neglected	in	favour	of	incident	reporting.”	Charles	Vincent	[69]		
Reporting	as	a	method	for	measuring	adverse	events	has	been	criticised	in	the	literature.	
Two	key	papers	using	prospective	and	restrospective	methods	to	assess	the	incidence	of		
adverse	events	in	hospital	settings	suggested	that	the	NRLS	did	not	have	enough	sensitivity	
or	specificity	to	detect	adverse	events	in	England,	compared	to	active	surveillance	and	
retrospective	case	note	review.	Sari	et	al	in	2007	looked	at	the	proportion	of	admissions	in	
one	hospital	that	had	a	patient	safety	incident	reported	versus	the	the	proportion	of	
admissions	with	incidents	detected	through	case	note	review	and	found	that	only	5%	of	
incidents	resulting	in	harm,	i.e.	adverse	events	were	detected	by	the	NRLS.	[96]	The	incident	
system	did	detect	7%		of	incidents	not	causing	harm,	i.e.	errors	that	case	note	review	did	
not,	although	case	note	review	detected	more	incidents	overall.		
Another	study	by	Olsen	et	al	in	2007	using	different	prospective	methods	found	little	
overlap	between	events	detected	by		the	NRLS	versus	surveillance	or	real	time	record	
review	for	detecting	clinical	risk	or	adverse	events.	[97]	These	results	were	disappointing	
given	the	investment	and	emphasis	placed	on	reporting.		
Noble	and	Pronovost	describe	three	principle	areas	where	there	are	epidemiological	
problems	in	using	incident	reports	to	measure	safety.[87]	
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1. The	reporting	paradox:	As	a	type	of	incident	is	recognised,	or	identified	as	a	priority	
the	numbers	of	reports	increase,	over-inflating	the	observed	rate	of	error	or	adverse	
event	
2. Underreporting	of	incidents:	This	reduces	the	usefulness	of	the	data	as	trends	can	
not	be	generalised	to	the	wider	population.	There	is	also	a	tendency	for	more	
serious	incidents	to	not	be	reported	which	biases	the	data.	[88]	
3. Participation	bias:	Nursing	staff	report	more	than	doctors,	which	skews	the	samples	
of	reports	towards	certain	types	of	events	and	also	creates	the	preception	that	
reporting	is	a	nursing	activity.	
Nevertheless	there	is	still	a	drive	to	use	reporting	rates	to	measure	the	safety	of	hospitals,	
to	compare	organisations	as	well	as	expecting	the	NRLS	to	generate	analyses	of	errors	and	
create	interventions	to	solve	them.	[98]	
The	vast	majority	of	incidents	reported	to	the	system	are	events	such	as	patients	slips	and	
falls,	not	leading	to	harm.	These	data,	whilst	steadily	increasing	in	volume	annually	do	not	
provide	the	crucial	adverse	events	monitoring	that	was	hoped	for	at	inception.	Sari	
commented	that	more	research	was	required	to	develop	reporting	so	that	it	would	give	an	
accurate	picture	of	the	incidence	of	adverse	events	and	errors	in	the	system.	However,	this	
may	not	be	an	appropriate	or	feasible	use	of	reporting.	Using	the	NRLS	as	a	tool		for	national	
learning	could	be	developed	further	and	may	be	more	fruitful.	The	“soft”	intelligence	and	
safety	themes	detected	through	reports	may	give	guides	as	to	areas	where	more	rigorous	
monitoring	methods	should	be	employed.	These	themes	will	be	explored	in	Chapter	6.	
2.5 STAFF	ATTITUDES	TOWARD	REPORTING	
Establishing	a	safety	culture	in	healthcare	organisations	is	crucial	to	error	reporting	and	
adverse	event	detection.	If	healthcare	workers	feel	free	to	openly	discuss	and	learn	from	
error	this	generates	safer	care.		This	requires	an	environment	where	candour	does	not	lead	
to	recrimination	but	instead	organisations	welcome	staff	insights	and	actively	seek	to	learn	
from	negative	circumstances.[99]	
By	creating	and	promoting	the	NRLS	there	has	been	a	slow	but	steady	increase	in	
participation	in	error	disclosure	and	discussion.	For	example	it	is	now	becoming	routine	for	
all	pressure	sores	to	be	reported	as	part	of	daily	nursing	tasks	with	87.5%	of	sores	being	
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reported	in	a	recent	study	of	24	hospitals	in	England.[100]	Most	hospital	staff	recognise	that	
patient	safety	is	a	priority	and	elements	such	as	the	WHO	surgical	safety	checklist,	
recognition	and	prevention	of	never	events	and	reportable	serious	untoward	incidents	are	
part	of	established	hospital	practice.	In	a	recent	retrospective	study,	by	Mayer	and	
colleagues,	of	6714	patients	in	5	hospitals	in	the	UK,	the	WHO	checklist	was	completed,	at	
least	in	part	in	96.7%	of	cases.[101]	
This	culture	shift	has	taken	time	and	considerable	effort	to	build	but	does	not	negate	the	
fact	that	there	is	considerable	under	reporting	of	patient	safety	incidents	and	adverse	
events,	with	recognisable	cultural	reasons	for	lack	of	engagement.	2.5.1 Autonomous	physician	culture	and	fear	of	recrimination	
Doctors	report	far	fewer	incidents	than	nurses;	which	skews	the	shape	of	the	data.	One	US	
study	by	Kaldjian	and	colleagues	surveyed	physicians	from	multiple	hospitals	to	assess	
reporting	practice.	They	found	that	only	17.8%	of	doctors	had	ever	reported	even	a	minor	
error.	[102]The	main	reasons	for	poor	physician	reporting	are	a	lack	of	faith	in	the	reporting	
bureaucracy	and	fear	of	recrimination	and	litigation.	[46	103]	The	hierarchical	structure	of	
medicine	has	been	a	factor	suggested	to	inhibit	reporting	of	adverse	events	due	to	fear	of	
preventing	career	progression	either	by	addressing	ones	own	errors	or	errors	of	peers	or	
seniors.	[104]	A	survey	of	274	oncology	staff	in	Johns	Hopkins	Institute	by	Smith	and	
colleagues	found	that	despite	doctors	agreeing	that	errors	were	occurring,	and	that	they	
had	a	responsibility	to	report,	they	were	significantly	less	likely	to	report.	The	main	reason	
given	was	concern	about	getting	colleagues	into	trouble	and	embarrassment.[105]			
In	a	qualitative	study	Renkema	and	colleagues	interviewed	doctors	to	understand	why	
incidents	are	not	reported.	They	found	that	the	fear	of	malpractice	litigation	as	well	as	
negative	hospital	response	towards	them	when	an	incident	was	reported	were	significant	
barriers.[46]	
Healthcare	professionals	often	have	an	autonomous	attitude	to	safety	problems	and	may	
even	enjoy	fixing	issues.		In	a	qualitative	study	in	Canada,	Hewiit	and	colleagues	found	that	
for	doctors	over	half	an	hour	in	in	an	8-hour	shift	on	average	is	taken	up	dealing	with	system	
failures	that	could	be	addressed.	[106]		
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However	healthcare	staff	tended	to	choose	to	temporarily	solve	the	problem	for	individual	
patients	and	move	on	rather	than	take	a	step	back,	assess	the	system	failures	and	report	
them	to	prevent	further	issues.	This	may	well	be	due	to	lack	of	time	and	lack	of	faith	in	
reporting.		2.5.2 Lack	of	time	and	complex,	ambiguous	taxonomy	
A	recent	evaluation	of	527	junior	doctors’	knowledge	in	the	NHS	regarding	patient	safety	
showed	that	their	understanding	of	patient	safety	concepts,	such	as	‘human	factors’	and	
‘root	cause	analysis’	was	high	(90%	and	65%	respectively).	Their	knowledge	was	assessed	
using	a	questionnaire	that	assessed	their	self-declared	understanding	of	these	concepts.	
However	only	55%	believed	that	reporting	errors	would	help	to	improve	patient	safety.	
[107]	Frequently	stated	reasons	include	lack	of	time	to	report,	poor	feedback	and	a	sense	of	
futility	in	reporting.	[108]	There	is	a	need	for	common	terminology	in	patient	safety.	
Complex	classification	systems	based	on	root	cause	analyses	and	the	concepts	of	system	
failure	were	developed	with	the	aim	of	improving	data	retrieval	from	the	perspective	of	
patient	safety	analysts.	One	hypothesis	to	be	tested	in	Chapter	5	is	that	this	type	of	
classification	increases	complexity	and	ambiguity	for	untrained	frontline	healthcare	
providers	and	adds	to	the	cumbersome	nature	of	reporting	for	users.	[74]	2.5.3 Inadequate	feedback	to	reporters		
One	major	barrier	to	reporting	is	the	perceived	lack	of	adequate	feedback	to	the	reporter.	
Identification	of	problem	areas	is	not	sufficient	for	learning	and	reporters	require	response	
from	reporting	system	to	perceive	any	benefit	from	completing	a	report.	[109]	The	NRLS	has	
been	criticized	for	poor	feedback	to	staff,	which	given	the	scale	of	reports	collected	is	
unsurprising.	[88]	At	a	local	level	feedback	varies	but	is	generally	not	given	to	the	reporter	
unless	the	level	of	harm	is	severe.	At	a	national	level	there	is	no	individual	feedback,	but	
learning	is	encouraged	through	alerts	and	rapid	responses.	This	lack	of	feedback	coupled	
with	the	curmudgeonly	nature	of	the	reporting	process	propagates	a	sense	of	futility	
amongst	reporters	with	limited	time	to	spare.	[110	111]	
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2.5.4 Clinical	leadership	and	reporting	priorities	
Evans	and	colleagues	surveyed	186	doctors	and	587	nurses	in	six	hospitals	in	South	
Australia.	They	found	that	senior	doctors	were	much	less	likely	to	have	ever	reported	an	
incident	than	junior	doctors	(58.4%	vs.	85.4%;	relative	risk	(RR)	0.58,	95%	Confidence	
interval	(CI)	0.46	to	0.73)	and	nurses	were	more	likely	to	have	reported	than	doctors	to	have	
ever	completed	a	report	(89.2%	v	64.4%;	RR	1.38,	95%	CI	1.19	to	1.61)	[112].	Senior	doctors	
are	more	likely	to	report	if	patients	are	harmed,	but	very	unlikely	to	report	near	misses	or	
errors.	[105]	Engaging	senior	staff	in	reporting	by	targeting	reports	toward	key	areas	of	high	
risk	of	harm	to	patients	may	be	critical	in	changing	the	traditional	stance	of	doctors	leaving	
reporting	to	nursing	staff.	Whilst	senior	doctors	may	be	challenging	system	errors	in	other	
ways,	encouraging	juniors	to	report	errors	provides	one	source	of	local	data	that	if	used	
properly	is	a	tangible	narrative	to	propel	internal	problem	solving.	[104]	Lack	of	hospital	
leadership	reduces	enthusiasm	for	learning	from	error	but	studies	have	shown	that	when	
junior	doctors	are	engaged	and	led	in	reporting	by	senior	colleagues,	both	quality	and	
quantity	of	reports	increases	with	positive	feedback	from	the	juniors.	[113]	
2.6 PATIENT	AND	PUBLIC	ATTITUDE	TOWARDS	REPORTING	
Patients	are	a	potentially	underutilised	as	a	source	of	reporting	data.	Hospitals	are	now	
routinely	surveying	patients	regarding	their	perception	of	quality	of	care	received	through	
the	friends	and	family	test,	Patient	Reported	Outcome	Measures	(PROMS)	and	Care	Quality	
Commission	surveys.	[24	114	115]	One	available	area	of	patient	engagement	is	to	use	
patients	to	report	adverse	events.	It	is	possible	for	them	to	report	via	the	NRLS	eform	but	
this	is	rarely	used,	with	less	than	10%	of	reports	submitted	this	way.[88]	Weissman	et	al	
interviewed	989	hospital	patients	in	the	US	and	found	that	23%	could	detect	an	adverse	
event	during	their	care,	which	was	twice	the	number	detected	by	record	review	alone.	[116]	
Another	UK	study	examined	staff	and	patient	views	in	3	hospitals	and	showed	that	patient	
perception	could	predict	safety	outcomes	and	offer	unique	perspectives	on	safety	not	
detected	by	staff	[117]	Whilst	patients	can	overestimate	the	severity	of	events,	or	
incorrectly	attribute	certain	events	to	lapses	in	clinical	care,	patients	are	likely	to	be	a	
valuable	resource	as	yet	untapped	and	may	add	more	areas	for	learning	than	is	currently	
being	detected	by	staff	reporting	alone.	[118]	The	Berwick	report	clearly	recommended	that	
the	patient	voice	must	be	listened	to	at	all	levels	in	order	to	make	healthcare	safer,	and	with	
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this	mandate,	learning	how	to	incorporate	patients	into	reporting	is	an	opportunity	for	
future	research.[70]	
Public	impressions	of	reporting	are	dichotomous.	It	is	an	expectation	that	healthcare	
workers	report	error	and	maintain	their	duty	of	candour.	Equally	when	aggregated	numbers	
of	reports	are	published	the	public	reaction	is	one	of	worry	and	criticism.	Headlines	such	as	
“One-fifth	of	hospital	‘may	be	covering	up	mistakes’	“	(BBC	News	June	2014)[119]	criticized	
under	reporting	in	English	Hospitals	suggesting	that	hospitals	are	deliberately	obscuring	
their	failings,	whereas	other	headlines	such	as	“Colchester	Hospital	NHS	Trust	has	most	
‘never	events’”	(BBC	News	May	2015)[120]	condemns	a	hospital	for	their	high	reporting	
rate.	One	research	group	looked	at	64	articles	across	6	countries	that	discussed	medical	
errors	in	cancer	care	and	found	that	the	media	tended	to	blame	individual	clinicians	for	
mistakes	and	rarely	took	a	systems	approach	to	error,	with	the	UK	media	being	one	of	the	
most	critical.	[121]	It	is	difficult	to	balance	transparency	regarding	errors	with	the	need	to	
not	alarm	the	public	or	allow	for	mis-interpretation	of	data.	The	following	chapter	shall	deal	
with	whether	reporting	rates	at	hospital	level	are	significant	markers	of	safety	and	worthy	of	
public	scrutiny	to	compare	quality	of	care.	
2.7 AREAS	FOR	INVESTIGATION	
This	chapter	has	explored	the	conception	and	background	to	the	NRLS	and	its	data	use.	This	
chapter	has	highlighted	further	research	questions	regarding	current	England	reporting	and	
wider	questions	regarding	reporting	globally.		
Specific	NRLS	research	questions	(addressed	in	chapters	4-6):	
• Do	reporting	rates	correlate	with	other	outcome	measures?	Are	reporting	rates	
proportional	to	other	measures	of	safety?	
• Which	healthcare	workers	in	which	specialties	report	and	are	there	differences	
between	professionals	groups	as	to	whether	adverse	events	or	errors	are	reported?	
• Can	the	NRLS	be	used	to	understand	safety	themes	such	as	surgical	harm?	
• How	accurate	is	the	NRLS	classification	system	for	surgery?	
• Can	the	NRLS	classification	system	be	improved?	
Global	reporting	questions:	
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• What	is	the	best	role	for	reporting	in	the	future?	
• Should	reporting	detect	adverse	events	or	errors?	
• Should	reporting	be	for	learning	or	monitoring?	
• How	can	learning	from	reports	be	maximised?	
This	thesis	shall	attempt	to	address	these	topics	in	the	following	chapters.	
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3 REDUCING	THE	BURDEN	OF	SURGICAL	HARM:	A	SYSTEMATIC	
REVIEW	OF	METHODS	TO	REDUCE	ADVERSE	EVENTS	IN	SURGERY*	
3.1 CHAPTER	OVERVIEW	
The	published	NRLS	data	suggest	there	may	be	a	considerable	burden	of	surgical	avoidable	
death,	although	these	data	require	exploration.[160	379]	This	chapter	begins	the	discussion	
in	this	thesis	regarding	surgical	adverse	events	by	systematically	reviewing	the	published	
methods	to	reduce	them.	
3.2 INTRODUCTION	
Surgery,	with	an	estimated	volume	of	234	million	operations	a	year	worldwide,	has	moved	
from	being	“simple,	ineffective	and	relatively	safe”	to	“complex,	effective	and	potentially	
dangerous”,	making	surgical	safety	a	significant	global	health	issue.[405	407]	This	rapidly	
advancing	field	requires	inbuilt	safety	measures	to	ensure	that	more	sophisticated	operative	
techniques	and	technology	are	not	compromised	by	system	error.[408]	There	is	increasing	
emphasis	on	ensuring	accountability	for	surgeons	with	open	reporting	of	operative	outcome	
and	complications.	Surgeons	require	new	mechanisms	to	solve	safety	problems	so	that	
adverse	events	are	minimised	and	patients	are	protected.		
The	Institute	of	Medicine	in	the	landmark	patient	safety	report	“To	err	is	human”	advocated	
reducing	harm	through	systems-based	initiatives.	Such	initiatives	should	seek	to	diminish	
the	probability	of	mistakes	occurring	and	be	focused	on	correcting	the	faulty	processes	that	
lead	to	error.	[162]	
Within	the	literature	there	are	a	myriad	of	intervention	types	suggested	to	improve	the	
safety	of	surgical	care.	To	make	recommendations	for	future	practice,	focus	should	be	
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placed	on	evidence-based	interventions	that	decrease	morbidity	and	mortality	as	a	result	of	
adverse	event.[409	410]		
	
3.3 AIMS	
The	aim	of	this	systematic	review	is	to	define	which	interventions	are	effective	in	reducing	
the	rate	of	adverse	events	for	surgical	patients	and	can	be	used	to	improve	safety	at	an	
institutional	level.	
3.4 METHODS	3.4.1 Review	search	strategy	
The	protocol	for	this	systematic	review	is	registered	with	the	National	Institute	of	Health	
Research	Database	(Protocol:	CRD4201200227	http://www.crd.york.ac.uk/PROSPERO.)	The	
methodology	and	reporting	were	performed	in	line	with	the	Preferred	Reporting	Items	for	
Systematic	review	and	Meta-Analyses	(PRISMA).[411]		
3.4.1.1 Inclusion	criteria	
Studies	were	eligible	for	inclusion	if	they	were	published	in	peer	reviewed	literature	and	
described	an	intervention	that	aimed	to	reduce	the	incidence	of	an	adverse	event	for	
surgical	patients.	Surgical	specialties	included	all	elective	and	emergency	vascular,	
gastrointestinal,	urology,	paediatric	and	orthopaedic	surgery	as	well	as	neurosurgery,	
cardiothoracic	surgery,	ophthalmology,	head	and	neck	surgery,	plastic	surgery	and	all	minor	
day	case	procedures.		Adverse	events	were	defined	as	previously	described	in	other	
literature:	an	injury	or	complication	which	occurs	as	a	result	of	health	care	management	and	
not	as	a	result	of	the	patient’s	pathology	and	which	causes	prolonged	hospital	stay,	
morbidity	or	mortality.[412]	Randomized	controlled	trials,	cohort,	cross	sectional	or	case-
control	were	included.		Searches	were	limited	to	the	English	language.		
3.4.1.2 	Exclusion	criteria	
Reviews,	conference	proceedings,	editorials,	opinions	and	case	reports	or	case	series	as	well	
as	articles	relating	to	non-surgical	specialties	were	excluded.	Interventional	radiology,	
cardiology	and	gastroenterology	were	not	included.	Studies	describing	modifications	in	
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surgical	technique	to	decrease	intra-operative	error	were	not	included.	These	studies	are	
undoubtedly	important,	but	the	wealth	of	literature	is	too	great	and	to	understand	and	
analyse	them	requires	very	specific	operative	knowledge	across	the	range	of	surgical	
specialties.	Thus	they	were	deemed	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	Initiatives	shown	to	
decrease	mortality	or	length	of	stay	without	demonstrating	a	decrease	in	adverse	events	
were	considered	not	specific	enough	for	this	review.	Studies	detailing	medication	errors	
have	been	examined	exhaustively	and	therefore	were	excluded.	
The	following	electronic	databases	were	systematically	investigated:	Medline	(Ovid	Medline	
(R)	1946	to	2012	Week	19),	EMBASE	(1974	to	2012	Week	19)	and	the	Cochrane	Library.		
(See	appendices)	Two	reviewers	(AMH	and	SP)	screened	abstracts	and	disagreements	were	
resolved	through	consultation	with	a	third	reviewer	(EMB).		Reference	lists	of	key	articles	
were	manually	searched	for	pertinent	studies.		
For	each	study	details	on	design,	setting,	surgical	sub-specialty,	aims,	intervention,	
outcome,	study	length	and	number	of	patients	were	extracted	using	a	pre-	set	data	
extraction	form.		3.4.2 Data	analysis	
Descriptive	and	quantitative	data	analyses	were	performed.	Summary	measures	used	were	
odds	ratio	of	effect	of	intervention	or	percentage	decrease	in	incidence	of	adverse	event,	
length	of	stay	and	mortality.		Studies	were	divided	into	those	that	sought	to	improve	
structure	or	process	factors.	Structure	factors	relate	to	fundamental	hospital	elements	such	
as	staff	and	equipment.	Process	refers	to	the	implementation	of	care.[11]	Within	this	
Donabedian	classification	the	studies	were	further	classified	into	groups	describing	
particular	types	of	intervention.	These	sub-classifications	were:	surgical	sub-specialization,	
staffing	factors,	benchmarking,	checklists,	care	pathways	training,	safety	technology	and	a	
combination	of	these	interventions.	
Studies	relating	to	the	volume	outcome	relationship	were	not	included.	Changes	in	overall	
caseload	within	an	institution	are	difficult	to	achieve	without	widespread	reconfiguration	of	
healthcare	services.	For	the	purposes	of	this	review,	this	was	deemed	to	be	beyond	the	
scope	of	the	analysis	as	this	review	explored	interventions	that	could	be	employed	at	an	
organisational	level.				
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3.4.3 Quality	assessment	for	individual	studies	
Cohort	and	case-control	studies	were	quality	assessed	using	the	Newcastle-Ottawa	
Scale.[413]	This	scale	is	recommended	by	the	Cochrane	Collaboration	for	assessing	risk	of	
bias	in	observational	studies.[414]	The	Cochrane	Collaboration	is	an	independent	research	
network	that	assembles	the	best	available	evidence	through	systematic	review	and	its	
methodology	is	highly	regarded,	with	its	guidance	informing	international	best	practice.	
[415]	High	quality	studies	were	those	that	attain	the	maximum	score	of	nine;	seven	or	eight	
was	classed	as	medium	quality	and	the	remainder	were	deemed	to	be	of	low	quality.	[416]	
Randomised	controlled	trials	(RCTs)	were	appraised	using	the	Cochrane	Collaboration’s	tool	
for	assessing	risk	of	bias	in	randomised	trials.[417]	The	quality	of	the	studies	underwent	
assessment	by	two	reviewers	(AMH	and	SP).	Detailed	analysis	was	only	performed	for	
observational	studies	(cohort	studies	and	case-control	studies)	with	a	medium	to	high	
quality	scoring	and	RCTS	
3.5 RESULTS	3.5.1 Study	characteristics	
Ninety-one	studies	met	selection	criteria	(Figure	3.1).		There	were	nine	RCTs	and	83	
observational	studies	(cohort,	case-control	or	cross-correlation	studies).	The	interventions	
were	subdivided	into	studies	where	the	intervention	examined	changes	to	hospital	
structural	factors	(26)	or	changes	to	process	factors	(65).	There	were	86	studies,	related	to	
volume-outcome	relationship,	which	were	not	included	in	this	review	as	this	was	deemed	to	
be	beyond	the	scope	of	the	review.		3.5.2 Quality	assessment	
Of	the	observational	studies	selected,	thirty-three	were	scored	as	medium	to	high	quality	on	
the	Newcastle	Ottawa	scale.	(Tables	8.1-8.5)		Nine	RCTs	were	scored	using	the	Cochrane	
Collaboration’s	tool.	(Table	8.6)	The	results	of	the	RCTS,	medium	and	high	quality	studies	
were	analysed	further.		
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Figure	3.1	Prisma	diagram	
	
	
	 	
Duplicates	and	non-surgical	specialties	removed:	26330	
Initial	Search		EMBASE:	22352	MEDLINE:	14454	COCHRANE:	1617	
STRUCTURE:	26	
Abstract	shortlist:	256	
Paper	shortlist	after	two	assessors’	agreement:	32	
Hand	searched	references:	59	
Final	shortlist:	91	 PROCESS:	65	
Staffing	16	
Checklists	9	
Sub-Specialization	10 Technology	3	
Mixed	Methods	4	
Benchmarking	or	Audit	4	
Care	Pathway	38	
Training	or	simulation	7	
Title	shortlist:	12093	 Reviews,	conference	proceedings,	editorials,	opinions	and	case	series	removed:	11837	
Studies	with	insufficient	end-points	removed:	183	Studies	related	to	volume-outcome	relationship:	86	Studies	related	to	surgical	technique:	15		
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Table	3.1	Quality	assessment,	observational	studies,	Newcastle-Ottawa	Scale	(part	1)	
Study	
	
Intervention/Aim	 Selection	 Comparability	 Exposure/O
utcome	
Quality	Score	
Sorelli	PG	
2008	
Ann	R	Coll	Surg	Engl.	
	
Emergency	surgery	
consultant	and	outcome	
	
***	 	 **	 Low	
Dang	D	
2002	
Heart	Lung	
	
ITU	Nurse	to	patient	ratio	 **	 **	 *	 Low	
Dimick	JB	
2001	
Am	J	Crit	Care	
	
ITU	Nurse	to	patient	ratio	 ***	 *	 *	 Low	
Dimick	JB	
2001	
Crit	Care	Med	
	
ITU	physician	input	 ***	 *	 **	 Low	
Amaravadi	RK	
2000	
Intensive	Care	Med	
	
ITU	Nurse	to	patient	ratio	 ***	 *	 **	 Low	
Hanson	
1999	
Crit	Care	Med	
	
ITU	Physician	input	 ****	 *	 *	 Low	
Ghaferi	AA	
2010	
J	Am	Coll	Surg	
	
Nurse	to	patient	ratio	
	
****	 **	 **	 Medium	
Carthon	JM	
2012	
J	Am	Geriatr	Soc.	
	
Nurse	to	patient	ratio	 ****	 	 **	 Low	
Kovner	C	
1998	
Image	J	Nurs	Sch	
	
Nurse	to	patient	ratio	 ***	 	 *	 Low	
Kovner	C	
2002	
Health	Serv	Res	
	
Nurse	to	patient	ratio	 **	 	 	 Low	
Cho	SH	
2003	
Nurs	Res	
	
Nurse	to	patient	ratio	 ***	 *	 **	 Low	
Rosen	AK	
2009	
Med	Care	
	
Duty	hour	reform	 ****	 **	 *	 Medium	
Pronovost	
1999	
JAMA	
	
ITU	Physician	input	 ***	 **	 **	 Medium	
Aiken	LH	
2003	
JAMA	
	
Educational	level	of	nurses	
and	mortality	
***	 **	 **	 Medium	
Snow	BW	
1996	
Pediatrics	
	
Sub-specialization	 **	 	 ***	 Low	
Tu	JV	
2001	
J	Vasc	Surg	
	
Sub-specialization	 ****	 **	 ***	 High	
Zorcolo	L	
2003	
Dis	Colon	Rectum	
	
Sub-specialization	 ****	 **	 ***	 High	
Heldenberg	E	
2004	
Isr	Med	Assoc	J	
Sub-specialization	 ****	 	 ***	 Medium	
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Table	3.2	Quality	assessment,	observational	studies,	Newcastle-Ottawa	Scale	(part	2)	
Study	
	
Intervention/Aim	 Selection	 Comparability	 Exposure/O
utcome	
Quality	Score	
Biondo	S	2010	
	Arch	Surg	
	
Sub-specialization	 ***	 **	 **	 Medium	
Smith	JAE	2003	
BJS	
	
Specialization	of	colorectal	
services	
**	 *	 **	 Low	
Sitzler	PJ	2004	
Colorectal	Dis	
	
Specialization	of	colorectal	
services	
**	 *	 *	 Low	
Di	Carlo	2001	
Dis	Colon	Rectum	
	
Specialization	and	
diverticular	fistula	outcome	
***	 	 *	 Low	
Ashkan	K	2003	
Ann	R	Coll	Surg	Engl.	
	
Neurosurgery	specialization	
for	aneurysms	
***	 	 **	 Low	
Agada	FO	2004	
Clin	Otolaryngol	
	
Sub	specialization	for	
thyroid	disease	
****	 	 **	 Low	
Sandblom	G	2000	
Eur	J	Surg	
	
Benchmarking	and	audit	to	
reduce	hernia	recurrence	
****	 	 ***	 Medium	
Morton	J	2006	
Surg	Endosc	
	
Voluntary	outcome	data	
submission	and	surgical	
outcome	
**	 *	 **	 Low	
Khuri	SF	2008	
Ann	Surg	
	
National	Surgical	Quality	
Improvement	Programme	in	
the	private	sector	
	
**	 *	 **	 Low	
Hall	BL	2009	
Ann	Surg.	
	
National	Surgical	Quality	
Improvement	Programme	
***	 *	 ***	 Medium	
Tan	JJ		2005	
Asian	J	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 *	 *	 Low	
Westvik	HH	2006	
J	Surg	Res	
	
Care	pathway	 **	 **	 **	 Low	
Muller	MK	2009	
Langenbecks	Arch	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ***	 *	 	 Low	
Parrado	CL	2008	
Qual	Manag	Health	Care	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 *	 ***	 Medium	
Trussell	J	2008	
Am	J	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 *	 **	 Medium	
Lee	BT	2008	
J	AM	Coll	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 	 **	 Low	
Stephen	AE	2003	
Surgery	
	
Care	pathway	 ***	 *	 *	 Low		
Raue	W	2004	
Surg	Endosc	
	
Care	pathway	 ***	 **	 *	 Low	
Kariv	Y	2007	
Dis	Colon	Rectum	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 *	 ***	 Medium	
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Table	3.3	Quality	assessment,	observational	studies,	Newcastle-Ottawa	Scale	(part	3)	
Study	
	
Intervention/Aim	 Selection	 Comparability	 Exposure/O
utcome	
Quality	Score	
Teeuwen	PH	
2010	
J	Gastrointest	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ***	 **	 **	 Medium	
Polle	SW	
2007	
Dig	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 *	 **	 Medium	
Holtzman	J	
1998	
Med	Care	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 	 **	 Low	
Stanley	AC	
1998	
J	Vasc	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 *	 **	 Medium	
Leibman	BD	
1998	
Urology	
	
Care	pathway	 ***	 	 *	 Low	
Chang	PL	
1999	
J	Urol		
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 	 *	 Low	
Pearson	S	
2000	
Aust	N	Z	J	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 *	 ***	 Medium	
Vitaz	TW	
2001	
J	Spinal	Disord	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 **	 **	 Medium	
Chang	SS	
2002	
J	Urol	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 	 *	 Low	
Choong	PF	
2000	
Med	J	Aust	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 **	 ***	 High	
Tomaszek	SC	
2010	
Eur	J	Cardiothorac	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 *	 *	 Low	
Munitiz	V	
2010	
Br	J	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ***	 **	 *	 Low	
Sheffield	KM	
2011	
J	Am	Coll	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 *	 ***	 Medium	
Archibald	LH	
2011	
Dis	Colon	Rectum	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 	 **	 Low	
Ronellenfitsch	U	
2012	
Obes	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 ****	 **	 *	 Medium	
Weber	
2011	
European	J	Surgical	
Oncology	
	
Short	stay	protocol	to	
reduce	complications	post	
mastectomy	
***	 *	 **	 Low	
Sweeney	AB	
2002	
Postgrad	Med	J	
	
Care	pathway	for	vascular	
patients	to	reduce	length	of	
stay	
*	 	 *	 Low	
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Table	3.4	Quality	assessment,	observational	studies,	Newcastle-Ottawa	Scale	(part	4)	
Study	
	
Intervention/Aim	 Selection	 Comparability	 Exposure/O
utcome	
Quality	Score	
Sarkar	
2011	
J	Trauma	
	
Safety	programme	to	
reduce	mortality	for	trauma	
patients	
****	 *	 **	 Medium	
Ryckman	
2009	
Jt	Comm	J	Qual	Pat	Saf	
	
Surgical	site	infection	
prevention	bundle		
****	 	 **	 Low	
Thomas	M	
2012	
Ann	Thorac	Surg	
	
Surgeon	operative	workload	 ***	 *	 **	 Low	
Sochalski	J	
2008	
Med	care	
	
Nursing	staff	levels	and	
outcome	
***	 *	 **	 Low	
McCulloch	P	
2010	
BMJ	
	
Care	pathway	to	reduce	
error	
**	 *	 	 Low	
James	
2012		
J	Bone	Joint	Surg	Am.	
	
Signing	the	surgical	site	to	
avoid	wrong	site	surgery	
****	 *	 **	 Medium	
Beaupre	LA	
2006	
Qual	Saf	Health	Care	
	
Care	pathway	to	reduce	
error	in	hip	fracture	patients	
***	 **	 *	 Low	
Sewell	M	
2011	
Int	Orthop	
	
Increase	use	of	WHO	
Checklist	
****	 *	 *	 Low	
Zavalkoff	SR	
2011	
Pediatr	Crit	Care	Med	
	
Handover	checklist	 ***	 **	 	 Low	
de	Vries	EN	
2010	
N	Engl	J	Med	
	
SURPASS	Checklist	 ****	 **	 ***	 High	
Askarian	M	
2011	
Qual	Manag	Health	Care	
	
WHO	checklist	 ***	 	 **	 Low	
Weiser	TG	
2010	
Ann	Surg	
	
WHO	checklist	 ****	 *	 **	 Medium	
Bliss	LA	
2012	
J	Am	Coll	Surg	
	
Theatre	checklist	 ***	 *	 **	 Low	
Van	Klei	WA	
2012	
Ann	Surg	
	
WHO	checklist	and	mortality	 ***	 **	 **	 Medium	
Robb	WB		
2012	
J	Gastro.	
Surg.	
	
Laparoscopic	
cholecystectomy	checklist	
****	 	 **	 Low	
Haynes	AB	
2009	
NEJM	
	
WHO	checklist	and	mortality	 ****	 *	 **	 Medium	
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Table	3.5	Quality	assessment,	observational	studies,	Newcastle-Ottawa	Scale	(part	5)	
Study	
	
Intervention/Aim	 Selection	 Comparability	 Exposure/O
utcome	
Quality	Score	
Lily	CM	
2011	
JAMA	
	
Tele-intensive	care	unit	to	
reduce	complications	
****	 **	 **	 Medium	
Young-Xu	
2011	
Arch	Surg	
	
Medical	Team	Training	
Program	
****	 **	 **	 Medium	
McCulloch	P		
2008	
Qual	Saf	Health	Care	
	
Non-technical	skills	training	
and	technical	error	
***	 *	 *	 Low	
Stather	
2010	
Thorac	Cardiovasc	Surg	
	
Education	to	reduce	error	in	
chest	drain	removal	
***	 	 **	 Low	
Goh	ES	
2009	
Int	J	Health	Care	Qual	
Assur.	
	
Training	programme	to	
reduce	cataract	surgery	
error	
***	 	 **	 Low	
Stringer	B	
2009	
Public	Health	Rep	
	
Reduce	needle	stick	injury	
through	training	
****	 *	 **	 Medium	
Cima	
2009	
Jt	Comm	J	Qual	Pt	Saf.	
	
Education	programme	to	
reduce	gossypiboma	
*	 	 *	 Low	
Brooke	BS	
2012	
Surgery	
	
National	Quality	Forum	Safe	
Practices	
***	 *	 ***	 Medium	
Kalina	M	
2009	
Pediar	Emerg	Care.	
	
MDT	decision	making,	
medication	reporting	
system	
****	 	 **	 Low	
Aga	H	
2012	
BMJ	Open	
	
Audit	and	benchmarking	
leading	to	increased	
consultant	input,	reduced	
time	to	theatre	and	increase	
HDU/ITU	provision	
	
***	 *	 **	 Low	
Bull	A		
2011	
J	Hosp	Infect.	
	
Care	pathway	(warming,	
normoglycaemia,	O2,	
antibiotics),checklist	
****		 	 *	 Low	
Novis	
2010	
J	Vasc	Surg	
	
Computerized	risk	
assessment	program	
***	 **	 **	 Medium	
Ryan	S	
2010	
IJS	
	
Electronic	handover	to	
reduce	length	of	stay	
****	 **	 **	 Medium	
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Table	3.6	Quality	assessment,	randomized	controlled	trials	quality	assessment,	the	
Cochrane	Collaboration	tool	for	assessing	risk	of	bias	
Study	 Intervention/Ai
m	
Selection	bias	 Performance	
bias	
Detection	
bias	
Attrition	bias	 Reporting	
bias	
Other	bias	
Random	
sequence	
generation	
	
Allocation	
concealment	
Muehling	BM	
2008	
Eur	J	
Cardiothoracic	
Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 Unclear	 Unclear	 Unclear	 High	risk	 Low	risk	 Unclear		 High	risk	
Ren	L	
2012	
World	J	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 Low	risk	 High	risk	 High	risk	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	 Unclear	 Low	risk	
Khoo	CK	
2007	
Ann	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	 High	risk	 Unclear	 Low	risk	 Unclear	 Unclear	
Gatt	M	
2005	
Br	J	Surg	
	
Care	pathway	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	 High	risk	 High	risk	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	 Unclear	
Delaney	CO		
2003	
Dis	Colon	
Rectum	
	
Care	pathway	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	 High	risk	 Unclear	 Low	risk	 Unclear	 Low	risk	
Serclova	Z	
2009	
Clin	Nutr	
	
Care	pathway	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	 High	risk	 High	risk	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	
Muller	S	
2009	
Gastroenterolo
gy	
	
Care	pathway	 Low	risk	 Unclear	 High	risk	 High	risk	 Low	risk	 Unclear	 Low	risk	
Cima	
2011	
Jt.	Commission	
Journal	Quality		
Patient	Safety	
	
Data-matrix-
coded	sponge	
system	
Unclear	 Unclear	 High	risk	 Unclear	 Unclear	 Unclear	 Unclear	
Brannick	MT	
2009	
Academic	
Medicine	
Decrease	
operative	error	
through	
training	
Unclear	 Unclear	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	 Low	risk	
	
	3.5.3 Studies	investigating	structural	interventions	
The	structural	interventions	were	categorised	into	studies	improving	staffing	factors	(16	
observational	studies)	and	studies	investigating	surgeon	sub-specialisation	(10	observational	
studies).[418-434]		
3.5.3.1 	Staffing	factors	
Four	studies,	that	examined	staffing	factors,	were	of	medium	quality	and	the	rest	were	
scored	as	low	on	the	Newcastle	Ottawa	scale.[424	435-437]	Having	daily	ITU	physician	ward	
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rounds	for	surgical	patients	decreased	the	risk	of	sepsis	{Odds	ratio	(OR):0.56,	95%	
Confidence	Interval	(CI)	0.91-0.99}.[437]	Increasing	nurse	to	patient	ratios	reduced	failure	to	
rescue	{OR:0.94(95%CI	0.89-0.99}	and	employing	nursing	staff	with	bachelor	degrees	
significantly	decreased	rates	of	adverse	events	{OR:0.95(95%CI	0.91-0.99)}.[424	436]	
Increasing	the	number	of	junior	surgeons	did	not	have	a	significant	effect	on	adverse	
events.[435](Table	3.7)	
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Table	3.7	Selected	papers	relating	to	staffing	factors	and	reduction	in	adverse	events	in	surgery	
Paper	 Number	
patients	
	
Date	and	
country	of	
study		
Study	design	 Specialty	 Intervention	 Adverse	event	 	 Odds	ratio	 95%	Confidence	
interval	
p	value	 Mortality	OR	 95%	Confidence	
interval)	
p	value	
Rosen	AK	2009		
Med	Care	
	
985,664	
	
2000-2005	
USA	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Surgery	
	
Resident	to	patient	ratio	
	
Sepsis	and	
respiratory	
failure	
	
Surgical	
complications	
	
Veterans	
Affairs	
Medicare	
	
Veterans	
Affairs	
Medicare	
0.926	
	
1.05	
	
0.980	
	
0.893	
	
0.588	–	1.45	
	
0.93-1.18	
	
0.694-1.39	
	
0.976-0.990	
n/a	
	
	
	
	
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
Pronovost	P	1999		
JAMA	
	
2,987	
	
1994-1996	
USA	
Retrospective	
cohort	
Vascular	
Surgery	
	
Daily	ITU	physician	
rounds	
	
All	adverse	
events	
Cardiac	
complications	
Sepsis		
	 0.666	
	
0.714	
	
0.556	
0.500-1.25	
	
0.128-2.00	
	
0.143-0.833	
	
n/a	 0.333	
	
0.368-1.45	 n/a	
Aiken	LH		
2003		
JAMA	
	
342	
	
1998-1999	
USA	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Surgery	
	
Educational	level	of	
Registered	Nurses	
	
Failure	to	
rescue	
	 0.950	 0.910-0.990	 0.020	 0.900	
	
0.910-0.990	
	
0.008	
Ghaferi	AA		
2010			
J	Am	Coll	Surg	
16,900	
	
2000-2006	
USA	
Cohort	study	 Surgery	
	
Nurse	to	patient	ratio	
	
Failure	to	
rescue	
	 0.940	 0.890-0.990	
	
	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
n/a	=	not	reported	by	paper,	numbers	in	bold	to	highlight	statistical	significance;	p	value<0.05	
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Table	3.8	Selected	papers	relating	to	sub-specialisation	and	reduction	in	adverse	events	in	surgery	
Paper	 No.	
patients	
Date	and	
country	of	
study		
Study	design	 Specialty	 Intervention	 Adverse	event	 Adverse	
events	%		
decrease			
p	value	 Mortality	
%	
decrease	
p	value	 Mortality	
Odds	ratio	
95%	
Confidence	
interval	
p	value	 Median	
LOS	
decrease	
IQR	
Tu	JV		
2001	
J	Vasc	Surg	
	
5,878	
	
1992-1996	
Canada	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Vascular	 Sub-
specialisation	
	
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 0.617	 0.448-0.847	 0.003	 n/a	 n/a	
Heldenberg	E		
2004	
Isr	Med	Assoc	J	
75	
	
1991-1996	
Israel	
Cohort	study	 Colorectal	 Sub-
specialisation	
All	Adverse	
events	
6.40	 n/a	 0.019	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
Biondo	S		
2010		
Arch	Surg	
	
1,046	
	
1993-2006	
Spain	
Cohort	study	 Colorectal	 Sub-
specialisation	
	
Anastomotic	
leak	
Re-operation	
5.90	
	
-0.20	
0.01	 10.4	 0.001	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 16.0(5-
153)	
5-153	
Zorcolo	L	
2003		
Dis	Colon	Rectum	
	
342	
	
1990-2000	
UK	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Colorectal	 Sub-
specialisation	
	
Systemic	
Complications	
Wound	
infection	
Anastomotic	
leak		
4.00	
	
9.00	
	
0.00	
0.50	
	
0.007	
	
1.00	
6.99	 0.08	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
n/a	=	not	reported	by	paper,	numbers	in	bold	to	highlight	statistical	significance;	p	value<0.05	
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Table	3.9	Selected	papers	relating	to	checklists	and	reduction	in	adverse	events	in	surgery	
Paper	 No.	
patients	
Date	of	study	
inclusion	
Study	design	 Specialty	 Intervention	 Adverse	event	 Relative	risk	
/Odds	ratio	
95%	
Confidence	
interval	
Adverse	events	
%	decrease		
p	value	 Mortality	
RR/OR	
95%	Confidence	
interval)	
Mortality	
%	
decrease		
p	value	
de	Vries	EN	
2010		
N	Engl	J	Med	
	
7,580		 2007-2209	
Netherlands	
Prospective	
multicentre	
cohort	study	
Surgery	 SURPASS	Checklist	
	
All	adverse	
events	
10.6	 8.70-12.4	 n/a	 n/a	 0.7(RR)	 0.2-1.2	 n/a	 n/a	
Weiser	TG	
2010		
Ann	Surg	
	
1,750		 Not	stated	
International	
Prospective	
multicentre	
cohort	study	
Surgery	 WHO	checklist	
	
All	adverse	
events	
n/a	 n/a	 6.70	 0.0001	 n/a	 n/a	 2.30	 0.0067	
van	Klei	WA	
2012			
Ann	Surg	
	
25,315		 2007-2010	
Netherlands	
Retrospectiv
e	cohort	
Surgery	 WHO	checklist	
	
Major	adverse	
cardiac	event	
0.9	 0.6-1.4	 0.03	 n/a	 0.85(OR)	 0.73-0.98	 	 	
Haynes	AB		
2009		
NEJM	
	
7,688		 2007-2008	
Multinational	
Prospective	
Cohort	study	
Surgery	 WHO	checklist	
	
All	adverse	
events	
	
Respiratory	
complication	
Wound	
infection	
Reoperation	
n/a	 n/a	 3.00	
	
	
-0.20	
	
2.80	
	
0.60	
0.001	
	
	
0.46	
	
0.001	
0.047	
n/a	 n/a	 0.70	
	
0.003	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	n/a	=	not	reported	by	paper,	numbers	in	bold	to	highlight	statistical	significance;	p	value<0.05	
	
Table	3.10	Selected	papers	relating	to	benchmarking	interventions	and	reduction	in	adverse	events	in	surgery	
Paper	 No.	
patients	
	
Date	of	
study	
inclusion	
Study	design	 Specialty	 Intervention	 Adverse	
event	
Adverse	
events	%	
decrease		
Mean	
improvement	
p	
value	
Adverse	
event		
Odds	ratio	
95%	
Confidence	
interval	
Mortality		
Mean		
decrease	
p	value	 Mortalit
y	OR	
95%	
Confidence	
interval	
Sandblom	G	
2000		
Eur	J	Surg	
	
1,232	
	
1984-1997	
Sweden	
Prospective	
cohort	study	
General	
Surgery	
Bench-marking	 Hernia	
recurrence	
8.6%	 n/a	 0.001	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
Hall	BL		
2009		
Ann	Surg	
	
300,251	
	
2005-2007	
USA	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Surgery	 NSQIP	 All	adverse	
events	
n/a	 0.114*	 0.05	 n/a	 n/a	 0.174*	
	
0.05	 n/a	 n/a	
Brooke	BS	
2012	Surgery	
	
79,462	
	
2004-2006	
USA	
Retrospective	
cohort	study.	
Surgery	 National	
Quality	Forum	
practices	
All	adverse	
events	
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 1.13	 1.03-1.25	
	
n/a	 n/a	 0.800	 0.710-0.910	
n/a	=	not	reported	by	paper,	numbers	in	bold	to	highlight	statistical	significance;	p	value<0.05	
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Table	3.11	Selected	papers	relating	to	new	technology	or	training	interventions	and	reduction	in	adverse	events	in	surgery	
	
Paper	 No.	
patients	
	
Date	of	study	
inclusion	
Study	design	 Specialty	 Intervention	 Adverse	event	 Adverse	
event	%	
decrease	
p	value	
	
Adverse	
event	Odds	
ratio	
95%	
Confidence	
interval	
Mortality	
Odds	ratio	
95%	
Confidence	
interval)	
Decrease	in	
Mean	Length	of	
stay	
p	value	
Novis		
2010		
J	Vasc	Surg	
	
800	
	
2007-2008	
USA	
Cohort	study	 Surgery	 Computerized	risk	
assessment	program	
	
30-day	DVT	
	
90-day	DVT	
1.20	
	
0.700	
0.12	
	
0.58	
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 1.00	 0.047	
Lilly	CM		
2011		
JAMA	
	
6,290	
	
2005-2006	
USA	
Prospective	
cohort	study	
Surgery	 Tele	intensive	care	
unit	(i.e.	remote	
care)	
	
Respiratory	
events	
Catheter	sepsis	
Renal	events	
	
11.4	
	
0.40	
0.00	
0.001	
	
0.001	
0.38	
0.150	
	
0.500	
1.000	
0.090-0.230	
	
0.270-0.930	
0.71-1.69	
0.400	 0.310-0.520	 n/a	 n/a	
Cima	RR	2011	
Jt	Comm	J	Qual	
Patient	Saf	
	
87,404	
	
2009	
USA	
RCT	 Surgery	 Data-matrix-coded	
sponge	system	
	
Retained	swab	 0.016*	 0.001	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
Young-Xu	2011		
Arch	Surg	
	
119,383	
	
2006-2008	
USA	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Surgery	 Medical	Team	
Training	Program	
	
All	adverse	events	 1.20	
	
0.001	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
Brannick	MT		
2009		
Acad	Med	
	
14,913	
	
2006-2007	
USA	
RCT	 Surgery	 Training	program	
	
All	adverse	events	 8.8	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
Stringer	B	2009		
Pub	Health	
Reports	
10,596	
	
n/a	
Canada	
Case	control	
study	
Surgery	 Training	video	
	
Needle-stick		 n/a	 	 0.50	 0.430-0.910	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
n/a	=	not	reported	by	paper,	numbers	in	bold	to	highlight	statistical	significance;	p	value<0.05	
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Table	3.12	Selected	papers	relating	to	care	pathways	and	reduction	in	adverse	events	in	surgery	(part	1)	
Paper	 Number	
patients	
	
Date	of	study	
inclusion	
Study	design	 Specialty	 Adverse	event	 Adverse	
events	%	
decrease		
p	value	 Adverse	
events	Odds	
ratio	
p	value	 Mortality	%	
decrease	
p	value	 Length	of	stay	%	
decrease/mean	
difference	
p	value	/	95%	
Confidence	
interval	
Muehling	BM	2008		
Eur	J	Cardiothoracic	
Surg	
	
58	
	
	
Not	stated	
Germany	
RCT	 Thoracic		 All	adverse	
events	
	
Respiratory	
complications	
	
20.0	
	
	
29.0	
	
0.172	
	
	
0.009	
n/a	 n/a	 -1%	 Not	
significant	
0.00	 n/a	
Parrado	CL	2008		
Qual	Manag	Health	
Care	
	
86	
	
200-2005	
Spain	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Urology	 All	adverse	
events	
6.00	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 0.090	 0.480-	3.26	
Trussell	J		
2008		
Am	J	Surg	
	
1,482	
	
Not	stated	
USA	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Cardiothoracic		 Wound	
infection	
2.00	 0.001	 2.10	 0.001	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
Kariv	Y		
2007		
Dis	Colon	Rectum	
	
194	
	
200-2004	
USA	
Cohort	study	 Colorectal	 Wound	
infection	
	
Anastomotic	
leak	
	
Re-operation	
	
4.21	
	
	
-7.40	
	
	
1.00	
0.19	
	
	
0.23	
	
	
0.80	
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 0.70	 0.071	
Teeuwen	PH		
2010	
J	Gastrointest	Surg	
	
183	
	
2003-2008	
Netherlands	
Cohort	study		 Colorectal	 All	adverse	
events	
	
Anastomotic	
leak	
	
	
32.0	
	
	
4.10	
	
	
0.008	
	
	
0.34	
	
	
n/a	 n/a	 1.60	 0.55	 3.00	 0.021	
Polle	SW		
2007		
Dig	Surg	
	
107	
	
2003-2005	
Netherlands	
Cohort	study	 Colorectal	 Major	
complications	
	
Minor	
complications	
	
Re-operation	
0.800	
	
	
2.70	
	
	
-3.10	
	
1.00	
	
	
0.784	
	
	
0.516	
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 2.50	 0.027	
Ren	L	
2012		
World	J	Surg	
597	
	
2007-2010	
China	
RCT	 Colorectal	 All	adverse	
events	
-0.30	 0.900	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 0.90	 0.001	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
n/a	=	not	reported	by	paper,	numbers	in	bold	to	highlight	statistical	significance;	p	value<0.05	
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Table	3.13	Selected	papers	relating	to	care	pathways	and	reduction	in	adverse	events	in	surgery	(part	2)	
Paper	 Number	
patients	
	
Date	of	study	
inclusion	
Study	design	 Specialty	 Adverse	event	 Adverse	
events	%	
decrease		
p	value	 Adverse	
events	Odds	
ratio	
p	value	 Mortality	%	
decrease	
p	value	 Length	of	stay	%	
decrease/mean	
difference	
p	value	/	95%	
Confidence	
interval	
Stanley	AC		
1998		
J	Vasc	Surg	
	
136	
	
1994-1997	
USA	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Vascular	 All	adverse	
events	
-8.00	 0.13	 n/a	 n/a	 -1.00	 0.90	 2.00	 0.020	
Pearson	S		
2000		
Aust	NZJ	Surg	
	
177	
	
1996-1998	
Australia	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Orthopaedic		 All	adverse	
events	
	
Re-admission	
	
0.700	
	
	
8.35	
>0.05	
	
	
>0.05	
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 2.00	 0.0001	
Vitaz	TW		
2001		
J	Spinal	Disord	
	
40	
	
1996	
USA	
Prospective	
cohort	study	
	
Neurosurgery	 Respiratory	
complications	
0.50		 0.050	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 11.7	 0.050	
Choong	PF		
2000		
Med	J	Aust	
	
111	
	
1997-1998	
Australia	
Prospective	
cohort	study	
Orthopaedic	 All	adverse	
events	
	
Re-admission	
	
12.0	
	
	
7.00	
>0.05	
	
	
>0.05	
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 	 1.40	 0.030	
Khoo	CK		
2007		
Ann	Surg	
	
81	
	
2003-2004	
UK	
RCT	 Colorectal	 Anastomotic	
leak	
Cardio-	
Respiratory	
	
5.70	
	
11.4	
n/a	
	
	
n/a	
n/a	 n/a	 5.71	 n/a	 2.00	 0.001	
Gatt	M		
2005	
Br	J	Surg	
	
39	
	
Not	stated	
UK	
RCT	 Colorectal	 All	adverse	
events	
27.6	 0.076	 n/a	 n/a	 -0.053	 n/a	 2.50	 0.027	
Delaney	CO	2003		
Dis	Colon	Rectum	
	
64	
	
Not	stated	
USA	
RCT	 Colorectal	 All	adverse	
events	
Re-admission	
	
8.00	
	
8.50	
0.58	
	
0.48	
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 1.70	 0.022	
Serclova	Z		
2009		
Clin	Nutr	
	
105	
	
2005-2007	
Czech	
Republic	
RCT	 Colorectal	 All	adverse	
events		
26.5	 0.003	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 3.00	 0.001	
	
Muller	S		
2009		
Gastroenterology	
	
156	
	
2004-2006	
Switzerland	
RCT	 Colorectal	 All	adverse	
events	
28.3	 0.001	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 4.00	 0.0001	
Sheffield	KM	2011		
J	Am	Coll	Surg	
	
567	
	
2005-2010	
USA	
Prospective	
cohort	study		
General	Surgery	 All	adverse	
events	
Re-admission	
	
3.87	
	
23.2	
0.42	
	
0.0001	
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 1.00	 0.010	
n/a	=	not	reported	by	paper,	numbers	in	bold	to	highlight	statistical	significance;	p	value<0.05	
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Table	3.14	Selected	papers	relating	to	care	pathways	and	reduction	in	adverse	events	in	surgery	(part	3)	
Papr	 Number	
patients	
	
Date	of	study	
inclusion	
Study	design	 Specialty	 Adverse	event	 Adverse	
events	%	
decrease		
p	value	 Adverse	
events	Odds	
ratio	
p	value	 Mortality	%	
decrease	
p	value	 Length	of	stay	%	
decrease/mean	
difference	
p	value	/	95%	
Confidence	
interval	
Ronellenfitsch	U		
2012		
Obes	Surg	
	
129	
	
2007-2009	
Germany	
Cohort	study	 Bariatric	 All	adverse	
events	
1.70	 0.98	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 1.00	 0.007	
Sarkar	
2011	
J	Trauma	
	
3,810,529	
	
2004-2008	
USA	
	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Trauma	Surgery	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 11.7	
	
7.1	
0.010	
	
0.010	
n/a	 n/a	
James	2012		
J	Bone	J	Surg	Am		
1,291,396	
	
1999-2010	
USA	
Cohort	study	 Orthopaedic	 Wrong	site	
surgery	
0.001	 0.550	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a		
n/a	=	not	reported	by	paper,	numbers	in	bold	to	highlight	statistical	significance;	p	value<0.05	
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3.5.3.2 Sub-specialization	
Significant	reduction	in	adverse	events	were	described	in	two	of	the	four	medium	to	high	
quality	observational	studies,	both	concerning	the	reduction	of	complications	post	
colorectal	surgery	through	the	use	of	specialty	trained	colorectal	surgeons.	[432	434]	
Zorcolo	et	al	found	a	9.72%(6.78%	vs.	16.5%)	reduction	in	wound	infection	post	
specialization	of	services	(p=0.007),	Biondo	et	al	found	a	5.90%(6.20%	vs.	12.1%)	decrease	in	
anastomotic	leak	rate	(p=0.01)	but	no	significant	effect	on	re-operation	rate.	This	effect	was	
independent	of	the	operative	volume.	(Table	3.8)	3.5.4 Studies	investigating	process	interventions	
Of	the	sixty-five	studies,	(nine	RCTs	and	fifty-six	observational	studies)	thirty-three	were	of	
sufficient	quality	for	detailed	analysis.[48	438-500]	
3.5.4.1 Benchmarking	
A	significant	reduction	in	all	adverse	events	was	observed	as	a	result	of	hospitals	enrolling	in	
the	American	College	of	Surgeons	National	Surgical	Quality	Improvement	Program	(NSQIP)	
{mean	improvement	0.11	(p=0.05)},	and	benchmarking	of	results	reduced	recurrence	rate	
for	hernia	repair,	though	this	was	not	statistically	significant.	[438	441]	(Error!	Reference	
source	not	found.Table	3.9)	
3.5.4.2 	Checklists	
The	World	Health	Organisation	theatre	checklist	was	found	to	significantly	reduce	adverse	
events	in	three	cohort	studies.	Weiser	and	colleagues	found	a	6.70%(11.7%	vs.	18.4%)	
decrease	in	adverse	events	(p=0.001)	and	van	Klei	and	colleagues	found	a	reduced	adverse	
event	rate	when	the	checklist	was	implemented	in	the	Netherlands	{OR:0.60(95%CI	0.60-
1.40)}.[483	485]	Haynes	et	al,	found	a	3.00%	decrease	in	adverse	events	(p=0.001)	from	
checklist	use	in	an	international	study	in	a	variety	of	surgical	procedures.[48]	Another	
cohort	study	examining	a	surgical	inpatient	checklist:	a	perioperative	surgical	patient	safety	
system	‘SURPASS’	showed	reduced	adverse	events	{RR:10.60(95%CI8.70-12.40)}	and	
mortality	rates	{RR:0.70(95%CI	0.20-1.20)}.[481],Checklists	featured	in	other	studies	but	
these	were	deemed	of	low	quality	so	were	not	included	in	this	analysis.[479	480	482	484	
486]	(Table	3.10)	
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3.5.4.3 Multiple	interventions	
Four	studies	combined	all	of	the	described	process	interventions.	Only	one	of	the	four	
studies	was	of	suitable	quality.	This	study,	in	the	USA,	addressed	the	effect	of	following	a	set	
of	National	Quality	Forum	safety	practices	and	showed	that	compliance	did	not	correlate	
with	reduction	in	adverse	events	{Odds	ratio:	1.13	(95%CI	1.03-1.25)}.[487](Table	3.11)	
3.5.4.4 Safety	Technology		
Three	studies	were	of	sufficient	quality	for	analysis.	Utilising	a	computerised	risk	assessment	
program	had	no	effect	of	30-day	deep	vein	thrombosis	(reduction	in	rates	by	1.25%(1.50%	
vs.	0.25%)	(p=0.12).[491]	Tele-intensive	care	unit	systems	reduced	post-operative	
respiratory	complications	{OR:0.15(95%CI	0.09-0.23)}	and	coded	sponge	detection	systems	
significantly	reduced	retained	swabs	by	0.02%(0.00%	vs.	0.02%)	(p=0.001).[492	493]	(Table	
3.11)	
3.5.4.5 Training	
A	cohort	study	in	the	United	States	assessed	the	effect	of	medical	team	training	and	showed	
a	significant	reduction	of	all	post-operative	adverse	events	{RR:0.83(95%CI	0.82-
0.84)}(p=0.001).[494]	A	randomised	controlled	trial	assessing	using	a	training	program	
including	role	play	and	video	teaching	to	reduce	adverse	events	produced	an	1.05%	(2.14%	
vs.	3.19%)	decrease	but	this	was	not	significant	(p<0.05).[495]	Using	video	to	educate	on	
safety	practices	was	effective	in	preventing	needle-stick	injuries	{OR:0.50	(95%CI	0.43-
0.91)}.[494	495	499]	(Table	3.11)	
3.5.4.6 Care	Pathways	
Thirty-eight	studies	met	the	inclusion	criteria	but	only	twenty	were	medium	to	high	quality	
observational	studies	or	RCTs.	Of	these	higher	quality	studies,	nine	related	to	enhanced	
recovery	colorectal	pathways.[451-454	464-467	501]	Two	cardiothoracic	studies,	one	
neurosurgical	paper	and	three	colorectal	studies	showed	a	significant	decrease	in	adverse	
events.	[444	447	452	460	466	467]	Three	studies,	conversely	showed	a	non-significant	
increase	in	adverse	events.	For	colorectal	patients	Kariv	et	al	showed	an	increase	in	
anastomotic	leak	rate	{7.40%(19.0	vs.	26.3%	(p=0.58)}	for	ileal	pouch	patients	and	Ren	et	al.	
demonstrated	an	increase	in	all	adverse	events	{3.10%(9.40	vs.9.70)	(p=0.52)}.	[453	454]	
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Examining	a	vascular	care	pathway	Stanley	et	al	found	a	non-significant	decrease	in	all	
adverse	events	{8.00%	(8.00%	vs.	16.00%)	(p=0.13)}.[456]	(Tables	3.12,3.12,3.14)	
3.6 DISCUSSION	3.6.1 Overall	findings	
A	systematic	review	of	all	methods	used	to	reduce	surgical	harm	has	not	been	undertaken	
previously.	The	structural	interventions	that	significantly	reduced	adverse	events	in	surgery	
were:		improving	nurse	to	patient	ratios	and	having	ITU	physician	involvement	for	surgical	
post-operative	patients.		Sub-specialization	in	surgery	reduced	error,	independently	of	the	
volume-outcome	relationship.	Effective	process	factors	included	submitting	surgical	
outcome	data	to	national	audit,	using	a	checklist	to	safeguard	against	error	and	adhering	to	
a	care	pathway.	Using	certain	safety	technology	significantly	enables	reduction	in	harm,	and	
team	training	has	a	positive	effect	on	patient	outcome.		
Most	of	these	interventions	have	few	medium	to	high	quality	cohort	studies	to	provide	
evidence	of	benefit.	The	strongest	evidenced	based	interventions	identified	were	care-	
pathways	and	surgical	safety	checklists	and	these	can	be	recommended	for	implementation	
into	surgical	care.	3.6.2 Comparison	with	other	literature	
The	approach	of	this	systematic	review	is	similar	to	a	recently	published	series	in	the	Annals	
of	Internal	Medicine,	which	reviewed	medical	patient	safety	strategies	and	their	evidence	
basis.	This	review	is	the	first	to	address	measurable	success	in	the	literature	of	surgical	
safety.	The	findings	of	this	review	concur	with	other	reviews	that	examined	the	impact	of	an	
individual	intervention.	Pronovost	and	colleagues	systematically	reviewed	ITU	physician	
staffing	and	patient	outcome	and	found	that	high	intensity	staffing	reduced	mortality	and	
length	of	stay.	Adverse	event	rate	was	not	specifically	addressed.[158]		
Care	pathways	are	well	described	in	the	literature;	most	trials	are	concerned	with	length	of	
stay	and	thirty	day	mortality	as	outcomes.	The	Cochrane	review	performed	by	Spanjersberg	
and	colleagues	examined	fast	track	surgery	pathways	in	colorectal	surgery,	five	of	their	
studies	were	included	in	this	analysis.[502]	Spansiersberg	et	al	showed	a	decrease	in	overall	
complications;	which	is	consistent	with	our	findings.	Similar	to	the	findings	of	our	study,	
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Spansiersberg	et	al	commented	that	methodological	quality	was	poor.		Lemmens	and	
colleagues	systematically	reviewed	all	digestive	surgery	care	pathways	and	found	a	positive	
but	non-significant	effect	on	adverse	events.	[503]	Hall	and	colleagues	performed	a	
systematic	review	of	enhanced	recovery	programmes	in	hepatobiliary	surgery.		They	
demonstrated	reduced	length	of	stay	with	no	significant	change	in	morbidity.[504]	
Borchard	and	colleagues	in	a	systematic	review	found	the	use	of	checklists	in	surgery	
reduced	complication	rates	as	well	as	mortality.[49]	The	studies	included	by	Borchard	et	al	
did	not	examine	adverse	event	rate	as	a	primary	outcome	but	showed	a	beneficial	effect	on	
the	incidence	of	harm	as	a	result	of	checklist	use.	The	literature	regarding	the	importance	of	
medical	team	training	in	nontechnical	skills	is	vast.	Whilst	one	systematic	review	by	Hull	and	
colleagues	showed	a	relationship	between	team-training	and	technical	intra-operative	
performance	few	studies,	however,	address	the	effect	on	patient	outcome.	[505]	3.6.3 Strengths	and	limitations	of	the	study	
There	are	acknowledged	difficulties	in	reviewing	the	literature	on	evidence-based	safety	
initiatives	due	the	traditional	approach	of	quality	of	care	research;	which	has	focused	on	
analysis	and	amendment	of	process	errors	rather	than	improving	better	outcomes.[409]		
There	were	many	studies	found	in	the	literature	but	most	were	low	quality	with	few	RCTs,	
and	were	underpowered	to	show	a	measurable	reduction	in	adverse	event	rate.	Few	
proposals	exhibit	evidence	of	improved	outcome,	and	whilst	many	interventions	such	as	
team	training,	pre-operative	technical	simulation,	or	care	pathways	are	intuitively	
beneficial,	very	few	studies	are	able	to	demonstrate	results	of	significantly	decreased	harm.	
This	review	did	not	address	interventions	that	reduce	potential	harm,	but	only	interventions	
that	reduce	a	defined	adverse	event	which	led	to	decreased	morbidity,	mortality	or	length	
of	stay.	Methods	to	reduce	drug	administration	errors	which	may	lead	to	harm,	or	measures	
to	improve	non-technical	skills,	the	effects	of	which	are	difficult	to	measure	in	terms	of	
patient	outcome,	but	have	been	shown	to	improve	safety	culture.	Improvements	in	
operative	technique	often	lead	to	decreasing	complication	rate,	however	these	studies	were	
too	numerous	and	diverse	to	be	included	in	this	review.	
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	It	is	not	possible	to	fully	establish	a	causal	relationship	between	the	interventions	described	
and	the	decrease	in	adverse	events	shown,	however	we	have	only	included	studies	that	
were	of	a	sufficient	quality	and	therefore	controlled	for	other	important	factors.	
Due	to	heterogeneity	of	subject	groups,	end	points,	and	specialties	it	was	not	possible	to	
compare	interventions	or	perform	meta-analysis	to	assess	for	the	most	effective	method	of	
reducing	adverse	events.	This	review	is	unique	in	that	it	specifically	focused	on	adverse	
event	reduction	rate,	therefore	provided	an	objective	measurement	of	the	safety	effect	for	
surgical	patients.	This	approach,	in	our	opinion	provides	a	strong	measure	of	the	success	of	
the	safety	intervention.	3.6.4 Future	work	
What	is	surprising	from	the	findings	of	this	review	is	the	lack	of	high	quality	evidence	for	
safety	practices	in	surgery,	particularly	for	safety	technologies	and	safety	education	or	
training.	This	study	approached	the	literature	with	an	aim	to	demonstrate	the	interventions	
that	lead	to	a	quantifiable	reduction	in	adverse	events.	Many	studies	measure	a	subjective	
improvement	in	safety	awareness	or	culture	as	opposed	to	examining	relevant	outcome	
measures	as	the	primary	endpoint.	High	quality	longitudinal	studies	assessing	safety	
interventions	are	required	to	demonstrate	patient	benefit	unequivocally.	The	literature	
regarding	the	WHO	checklist	is	one	example	where	this	has	been	successfully	achieved.	
Similar	testing	should	be	employed	for	other	readily	accepted	interventions	such	as	safety	
training,	simulation	teaching,	and	safety	technology.	Simulation	training	for	endoscopy	has	
been	shown	to	reduce	patient	discomfort	although	not	complication	rate.[506]	Virtual	
reality	training	for	laparoscopic	surgery	has	been	shown	to	reduce	technical	error	rate.		It	
will	be	important	to	assess	whether	this	translates	into	a	true	reduction	in	adverse	event	
rates.	[506	507]		Studies	such	as	those	that	examined	the	WHO	checklist	required	
considerable	funding	and	were	of	a	large	size	to	be	adequately	powered	to	demonstrate	an	
improvement	in	outcome.[48]	The	rewards	of	such	high	quality	research	are	ready	
translation	into	clinical	practice	as	demonstrated	by	the	widespread	introduction	of	the	
WHO	checklist	to	the	National	Health	Service.		Quantifiable	patient	benefit	and	evidence-
based	practice	are	paramount	to	under	write	changes	in	surgical	services	and	engage	a	
broad	range	of	healthcare	professionals.		
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3.7 CONCLUSION	
By	effecting	change	in	structural	and	process	factors	as	described	by	this	systematic	review,	
surgery	may	be	made	safer	in	a	way	that	is	measurable	and	shows	benefit	to	patients.	These	
include	increasing	nursing	staff,	sub-specialised	services,	checklists,	team	training,	safety	
devices,	and	care	pathways	as	well	as	publishing	hospital	complication	results.	
Future	safety	research	in	surgery	should	focus	on	demonstrating	interventions	that	lead	to	a	
quantifiable	reduction	in	adverse	events.	
It	may	be	suggested	that	A	key	issue	with	proving	safety	intervention	efficacy	is	the	
measurement	tools	available	are	inadequate.	The	next	chapter	shall	assess	the	value	of		
using	voluntary	reported	adverse	events	in	measuring	safety.		Chapter	5	will	assess	whether	
there	are	recurring	themes	in	reported	surgical	adverse	events	that	may	help	to	target	
surgical	safety	interventions.		 	
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4 ADVERSE	EVENT	REPORTING	IN	THE	UK:	A	QUANTATIVE	
EXPLORATION	OF	NRLS	DATA2	
4.1 CHAPTER	OVERVIEW	
In	the	previous	chapter	it	was	shown	that	despite	there	being	over	12,000	research	papers	
on	improving	surgical	safety,	few	actually	showed	measurable	reduction	in	adverse	events.	
The	proposed	reason	for	this	was	in	part	due	to	the	difficulty	in	measuring	adverse	event	
rate.	One	such	measuring	tool	is	voluntary	reporting,	employed	on	a	national	scale	in	the	
NHS.	
In	chapter	2,	introducing	the	NRLS	the	various	problems	and	potential	of	using	the	data	to	
calculate	patient	safety	at	a	hospital	level	was	discussed.	The	objective	of	this	chapter	is	to	
explore	the	reporting	systems	data.	This	chapter	seeks	to	assess	what	influences	reporting	
rates	and	whether	they	reflect	other	metrics	of	hospital	structure	and	outcome.	
4.2 INTRODUCTION	
Voluntary	reporting	of	adverse	events	to	an	external	agency	was	developed	in	the	industrial	
and	transport	sectors	where	good	levels	of	operational	safety	are	achieved	within	high-risk	
environments.	[122]	In	aviation	the	“no	blame”	culture	facilitates	regular	reporting	of	any	
and	every	type	of	error.	Despite	doubling	of	hours	in	flight	over	the	last	two	decades,	the	
number	of	fatalities	has	correspondingly	halved.	[123]	In	mining	all	injury,	and	‘near	hit’	or	
near	miss	events	are	reported	both	electronically	and	verbally	with	safety	successfully	
remaining	high	on	the	agenda	and	rapid	reaction	to	reports	facilitating	operational	
sensitivity	to	areas	of	risk.[124]	On	the	basis	of	these	successes	reporting	was	
recommended	internationally	as	a	urgent	requirement	for	healthcare	services	to	improve	
their	safety	profiles.[75	125]	
																																																								
Content	from	this	chapter	was	published	as:		
Howell	AM,	Burns	EM,	Bouras	G,	Donaldson	LJ,	Athanasiou	T,	Darzi	A.	Can	Patient	Safety	Incident	Reports	Be	Used	to	Compare	Hospital	Safety?	Results	from	a	Quantitative	Analysis	of	the	English	National	Reporting	and	Learning	System	Data.	PLoS	One.	2015	Dec	9;10(12):e0144107.	PMID:	26650823	
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A	database	of	patient	safety	incident	reports	(the	National	Reporting	and	Learning	System;	
NRLS)	was	created	in	the	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	in	England	in	2003.	It	is	now	the	
largest	repository	of	such	incidents	in	the	world,	and	systems	to	capture	adverse	events	are	
well	established	in	many	other	countries.[126]	The	NRLS	was	originally	designed	to	enable	
analysis	of	frequently	occurring	and	serious	events.	It	then	issued	national	patient	safety	
warnings	and	disseminated	solutions	to	prevent	these	events	recurring.	Regulators	currently	
scrutinise	the	rates	of	reported	safety	incidents	to	assess	the	relative	safety	of	
hospitals.[127]	
High	profile	service	failures	within	the	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	in	the	United	Kingdom	
(UK)	have	increased	public	concern	about	preventable	harm	in	healthcare	and	the	demand	
for	transparency	and	accountability.[68]	There	is	an	expectation	that	the	large	volume	of	
information	collected	through	incident	reporting	should	allow	valid	judgments	about	the	
risks	to	patients	in	one	hospital	compared	to	another.	Indeed,	a	recent	major	enquiry	into	
failures	of	standards	of	care	in	one	English	hospital	expressed	some	incredulity	that	this	was	
not	already	a	routine	component	of	monitoring	of	NHS	performance.[127]	
Rates	of	reporting	are	used	by	the	main	regulator	of	NHS	hospitals	the	Care	Quality	
Commission	to	rank	organisations,	but	it	is	not	clear,	how	to	distinguish	between	the	true	
level	of	unsafe	care	and	variations	in	reporting	behaviour.	It	is	possible	to	hypothesize	that	
low	reporting	rates	are	undesirable	as	this	could	imply	a	poor	safety	culture	where	staff	do	
not	engage	with	reporting	safety	breaches.	Equally	it	could	be	suggested	that	high	reporting	
rates	are	undesirable	as	this	implies	a	high	incidence	of	harm	in	the	organisation.	
Hutchinson	and	colleagues	examined	NRLS	data	two	years	after	it	commenced	in	2005	and,	
at	that	time,	found	no	correlation	between	high	reporting	rates	and	hospital	outcome	
measures.	They	concluded	that	this	was	almost	certainly	due	to	low	reporting	rates.	[128]		
Since	the	publication	of	this	study,	rates	have	increased	with	significant	variation	between	
hospitals.[129]	This	study	intends	to	reanaalyse	the	data	and	add	to	this	work.	This	study	
increases	and	updates	the	understanding	of	reporting	in	England	because		now	a)	every	NHS	
organisation	now	reports	to	the	NRLS,	b)	data	sets	are	homogenised	with	some	mandatory	
fields,	c)	the	rate	of	reporting	has	increased	per	annum	from	tens	of	thousands	to	over	a	
million	reports	,	d)	reporting	serious	harm	and	death	incidents	to	the	NRLS	is	mandatory	and	
e)	there	are	now	a	variety	of	validated	quality	metrics	with	which	to	compare	NRLS	data	to.	
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4.3 AIMS	
This	study	aims	to	establish	what	factors	relate	to	high	reporting	of	no	harm	events	versus	
those	incidents	that	lead	to	harm	or	even	death.		
In	addition,	this	study	aims	to	assess	how	organizational	culture	impacts	on	reporting	rate	
by	assessing	responses	to	a	national	staff	survey.	
4.4 HYPOTHESIS	
Hospitals	with	better	infrastructure,	lower	standardized	mortality	rates,	higher	patient	
satisfaction	and	less	litigation	report	more	patient	safety	incidents.	
4.5 METHODS	
The	study	population	was	all	reports	of	patient	safety	incidents	from	NHS	acute	hospital	
trusts	during	the	period	1st	January	2003	to	31st	May	2013	reported	to	the	NRLS	database.	
Although	all	NHS	organizations	are	required	to	report	incidents,	those	without	inpatient	
provision,	(e.g.	primary	care	and	mental	health	services)	were	excluded	from	the	present	
study.	So	too	were	specialist	hospitals	such	as	neurosurgical	or	paediatric	centres.	This	was	
to	eliminate	the	potential	for	bias	and	to	ensure	homogeneity	of	the	analysed	hospital	
trusts.	Primary	care	centres	rarely	report	incidents	and	have	different	quality	assessments.	
Specialist	hospitals	have	different	structural	and	process	frameworks	and	therefore	are	not	
suitable	for	comparison.		4.5.1 Data	description	
The	NRLS	was	established	by	National	Patient	Safety	Agency	in	2002	and	has	accumulated	
over	nine	million	reports	since	it	began.	All	NHS	staff	are	encouraged	to	report	the	patient	
safety	incidents	that	they	observe.	A	“patient	safety	incident”	is	defined	as	an	event	during	
an	episode	of	patient	care	that	had	the	potential	to	or	did	cause	injury	or	harm	to	the	
patient.	[9]	Each	report	requires:	demographic	and	administrative	data:	incident	category,	
degree	of	harm,	organization	code,	incident	location,	age,	sex	and	ethnicity	of	patient	and	
date	and	time	of	incident.	The	job	description	of	the	member	of	staff	reporting	is	also	
captured.	These	are	categorical	variables,	mainly	captured	in	drop-down	menus.	There	is	
also	a	free	text	section	in	which	the	reporter	is	asked	to	describe	what	happened	and	what	
action	was	taken	as	a	result.	This	study	examined	the	categorical	data	alone,	as	there	is	
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currently	no	computational	method	to	analyse	the	free	text	narratives	of	millions	of	reports,	
and	the	volume	makes	this	level	analysis	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.		
The	reporter	designates	an	incident’s	severity	as	no	harm,	low	harm,	moderate	harm,	
severe	harm	or	death.	Harm	is	defined	as	injury	or	complication	leading	to	morbidity,	
mortality	or	increased	length	of	stay.	For	the	purposes	of	understanding	what	factors	relate	
to	reported	harm	versus	no	harm;	low	harm,	moderate	harm,	severe	harm	and	death	were	
grouped	as	“harm”.	4.5.2 Hospital	characteristics	
Several	hospital	characteristics	were	examined.	(Table	4.1)	
Table	4.1	Summary	of	datasets	used	to	evaluate	hospital	factors	influencing	reporting	rates		
	
Classification	 Hospital	factor	 Dataset	source	
Structure	 Hospital	size	 Department	of	Health,	Publications	and	
statistics[130]	Number	of	critical	care	beds	available		
Teaching	Hospital	Status	 NRLS	designation	
Nurses	to	beds	ratio	 The	Information	Centre[131]	
Clinicians	to	beds	ratio	
Outcome	 Standardised	Hospital	Mortality	Index	 The	Information	Centre	[132]	
Patient	views	on	care	 Care	Quality	Commission	
Litigation	Claims	 National	Health	Service	Litigation	
Authority	
Litigation	Payments	 National	Health	Service	Litigation	
Authority[133]	
	
	
Incident	reporting	rates	for	hospital	trusts	in	the	study	population	were	obtained	from	the	
Organization	Patient	Safety	Incident	Reports.	[129]	Reporting	rates	were	calculated	per	100	
admissions.		The	denominator	was	taken	from	the	Hospital	Episode	Statistics.		
The	frequency	of	reported	patient	safety	incident	rates	were	correlated	with	hospital	
characteristics	over	the	same	time	period.	Factors	associated	with	harm	and	deaths	were	
examined	in	more	detail.	Hospital	factors	were	considered	to	be	either	structural	or	
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performance-related.[11]	No	process	factors	were	used,	as	there	were	not	any	nationally	
collected	metrics	that	included	data	from	all	hospitals.	
The	hospital	size	was	determined	by	two	factors:	the	number	of	beds	and	staffing	levels	
using	routine	NHS	statistical	sources.	[130	131]	Total	available	bed	numbers	were	calculated	
as	the	average	daily	number	of	open	and	staffed	beds	overnight.	[131]	The	staffing	rate	was	
calculated	as	full	time	clinicians	or	nurses	divided	by	available	beds	to	allow	comparison	
between	hospitals	trusts.		
Summary	Hospital-Level	Mortality	Indicator	(SHMI)	and	Care	Quality	Commission	(CQC),	
institutional	level,	patient	survey	data	were	used	as	outcome	measures.	SHMI	figures	were	
obtained	from	The	NHS	Information	Centre	[132]	The	indicator	reports	risk	adjusted	all-
cause	mortality	30	days	post	discharge	and	is	derived	from	Hospital	Episode	Statistics/Office	
for	National	Statistics	linked	data		as	a	risk-adjusted	ratio	of	observed	deaths	over	expected	
deaths.	[134	135]	Risk-adjusted	expected	death	rates	are	calculated	for	diagnostic	groups	
taking	into	account	admission	method,	age,	gender	and	Charlson	comorbidity	Index.[136]	
During	initial	analysis	there	was	significant	association	between	SHMI	and	rate	of	reported	
death	(relative	risk=0.02,	95%CI:	0.00	to	0.04,p=0.03).	(Table	4.3)	As	it	was	likely	to	be	a	
confounder,	it	was	removed	from	the	analysis	for	factors	influencing	death	rate.	
The	CQC	is	an	independent	regulator	of	health	and	adult	social	care	in	England.	As	part	of	its	
role	it	surveys	patients’	experience	of	their	hospital	stay.	Hospitals	are	ranked	based	on	
questions	relating	to	overall	quality	of	care.	Data	regarding	claims	and	payments	for	
litigation	were	obtained	from	the	NHS	Litigation	Authority.	[133]		4.5.3 NHS	staff	survey	
The	NHS	Staff	Survey	collects	information	from	staff	about	working	conditions	in	their	NHS	
organization.	The	survey	asks	specific	questions	about	adverse	events	and	incident	
reporting.	[137]		4.5.4 Statistical	analysis	
Statistical	analysis	was	performed	with	SPSS®	version	20.0	(SPSS,	Chicago,	Illinois	USA.)	For	
non-parametric	variables	median	(interquartile	range)	values	were	given	and	non-
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parametric	data	were	correlated	using	Spearman’s	rank	correlation	coefficient.	P<0.05	was	
considered	significant	for	all	tests.		
Factors	potentially	influencing	reporting	frequency	were	evaluated	using	Pareto	chart	
analysis	to	highlight	the	areas	of	vulnerability	for	patient	safety.	Pareto	charts	express	
categories	in	descending	order	of	frequency	using	a	bar	graph	whilst	the	cumulative	total	of	
values	or	occurrences	for	each	category	is	represented	by	a	line	graph.		
A	logistic	regression	model	was	used	to	examine	patient	and	staffing	factors	that	relate	to	
the	level	of	harm	as	identified	by	the	reporter.	Separate	linear	regression	models	were	
created	for	modelling	reporting	rates	and	hospital	factors	harm	versus	no	harm,	and	for	
death	versus	no	death.	Harm	included	low	harm,	moderate	harm,	severe	harm	or	death,	
with	no	harm	as	the	reference	category.	Factors	with	a	significance	level	of	<0.1	on	
bivariance	analysis	were	included	in	the	regression.	4.5.5 Ethical	approval	
This	research	was	approved	by	the	Imperial	College	Joint	Research	Compliance	Office	
Reference	number	13SM0726.	All	patient	records	and	information	were	anonymised	and	
de-identified	by	the	NRLS	before	being	accessed	by	the	research	team,	and	therefore	
consent	for	use	of	data	was	not	required	
4.6 RESULTS	4.6.1 Data	quality	analysis	
A	total	of	148	hospital	trusts	reported	to	the	NRLS	over	the	10-year	study	period.	There	
were	15	key	variables	that	had	greater	than	80%	complete	data.	(Table	4.2)	
Unfortunately	variables	such	as	patient	ethnicity	and	member	of	staff	reporting	are	not	
mandatory	categories	and	poorly	completed.	Overall	reporting	rates	increased	
exponentially	from	2003	to	2013,	66,	931	incidents	in	total	for	acute	hospitals	were	
reported	from	2003	to	2005	as	the	system	was	established,	compared	with	1,093,091	
reports	over	one	year	in	2013.	
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Table	4.2	Data	quality	assessment:	Incident	demographic	variables	
Variable	type	 Variable	 %Complete	
Incident	variables	 Unique	incident	identifier	 100.00	
	 Date	the	report	was	exported	to	the	
NRLS	cleansed	
84.49	
What	happened		 Free	text	description	of	what	
happened	
99.38	
	 Incident	category		 99.39	
	 Degree	of	harm	(severity)		 99.39	
Where	incident	occurred	 Country	 97.66	
	 NHS	Organisation	code	 99.4	
	 Location	of	incident	e.g.	ward		 99.39	
Patient	demographics	 Adult/Paediatric	specialty	 98.01	
	 Patient	sex	 80.73	
	 Age	at	time	of	incident	 63.31	
	 Patient	ethnic	category	 35.91	
When	incident	occurred	 Month	and	Year	of	Incident	 91.74	
	 Date	of	incident	 84.68	
	 Time	 83.77	
Who	reported	the	incident	 Staff	type	 16.06	4.6.2 Trends	in	reported	harm	and	death	
Over	60%	of	reports	concerned	patients	over	the	age	of	65	years.	The	patients	most	likely	to	
be	included	in	an	incident	report	were	in	the	76-85	year	age	group	(867,548	reports)	When	
harm	was	reported	over	half	of	such	incidents	involved	patients	in	medical	specialties.	
(Figure	4.1,	Figure	4.2)	
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Figure	4.1:	Pareto	chart	of	medical	specialty	and	report	frequency	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		
Figure	4.2	Pareto	chart	of	patient	age	group	and	report	frequency		
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Table	4.3	Correlations	between	different	metrics	of	quality	and	safety	
	
Factor	 Total	reporting	rate/100	
admissions	
“Death”	rate/100	
admissions	
	 Spearman’s	
coefficient	
P	value	 Spearman’s	
coefficient	
P	value	
Beds/Hospital	trust	 -0.07	 0.43	 -0.04	
	
0.66	
Teaching	Hospital	status	 0.10	 0.25	 0.07	 0.40	
Critical	care	beds	 -0.05	 0.57	 -0.01	 0.94	
Clinicians/bed	 -0.11	 0.19	
	
0.17	 0.04	
Nurses/bed	 -0.01	
	
0.87	
	
0.14	 0.09	
SHMI	 -0.01	 0.91	
	
0.16	 0.05	
Overall	CQC	score	 0.09	 0.30	 0.05	 0.54	
NHS	Litigation	Authority	claims	 -0.16		 0.10	 0.06	 0.55	
NHS	Litigation	Authority	claims/bed		 -0.15	 0.12	 0.06	 0.52	
NHS	Litigation	Authority	
payments/bed	
-0.12	 0.25	 0.08	 0.45	
NHS	Litigation	Authority	payments	 -0.16	 0.11	 0.07	 0.51	4.6.3 Relationship	between	reported	harm	and	patient	or	staff	factors	
Using	binary,	multiple	logistic	regressions	we	assessed	the	effects	of	patient	age,	gender,	
specialty,	month,	location,	time	and	day	of	report	on	whether	a	harm	report	or	a	no	harm	
report	was	recorded.	
The	age	group	76-85	years	was	most	likely	to	have	incidents	reported	(OR	1.49	CI	1.44-1.54	
p<0.05).	Male	patients	were	less	likely	to	have	reported	harm	OR	0.93	(95%CI:	0.92-0.94)	
(p<0.001)	
No	harm	incidents	were	most	likely	to	be	reported	from	pharmacy	(OR	3.03	(95%CI:	2.04-
4.55)	(p<0.001).	
Patients	were	most	likely	to	have	a	harm	report	during	their	stay	if	admitted	under	
Medicine:	OR	1.77	(95%CI:	1.71-1.83)	(p<0.001)	Obstetrics	and	gynaecology	reported	the	
most	near	miss	reports:	OR	1.61	(95%CI:	1.12-2.27)	(p=0.009)	Clinicians	were	slightly	more	
likely	to	file	a	harm	report	than	other	specialties		(when	adjusted	for	age,	gender,	month,	
location,	time,	weekend):	OR	1.085	(95%CI:	1.050-1.121)	(p<0.01).	
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4.6.4 Relationship	between	reported	death	and	patient	and	staff	factors	
Clinicians	were	significantly	more	likely	to	report	death	than	other	staff	members	OR	
3.04(95%CI:	2.43-3.80)	(p<0.01).	When	adjusted	for	all	factors	death	was	more	likely	to	be	
reported	at	night:	OR	1.25	(95%CI:	1.13-1.39)(p<0.01).	4.6.5 Relationship	between	reporting	rates	and	hospital	characteristics		
Hospital	level	data	were	examined	for	2011.	There	were	399,751	reports	included	in	2011	of	
which	115031	(28%)	were	harm	reports	and	688	(0.17%)	were	reported	as	deaths.	The	
median	number	of	reports	across	all	hospital	trusts	was	5.87	(Inter-quartile	Range	
(IQR)=2.06)	per	100	admissions	and	the	median	number	of	deaths	reported	was	0.01	
(IQR=0.01)	per	100	admissions.	4.6.6 Structural	factors	
The	median	number	of	full	time	clinicians	per	bed	per	hospital	trust	was	0.77(IQR=0.23).	
There	were	no	significant	associations	between	clinicians	per	bed	and	overall	rate	of	
reporting	or	reported	deaths.	(Table	3.4)	
There	was	a	significant	negative	association	between	clinicians	per	bed	and	rate	of	reported	
harm	(Relative	risk	(RR)=	-1.78,	95%	Confidence	Interval	(CI):	-3.33	to-0.23,	p=0.03).	(Table	
3.4)	
Table	4.4	Associations	between	hospital	characteristics	and	overall	rate	of	reporting,	
multiple	linear	regression	models	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Factor	 B	Coefficient	 P	value	 Confidence	intervals	
Teaching	Hospital	status	 0.74	 0.16	 -0.27	to	1.75	
Clinicians/bed	 -2.67	 0.08	 -5.66	to	0.33	
Nurses/bed	 0.81	 0.32	 -0.79	to	2.40	
SHMI	 -0.54	 0.72	 -3.54	to	2.45	
Overall	CQC	score	 0.03	 0.27	 -0.03	to	0.09	
NHS	Litigation	Authority	claims/bed	 -5.00	 0.05	 -19.22	to	9.231	
	 104	
The	median	number	of	full	time	nurses	per	bed	per	hospital	trust	was	1.82	(IQR=0.38).	
There	were	no	significant	associations	between	nurses	per	bed	and	overall	rate	of	reporting	
or	reported	harm	or	deaths.	
Twenty-seven	hospitals	were	classed	as	teaching	hospitals	and	there	were	no	significant	
associations	with	overall	rate	of	reporting	or	reported	harm	or	deaths.	(Tables	3.4,	3.5)	
3.5.7.	Outcome	factors	
There	were	no	significant	associations	between	SHMI	and	overall	rate	of	reporting	or	
reported	harm.	(Tables	3.4,3.5)	
The	overall	CQC	survey	response	rate	was	53%.	[138]	CQC	median	overall	scores	were	6.40	
(IQR=0.40).	There	were	no	significant	associations	between	CQC	scores	and	overall	rate	of	
reporting	or	reported	harm	or	deaths.	(Tables	3.4,3.5)	
The	median	number	of	NHS	Litigation	Authority	(LA)	claims	per	hospital	trust	per	bed	was	
0.06	(IQR=0.00).	There	were	no	significant	associations	between	claims	and	rate	of	reported	
harm	or	reported	deaths.	The	number	of	claims	negatively	correlated	with	the	reported	
harm	rate	(RR=9.30	95%CI:	2.04	to	16.54,	p=0.01).	(Table	3.5)	
	
Table	4.5	Associations	between	hospital	characteristics	and	rate	of	reported	harm,	multiple	
linear	regression	models	
	
	
	
	
	
	
3.5.8.	Barriers	to	reporting:	investigating	relationship	between	reporting	rates	and	NHS	staff	
survey	
The	median	number	of	staff	per	trust	responding	to	the	NHS	Staff	survey	questions	was	399	
(IQR=93.5).	NHS	staff	survey	questions	related	to	incident	reporting	showed	significant	
Factor	 B	Coefficient	 P	value	 Confidence	intervals	
Teaching	Hospital	status	 0.12	 0.65	 -0.40	to	0.65	
Clinicians/bed	 -1.78	 0.03	 -3.33	to	-0.23	
Nurses/bed	 0.82	 0.05	 -0.01	to	1.64	
SHMI	 -0.41	 0.61	 -2.00	to	1.15	
Overall	CQC	score	 0.02	 0.14	 -0.01	to	0.05	
NHS	Litigation	Authority	claims/bed	 9.30	 0.01	 2.04	to	16.54	
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correlations	between	reporting	rate	and	the	following	factors:	hospital	trusts	that	
encourage	reporting	(r=0.26	(p=0.001)),	keep	reports	confidential	(r=0.17	(p=0.04)),	keep	
staff	informed	about	incidents	(r=0.23	(p=0.01))	and	feedback	on	changes	made	(r=0.20	
p=0.02)).	Hospital	trusts	that	penalized	staff	for	incidents	had	a	negative	correlation	with	
reporting	rate	(r=-0.18	(0.03)).	(Table	4.6)	
Table	4.6	Correlations	between	NHS	Staff	survey	questions	on	error	reporting	and	reporting	
rate	
	
4.7 DISCUSSION	
The	rate	of	patient	safety	incident	reports	in	the	NHS	in	England	has	increased	exponentially	
since	collection	began.	This	reflects	the	emphasis	placed	on	patient	safety	by	successive	
governments	and	the	willingness	of	front-line	staff	to	provide	information	that	is	ultimately	
intended	to	reduce	the	risks	of	care.[125	139	140]	4.7.1 Reporting	trends		
Our	analysis	reveals	that	patients	most	vulnerable	to	reported	harm	are	elderly	medical	
inpatients.	This	merely	corresponds	to	the	inpatient	population	as	nearly	two	thirds	of	UK	
hospital	admissions	are	patients	aged	over	65	years,	and	account	for	approximately	70%	of	
bed	days.[141]	In	addition	to	factors	such	as	increased	frailty	over	85	year	olds	account	for	
Question	(summarized)	 Total	reporting	rate/100	admissions	
	 Spearman’s	coefficient	 P	value	
Have	you	seen	any	incidents	in	the	last	month?	 0.09	 0.29	
Have	you	reported	an	incident	in	the	last	month?	 0.18	 0.03	
Hospital	trust	treats	staff	involved	in	incidents	fairly	 0.07	 0.37	
Hospital	trust	encourages	reporting	 0.26	 <0.01	
Hospital	trust	treats	reports	confidentially	 0.17	 0.04	
Hospital	trust	punishes	people	involved	in	incidents	 -0.18	 0.03	
Hospital	trusts	takes	action	to	prevent	further	
incidents	
0.13	 0.11	
Hospital	trust	informs	staff	about	incidents	occurring	
in	the	hospital	trust	
0.23	 0.01	
Staff	get	feedback	about	changes	made	as	a	result	of	
reported	incidents	
	
0.20	 0.02	
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25%	of	bed	days	and	have,	on	average,	a	significantly	longer	hospital	stay	than	younger	
patients.[141]		
We	observed	that	clinicians	are	significantly	more	likely	to	report	a	death	than	other	
members	of	staff,	although	there	were	lower	rates	of	reports	filed	by	clinicians	overall,	in	
keeping	with	other	studies.[108	134]	Such	variation	may	reflect	the	perceived	level	of	
responsibility	for	handling	different	levels	of	harm.	Using	reports	of	death	to	trigger	safety	
initiatives	may	motivate	clinicians	better	than	near	miss	reports.[108]	
Obstetrics	and	gynaecology	patients	were	more	likely	to	have	a	no	harm	event	reported	
than	any	other	specialty.	This	specialty	has	an	established	history	of	reporting	and	a	strong	
safety	culture	supported	through	established	national	audits	into	all	maternal	and	neonatal	
morbidity	and	mortality.[142]This	may	account	for	the	dedication	to	reporting	all	patient	
safety	incidents.	
The	hospital	setting	in	which	patients	were	most	likely	to	have	a	near	miss	reported	was	in	
pharmacies.	This	excellent	level	of	reporting	may	be	explained	through	the	process	of	
medicine	reconciliation.	This	is	where	medication	errors	are	scrutinized	closely	and	is	a	
National	Institute	for	Health	and	Clinical	Excellence	(NICE)	guideline	and	shown	to	be	
effective	in	preventing	harm.[143]		4.7.2 Total	reporting	rate	and	hospital	characteristics	
Hospitals	with	a	better	reporting	record	do	not	have	strongly	differentiating	hospital	
characteristics.	(Table	3.4)	
Staffing	levels	and	teaching	hospital	status	did	not	impact	significantly	on	reporting	rates.	
Unlike	other	studies	we	were	unable	to	find	an	association	between	nursing	staff	levels	and	
reported	events,	however	our	study	took	into	account	other	organizational	factors.[144	
145]		
The	SHMI	for	hospital	trusts	had	no	notable	relationship	with	overall	reporting	rates.	It	was	
hypothesized	that	a	low	SHMI	would	correlate	with	a	high	overall	reporting	rate,	suggesting	
that	a	hospital	with	a	lower	unexpected	mortality	rate	would	have	a	stronger	safety	culture,	
reporting	and	learning	from	incidents	more	frequently	and	therefore	tackling	failures	that	
lead	to	patient	harm.	This	was	not	the	case.	There	were	no	association	between	overall	
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reporting	rates	and	patient	satisfaction	with	care	as	measured	through	the	CQC	survey	or	as	
stated	hospital	trust	SHMI.		
There	was	no	relationship	between	litigation	payments	with	overall	reporting	rates,	but	
there	was	a	significant	negative	association	with	claims	and	reporting	rates.	
Overall	there	were	no	significant	relationships	between	overall	reporting	rates	and	most	
hospital	structure	and	outcome	factors.	This	is	in	keeping	with	earlier	studies	and	is	in	spite	
of	increased	reporting	rates.[146]	When	Sari	and	colleagues,	in	2007,	examined	adverse	
events	recorded	in	case	notes	they	found	that	the	NRLS	identifies	only	5%	of	errors	that	
cause	harm	to	patients.[96]	The	NRLS	cannot	in	its	current	form	quantify	the	safety	of	a	
hospital.	It	is	important	that	the	data	are	not	used	to	draw	conclusions	that	are	clouded	by	
non-responder	bias.		
This	problem	is	not	unique	to	the	NHS	system.	A	report	in	2012	from	the	inspector	general	
of	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	in	the	United	States	found	that	only	14%	
of	adverse	events	experienced	by	Medicare	patients	are	captured.[147]	The	report	noted	
that	incident	reporting	systems	were	relied	on	to	identify	safety	problems,	although	
administrators	were	aware	the	data	were	incomplete.	Reasons	for	low	reporting	included	
staff	not	being	aware	of	what	events	constituted	harm.	[147]This	report	recommended	that	
the	Agency	for	Healthcare	Research	and	Quality	(AHRQ)	create	a	list	of	reportable	events	in	
collaboration	with	the	Centers	for	Medicare	and	Medicaid	Services.	4.7.3 Reported	harm	rate	and	hospital	characteristics	
There	were	some	associations	found	when	incidents	that	caused	patient	harm	were	
separated	out	and	correlated	with	hospital	characteristics.		
Clinician-bed	ratio	corresponded	to	a	significant	reduction	in	the	rate	of	harm	reported,	
(although	not	having	a	relationship	with	overall	reporting	rates	that	included	near	misses).	
This	finding	should	be	interpreted	with	caution	as	the	R-value	was	small,	and	so	although	a	
significant	correlation,	it	is	not	a	strong	correlation.	It	may	be	that	care	received	by	patients	
is	safer	when	clinician	staffing	is	increased.	Similarly,	a	study	by	Yasunaga	and	colleagues	
found	that	outcomes	in	surgical	cancer	patients	in	Japan	were	associated	with	a	higher	
number	of	doctors	per	bed.[148]		
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4.7.4 Reporting	rates	and	litigation	claims		
There	was	a	positive	association	between	litigation	claims	and	reported	harm,	when	
analysed	separately	from	overall	reporting	rates.		
It	contrasts	to	the	negative	association	between	litigation	claims	and	overall	reporting	rates.	
One	interpretation	is	that	hospitals	that	report	more	have	a	stronger	safety	culture	and	
therefore	are	less	likely	to	have	patients	claiming	for	malpractice.	
With	respect	to	the	positive	association	between	claims	and	harm	specific	reports	we	
suggest	that	generally	staff	may	report	specific	incidents	of	harm	when	they	are	aware	of	
the	potential	for	patient	claims	and	this	may	be	to	mitigate	the	litigation	or	provide	real	
time	documentation	and	accountability.		This	may	be	an	area	for	further	study	if	hospitals	
can	use	specific	harm	reporting	data	to	identify	areas	of	potential	litigation	risk.	4.7.5 Insights	from	the	NHS	Staff	Survey	
Previous	studies	found	relationships	between	high	reporting	rates	and	safety	culture	as	
assessed	by	the	NHS	Staff	Survey.	[146]	Potential	reasons	for	health	care	workers	
underreporting	include	concerns	over	reputation	or	peer	disapproval,	lack	of	meaningful	
feedback	from	the	system	or	uncertainty	regarding	who	was	responsible	for	reporting.[112	
134	135]	The	NHS	Staff	survey	questions	reflected	NRLS	reporting	rates.		In	hospital	trusts	
where	people	stated	that	they	reported	events,	the	reporting	rate	was	higher.	Hospital	
trusts	that	encouraged	reporting,	had	imposed	confidentiality	on	reports,	fed	back	to	staff	
about	incidents	and	promoted	change	had	significantly	higher	reports.	Hospital	trusts	that	
were	deemed	to	have	punished	reporters	had	significantly	lower	reporting	rates.			4.7.6 Suggestions	to	improve	learning	from	reporting	
There	is	potential	for	redeveloping	the	data	collection	process	to	facilitate	specialty	based	
reporting,	a	method	that	has	been	successfully	pioneered	by	the	Australian	Incident	
Monitoring	System.	[149]	Accurate	measurement	of	incidents	requires	standardized	
definitions	of	types	of	adverse	event	or	complications	for	the	given	specialty	and	a	minimum	
dataset	is	crucial	for	data	homogeneity.	[110]	Our	suggestions	are	two-fold.	The	first	is	to	
more	tightly	define	a	few	specific	incidents	to	be	reported	nationally	so	that	staff	can	focus	
their	reporting	efforts.	This	has	been	adopted	successfully	in	other	systems,	such	as	the	
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Hong	Kong	system	where	specific	patient	safety	incidents	such	as	never	events	are	focused	
on	and	mandated.	Secondly	the	true	value	of	the	NRLS	reports	may	lie	in	the	patterns	and	
trends	picked	up	in	the	detail	of	the	"free-text"	section	of	the	incidents.	It	may	be	more	
useful	to	focus	local	reporting	systems	on	trying	to	capture	why	incidents	occur	rather	than	
how	often	they	occur.	The	current	database	should	be	fully	exploited	to	understand	the	
system	failures	that	lead	to	patient	harm.	Methods	for	rapid	free	text	analysis	must	be	
developed	to	enable	real-time	warning	systems	for	at	risk	specialties	or	institutions.	[150]	
It	has	been	suggested	that	voluntary	reporting	may	not	be	the	best	way	to	gather	accurate	
information	regarding	how	safe	a	hospital	is.[88	151]	Particularly	as	public	attention	has	
been	drawn	towards	patient	safety	and	incident	reporting,	the	variation	in	rates	must	be	
explained	adequately.[152]	This	study’s	findings	agree	that	reported	rates	of	events	do	not	
correlate	strongly	with	other	measures	of	hospital	structure	or	performance.	It	suggests	
that	to	understand	how	safe	a	hospital	is	other	data	sources	must	be	used.	Using	reporting	
rates,	as	an	indicator	of	the	relative	safety	or	quality	of	a	hospital	trust	is	likely	to	be	
inaccurate.	[153]	When	reports	are	separated	into	incidents	that	cause	harm	versus	no	
harm	there	does	seem	to	be	a	relationship	between	harm	levels	and	clinician	staffing.	There	
is	also	correlation	between	harm	and	litigation	claims.	Looking	at	reported	harm	rates	may	
be	a	useful	area	for	further	study.	This	study	also	shows	that	different	specialties	and	staff	
focus	on	reporting	different	levels	of	patient	harm.	There	was	correlation	between	high	
reporting	rates	and	confidential,	but	open	reporting	environments.	Tailoring	reporting	to	
individual	staff	concerns	may	create	better	engagement	from	frontline	staff.		
4.8 LIMITATIONS	
This	study	was	limited	by	the	paucity	of	commonly	used	national	measures	of	hospital	
quality	available	to	compare	with	reporting	rates.	These	measures	are	often	proxy	metrics	
for	quality	and	safety	and	none	are	without	criticism.		
Staffing	and	bed	numbers	are	basic	methods	for	understanding	hospital	structure	and	do	
not	fully	assess	the	complexities	of	hospitals	as	organizations.	Despite	this	staffing	numbers	
per	bed	have	been	reported	to	relate	to	patient	safety	and	outcome,	increased	nurse	
staffing	has	been	associated	with	lower	adverse	events	and	reduced	hospital	related	
mortality.	This	may	justify	the	use	of	these	measures	for	comparison	and	assessment.[126	
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154-159]	Future	studies	should	include	other	structural	factors	such	as	the	availability	of	
appropriate	IT	equipment	to	facilitate	reporting	to	fully	understand	discrepancies	in	
reporting	rates	between	hospitals.		
The	outcome	measures	used	to	compare	incident	rates	are	limited	but	well	known	methods	
for	assessing	hospital	performance.	SHMI	is	a	now	commonly	used	measure	of	hospital	
performance,	by	measuring	unexpected	death	after	adjusting	for	comorbidities.	There	has	
been	criticism	in	the	literature	of	SHMI	as	an	outcome	measure	as	the	indicator	relies	on	
routinely	collected	data	that	can	be	inaccurate.	A	recent	study	showed	there	were	only	
weak	associations	between	the	proportion	of	avoidable	deaths	and	the	SHMI	and	that	there	
were	few	significant	differences	between	hospitals	when	avoidability	of	death	was	assessed.	
[160]	However	excess	mortality	as	an	end	point	is	a	useful	broad	indicator	of	quality	and	the	
SHMI	has	been	recognized	as	transparent	and	reproducible.	It	is	currently	used	as	an	
acceptable	method	to	flag	hospitals	that	may	be	poorly	performing.[161]	Therefore	we	
decided	it	was	an	appropriate	standard	to	compare	to	reporting	rates.	Future	studies	should	
seek	to	compare	hospital	reported	death	figures	with	hospital	avoidable	mortality	
demonstrated	using	retrospective	case	note	review.	
CQC	patient	survey	results	are	outcome	factors	commonly	used	to	characterize	
institutions.[156	162	163]	With	respect	to	using	CQC	patient	survey	results	there	is	potential	
for	bias	in	relying	on	the	patient’s	perception	of	care.	Patients	may	over-estimate	safety	
within	an	institution	as	they	are	not	necessarily	aware	of	safety	issues.	[164]	However	CQC	
survey	results	were	included	as	patient	experience	is	another	dimension	of	hospital	
quality.[118]	The	role	of	patients	in	monitoring	their	own	care	is	becoming	increasingly	
important.		
The	factors	used	in	this	study	attempted	to	encapsulate	measurable	features	of	hospital	
care.	This	study	chose	reproducible,	routinely	collected	data	representing	quantitative	
factors	relating	to	hospital	care,	but	the	authors	acknowledge	that	some	organizations	may	
have	process	factors,	improved	teamwork,	communications	and	safety	strategies,	which	
have	not	been	assessed	in	this	study	and	that	may	well	impact	on	reporting	rates	of	patient	
safety	incidents.[165	166]	This	does	limit	the	full	assessment	of	whether	reporting	rates	
relate	to	hospital	quality	of	care.	
	 111	
Using	the	staff	survey	has	limitations	with	respect	to	assessing	the	quality	of	a	hospital	trust,	
as	was	shown	by	Pinder	and	colleagues	where	there	were	weak	negative	correlations	of	
staff	survey	results	with	mortality	statistics.[167]	However	the	survey	does	correlate	with	
patient	experience	and	takes	views	from	a	wide	spectrum	of	thousands	of	staff	members.	
The	staff	survey	was	used	to	understand	what	views	regarding	reporting	influenced	
reporting	rates	and	these	were	consistent	in	suggesting	that	staff	perception	is	a	strong	
moderator	of	reporting	rate.	
4.9 CONCLUSION	
The	NRLS	is	the	largest	patient	safety	reporting	system	in	the	world.	This	study	did	not	find	
many	hospital	characteristics	that	significantly	influenced	overall	reporting	rate.	There	were	
no	relationships	between	size	of	hospital,	numbers	of	staff,	mortality	outcomes	or	patient	
satisfaction	outcomes	and	reporting	rates.	The	study	did	find	that	hospitals	where	staff	
reported	more	incidents	had	reduced	litigation	claims.	The	study	found	that	when	clinician	
staffing	is	increased	fewer	incidents	reporting	patient	harm	are	reported,	whilst	near	misses	
remain	the	same.	Certain	specialties	report	more	near	misses	than	others,	and	doctors	
report	more	harm	incidents	than	near	misses.	Staff	survey	results	showed	that	open	
environments	and	reduced	fear	of	punitive	response	increases	reporting.	Reporting	rates	
should	not	be	used	to	assess	hospital	safety.	Different	healthcare	professionals	focus	on	
different	types	of	safety	incident	and	focusing	on	these	areas	whilst	creating	a	responsive,	
confidential	learning	environment	will	increase	staff	engagement	with	error	disclosure.	
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5 ASSESSING	THE	CLASSIFICATION	OF	REPORTED	ADVERSE	
EVENTS	IN	SURGERY	IN	ENGLAND:	A	RETROSPECTIVE,	
OBSERVATIONAL	STUDY	USING	THEMATIC	ANALYSIS	OF	INCIDENTS	
REPORTED	TO	THE	NATIONAL	REPORTING	AND	LEARNING	SYSTEM	
5.1 CHAPTER	OVERVIEW		
In	the	last	chapter	analysis	of	NRLS	data	suggested	that	data	from	incident	reporting	
systems	should	not	be	used	to	characterise	the	levels	of	harm	in	institutions	or	make	
inferences	about	hospital	care.[168]		
That	study	assessed	the	categorical	data	or	‘tick	box’	data	within	the	NRLS.		The	categorical	
data	should	reflect	the	free	text	narrative	within	reports,	as	the	reporters	are	asked	to	
characterise	the	incident	before	writing	about	it.	However	it	is	unclear	whether	the	
classifiers	do	in	fact	reflect	the	free	text	description	of	the	incident.	Reporting	systems	have	
been	criticised	for	cumbersome	classification	systems,	and	the	NRLS	may	also	suffer	from	an	
overly	complex	ontology.		
Surgical	adverse	events	lend	themselves	to	discrete	classification,	and	there	is	a	wealth	of	
literature	available	on	ways	to	classify	complications.	It	may	be	that	with	improved	
classification,	the	incident	narratives	capture	in	the	reports	can	be	fully	explored	and	used	
to	understand	surgical	incident	themes.		
	This	chapter	shall	assess	the	current	classification	system	for	surgical	incidents,	review	
classification	options	available	and	propose	a	new	surgical	adverse	event	classification	
system.	It	will	then	use	this	system	to	thematically	review	serious	harm	incidents	to	assess	if	
any	trends	emerge.	
5.2 INTRODUCTION	5.2.1 Why	are	adverse	events	in	surgery	important?		
The	World	Health	Organisation	defines	health	as	“a	complete	state	of	physical,	mental	and	
social	well-being,	and	not	merely	the	absence	of	disease	or	infirmity.”[169]	Surgery	is	a	
unique	medical	specialty	because,	although	patients	may	not	have	an	absence	of	disease,	
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they	may	begin	their	hospital	episode	relatively	“well”.		A	patient	with	an	inguinal	hernia,	
for	example,	may	have	an	adequate	quality	of	life	but	opts	to	undergo	surgery	in	order	to	
improve	their	health	through	the	reduction	of	symptoms.		Indeed	patients	with	early	stage	
malignancy,	who	are	admitted	for	elective	resection,	can	be	subjectively	healthy,	although	
an	operation	is	required	to	extend	their	lifespan	or	cure	their	cancer.		In	this	context	
patients	are	willingly	submitting	themselves	to	a	procedure	that	is	traumatic	with	the	aim	of	
subsequent	benefits,	once	recovery	is	complete.		Errors	in	surgery	can	directly	harm	a	
patient	and	the	balance	between	risk	and	benefit	can	be	more	precisely	weighed	and	
acknowledged.	Adverse	events	(AEs)	or	complications	in	surgery	are	relatively	simple	to	
define	compared	with	patients	under	medical	specialties	who	are	acutely	unwell	to	begin	
with.	A	patient	can	walk	in	to	hospital	and	as	a	direct	consequence	of	surgical	intervention	
leave	the	hospital	with	injury	or	disability.		Perhaps	for	this	reason,	there	is	a	legacy	of	self	–
scrutiny	and	determination	to	record	and	learn	from	errors	amongst	surgeons.	In	the	
eighteenth	century	John	Hunter,	the	founder	of	scientific	surgery,	concluded	that	surgery	
should	only	be	considered	if	other	options	had	been	exhausted	as	surgery	can	worsen	
injury.[16]	More	recently	the	scrutiny	of	surgical	risk	and	mortality	in	the	UK	has	been	
national	and	widely	publicized	in	the	form	of	league	tables	and	outcome	statistics.[170	171]	
As	previously	discussed	in	the	introductory	chapters;	whilst	the	benefit	of		“naming	and	
shaming”	outliers	in	surgical	performance	can	be	questioned,	there	is	much	to	be	gained	
from	understanding	the	incidence	of	surgical	adverse	events	and	learning	from	the	process	
errors	that	lead	to	them.		
Garcia	and	colleagues	found	that	a	significant	proportion	of	intra-hospital	deaths	associated	
with	AEs	were	in	surgical	cases.[172]	The	Harvard	Medical	Practice	Study	also	found	that	
surgical	specialties	had	a	greater	number	of	adverse	events	than	other	specialities,	
(although	not	a	greater	proportion	of	negligence).[173]	Whether	this	is	due	to	errors	being	
more	apparent	in	surgery	or	because	surgery	is	higher	risk	is	unclear.	
Another	interesting	aspect	of	surgical	error	is	that	a	substantial	proportion	of	adverse	
events	in	surgery,	especially	in	theatre,	could	be	directly	blamed	on	human	error.	Fabri	and	
colleagues,	on	prospectively	observing	errors	in	theatre,	found	that	individual	factors	such	
as	poor	surgical	technique,	inadequate	decision	making,	poor	understanding	of	the	clinical	
scenario	and	inattention	to	detail	caused	most	surgical	error.[174]	The	Utah	Colorado	
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Medical	Practice	study	showed	the	incidence	of	adverse	events	in	surgical	patients	to	be	
3.0%	and	nearly	half	were	related	to	poor	technique,	wound	infection	or	bleeding.[175]	
This	observation	suggests	solutions	for	errors	in	the	form	of	targeting	training	to	overcome	
deficiencies	in	technical	skills.		
However	a	more	accurate	approach	is	to	assess	human	factors.	The	Health	and	Safety	
Executive	for	the	World	Health	Organization	defines	human	factors	in	the	following	manner:	
"Human	factors	refer	to	environmental,	organizational	and	job	factors,	and	human	and	
individual	characteristics	which	influence	behaviour	at	work	in	a	way	which	can	affect	health	
and	safety.	A	simple	way	to	view	human	factors	is	to	think	about	three	aspects:	the	job,	the	
individual	and	the	organization	and	how	they	impact	people’s	health	and	safety-related	
behaviour."	[176]	
A	surgeon’s	technical	skill	is	only	one	part	of	the	operating	machinery.	The	theatre	team	
interactions,	intra-operative	environment	and	quality	of	equipment	all	need	to	be	in	
optimised	for	good	surgical	decision-making	and	technique.[177]	The	studies	described	
above	did	not	measure	the	effect	that	latent	factors	such	as	stress	have	on	intraoperative	
skill.[178]	Operating	room	stress	is	measurable	and	impacts	performance	as	shown	in	a	
prospective	study	by	Arora	and	colleagues.[179]	Interventions	such	as	mental	practice,	
where	surgeons	rehearse	surgical	steps	in	advance	of	operating,	have	been	shown	to	lower	
stress	hormones	and	improve	performance.	[180]		
For	events	such	as	wrong	site	surgery	and	retained	foreign	bodies,	there	is	evidence	that	
improving	system	factors,	introducing	checklists	and	enhancing	theatre	communication	
significantly	reduces	harm.[181	182]	
Reason’s	organizational	accident	model	that	combines	the	multiple	different	lenses	through	
which	intra-operative	errors	are	viewed	is	the	most	complete.	[45]	Recognising	that	chains	
of	events	involving	many	small,	unrecognized	system	failures	can	provoke	the	final	error	
that	leads	to	operative	complication	is	a	crucial	step	in	being	able	to	guard	against	future	
adverse	events.		
The	scale	of	the	problem	is	difficult	to	measure.	One	prospective	single	centre	study	by	
Healey	and	colleagues	in	2002	assessed	complications	in	surgery.	They	found	27%	to	42%	of	
patients	suffered	complications.[183]	The	same	study	noted	that	30%	of	the	mortality	
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incurred	was	due	to	error.	A	retrospective	case	review	study	in	1991	by	Gawande	and	
colleagues	in	Utah	found	an	adverse	event	incidence	rate	of	1.9%	of	admissions.	The	first	
multicentre	US	study	assessing	the	incidence	of	adverse	events:	the	Harvard	Medical	
Practice	Study	by	Leape	and	colleagues	in	1991	found	a	post	operative	adverse	event	rate	of	
only	17%	of	admissions.[173]	A	study	recently	used	a	reporting	system	to	describe	the	
incidence	of	surgical	adverse	events,	with	the	findings	of	6.5%	of	admissions.[184]	Given	
previous	work	discussed	in	this	thesis	of	the	epidemiological	bias	in	using	reporting	to	
measure	rate	of	harm,	this	study	will	not	use	NRLS	data	for	the	same	purpose.	Rather	than	
counting	the	number	of	events,	understanding	surgical	adverse	events	is	equally	useful	for	
improving	patient	care	and	reducing	avoidable	harm.	To	understand	events,	the	language	
used	to	describe	them	must	be	simple,	and	precise.	5.2.2 Classification	of	surgical	adverse	events		
5.2.2.1 	Available	methods	for	classifying	adverse	events	
Professor	Runciman,	founder	of	the	Australian	Incident	Management	System,	describes	
classification	systems	in	the	context	of	reporting	as:	an	arrangement	of	concepts	into	groups	
and	their	subdivisions	to	express	the	semantic	relationships	between	them.	[9]	
Unfortunately	classification	and	language	in	patient	safety	has	been	inconsistent	and	ill	
defined.	One	review	found	24	different	definitions	for	error,	and	another	survey	found	14	
different	explanations	for	adverse	event	with	a	range	of	opinions	on	what	constitutes	near	
misses,	close	calls	and	failures.[185	186]	There	are	different	ways	of	expressing	and	
grouping	patient	safety	incidents.	For	ease	of	understanding	reporting	system,	classification	
systems	can	be	broadly	grouped	into	three	categories.	(Figure	4.1)	Incidents	can	be	
classified	by:	
• Process	errors	occurring	that	may	or	may	not	lead	to	harm		
• Severity	of	harm	caused	to	the	patient	by	the	incident	
• Root	cause	of	the	incident	(only	possible	after	in	depth	analysis)	
• A	description	of	clinical	adverse	event	or	the	end	result	of	the	incident	 	
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• 	
Figure	5.1	The	different	approaches	to	patient	safety	incident	classification	
	
The	commonest	classification	system	for	learning	is	to	categorise	events	by	their	process	
errors.	An	example	of	such	a	system	is	the	International	Patient	Safety	Classification	by	the	
World	Alliance	For	Patient	Safety,	(World	Health	Organization).	[9]	In	this	system	consistent	
terms	for	defining	patient	safety	events	were	agreed	upon	including	incidents	types:	defined	
under	the	following	broad	categories;	errors	relating	to:	
• Clinical	administration	
Error	classification	example	 "Clinical	process/procedure"	 International	Patient	Safety	Classification	by	the	World	Alliance	For	Patient	Safety[12]
Severity	classification	example	 "Severity	Grade	IIIb:Complication	requiring	intervention	under	general	anaesthesia" Clavien-Dindo	Classification	[15]Root	cause	analysis	classification	example	
"Care	delivery	
problem:	
Care	deviated	
beyond	safe	limits	of	
practice"
The	London	Protocol[16]
Adverse	event	classification	example	 "1.6	Injury:	Injury	intraoperative,	to	other	organ" Morbidity	and	Mortality	Conference	Based	Classification	System[17]
“There	was	a	
perforation	of	
bowel	during	
insertion	of	
supra-pubic	
catheter.	
Surgery	
performed	by	
registrar.	
Complication	
recognised	
after	patient	
collapsed.”	
	Report	from	NRLS	
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• Clinical	process/procedure	
• Documentation	
• Healthcare-associated	infection	
• Medication/IV	fluids	
• Blood/blood	products	
• Nutrition	
• Oxygen/gas/vapour	
• Medical	device/equipment	
• Behaviour	
• Patient	accidents	
• Infrastructure/building/fixtures	
• Resources/organizational	management	
Another	approach	is	to	describe	incidents	by	their	severity.	The	most	comprehensive	
example	of	this	is	the	Clavien-Dindo	system	that	describes	surgical	complications	according	
to	the	degree	of	injury.[187]	This	is	helpful	for	understanding	the	clinical	impact	of	an	
adverse	event	and	where	to	potentially	target	patient	safety	initiatives	to	provide	the	
greatest	benefit	for	patients	and	staff.	What	it	does	not	show	is	the	circumstances	of	the	
incident,	or	the	nature	of	the	incident,	only	the	impact	of	the	incident.	
Root	cause	analysis	classification	systems	such	as	the	London	Protocol	are	the	most	in-
depth	methods	to	classify	reports.	However	this	type	of	classification	cannot	be	employed	
as	an	initial	response	to	the	incident.	This	method	is	only	suitable	for	classifying	incidents	
once	a	thorough	investigation	of	the	event	has	occurred.	Ideally	a	team	of	external,	
impartial,	experienced	investigators	would	review	events	and	assemble	all	evidence.		Data	
from	team	interviews	and	notes	would	help	develop	a	full	picture	of	the	incident	before	the	
active	and	latent	failures	were	coded	and	the	incident	classified.[4]	
Perhaps	surprisingly	the	least	used	method	of	incident	classification	is	to	group	incidents	
under	clinical	adverse	event	categories.	Adverse	events	can	be	collated	under	clinical	
headings	such	as	“respiratory	complications”,	within	which	known	adverse	events	such	as	
postoperative	pulmonary	embolisms	and	postoperative	lower	respiratory	tract	infections	
are	grouped.		
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Patient	safety	experts	tend	to	reject	this	mode	of	classification	perhaps	because	it	does	not	
allow	the	reporter	to	suggest	the	system	failure	behind	the	event	and	does	not	provide	any	
understanding	of	why	the	incident	occurred.	This	reduces	the	degree	of	learning	to	be	
obtained	from	analysing	the	categorical	data.	However	this	form	of	classification	may	be	the	
mode	most	intuitive	to	the	clinical	staff	who	report	the	incident.	
5.2.2.2 	Problem	with	current	NRLS	classification	system	
Reporting	data	in	general	are	not	comprehensively	gathered.	There	are	many	deficiencies	
within	the	NRLS	where	basic	demographic	data	are	incompletely	obtained.	Events	are	not	
classified	in	a	systematic	matter.	The	NRLS	classification	system	provided	is	a	combination	of	
error,	root	cause	and	adverse	event	classification	system.	It	attempts	to,	through	the	
classification	offered,	code	the	root	cause	or	process	error	leading	to	an	adverse	event	
without	the	need	for	reading	the	free	text.	This	is	in	order	to	facilitate	understanding	of	the	
reasons	for	harm	occurring,	without	the	burden	of	reading	the	millions	of,	sometimes,	
lengthy	free	text	descriptions.	Unfortunately	this	means	that	although	the	coding	is	relevant	
from	the	perspective	of	safety	analysis,	it	is	not	clinically	relevant.		
For	surgical	complications,	where	adverse	events	are	easier	to	define	there	is	potentially	a	
huge	benefit	in	having	a	coding	system	that	is	effective	and	categorizes	events	for	clinicians	
so	that	meaningful	data	patterns	can	be	generated.	For	example	staff	wishing	to	report	an	
intraoperative	complication	may	find	it	difficult	to	code	the	event	given	the	surgical	options	
available.	(Table	6.2)	When	the	event	is	recent	the	reporter	may	not	have	had	the	
opportunity	to	digest	the	process	errors	relating	to	the	incident.	They	also	often	do	not	have	
the	training	to	be	able	to	discern	the	root	causes	of	errors.	They	may	simply	want	to	flag	a	
clinical	issue,	and	therefore	find	the	codes	available	confusing	or	obtuse.	This	may	lead	to	
inadequate	classification	of	events.	
5.3 AIMS	
• Explore	the	classification	of	surgical	incidents	in	the	NRLS	
• Understand	the	classification	literature	
• Thematically	examine	trends	in	surgical	incidents	
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5.4 OBJECTIVES	
• Determine	the	accuracy	of	the	NRLS	classification	system	in	categorising	surgical	
incidents	
• Describe	NRLS	surgical	incident	data	
• Perform	a	literature	search	of	surgical	adverse	event	classification	systems	
• Develop	a	surgical	adverse	event	classification	system	that	consolidates	findings	
from	the	literature	search	
• Thematically	review	a	sample	of	serious	incidents	using	the	new	classification	system	
5.5 HYPOTHESIS	
NRLS	reports	for	theatre	incidents	are	inadequately	classified.	Theatre	reports	can	be	used	
to	understand	types	of	surgical	adverse	events	and	these	events	can	be	re-classified	in	a	
way	that	promotes	understanding	of	areas	of	risk.	
5.6 METHODS	5.6.1 NRLS	data	exploration	
5.6.1.1 2003-2013	NRLS	surgical	incident	data	
All	287,808	reports	of	adult	patient	safety	incidents	from	acute	hospitals	in	England	relating	
to	theatre	from	2003	to	2013	were	examined	to	describe	reporting	trends	and	the	severity	
of	types	of	harm	reported.	The	reports	were	selected	on	the	basis	of	the	clinical	area	in	
which	they	occurred.	This	area	was	coded	as	“theatre”.	This	was	chosen	as	being	most	
accurate	for	detecting	events	that	were	surgical	in	nature,	and	specifically	perioperative.	
This	was	chosen	instead	of	incidents	coded	as	“surgical	specialty”	for	two	reasons.	“Surgical	
specialty”	as	a	category	can	include	incidents	occurring	to	patients	that	are	related	to	
pharmacy	errors,	outpatient	delays	and	multiple	other	issues	such	as	nurse	staffing	issues	
that	occur	on	surgical	wards,	which	meant	that	there	was	that	were	many	that	would	not	be	
relevant	or	surgery	specific,	and	therefore	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.	Selecting	
“theatre”	events	reduced	the	volume	of	reports	and	increased	the	sensitivity	for	relevant	
surgical	adverse	events.		Reports	relating	to	obstetric	theatres	were	excluded	as	the	study’s	
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coders	were	surgeons,	and	so	could	not	bring	the	level	of	clinical	expertise	to	accurately	
categorise	obstetric	adverse	events.		
5.6.1.2 Assessment	of	current	NRLS	surgical	event	classification	
From	the	2003-2013	reports	a	random	sample	of	703	surgical	incident	reports	was	
interrogated	manually.	As	previously	described	when	reporters	report	an	incident	they	are	
firstly	given	different	coding	options	of	types	of	incident	to	choose	from	by	the	Datix	system	
or	other	reporting	software	provider.	Following	selecting	this	code	they	will	then	describe	
the	incident	using	free	text.	These	coding	options	act	as	a	classification	system	to	interpret	
the	types	of	incident	reported	by	users.	It	was	hypothesised	that	this	classification	system	is	
not	specific	enough	for	surgical	incidents.		Therefore,	using	a	random	subset	of	reports,	the	
categories	selected	were	examined	and	compared	to	the	free-text	description	of	the	
incident	for	accuracy	and	precision.	Firstly	the	task	was	to	determine	whether	the	selected	
category	was	correct	i.e.	did	the	category	relate	to	the	incident.	Secondly	the	selected	
category	was	assessed	for	precision,	i.e.	were	other	possible	categories	equally	relevant	to	
the	incident.	
A	two-person	independent	assessment	method	was	employed	and	data	were	extracted	
using	a	standardized	form.	(AMH	and	PP)	
An	arbitrator	reviewer	was	used	where	there	was	disagreement	between	the	first	two	
assessors.	(EB)	Agreement	between	the	two	reviewers	was	assessed	using	kappa	statistic.	
5.6.1.3 2010-2011	NRLS	surgical	incident	data	
For	the	thematic	analysis	a	year	of	NRLS	surgical	data	was	selected	for	review.	The	study	
population	was	4094	patient	safety	incidents	reported	by	staff	in	NHS	acute	hospitals	in	
England	over	a	single	year.	The	year	2010-2011	was	specifically	chosen.	This	was	the	year	
when	it	became	mandatory	to	report	all	incidents	of	death	and	severe	types	of	harm	in	
England,	with	substantial	encouragement	at	an	organisational	level.		
Descriptive	statistics	for	the	data	were	calculated.	These	data	were	searched	for	patient	
safety	incidents	resulting	in	serious	harm.	
Serious	harm	reports	were	defined	as	those	that	were	either	coded	as	“severe	harm”	or	
“death”.	Serious	harm	reports	were	chosen	as	more	likely	to	represent	true	surgical	adverse	
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events	rather	than	process	errors	or	staffing	complaints.	Selecting	serious	harm	reports	is	
the	most	appropriate	way	of	attempting	to	refine	the	review	to	surgically	significant	reports,	
for	the	purpose	of	this	study.	Two	hundred	and	fifteen	serious	harm	reports	were	found	and	
used	for	thematic	review	5.6.2 Literature	review	of	current	surgical	adverse	event	classification	systems	
5.6.2.1 Search	strategy	
Two	independent	reviewers	performed	a	literature	review	of	surgical	adverse	event	
classification	systems.	Using	the	OvidSP	search	platform	Ovid	Medline	and	EMBASE	were	
searched	from	inception	to	July	Week	2	2014	
The	search	terms	used	were	surg$.ab,kw,sh,ti.	(OR)	operat$.ab,kw,sh,ti.(AND)	adverse	
event.ab,kw,sh,ti.	(OR)	complication.ab,kw,sh,ti.	(OR)	incident	(AND)	class$.	The	titles	and	
abstracts	extracted	were	searched	for	studies	of	relevance	and	thus	a	shortlist	of	relevant	
studies	was	selected.	Selected	studies	were	hand	searched	for	relevant	references	and	
assessed	for	applicability.	
5.6.2.2 Selection	criteria	
Studies	were	included	if	they	fulfilled	the	following	criteria:	studies	assessing	surgical,	adult	
patients	where	complications,	or	adverse	events	were	classified.	
Studies	were	excluded	if	they	related	to	endoscopic,	obstetric	or	gynaecology	procedures,	
paediatric	surgery,	dermatology	or	medicine	exclusively.	They	were	excluded	if	they	focused	
on	classifying	complication	severity	or	explored	classifications	of	root	causes	of	adverse	
event	or	errors.	Studies	were	also	rejected	if	they	described	adverse	events	from	clinical	
trials.	Papers	relating	to	conference	abstract	or	letters	were	excluded.		
A	list	of	relevant	classification	systems	was	compiled	and	a	list	of	adverse	events	from	each	
system.	The	adverse	events	were	pooled	and	grouped	and	a	final	homogenized	list	was	
compiled.	
Systems	purely	related	to	anaesthesia	were	rejected,	but	systems	with	peri-operative	
complications	were	included	so	that	some	complications	that	could	be	attributed	to	
anaesthesia	were	in	the	final	list.	
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Classification	systems	that	were	specialty	specific,	for	example	the	system	described	by	
Street	et	al.	(2011)	regarding	spinal	surgery,	contained	very	discrete	adverse	events	such	as	
CSF	leak.[188]	These	events	were	grouped	into	“neurological	injury”	to	allow	a	more	concise	
list.	5.6.3 Thematic	review	and	re-classification	
Two	surgeons	(AMH	and	PP)	reviewed	each	of	the	215	serious	harm	reports	independently.	
Using	the	free	text	description	the	type	of	surgical	harm	was	classified	using	an	inductive	
approach	based	on	the	framework	generated	by	the	literature	review.	An	inductive	method	
involves	searching	for	patterns	from	observation	and	the	development	of	theories	that	build	
as	research	questions	are	answered.	[189]	It	is	often	referred	to	as	a	“bottom	up”	approach	
and	has	been	used	successfully	in	qualitative	studies	to	build	up	a	picture	of	the	
phenomenon	being	studied.[190	191]	
	In	this	instance	as	an	adverse	event	was	identified	an	adverse	event	class	was	adopted	until	
there	were	no	further	new	classes.	We	aimed	for	one-to	one	mapping	of	types	of	events.	
Saturation	of	types	of	events	for	this	sample	of	peri-operative	reports	was	reached	after	50	
events	
Attempts	to	reduce	bias	were	ensured	through	non-clinical	and	clinical	judgement	and	any	
disagreements	were	resolved	through	mutual	discussion.		
5.7 RESULTS	5.7.1 Literature	search	and	adverse	event	classification	system	compilation	
5.7.1.1 	Literature	search	
The	initial	search	provided	778	results,	78	were	selected	after	the	abstract/title	search	and	
18	were	shortlisted.	(Tables	4.1-4.3)	
Eighteen	classification	systems	were	rejected	as	although	excellent,	did	not	class	according	
to	the	clinical	event,	but	rather	the	cause	of	the	event	or	the	severity	of	the	event.	(Table	
5.3	and	Table	5.4)	There	were	12	classification	systems	that	classified	events	with	respect	to	
their	root	cause	or	the	process	errors	involved.	For	example	the	Eindoven	classification	
system;	which	classes	events	caused	by	design	failures,	or	management	failures,	or	cultural	
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problems	within	hospitals.[192]	There	were	six	classification	systems	found	that	related	to	
or	included	surgical	specialties	that	classified	complications	or	adverse	events	according	to	
their	severity.	The	most	inclusive	and	cited	example	is	the	Comprehensive	Complication	
Index	for	Surgical	Morbidity	and	Mortality	by	Slankamenac,	and	colleagues.,	which	is	based	
on	the	Clavien	Dindo	classification	score.	[187	193]	This	allows	all	complications	to	be	
classed	easily	according	to	the	harm	that	occurs,	calculated	on	a	scale,	for	example	post	
operative	nausea	and	vomiting	is	classed	as	Grade	I,	whereas	anastomotic	leak	is	classed	as	
grade	IIIb.	Multiple	complications	can	be	grouped	to	give	an	index	of	grouped	
complications.	This	type	of	classification	system	is	extremely	useful	for	understanding	the	
clinical	consequences	of	adverse	events,	but	was	not	simplistic	enough	for	initial	
interpretation	of	reports.	
335	adverse	events	were	captured	within	the	selected	classification	systems	and	once	
duplications	were	eliminated,	77	peri-operative	events	were	identified	as	a	result	of	the	
literature	review.	(Table	5.5	and	Table	5.6)	These	adverse	events	formed	the	basis	of	the	
classification	system	for	the	NRLS	surgical	reports	that	were	analysed.	They	were	grouped	
into	clinically	meaningful	categories	for	ease	of	use.	
	
Figure	5.2	Flowchart	of	literature	search	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Papers	identified	(n=778)	
Full	text	examined	for	eligibility	(n=79)	
Did	not	meet	inclusion	criteria:	Other	(n=43)	
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Studies	included	in	final	shortlist	(n=18)	
Did	not	meet	inclusion	criteria:	Classification	of	causes	of	surgical	adverse	events,	or	error	classification	(n=12)	
Did	not	meet	inclusion	criteria:	Classification	of	severity	surgical	adverse	events	(n=6)	
Additional	papers	from	hand	search	of	included	studies	(n=1)	
Perioperative	adverse	events	identified	(n=77)	
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5.7.1.2 	Classification	systems	identified	
Table	5.1	Surgical	adverse	event	classification	systems	selected	(Part	1)	
Classification	system	 Author,	Year	of	Publication	and	Journal	(if	applicable)	 Specialty	 Number	of	surgical	specific	
adverse	events	in	system		
Classification	from	the	Operating	Room	
Incident	Reporting	System	
Antonacci	et	al.[194]2008	
Archives	of	Surgery	
All	surgical	specialties	 34	
Morbidity	and	Mortality	Conference	
Based	Classification	System	
Antonacci	et	al.[195]	2008	
Journal	of	Surgical	Research		
All	surgical	specialties	 30	
Specific	classification	of	four	common	
and	avoidable	surgical	adverse	events	
Bruce	et	al.	[122]2001	
Health	Technology	Assessment	
All	surgical	specialties	 4	
ICD-9	based	classification	of	adverse	
events	or	complications	
Campbell,	P.G.	et	al.[196]	2011	
Journal	of	Neurosurgery	and	Spine	
Spinal	surgery	 8	
Trigger	tool	list		 Griffin,	F.A.	et	al.[197]2008	
	Quality	and	Safety	in	Health	Care	
All	surgical	specialties	 23	
Thoracic	Morbidity	and	Mortality	
Classification	system	
Ivanovic,	J.	et	al.[198]	2014	
Journal	of	the	American	College	of	Surgeons	
Thoracic	surgery	 14	
National	Surgical	Quality	Improvement	
Program	list	
Khuri	et	al.[199]	2007	
Journal	of	the	American	College	of	Surgeons	
General	and	vascular	surgery	 21	
Harvard	Medical	Practice	Study	 Leape,	L.L.	et	al.[200]1991	
New	England	Journal	of	Medicine	
All	surgical	specialties	 16		
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Table	5.2	Surgical	adverse	event	classification	systems	selected	(Part	2)	
Table	5.3	Classification	systems	not	included	(Part	1)	
Classification	system	 Author,	Year	of	Publication	and	Journal	(if	applicable)	 Specialty	 Number	of	surgical	specific	
adverse	events	in	system		
Adverse	Events	in	Spinal	surgery	 Mirza	S.K.	et	al.[	201]	2006	
Biomedical	central	Musculoskeletal	Diseases	
Spinal	surgery	 16	
Patient	Safety	Indicators	from	New	York	
State	Inpatient	Database	
Miller,	M.R.	et	al.[	202]	2001	
Health	Services	Research	
All	specialties	including	obstetrics	
and	medicine	
9	
Victorian	hospitals	adverse	events	list	 Moje,	C.	et	al.	[203]	2006	
Australian	Health	Review	
All	surgical	specialties	 34	
Spinal	Surgery	Intra-operative	and	
Postoperative	Complications	
Rampersaud,	Y.R.	et	al.[	204]	2006	
Spine	
Neurosurgery	 23	
Prinicipal	Natural	Categories	Adverse	
Events	list	
Runciman,	W.B.	[205]	2002	
Quality	and	Safety	in	Health	Care	
All	specialties	including	obstetrics	
and	medicine	
13	
Spine	Study	Group	Adverse	Event	Form	 Street,	J.T.	et	al.[	188]2012	
The	Spine	Journal	
Spinal	surgery	 37	
Adverse	Events	in	Utah	and	Colorado	 Thomas,	E.J.	et	al.[	206]	2000	
Medical	Care	Journal	
All	specialties	including	obstetrics	
and	medicine	
12	
Orthopaedic	Adverse	Events	 Unbeck,	M.	et	al.	[207]	2010	
Scandinavian	Journal	of	Caring	Sciences	
Orthopaedics	 10	
Agency	for	Healthcare	Research	and	
Quality	Patient	Safety	Indicators	
AHRQ	Publication	Number	15-M053-4-EF	2015	[208]	 All	specialties	including	obstetrics	
and	medicine	
24	
	“Never	Events”	List	 Department	of	Health,	NHS	2011[209]	 All	specialties	including	obstetrics	
and	medicine	
7	
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Classification	system	 Author,	Year	of	Publication	and	Journal	(if	applicable)	 Specialty	 Reason	not	included	
Patient	Safety	Event	Taxonomy,	Joint	
Commission	on	Accreditation	of	
Healthcare	Organizations	
Chang,	A.	[210]	2005	
International	Journal	for	Quality	in	Health	Care	
All	specialties	including	
obstetrics	and	
medicine	
Error	classification,	rather	
than	adverse	event	
Patient	Safety	Event	Taxonomy	
National	Quality	Forum	
Clarke,	J.R.[211]	2008	
Advances	in	Patient	Safety:	New	Directions	and	Alternative	Approaches	
All	specialties	including	
obstetrics	and	
medicine	
Error	classification,	rather	
than	adverse	event	
Fabri	classification	system	for	surgical	
complications	
Fabri,	P.J.[212]	2008	
Surgery	
All	surgical	specialties	 Error	classification,	rather	
than	adverse	event	
Datix	Complication	Classification	
System	(CCS)	
Gurjar,	S.V.	et	al.[213]	2010	
International	Journal	of	Surgery	
All	surgical	specialties	 Adverse	event	severity	
classification	system	
Intra-operative	severity	classification	
system	
Kaafarani,	H.	et	al.[214]	2014	
Journal	of	the	American	College	of	Surgeons	
All	surgical	specialties	 Adverse	event	severity	
classification	system	
Imperial	College	Error	Capture	Tool	for	
Vascular	and	Endovascular	Surgery	
Mason,	S.L.	et	al.[215]	2012	
European	Journal	of	Vascular	and	Endovascular	Surgery	
Vascular	Surgery	 Error	classification,	rather	
than	adverse	event	
Surgical	Morbidity	and	Mortality	
review	
Morris	J.A.[216]	2003	
Annals	of	Surgery	
All	surgical	specialties	 Error	classification,	rather	
than	adverse	event	
Joint	replacement	complications	 Mnatzaganian,	G.	et	al.[217]	2012	ANZ	Journal	of	Surgery	 Orthopaedics	 Adverse	event	severity	
classification	system	
Cardiothoracic	Incident	Classification	 Nast,	P.A.[218]	2005	
Journal	of	Thoracic	and	Cardiovascular	Surgery	
Cardiothoracic	surgery	 Error	classification,	rather	
than	adverse	event	
Intraoperative	complications	of	
retrograde	intrarenal	surgery	
Oguz,	U.	et	al.[219]	
2014	
Urologia	Internationalis	
Urology	 Adverse	event	severity	
classification	system	
Table	5.4	Classification	systems	not	included	(Part	2)	
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Classification	system	 Author,	Year	of	Publication	and	Journal	(if	applicable)	 Specialty	 Reason	not	included	
Minimally	Invasive	Surgery	Error	
classification	system	
Rassweiler,	M.C.	et	al.[220]	2011	
Journal	of	Endourology	
Urology	 Error	classification,	rather	
than	adverse	event	
Reason	model	 Reason	JT.	[221]		1997.	
Human	Error,	Cambridge	University	Press	
All	specialties	including	
obstetrics	and	
medicine	
Error	classification,	rather	
than	adverse	event	
International	Patient	Safety	
Classification,	World	Alliance	For	
Patient	Safety,	World	Health	
Organization	
Runciman,	W.	[9]	2009	
International	Journal	for	Quality	in	Health	Care	
All	specialties	including	
obstetrics	and	
medicine	
Error	classification,	rather	
than	adverse	event	
Otolaryngology	error	classification	
system	
Shah,	R.K.	2004	
Laryngoscope	
Head	and	Neck	Surgery	 Error	classification,	rather	
than	adverse	event	
Comprehensive	Complication	Index	for	
Surgical	Morbidity	
Slankamenac,	K[187]	2013	
Annals	of	Surgery	
All	surgical	specialties	 Adverse	event	severity	
classification	system	
National	Coordinating	Council	
Medication	Error	Reporting	and	
Prevention	Index	
Snyder,	R.	[222]	2007	
Pharmacoepidemiology	and	Drug	Safety	
All	specialties	including	
obstetrics	and	
medicine	
Adverse	event	severity	
classification	system	
Preferred	Reporting	Items	for	
Systematic	
Reviews	and	Meta-Analyses	(PRISMA)-
Medical	
van	der	Schaaf,	T.W.	[192]	2005	
Eindhoven	University	of	Technology	
All	specialties	including	
obstetrics	and	
medicine	
Root	cause	analysis	
classification	system	
The	London	Protocol		
Systems	Analysis	of	Clinical	Incidents	
Vincent,	C.[4]	1998	
British	Medical	Journal	
All	specialties	including	
obstetrics	and	
medicine	
Root	cause	analysis	
classification	system	
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Table	5.5	Comprehensive	classification	of	surgical	adverse	events	(Part	1)	
Surgical	adverse	
event	class	level	1	
Surgical	adverse	event	class	level	2	
Never	event	 Wrong	site	surgery	
Wrong	implant/	prosthesis	
Retained	foreign	body	
Aspiration	pneumonia	
Generic	surgical	
events	
Superficial	iatrogenic	injury	
Unanticipated	procedure	
Pain	
Unanticipated	organ	injury/removal/repair	
Medication	complication	
Electrolyte	imbalance/fluid	overload	
Laparoscopic	conversion	
Readmission	
Seroma	
Unplanned	return	to	theatre	
Internal	device	malfunction	
Air	embolism	
Mechanical	complication	of	internal	device/implant/graft	
Pressure	ulcer	due	to	external	device	
Cancelled/Delayed/F
ailed	operation	
Due	to	abnormal	lab	result	
Due	to	acute	medical	problem	
Due	to	change/error	in	surgical	finding	
Due	to	equipment/theatre/staffing/bed	
Haematological/Vasc
ular	adverse	event	
Intra-operative/Post-operative	haemorrhage	(requiring	transfusion)	(includes	
coagulopathy)	
Haematoma	
Deep	vein	thrombosis	
Blood	products	adverse	reaction/mismatch/TRALI/not	available	
Thrombosed/occluded	bypass/graft	
Respiratory	adverse	
event	
	
Pulmonary	embolism	
Respiratory	failure/	Acute	Respiratory	Distress	Syndrome	
Post	operative	pneumonia	
Pneumothorax	(iatrogenic)	
Airway	management/	tracheostomy	related	complication	
Unplanned	intubation	
Cardiovascular	
adverse	event	
Myocardial	infarction	
Intra-operative	cardiopulmonary	arrest	
Congestive	heart	failure	
Supraventricular	arrhythmia	
Intra-operative/post-operative	hypotension	
Gastrointestinal	
adverse	event	
Infection:	intra-abdominal	abscess	
Iatrogenic:	bile	duct	injury	
Anastomotic	leak	
GI	bleeding	
Post	operative	ileus	
Pancreatitis	
Post	operative	bowel	obstruction	
Colostomy/	gastrostomy	/	enterostomy	complications		
Iatrogenic	enterotomy	
Fistula	
	 	
	 130	
Table	5.6	Comprehensive	classification	of	surgical	adverse	events	(Part	2)	
Surgical	adverse	
event	class	level	1	
Surgical	adverse	event	class	level	2	
Orthopaedic	adverse	
event	
Mechanical	complication	of	prosthetic	joint	
Post-operative	hip	fracture	
Non-union	
Intraoperative	fracture	
Neurological	adverse	
event	
Worsened	anxiety/	depression	
Swallow	problem	
Gait/balance	problem	
Coma	>24hr	
Hydrocephalus	
Nerve/spinal	cord	compression/damage	
Intra-cerebral	haemorrhage	
Seizure	
Cerebro-vascular	accident	
Renal/urological/hep
atic	adverse	event	
Renal	complications	(oliguria/	failure/	incontinence	/	retention)	
Hepatic	failure	due	to	a	procedure	
Hepatorenal	syndrome	due	to	a	procedure	
Post-operative	stricture	of	urethra	
Post-operative	stricture	of	ureter	
Wound	related	
adverse	event	
Wound	infection	
Wound	dehiscence	with	return	to	theatre	
Wound	dehiscence	without	return	to	theatre	
Wound	infection	
Hospital	acquired	
infection	
Clostridium	difficile	colitis	
Sepsis	/	bacteraemia	
Post	operative	urinary	tract	infection	
Phlebitis	
Unexpected	day	case	
admission	
Due	to	acute	medical	problem	
Due	to	modified	procedure	
Due	to	pain	
	
	5.7.2 NRLS	Surgical	Data	description		
5.7.2.1 2003-2013	NRLS	surgical	incidents	
Over	the	decade	examined	from	2003	to	2012	287,808	surgical	incidents	occurring	in	
theatres	were	reported.	76309	events	were	described	as	causing	patient	harm	and	746	as	
death	(Figure	4.3).	Rates	of	reported	harm	and	death	in	theatres	increased	exponentially	
over	the	decade	in	line	with	overall	reporting	rates,	although	the	rate	of	increase	was	not	as	
substantial	.	(Figure	4.4	and	4.5)	
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Figure	5.3	NRLS	categorised	severity	of	surgical	incidents	reported	2003-2013	
	 	
287,808	Reported	surgical	patient	safety	incidents	
211,419	Near	misses	or	no	harm	incidents	
76,309	Harm	incidents	
764	Deaths	
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Figure	5.4	Numbers	of	reported	incidents	compared	with	surgical	incidents	over	a	decade	
	
Figure	5.5	Numbers	of	reported	surgical	incidents	over	a	decade	
	5.7.3 Assessment	of	current	NRLS	surgical	event	classification	
Seven	hundred	and	three,	randomly	selected,	surgical	reports	were	assessed	for	the	
accuracy	of	incident	classification	using	the	current	NRLS	categories.	(Table	4.7	and	Table	
5.8)	
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Table	5.7	NRLS	Classification	options	for	theatre	incidents	(part	1)	
NRLS	Theatre	
Classification	level	1	
NRLS	Theatre	Classification	level	2	
Access,	admission,	
transfer,	discharge	
(including	missing	
patient)	
Other	
Access	/	admission	-	unplanned	admission	/	transfer	to	specialist	care	unit	
Failure	in	referral	process	
Clinical	assessment	
(including	diagnosis,	
scans,	tests,	
assessments)	
Other	
Test	results	/	reports	-	failure	/	delay	to	receive	
Diagnosis	-	delay	/	failure	to	
Test	results	/	reports	-	failure	/	delay	to	interpret	or	act	on	
Test	results	/	reports	-	failure	/	delay	to	receive	
Test	results	/	reports	–	incorrect	
Consent,	
communication,	
confidentiality	
Other	
Failure	to	receive	informed	consent	(includes	doctrine	of	necessity)	
Communication	failure	-	with	patient	/	parent	/	carer	
Communication	failure	-	within	team	
Documentation	
(including	electronic	&	
paper	records,	
identification	and	drug	
charts)	
Other	
Documentation	-	no	access	to	
Documentation:	missing	/	inadequate	/	wrong	/	illegible	healthcare	record	/	
card	
Patient	incorrectly	identified	
Implementation	of	care	
and	on-going	monitoring	
/	review	
Other	
Delay	or	failure	to	monitor	
Delay	/	failure	in	recognising	complication	of	treatment	
Delay	/	difficulty	in	obtaining	clinical	assistance	
Infection	Control	
Incident	
Other	
Failure	of	sterilisation	or	contamination	of	equipment	
Infrastructure	(including	
staffing,	facilities,	
environment)	
Other	
Lack	of	/	delayed	availability	of	operating	theatre	
Lack	of	/	delayed	availability	of	beds	(high	dependency	/	intensive	care)	
Lack	of	suitably	trained	/	skilled	staff	
Failure	/	delay	in	collection	/	delivery	systems	
Inadequate	check	on	equipment	/	supplies	
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Table	5.8	NRLS	Classification	options	for	theatre	incidents	(part	2)	
NRLS	Theatre	
Classification	level	1	
NRLS	Theatre	Classification	level	2	
Medical	device	/	
equipment	
Other	
Wrong	device	/	equipment	used	
Lack	/	unavailability	of	device	/	equipment	
Failure	of	device	/	equipment	
	
Medication	
	
Medication	
Other	
	
Other	
Patient	accident	 Other	
Slips,	trips,	falls	
	
Treatment,	procedure	 Other	
Extended	stay	/	episode	of	care	
Treatment	/	procedure	-	delay	/	failure	
Unplanned	return	to	theatre	
Treatment	/	procedure	-	inappropriate	/	wrong	
Missing	needle	/	swab	/	instrument	
Delay	/	difficulty	in	obtaining	clinical	assistance	
Retained	needle	/	swab	/	instrument	
	
Overall,	3.1%(22/703)	of	incidents	were	classified	incorrectly,	i.e.	the	category	chosen	did	
not	relate	to	the	free	text	description	of	the	incident.	(Table	5.9)	
There	was	an	alternative	possible	incident	classification	option	in	more	than	two	thirds	of	
cases	(69.0%	(485/703))	and	in	9.5%	(67/703)	of	cases	there	were	three	or	more	
appropriate	alternate	classifiers,	as	shown	by	the	example	in	Table	4.9.	
Kappa	statistic	of	agreement	between	the	two	reviewers	regarding	the	assessment	of	
correct	classification	was	0.917	(error	alpha	0.82,	p=0.0001).	
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Table	5.9:	NRLS	Surgical	events	classification	assessment	
Classification	assessment	 Number	cases	
Incidents	classified	incorrectly	 3.1%	(22/703)	
Incidents	with	alternate	possible	
NRLS	classifier	
69.0%	(485/703)	
Incidents	with	greater	than	3	
alternate	possible	NRLS	classifiers	
9.5%	(67/703)	
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Figure	5.6	Sample	report	and	example	how	incident	could	have	been	classified	
	
The	reporter	had	classified	the	event	under	‘Other’.	Shown	are	all	the	possible	categories	that	would	have	been	appropriate	under	the	current	NRLS	system	classification	 	
"Patient	returned	to	theatre	
48	hours	after	laparoscopic	appendectomy	because	patient	found	on	ward	with	
tachycardia	and	drop	in	Hb.
Unable	to	contact	surgical	team	during	day.	Patient	found	to	be	bleeding	from	
mesentery."
Delay	or	failure	to	monitor
Delay	or	failure	in	recognising	complication	of	treatment
Communication	problem
Treatment	failure
Other
137		
5.7.4 Description	and	classification	of	2010-2011	NRLS	surgical	incidents	
In	2010-2011	1,226,482	incidents	were	reported.	Of	these	4094	were	coded	as	theatre	
incidents	causing	harm.	(Table	4.11)	The	reports	were	from	all	surgical	specialties;	1879	
(45.9%)	were	categorised	as	“other”	surgical	specialty,	rather	than	selecting	a	listed	
specialty.	The	mean	age	of	patients	was	63,	standard	deviation	19.8	with	39/215	patients	
having	no	age	recorded.	80.0%	of	reporters	did	not	identify	their	profession.	(Figure	4.7)	
88.8%	of	incidents	were	reported	on	a	weekday.		(Figure	4.8)		Over	half	of	the	incidents,	
(56.3%,	121/215),	were	classed	by	the	reporter,	using	the	NRLS	classification	system,	as	a	
failure	of	“Treatment,	procedure”.	(Figure	4.9)	For	analysis,	215	incidents	that	were	classed	
as	occurring	in	the	setting	“theatre”,	and	reported	as	“severe	harm”	or	“death”	were	
identified.		These	were	analysed	and	mapped	to	the	classification	system	compiled	from	the	
literature	review,	by	two	independent	reviewers	with	a	third	reviewer	arbitrating.	(Table	
4.12)	Surgical	specialties	and	severity	of	reporter-identified	harm	in	selected	surgical	NRLS	
reports	from	2010-2011	
Table	5.10	Table	to	show	speciality	of	patient	reports	and	level	of	reported	harm	
Surgical	Specialty	 Low	Harm	 Moderate	
Harm	
Severe	Harm	 Death	
Vascular	surgery	 17	 7	 5	 0	
“Other”	 1879	 660	 60	 23	
Trauma	and	orthopaedics	 613	 188	 19	 15	
Urology	 79	 25	 9	 2	
General	surgery	 904	 229	 28	 14	
Ophthalmology	 186	 73	 5	 0	
Cardiothoracic	surgery	 93	 35	 12	 4	
Neurosurgery	 60	 26	 6	 1	
Colorectal	surgery	 11	 9	 1	 0	
ENT	 113	 23	 3	 1	
Plastic	surgery	 61	 13	 3	 0	
Maxillofacial	/	oral	surgery	 43	 10	 2	 1	
Breast	surgery	 29	 10	 1	 0	
Dental	surgery	 4	 2	 0	 0	
Renal	surgery	 2	 0	 0	 0	
Total	 4094	 1310	 154	 61	
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Figure	5.7	2010-2011	surgical	incidents	and	reporter	profession	
	
Figure	5.8	2010-2011	Surgical	incidents:	Day	of	week	a	severe	harm/death	incident	was	
reported	
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Figure	5.9	NRLS	Classification	of	“severe	harm”	and	“death”	surgical	incidents	2010-2011	
	
	
Figure	5.10	Thematic	categorization	of	Elective/Emergency	incidents	
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5.7.5 Thematic	review	
After	clinical,	two-person	evaluation	of	the	serious	surgical	incident	reports:	50.2%	
(108/215)	were	classed	as	elective,	with	20%	(43/215)	of	incidents	not	containing	enough	
information	to	be	able	to	discern	whether	they	were	emergency	or	elective.	(Figure	4.10)	
	
All	serious	reported	surgical	incidents	were	classifiable	within	the	new	classification	system.	
Saturation	was	reached	at	35	of	the	77	adverse	events	available	for	classification	from	the	
literature	review.	(Tables	4.12,	4.13)The	reviewers	found	that	it	was	possible	to	classify	50.2	
%	of	serious	reported	surgical	incidents	into	5	types	of	adverse	event:	wrong	site	surgery	
(7.91%),	unanticipated	organ	injury/removal/repair	(12.1%),	cancelled/delayed/failed	
operation	due	to	equipment/theatre/staffing/bed	issue	(10.2%),	intra-operative	
cardiopulmonary	arrest	(10.2%)	and	intra-operative/post	operative	haemorrhage	requiring	
transfusion	(9.8%).	(Figure	4.11)	
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Table	5.11	Thematic	review	and	re-classification	of	serious	theatre	incidents	2010-2011	
(Part	1)	
Type	of	surgical	
incident	level	1	
Number	of	
incidents	
	 Number	of	
incidents	
Percentage	
of	incidents	
Never	event	 27	 Wrong	site	surgery	 17	 7.9	
Wrong	implant/	prosthesis	 0	 0	
Retained	foreign	body	 10	 4.7	
Aspiration	pneumonia	 0	 0	
Generic	surgical	
events	
64	 Superficial	iatrogenic	injury	 1	 0.5	
Unanticipated	procedure	 5	 2.3	
Pain	 1	 0.5	
Unanticipated	organ	
injury/removal/repair	
26	 12.1	
Medication	complication	 2	 0.9	
Electrolyte	imbalance/fluid	overload	 1	 0.5	
Laparoscopic	conversion	 0	 0	
Readmission	 0	 0	
Seroma	 0	 0	
Unplanned	return	to	theatre	 13	 6.0	
Internal	device	malfunction	 0	 0	
Air	embolism	 0	 0	
Mechanical	complication	of	internal	
device/implant/graft	
13	 6.0	
Pressure	ulcer	due	to	external	device	 2	 0.9	
Cancelled/	
Delayed/Failed	
operation	
27	 Due	to	abnormal	lab	result	 1	 0.5	
Due	to	acute	medical	problem	 2	 0.9	
Due	to	change/error	in	surgical	finding	 2	 0.9	
Due	to	equipment/theatre/staffing/bed	 22	 10.2	
Haematological
/	Vascular	
27	 Intra-operative/Post-operative	
haemorrhage	(requiring	transfusion)	
(includes	coagulopathy)	
21	 9.8	
Haematoma	 0	 0	
Deep	vein	thrombosis	 0	 0	
Blood	products	adverse	
reaction/mismatch/TRALI/not	available	
5	 2.3	
Thrombosed/occluded	bypass/graft	 1	 0.5	
Respiratory	
	
15	 Pulmonary	embolism	 4	 1.9	
Respiratory	failure/	Acute	Respiratory	
Distress	Syndrome	
1	 0.5	
Post	operative	pneumonia	 0	 0	
Pneumothorax	(iatrogenic)	 0	 0	
Airway	management/	tracheostomy	
related	complication	
10	 4.7	
Unplanned	intubation	 0	 0	
Cardiovascular	 32	 Myocardial	infarction	 2	 0.9	
Intra-operative	cardiopulmonary	arrest	 22	 10.2	
Congestive	heart	failure	 0	 0	
Supraventricular	arrhythmia	 2	 0.9	
Intra-operative/post-operative	
hypotension	
6	 2.8	
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Table	5.12	Thematic	review	and	re-classification	of	serious	theatre	incidents	2010-2011	
(Part	2)	
Type	of	surgical	
incident	level	1	
Number	
of	
incidents	
	 Number	of	
incidents	
Percentage	
of	incidents	
Gastrointestinal	 7	 Infection:	intra-abdominal	abscess	 1	 0.5	
Iatrogenic:	bile	duct	injury	 0	 0	
Anastomotic	leak	 2	 0.9	
GI	bleeding	 0	 0	
Post	operative	ileus	 0	 0	
Pancreatitis	 0	 0	
Post	operative	bowel	obstruction	 1	 0.5	
Colostomy/	gastrostomy	/	enterostomy	
complications		
0	 0	
Iatrogenic	enterotomy	 3	 1.4	
Fistula	 0	 0	
Orthopaedic	 5	 Mechanical	complication	of	prosthetic	
joint	
3	 1.4	
Post-operative	hip	fracture	 0	 0	
Non-union	 0	 0	
Intraoperative	fracture	 2	 0.9	
Neurological	 7	 Worsened	anxiety/	depression	 0	 0	
Swallow	problem	 0	 0	
Gait/balance	problem	 0	 0	
Coma	>24hr	 0	 0	
Hydrocephalus	 0	 0	
Nerve/spinal	cord	compression/damage	 3	 1.4	
Intra-cerebral	haemorrhage	 1	 0.5	
Seizure	 0	 0	
Cerebro-vascular	accident	 2	 0.9	
Renal/urological/
hepatic	
0	 Renal	complications	(oliguria/	failure/	
incontinence	/	retention)	
0	 0	
Hepatic	failure	due	to	a	procedure	 0	 0	
Hepatorenal	syndrome	due	to	a	
procedure	
0	 0	
Post-operative	stricture	of	urethra	 0	 0	
Post-operative	stricture	of	ureter	 0	 0	
Wound	related	 1	 Wound	infection	 0	 0	
Wound	dehiscence	with	return	to	theatre	 1	 0.5	
Wound	dehiscence	without	return	to	
theatre	
0	 0	
Wound	infection	 0	 0	
Hospital	acquired	
infection	
0	 Clostridium	difficile	colitis	 0	 0	
Sepsis	/	bacteraemia	 0	 0	
Post	operative	urinary	tract	infection	 0	 0	
Phlebitis	 0	 0	
Unexpected	day	
case	admission	
1	 Due	to	acute	medical	problem	 1	 0.5	
Due	to	modified	procedure	 0	 0	
Due	to	pain	 0	 0	
143		
Figure	5.11	Incidents	using	the	comprehensive	classification	of	surgical	adverse	events	
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5.8 DISCUSSION	5.8.1 Study	findings	
5.8.1.1 NRLS	Surgical	incident	reporting	2003-2013	
Reporting	of	surgical	incidents	increased	over	the	decade	in	keeping	with	overall	trends	in	
reporting.	[168]	As	has	been	seen	in	previous	chapters,	most	reports	are	of	“no	harm”	
events.	
5.8.1.2 NRLS	Surgical	incident	classification		
The	two-person	assessment	of	the	NRLS	classification	system	for	surgery,	found	that	the	
classification	options	were	too	vague	and	not	specific	or	appropriate	for	theatre.	In	over	two	
thirds	of	the	reports	there	was	an	alternative	possible	classification.	Two	reviewers	showed	
strong	agreement	for	the	assessment	of	the	correct	classification.	This	suggests	that	it	is	
possible	to	improve	the	classification	system	so	that	theatre	safety	problems	were	identified	
more	accurately.	
As	shown	by	the	example	report	(Figure	4.6)	it	is	difficult	from	the	free	text	to	classify	
incidents	on	the	basis	of	process	error	or	root	cause,	but	it	may	be	easier	to	group	incidents	
with	respect	to	the	type	of	adverse	event.	
5.8.1.3 NRLS	surgical	incident	reporting:	serious	harm	cases	2010-2011	
From	the	2010-2011	year	of	surgical	events,	there	were	fewer	reports	at	the	weekend	then	
on	a	weekday,	perhaps	reflecting	the	greater	use	of	theatres	during	the	week.	Only	a	fifth	of	
reporters	chose	to	identify	their	profession,	and	just	over	a	half	chose	to	identify	their	
specialty.	In	the	same	vein	half	of	reporters	did	not	declare	their	specialty	but	chose	
“other”.	This	reflects	two	issues	with	the	NRLS.	The	first	is	the	lack	of	mandatory	
demographic	data	requested	by	the	system,	an	issue	highlighted	by	the	Delphi	review	in	
Chapter	6.	It	also	perhaps	reveals	the	hesitancy	with	which	healthcare	professionals	wish	to	
identify	themselves	as	the	source	of	the	report.	This	may	be	due	to	fear	of	recrimination,	or	
a	desire	not	to	be	viewed	as	a	“whistle-blower”.			
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Over	half	events	were	classed	using	the	NRLS	system	as	related	to	“treatment/procedure”.	
As	discussed	in	the	classification	assessment	in	Section	5.8.1.2	the	NRLS	classification	is	
vague	and	likely	to	not	represent	the	incident	fully.	
5.8.1.4 Comprehensive	classification	of	surgical	adverse	events,	derived	from	literature	
review	
This	classification	system	is	the	first	of	its	kind.	The	intent	was	to	compile	all	published	peri-
operative	adverse	events	to	produce	a	list	that	would	be	clinically	relevant	and	surgically	
specific.		
Literature	search	identified	36	surgical	safety	classification	system	papers,		
18	of	which	were	classifying	process	error	or	root	cause	of	the	adverse	event	rather	than	
the	event	itself.	From	the	18	selected	papers,	77	peri-operative	specific	adverse	events	were	
compiled	and	grouped	into	clinical	categories.	The	result	is	a	complete	list	of	surgical	
adverse	events	that	can	be	used	to	categorise	theatre	complications.	
5.8.1.5 Thematic	review	of	NRLS	surgical	incident	reporting:	serious	harm	cases	2010-
2011	using	new	comprehensive	classification	of	surgical	adverse	events		
The	serious	harm	cases	were	relatively	simple	to	classify	using	the	new	comprehensive	
classification	of	surgical	adverse	events.	The	clinical	relevance	and	simplicity	of	the	
comprehensive	classification	system	lends	itself	to	streamlined	reporting,	reducing	reporter	
burden.	The	events	saturated	relatively	early	at	35	adverse	events	types	and	some	common	
themes	were	identified.	From	thematic	review	it	was	found	that	the	following	five	classes	
captured	over	half	of	the	incidents:	
• wrong	site	surgery		
• unanticipated	organ	injury/removal/repair		
• cancelled/delayed/failed	operation	due	to	equipment/theatre/staffing/bed	issue		
• intra-operative	cardiopulmonary	arrest		
• intra-operative/post	operative	haemorrhage	requiring	transfusion		
As	previously	discussed	in	Chapter	4	we	cannot	use	these	reporting	data	trends	to	
understand	the	true	incidence	of	theatre	harm	but	we	may	use	thematic	analyses	to	reveal	
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areas	for	reporter	concern.	Two	of	the	top	five	adverse	events	were	technical	complications,	
related	to	bleeding	or	injury.	This	is	in	keeping	with	earlier	studies	of	theatre	adverse	
events.[174]		
Wrong	site	surgery	is	a	“never	event”	and	is	a	mandatory	event	for	reporting.	Therefore	this	
may	explain	why	it	features	in	the	top	five	serious	harm	reports.		
Operative	cancellation	or	delay,	due	to	infrastructure	shortage,	leading	to	serious	harm	is	
unfortunately	a	theme	that	will	be	unsurprising	to	many	surgeons.[223]	A	study	on	stressful	
factors	compromising	theatre	safety	showed	that	equipment	problems	occurred	the	most	
frequently	and	were	the	most	stressful	to	surgeons.	[224]		
Intra-operative	cardiopulmonary	arrest	is	an	event	that	may	or	may	not	be	preventable,	and	
requires	thorough	root	cause	analysis	to	assess,	but	is	always	unexpected	and	usually	fatal.	
On-table	death	is	often	traumatising	for	theatre	teams.[225]	In	a	study	by	Goldstone	and	
colleagues	of	cardiothoracic	surgeons,	who	experienced	intra-operative	death,	their	surgical	
performance	for	subsequent	cases	was	diminished,	reflected	by	longer	patient	stay	in	ITU	
post	operatively.[226]	It	is	difficult	to	measure	the	personal	impact	of	“losing	a	patient”	
during	surgery.	However	one	study	by	Pinto	and	colleagues	measured	traumatic	stress	after	
serious	operative	complications.		They	found	that	a	third	of	surgeons	reported	clinically	
significant	traumatic	stress	up	to	one	month	after	the	incident.[57]	Cardiac	surgeon	Lord	
Brock’s	‘A	philosophy	of	surgery	‘	describes	operative	deaths	thus:	
“It	is	the	repetition	of	such	experiences	that	leaves	its	mark	on	the	surgeon	and	inevitably	
influences	his	life	permanently”.	[227]	
With	this	in	mind	it	is	not	surprising	that	on	table	cardio	pulmonary	arrest	is	a	subject	for	
reporting.	Previous	work	looking	at	on-table	deaths	in	orthopaedics	using	NRLS	data	showed	
that	unexpected	peri-operative	death	in	orthopaedics	was	commonly	reported	with	cement	
use.[228]	Associations	such	as	this	are	useful	for	increasing	understanding	of	these	
potentially	preventable	causes	of	mortality.		
The	rationale	for	using	a	classification	system	that	characterized	adverse	events	according	
to	the	clinical	consequence	that	occurred	rather	than	the	root	cause	of	the	event	or	the	
process	leading	to	the	event	was	to	simplify	the	identification	of	events.	Clinical	problems	
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are	easier	for	clinicians	to	identify	and	provide	an	unambiguous	starting	point	for	further	
exploration.	Detecting	“what	happened”	first,	rather	than		“how	it	happened”,	or	even	“why	
it	happened”	is	a	less	convoluted	question,	particularly	for	staff	who	are	too	close	to	an	
incident	occurring	to	comprehend	the	mechanics	of	the	event.	We	found	when	reading	the	
free	text	descriptions	of	events	and	matching	them	to	the	NRLS	options	for	classification,	
that	frequently	the	reporter	would	detail	“what	happened”	in	the	free	text,	but	rarely	
“how”	or	“why”	and	we	surmised	that	this	explains	why	often	the	NRLS	classification,	that	
asked	“how”	or	“why”	questions,	did	not	match	the	free	text.	This	concurs	with	findings	of	
de	Leval	and	colleagues	who	found	that	a	human	factors	researcher	was	better	at	recalling	
and	assessing	team	performance	and	operative	environment	than	the	surgical	team	who	
were	immersed	in	it.[229]	
Simplifying	the	classification	process	for	the	clinical	reporter	we	hope	will	ease	the	burden	
of	report	filling	in	a	working	environment	that	is	often	overwhelmed	with	bureaucracy.	As	
Professor	Charles	Vincent	commented	in	an	Editorial	in	the	BMJ,	at	the	inception	of	the	
NRLS,	reports	should	be	a	window	on	the	failures	in	the	system,	and	not	used	as	the	blue	
print	of	the	events.[77]	Incident	reporting	should	not	be	used	to	interpret	the	causes	of	
problems	in	the	system.[230]	5.8.2 Limitations	
Assessing	reports	from	theatre	necessarily	means	that	this	study	does	not	capture	adverse	
events	on	the	ward	such	as	pulmonary	emboli,	post-operative	cardiac	complications,	wound	
infections	and	dehiscence	not	requiring	return	to	theatre.	Since	the	literature	review	
covered	all	surgical	adverse	events,	there	were	many	events	in	the	classification	system	not	
mapped	by	the	sample	of	incidents	this	study	reviewed.	This	would	be	useful	future	work	
following	this	study.			
Although	the	purpose	of	the	comprehensive	classification	system	was	to	reduce	ambiguity	
there	will	be	inevitable	cross	over	of	categorisation:	for	example	“un	planned	return	to	
theatre”	may	be	due	to	“post-operative	haemorrhage”.	In	these	cases	the	reviewer	will	
need	to	use	discretion	to	classify.	It	may	be	that	nurses,	for	example,	are	more	comfortable	
reporting	a	case	as	unplanned	returned	to	theatre,	as	opposed	to	the	junior	doctor	who	was	
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monitoring	the	drop	in	haemoglobin	and	therefore	reports	as	haemorrhage.	No	
classification	system	is	perfect	and	there	are	limitations	in	using	reporting	to	fully	
understand	all	operating	room	adverse	events.	Since	what	is	reported	is	just	a	flavour	of	the	
full	picture	the	comprehensive	classification	system	cannot	fully	categorise	what	happened.	
However	the	system	may	hopefully	give	the	reporter	a	more	clinically	meaningful	way	of	
classing	the	event,	than	the	current	system	available.	5.8.3 Potential	pitfalls	of	new	classification	approach	
Classifying	by	adverse	events,	by	definition	promotes	a	reporting	of	the	consequences	of	
error,	many	of	which	are	technical	errors:	organ	damage,	bleeding,	anastomotic	leak,	as	was	
shown	by	this	study.	This	may	lead	directly	to	an	assessment	on	the	reporter’s	part	of	the	
technical	performance	of	the	surgeon.	Technical	performance	has	been	described	as	a	result	
of	clinical	knowledge,	dexterity	and	judgement.	[231]	Attributing	surgical	error	to	a	failure	
of	individual	performance	is	not	always	appropriate	or	fair.	Safe	surgery	requires	competent	
technical	and	non-technical	skills	and	these	are	both	influenced	by	operating	room	
conditions,	team	dynamics	and	external	stressors.	When	categorizing	adverse	events	in	the	
operating	room,	without	viewing	the	incidents	through	a	systems	approach	lens,	one	must	
be	careful	to	not	apportion	blame	to	individuals.	[232]	Although	events	in	our	classification	
system	are	being	characterised	as	“injury	to	organs”	for	example,	this	does	not	necessarily	
imply	poor	surgical	skill	as	the	sole	reason	for	failure.	Factors	such	as	time	pressure;	
interruptions,	equipment	failure	and	hostile	team	interactions	impact	on	technical	skills.	A	
study	by	Arora	and	colleagues	found	that	the	surgical	community	expects	surgeons	to	
manage	these	stressors	without	allowing	a	deleterious	impact	on	their	skill,	but	does	not	
provide	any	training	to	do	this.	[233]	Therefore	when	simplifying	the	classification	process,	
one	must	ensure	that	the	dialogue	regarding	the	event	does	not	stop	at	the	point	of	
defining	the	adverse	event,	but	moves	forward	with	more	in	depth	analysis	to	prevent	
unjust	assignation	of	blame.	
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5.8.4 Suggested	mode	of	report	classification	
From	this	study	it	can	be	suggested	that	serious	harm	incidents	are	possible	to	classify	as	
adverse	events.	However	this	classification	system	should	only	provide	a	starting	point	from	
which	further	analysis	should	progress.	
As	more	in	depth	review	of	events,	greater	understanding	is	gained	and	therefore	solutions	
for	prevention	can	be	generated	 	
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Figure	5.12	Chart	showing	suggested	mode	of	incident	report	classification	
	5.8.5 Conclusion	
The	incidence	of	reported	surgical	safety	incidents	is	increasing.	Most	are	no	harm	incidents.	
The	current	classification	system	is	vague	and	prevents	accurate	categorization	of	types	of	
surgical	adverse	events	reported.	It	is	possible	to	reclassify	serious	harm	surgical	events	
using	an	adverse	event	based	classification	system.	Re-classification	reveals	some	common	
themes	in	reported	theatre	adverse	events.	5.8.6 Future	work	
This	study	suggests	that	the	NRLS	classification	system	for	type	of	incident	can	be	improved.	
From	this,	the	further	question	to	be	understood	is	how	accurately	the	NRLS	classifies	harm.	
This	is	of	importance	as	firstly	the	serious	harm	incidents	are	selected	at	a	national	level	for	
greater	study.	If	the	classification	is	inaccurate	then	the	selected	incidents	are	not	
representative	of	the	serious	cases.	Secondly	the	number	of	serious	harm	cases	is	used	to	
compare	organisations	and	again	this	may	be	inaccurate.	
From	this	study,	it	may	be	postulated	that	analysis	of	the	free	text	section	of	incident	
reports	may	allow	better	discrimination	and	enhance	learning	from	surgical	incidents.	The	
What	happened?
•i.e.	classify	the	adverse	event•Comprehensive	classification	sytstem•Easy	to	classify	by	the	reporter	at	the	time	
How	did	it	happen? •What	are	the	process	errrors	that	occurred?•Classified	after	review	of	events	by	the	clinical	team
Why	did	it	happen? •Root	cause	analysis	of	events•Classified	after	informed,	detailed	analysis	by	trained	reviewers
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next	step	would	be	to	automate	the	free	text	analysis.	To	further	this	work	natural	language	
processing	could	be	applied	to	categorise	and	process	future	reports.	This	is	a	subject	for	
future	work,	but	is	explored	in	a	study	in	the	Appendices.	
This	study	has	shown	that	there	are	recurrent	safety	problems	identified	in	the	operating	
room.	As	chapter	3	addressed,	there	are	few	solutions	that	measurably	reduced	adverse	
events	in	surgery.	
Clearly	surgical	complications	leading	to	severe	harm	and	death	are	events	warranting	more	
precise	monitoring	and	understanding	than	can	be	provided	through	incident	reports.	Other	
retrospective	methods	may	be	a	useful	method	to	examine	surgical	safety	failures.	One	such	
way	is	case	note	review.	Focussing	on	surgical	death	and	avoidable	death	through	
retrospective	case	review	methodology	shall	be	the	emphasis	of	Chapter	7.	 	
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6 ADVERSE	EVENT	REPORTING:	DEVELOPING	AN	
INTERNATIONAL	CONSENSUS	OF	THE	FUTURE	ROLE	OF	REPORTING	
IN	MEASURING	ADVERSE	EVENTS3	
	
6.1 CHAPTER	OVERVIEW	
This	chapter	progresses	from	the	quantitative	assessment	of	the	NRLS	and	the	previous	
exploration	of	ways	to	maximise	its	utility,	to	a	broader	assessment	of	the	goals	of	
reporting.	This	chapter	details	a	study	that	draws	together	the	international	patient	safety	
expertise	to	create	consensus	guidelines	on	the	future	role	of	reporting	systems.	
6.2 INTRODUCTION	
The	establishment	of	patient	safety	reporting	systems	(PSRS)	was	driven	by	healthcare	
organizations	attempting	to	achieve	the	level	of	resilience	and	response	to	error	that	has	
been	seen	in	the	aviation	industry.	[268	269]	In	the	United	States	(US),	the	Aviation	Safety	
Reporting	System	(ASRS)	is	central	to	the	safety	record	of	the	airline	industry.	[270]	Pilots	
have	a	culture	of	reporting	all	errors	to	a	centralized	system	for	the	benefit	of	shared	
learning.	By	following	a	pattern	of	error	detection,	reporting,	learning,	monitoring	changes	
and	highlighting	solutions	this	may	have	contributed	to	the	reduction	in	airline	fatalities,	
despite	increasing	activity	over	the	last	20	years.	[123	271]		
The	Institute	of	Medicine	adopted	PSRS	as	an	approach	to	gain	understanding	on	patient	
safety	risks	in	hospitals.	[272]	PSRS	now	exist	internationally	throughout	healthcare	such	as	
the	Advanced	Incident	Management	System	run	by	the	Australian	Patient	Safety	Foundation	
in	South	Australia	and	the	Danish	Patient	Safety	Database	to	name	a	few.	[273	274]	In	the	
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United	Kingdom	(UK)	the	National	Patient	Safety	Agency	established	the	National	Reporting	
and	Learning	System	in	2003.	This	database	has	grown	and	now	receives	over	1	million	
reports	per	annum.	[275]	Such	systems	are	becoming	a	mandatory	requirement	
internationally	for	governance	and	risk	management.	[276	277]	
The	premise	of	PSRS	in	healthcare,	as	in	other	industries,	was	that	they	would	allow	the	
regular	recording	of	patient	safety	events	captured	by	healthcare	providers	in	situ.	These	
reports	would	provide	insights	into	patient	harm	generating	preventative	strategies.	[278]	
The	aims	of	PSRS	were	initially	broad.	The	systems	were	to	be	used	for	monitoring	levels	of	
harm,	identifying	rare	events	and	rapidly	disseminating	knowledge	about	high-risk	
processes	of	care.	The	intent	was	also	for	systems	to	be	“blame-free”,	used	for	learning	and	
solution	generating	and	designed	to	foster	a	cycle	of	improvement	in	a	setting	of	open	
disclosure	regarding	system	failure.		
Given	the	rapid	uptake	of	reporting	internationally,	it	is	clear	that	healthcare	professionals	
have	shown	a	desire	to	express	and	record	unsafe	practices.	There	are	many	examples	of	
instances	where	effective	use	of	PSRS	enhances	safety	or	provides	new	understanding	of	
system	failure.	[279-282]	Encouraging	staff	to	report,	creating	an	environment	where	
mistakes	are	examined	and	potentially	solved,	is	an	important	step	forward	in	enhancing	
patient	safety.	Ultimately,	detecting	and	protecting	against	adverse	events	may	reduce	
avoidable	harm;	which	is	the	foundation	of	safety	initiatives.	
Over	a	decade	since	reporting	began	it	is	unclear	whether	hospitals	are	indeed	safer.	[283-
285]	What	we	do	know	is	that	more	incidents	are	reported	each	year.	Better	awareness	of	
different	types	of	incidents	spanning	drug	and	device	errors,	falls	and	venous	
thromboembolism	as	well	as	avoidable	deaths,	“never	events”	such	as	wrong	site	surgery	
and	pressure	sores	increase	the	overall	number	of	reports.	Reporting	the	various	causes	of	
such	adverse	events	by	taking	a	“system-failures”	[4	13]	approach	accumulates	even	more	
data	such	as	reports	of	diagnostic	delay,	faulty	processes,	communication	problems	and	
staffing	shortages.	Unfortunately	if	detection	of	events	were	the	overall	aim	of	PSRS	and	the	
quantity	of	reports	amassed	reflect	the	success	of	the	system,	then	this	aim	has	not	been	
achieved.	Despite	increased	awareness	large	PSRS,	such	as	the	NRLS	in	the	UK,	still	
underestimate	the	true	incidence	of	harm	detecting	only	5%	of	actual	incidents.	[86]		
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The	World	Health	Organization	(WHO)	published	draft	guidelines	for	reporting	systems	in	
2005	and	provided	recommendations	for	the	establishment	of	reporting	systems.	These	
included	the	need	to	clearly	set	out	the	objectives	of	the	system	as	well	as	guidance	on	
issues	such	as	how	to	keep	reports	confidential	and	deal	with	serious	hazards	rapidly.	[286]	
There	is	concern	that	the	objectives	of	PSRS	are	still	not	clear.	[287]	Considerable	resources	
have	been	devoted	to	reporting.	Focusing	on	increasing	reporting	rates	in	isolation	creates	
new	challenges	as	incidents	are	reported	at	a	rate	at	which	often	the	PSRS	are	unable	to	
process,	let	alone	solve.	This	leads	to	a	time	lag	in	the	feedback	loop,	or	sometimes	no	
feedback	at	all	–	either	to	the	reporter	of	an	incident,	or	to	a	team	involved	or	even	a	wider	
hospital	organization.	Thus	if	the	aim	of	PSRS	is	for	learning	and	improving	patient	safety,	
this	aim	is	compromised	by	the	heterogeneity	and	volume	of	incidents.	[283]	
With	increasing	demand	from	government	bodies	and	the	public	alike	to	be	transparent	
about	healthcare	related	harm,	it	is	appropriate	to	reflect	on	whether	reporting	systems	are	
able	to	provide	both	the	monitoring	capability	and	solutions	to	system	failures	that	appear	
to	be	achieved	by	reporting	in	other	industries.	This	study	is	an	opportunity	to	define	what	
information	should	be	captured,	and	how	the	information	should	be	used	to	maximize	
learning	and	increase	clinical	participation.	[112	288]	
6.3 AIMS	
The	primary	objective	of	this	study	was	to	delineate	the	role	of	PSRS	and	gain	consensus	
from	international	PSRS	experts	as	to	the	future	place	of	reporting	within	the	patient	safety	
landscape.	
6.4 HYPOTHESIS	
Through	Delphi	method,	international	experts	can	reach	consensus	on	the	future	role	of	
PSRS.	
6.5 METHODS	
A	multi-method,	multi-phase	approach	was	adopted	to	establish	expert-derived	guidelines	
and	recommendations	on	patient	safety	incident	reporting.	The	Delphi	consensus	
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methodology,	as	described	by	Jones	et	al,	[289]	was	employed	and	is	described	in	detail	
below.		6.5.1 Literature	review	and	expert	identification		
A	scoping	review	of	the	literature	was	conducted	to	understand	the	evidence	base	and	
research	questions	relevant	to	PSRS	and	identify	academic	experts	in	the	field.	The	following	
key	words	were	used	in	combinations:	patient	safety,	reporting	systems,	voluntary	
reporting,	incident	reporting,	were	searched	in	PubMed	in	May	2013.	In	addition	the	
reference	lists	of	the	relevant	articles	were	hand-searched	to	identify	any	additional	
articles/experts.	Experts	were	defined	as	individuals	who	had	published	peer-reviewed	
articles	on	patient	safety	reporting	systems	and	had	experience	with	the	development,	
management	or	evaluation	of	a	reporting	system.	Experts	with	≥6	peer-reviewed	original	
research	publications	were	identified	and	invited	to	complete	a	semi-structure	interview	
(stage	2)	and	experts	with	≥3	articles	were	recruited	for	the	expert	Delphi	consensus	panel	
(stages	3	&	4).	These	articles	were	reviewed	to	outline	the	main	areas	of	academic	debate	
and	interest	regarding	the	role	of	PSRS	for	discussion.	These	themes	were	addressed	in	the	
second	stage	of	the	Delphi	process	using	semi-structured	interviews.		6.5.2 Semi	structured	interviews	with	incident	reporting	system	experts	
Fifteen	experts	were	identified	and	invited	to	participate	in	this	stage.	Of	these,	fourteen	
international	experts	(93·3%)	agreed	to	be	interviewed.	An	interview	protocol	was	devised	
and	reviewed	by	a	team	of	clinicians	and	psychologists/patient	safety	experts	(see	
appendices).	One	pilot	interview	was	conducted	with	an	expert	to	ensure	relevance	and	
clarity.	Piloting	resulted	in	expanding	the	theme	regarding	accountability	for	error	in	
healthcare.	The	interviews	were	conducted	(three	in	person,	ten	by	telephone	and	one	
conducted	via	email	exchange)	and	were	recorded	and	transcribed	with	permission.		
The	interview	protocol	was	structured	around	three	key	themes	derived	from	the	literature:	
• What	can	reporting	systems	achieve	and	what	are	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	
using	reporting	systems	to	monitor	and	learn	from	healthcare	error?	
• How	can	national	reporting	systems	such	as	the	NRLS	be	improved	to	maximize	their	
utility?	
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• What	incidents	should	be	a	reporting	priority	and	who	should	be	accountable	for	
analysis,	investigation,	feedback	and	solutions	to	incidents?	6.5.3 Thematic	analysis	
All	interviews	were	analysed	thematically	to	identify	emergent	themes	by	the	primary	
researcher.	A	second	reviewer	(LH)	analysed	approximately	20%	(3/14)	of	the	interviews	to	
ensure	consistency	in	extraction	and	reduce	bias.	6.5.4 Delphi	survey	round	1	
Consensus	was	set	a	priori	at	70%	agreement	for	a	statement	to	be	included	as	a	guideline,	
as	per	standard	Delphi	method	criteria.	[290]	The	themes	that	emerged	from	the	expert	
interviews	were	used	to	inform	the	development	of	the	Delphi	survey.		The	survey	was	
developed	and	piloted	with	patient	safety	experts	to	assess	content	and	flow,	as	well	as	
comprehension	and	clarity	of	questions.	The	survey	was	administered	electronically	via	
Qualtrics	survey	software	(www.qualtrics.com).	In	total,	the	survey	contained	58	questions	
presented	as	statements.	Experts	were	required	to	state	their	level	of	agreement	either	
using	5-point	Likert	scales	for	agreement	or	multiple-choice	options	(Appendix	2).	This	
survey	was	emailed	to	a	wider	panel	of	30	experts	(including	the	original	14	interviewees)	
based	on	their	peer-reviewed	publications.	Two	separate	reminder	emails	were	sent	at	two	
weekly	intervals.	Likert	scores	were	analysed	as	follows:	where	the	response	was	“agree”	or	
“strongly	agree”	the	response	was	classed	as	“agree”	whereas	the	responses	“neutral”,	
“disagree”	or	“strongly	disagree”	were	classed	as	“disagree”.	Experts	were	invited	to	
provide	free-text	comments	for	each	question	in	order	to	better	understand	the	rationale	
behind	their	responses.	6.5.5 Delphi	survey	round	2		
Responses	to	the	questions	received	within	Round	1	of	the	consensus	building	process	were	
analysed	and	then	individually	fed	back	to	each	expert	in	Round	2	with	their	own	responses	
presented	and	shown	as	a	percentage	of	the	rest	of	the	expert	panel.	For	example	if	the	
expert	agreed	with	a	statement,	they	would	be	reminded	of	this	and	shown	a	chart	showing	
what	percentage	of	the	panel	also	agreed	versus	those	who	disagreed	or	were	neutral.	This	
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allowed	the	expert	to	see	their	response	as	well	as	the	responses	of	the	panel	without	
knowing	the	identity	of	the	individuals	represented.	They	were	then	asked	the	same	
question	again	and	were	able	to	keep	their	original	answer	or	change	their	answer.	This	
approach	was	to	allow	firstly	for	the	expert	to	check	that	they	had	responded	correctly	in	
the	first	instance	and	secondly	to	provide	an	opportunity	for	the	experts	to	consider	their	
views	in	light	of	how	the	expert	panel	responded.	The	analysis	of	Likert	scales	was	
performed	as	described	for	Round	1.		6.5.6 Ethical	approval	
This	research	was	approved	by	the	Imperial	College	Joint	Research	Compliance	Office	
Reference	number	ICREC_13_3_7.	No	human	or	animal	tissue	was	used	in	this	research.	No	
patient	information	or	data	was	used	for	this	research.	Written	consent	was	obtained	from	
all	expert	contributors	prior	to	interview.	
6.6 RESULTS	6.6.1 Literature	review	and	semi	structured	interview		
The	literature	review	identified	15	experts	who	had	published	≥6	peer-	reviewed	
publications	related	to	PSRS	with	a	total	of	102	PSRS	papers.	These	academics	represent	an	
international	body	of	experts	in	reporting	systems	across	five	countries.	(Tables	6.1,	6.2)	
Fifteen	experts	were	identified	and	invited	to	participate	in	this	stage.	Of	these,	fourteen	
international	experts	(93·3%)	agreed	to	participate	in	a	semi-structured	interview	and	had	
published	90	PSRS	papers	between	them.	[8	74	85	108	125	234	241	259	262	267	272-274	
276	278	283	291-365].	The	median	interview	length	was	41.0	minutes	(interquartile	range	
12.8	minutes).	From	two-person	analysis	eight	main	constructs	for	Delphi	consensus	were	
generated	with	58	questions	regarding	specific	issues	in	reporting.		
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Table	6.1	Semi-structured	interview	expert	panel	(listed	alphabetically)	(part	1)	
Expert	 Institution	 Role	 Patient	safety	and	reporting	system	expertise	
	
Country	
Professor	James	
Bagian	
Ann	Arbor	
University	of	
Michigan	
	
Director	of	Center	for	
Healthcare	Engineering	
and	Patient	Safety	
• Chief	Patient	Safety	Officer	and	Founding	Director	of	the	National	Centre	for	Patient	Safety	for	Department	of	Veterans	Affairs	
1999-2010	
• NASA	Aerospace	Advisory	Panel	2006-	2014	
• Over	10	years	experience	in	developing	reporting	systems	
	
United	States	
Professor	G.	Ross	
Baker	
University	of	
Toronto	
Professor	of	Health	
Policy,	Management	and	
Evaluation	
• Professor	and	Program	Director,	MSc.	Quality	Improvement	and	Patient	Safety	Institute	of	Health	Policy,	Management	and	
Evaluation	
• Steering	Committee	Member	for	Safer	Healthcare	Now	(National	Patient	Safety	Program)	2005-2010	
• Co-Chair	Methods	and	Measures	for	Patient	Safety	World	Health	Organization	2005-2009	
	
Canada	
Professor	David	
Bates	
Harvard	Medical	
School	
Professor	of	Medicine	
Professor	of	Health	
Policy	and	Management	
• Chief	Quality	Officer	Brigham	and	Women’s	Hospital	2011-2014	
• President	of	the	International	Society	for	Quality	in	Healthcare	2013-2014	
• Chairman	of	the	American	Medical	Informatics	Association	2008-2009	
	
United	States	
Professor	Liam	
Donaldson	
Imperial	College	
London	
Chair	in	Health	Policy	 • World	Health	Organization	envoy	for	patient	safety	
• Chief	Medical	Officer	for	England	1998-2010	
• Chairman	of	the	National	Patient	Safety	Agency	and	Founder	of	the	National	Reporting	and	Learning	System	
	
United	Kingdom	
Professor	Wilson	
Pace	
University	of	
Colorado	
Professor	of	Family	
Medicine	
• Director	of	DARTNet		(research	network	that	includes	electronic	health	records,	claims	and	patient	outcomes)	
• Committee	for	Institute	of	Medicine:	studying	medication	errors	
• Taxonomy	development	for	adverse	events	
	
United	States	
Professor	Peter	
Pronovost	
Johns	Hopkins	
School	of	
Medicine	
Professor	of	
Anaesthesiology	and	
Critical	Care	Medicine,	
Surgery,	Nursing	
• Chairman	of	ICU	Advisory	Panel	for	Quality	Measures	of	the	Joint	Commission	
• Chairman	of	the	ICU	Physician	Staffing	Committee	for	the	Leapfrog	Group	
• Member	of	the	Quality	Measures	Work	Group	of	the	National	Quality	Forum	
• Senior	Vice	President	for	Patient	Safety	and	Quality	and	Director	of	the	Armstrong	Institute	for	Patient	Safety	and	Quality	
Johns	Hopkins	
	
United	States	
Professor	Bill	
Runciman	
University	of	
South	Australia	
Professor	of	Patient	
Safety	and	Healthcare	
Human	Factors	
• President	of	the	Australian	Patient	Safety	Foundation	1988-2014	
• Founder	of	the	Advanced	Incident	Management	System	(national	incident	system)	
• On	the	Australian	Council	for	Safety	and	Quality	in	Health	Care	and	the	Australian	Health	Information	Council	
	
Australia	
Professor	Kaveh	
Shojania	
University	of	
Toronto	
Director	of	the	Centre	
for	Quality	Improvement	
and	Patient	Safety	
	
• Canada	Research	Chair	in	Patient	Safety	and	Quality	Improvement	
• Associate	Professor,	Department	of	Medicine,	University	of	Toronto	
• Editor-in-chief,	British	Medical	Journal	Quality	&	Safety	
	
Canada	
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Table	6.2	Semi-structured	interview	expert	panel	(listed	alphabetically)	(part	2)	
Expert	 Institution	 Role	 Patient	safety	and	reporting	system	expertise	 Country	
Professor	Andrew	
Smith		
University	of	
Lancaster	
Professor	of	Clinical	
Anaesthesia	
• Director	of	the	Lancaster	Patient	Safety	Research	Unit	
• Part	of	the	joint	National	Patient	Safety	Agency/Royal	College	of	Anaesthetists'	'Safe	Anaesthesia	Liaison	Group'	
• Involved	in	producing	the	Helsinki	Declaration	on	Patient	Safety	in	Anaesthesiology	
	
	
United	Kingdom	
Professor	Charles	
Vincent	
University	of	
Oxford	
Health	Foundation	
Professor,	Department	
of	Experimental	
Psychology	
• Involved	in	implementation	and	advisor	for	the	National	Reporting	and	Learning	System	
• Director	of	the	National	Institute	of	Health	Research	Centre	for	Patient	Safety	&	Service	Quality	at	Imperial	College	Healthcare	
Trust.	
• Commissioner	on	the	UK	Commission	for	Health	Improvement	1999-2003	
	
United	Kingdom	
Professor	Robert	
Wachter	
University	of	
California	
Professor	and	Associate	
Chairman	of	the	
Department	of	Medicine	
	
• Lead	for	the	AHRQ	Patient	Safety	Network	
• Chair	of	the	American	Board	of	Internal	Medicine	2013-2014	
• Member	of	the	Board,	Lucian	Leape	Institute	of	the	National	Patient	Safety	Foundation.	
United	States	
Professor	Cordula	
Wagner	
VU	University	
Medical	Centre	
Professor	of	Patient	
Safety	
• Head	of	Quality	and	Organization	of	hospital-	and	long	term	care	at	NIVEL	Netherlands	Institute	for	Health	Services	Research		
• Responsible	for	the	National	Patient	Safety	Research	Program	in	the	Netherlands	
• Head	of	the	patient	safety	research	centre	‘Safety	4	Patients’,	a	collaboration	of	EMGO+	and	NIVEL.	
	
Netherlands	
Dr.	Saul	Weingart	 Tufts	Medical	
Centre	
Chief	Medical	Officer	
and	Senior	Vice	
President	of	Medical	
Affairs	
• Vice	President	for	Quality	Improvement	and	Patient	Safety	Dana-Farber	Cancer	Institute	
• Chair	of	the	Board	of	Governors	at	the	National	Patient	Safety	Foundation	
• Editorial	advisory	boards	of	the	Joint	Commission	Journal	on	Quality	and	Patient	Safety	
	
	
United	States	
Professor	Albert	
Wu	
Johns	Hopkins	
Bloomberg	School	
of	Public	Health	
Professor	of	Health	
Policy	and	Management	
and	Medicine	
• Director,	Center	for	Health	Services	and	Outcomes	Research	
• Member	of	the	Institute	of	Medicine	committee	on	identifying	and	preventing	medication	errors	
• Senior	Adviser	for	Patient	Safety	to	World	Health	Organization	2007-2009	
	
United	States	
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During	interviews	the	experts	discussed	a	broad	range	of	issues	related	to	reporting.	The	
experts	identified	the	demands	placed	on	reporting	systems	to	provide	both	a	learning	
platform	and	a	surveillance	system.	They	addressed	the	burden	of	numerous	different	types	
of	incidents	that	could	be	reported	and	discussed	how	inclusive	systems	should	be.	There	
was	enthusiastic	discussion	about	ways	in	which	to	improve	reporting	quality	and	the	
importance	of	embedding	reporting	into	the	culture	of	hospitals,	stressing	that	reporting	
should	be	used	for	system	improvement	and	not	punishment.	There	were	mixed	views	
regarding	the	optimum	ways	to	collect	data	and	feedback	to	staff.	Some	experts	had	a	
hospital-focused	perspective	and	others	were	nationally	cantered	with	respect	to	where	
reports	should	be	collated.	All	agreed	the	responsibility	for	improvement	lay	with	the	
hospitals.	From	these	interviews,	seven	topic	areas	for	wider	Delphi	expert	review	were	
generated:	
1. Roles	that	reporting	systems	can	achieve	
2. Roles	reporting	systems	cannot	fulfil	
3. Methods	to	maximize	learning	and	feedback	from	reporting	systems	
4. The	role	of	national	and	local	data	collection	and	safety	solutions	
5. Voluntary	versus	mandatory	data	collection	
6. Investigation	of	incidents	and	accountability	
7. Staff	training	in	reporting	and	investigating	incidents	6.6.2 Delphi	survey		
From	60	experts	invited	for	the	broader	Delphi	survey,	30	agreed	to	participate	(50%).	Of	
these	30,	90·0%	had	greater	than	10	years	expertise	in	incident	reporting	and	86.7%	had	
been	involved	in	the	development	of	an	incident	reporting	system.	After	the	first	round,	
experts	recruited	reached	consensus	on	25	statements	regarding	the	purpose	and	remit	of	
national	PSRS.	All	58	statements	including	the	consensus	statements	were	incorporated	into	
the	second	round	to	check	for	consistency	of	response	and	to	increase	levels	of	consensus.	
After	the	second	round	of	individual	feedback	26/30	(86·7%)	experts	responded	with	their	
revised	opinions.	From	the	58	questions:	40	statements	reached	consensus	and	formed	the	
expert-derived	guidelines	(Table	6.3,	Table	6.4,	Table	6.5).	A	further	seven	statements	
achieved	greater	than	65%	consensus,	however	11	topics	were	unresolved	with	no	clear	
agreement	(Table	6.3,	Table	6.4,	Table	6.5).	
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Table	6.3	Guidelines	for	national	patient	safety	incident	reporting	systems	(italicized	statements	in	grey	indicate	areas	not	reaching	consensus)	
(part	1)	
Guideline	statement	 %	
Consensus	
(n=	26)	
Role	of	reporting	systems	 	
Reporting	systems	should	be	used	to	identify	the	types	of	safety	problems	that	exist	 96·2	
Reporting	systems	should	be	used	to	detect	rare	events	not	picked	up	by	other	methods	 92·3	
Reporting	systems	should	be	used	to	share	learning	between	hospitals	 92·3	
Reporting	system	data	should	be	used	as	indicators	of	the	safety	culture	of	a	hospital	 80·8	
Mandatory	system	reporting	systems	should	be	used	to	measure	the	rate	of	specific	types	of	reported	harm	(e.g.	wrong	site	surgery)	in	a	hospital	 73·1	
	
Roles	reporting	systems	cannot	fulfil	 	
Reporting	systems	are	a	not	a	valid	and	reliable	measure	of	how	safe	a	hospital	is.	 80·8	
Reporting	system	data	should	not	be	used	to	measure	the	national	incidence	of	harm	(e.g.	within	the	national	health	service)	 76·9	
Reporting	systems	should	not	be	used	to	identify	unsafe	hospitals	 69·0	
Voluntary	system	reporting	systems	should	not	be	used	to	measure	the	rate	of	harm	in	a	hospital	 65·4	
Reporting	systems	should	not	be	used	to	identify	unsafe	healthcare	professionals	(e.g.	doctors	and	nurses)	 65·4	
	
Methods	to	maximize	learning	from	reporting	systems	 	
Near	misses	or	no	harm	events	should	be	reported	 96·2	
Anonymous	reporting	data	should	be	readily	available	to	research	groups	for	analysis	 92·3	
Incident	reports	should	be	used	in	educational	programs	for	trainees	to	promote	quality	improvement	 92·3	
Adverse	event	classification	systems	should	be	standardized	to	/	allow	comparisons	 84·6	
Minimum	data	set	should	include	hospital	number,	patient	age,	time,	/	date	and	location	of	incident	and	specialty	caring	for	patients		 84·6	
Staff	should	be	encouraged	to	propose	solutions	for	events	at	the	time	of	the	report	 84·6	
Reports	should	contain	patient	identifiers	so	they	can	be	linked	to	other	data	sets	 73·1	
There	should	be	national	priorities	for	reporting	certain	events	 77·0	
The	quality	of	incident	reports	submitted	to	a	reporting	system	is	more	important	for	learning	than	the	quantity	of	reports	 77·0	
All	reporters	should	have	the	option	to	keep	their	report	anonymous	so	that	they	are	not	identified	 73·1	
Minimum	data	set	should	include	national	identifying	number	(e.g.	NHS	number	or	social	security	number)	 53·8	
Fewer	and	better	described	incidents	should	be	encouraged,	compared	to	more	and	less	well	described	 42·3	
Minimum	data	set	should	include	the	consultant	or	attending	involved	in	patient	care	or	attending	in	charge	of	care	 42·3	
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Table	6.4:	Guidelines	for	national	patient	safety	incident	reporting	systems	(italicized	statements	in	grey	indicate	areas	not	reaching	
consensus)	(part	2)	
Guideline	statement	 %	Consensus	
(n=	26)	
Where	different	types	of	incidents	should	be	reported	 	
Hospitals	should	submit	their	solutions	to	safety	problems	nationally	for	shared	learning	 88·0	
Device	incidents	should	be	reported	both	nationally	and	locally	 88·0	
Never	events	should	be	reported	both	nationally	and	locally	 88·0	
Hospital	acquired	infections	should	be	reported	both	nationally	and	locally	 80·8	
Medication	incidents	should	be	reported	both	nationally	and	locally	 76·9	
Staff	shortages	should	be	reported	Locally	only	 72·0	
Initiatives	to	prevent	harm	should	be	generated	at	a	hospital	level	 72·0	
Incidents	that	lead	to	harm	should	be	reported	both	nationally	and	locally	 77·0	
Reports	should	objectively	classify	what	harm	was	caused	and	not	the	potential	for	harm	 65·3	
There	should	be	specific	criteria	for	what	to	report.	 65·4	
Reports	of	misconduct	by	other	health	care	professionals	should	be	reported	locally	only	 61·5	
Events	from	morbidity	and	mortality	meetings	should	be	reported	to	a	national	system	 46·2	
Complaints	about	other	members	of	staff,	or	staffing	issues	should	NOT	be	reported	to	a	national	system	 46·2	
Near	misses	should	be	reported	locally	only	(other	options:	nationally	or	nationally	and	locally)	 42·3	
Professional	misconduct	incidents	should	be	reported	locally	only	(other	options:	nationally	or	nationally	and	locally)	
	
42·3	
Staff	training	 	
Greater	emphasis	needs	to	be	placed	on	training	staff	to	identify	and	report	safety	incidents	 80·8	
Senior	nurses,	doctors,	managerial	staff	and	other	healthcare	professionals	should	be	trained	to	routinely	investigate	patient	/	safety	incidents	 73·1	
Junior	nurses,	administration	staff	and	medical	students	should	be	trained	routinely	to	investigate	patient	safety	incidents	 65·3	
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Table	6.5:	Guidelines	for	national	patient	safety	incident	reporting	systems	(italicized	statements	in	grey	indicate	areas	not	reaching	
consensus)	(part	3)	
Guideline	statement	 %	Consensus	
(n=	26)	
Voluntary	and	mandatory	data	capture	 	
There	should	be	mandatory	reporting	of	never	events	or	serious	events	such	as	wrong	site	surgery	 92·0	
Near	misses	should	be	captured	by	a	voluntary	system	 88·0	
Medication	incidents	should	be	captured	by	a	voluntary	system	 80·8	
Device	incidents	should	be	captured	by	a	mandatory	system	 80·8	
Hospital	acquired	infections	should	be	captured	by	a	mandatory	system	
	
77·0	
Staff	shortages	or	risk	assessments	should	be	captured	by	a	voluntary	system	
	
53·8	
Investigation	of	incidents	and	accountability	 	
Hospitals	should	have	an	executive	board	member	responsible	for	patient	safety	 100	
Hospitals	should	be	accountable	for	investigating	their	own	reports	 84·6	
Hospitals	should	not	determine	their	own	reporting	priorities	 84·6	
Reporting	systems	should	give	individual	feedback	to	reporters	 84·6	
Never	events	and	incidents	leading	to	death	and	severe	harm	should	be	prioritized	for	investigation	 80·8	
Reporters	who	report	deaths	should	receive	specific	feedback	after	analysis	 80·8	
Reporters	who	report	never	events	should	receive	specific	feedback	after	analysis	 76·9	
Analysis	of	all	incident	types	is	desirable	however	near	miss	incidents	are	less	of	a	priority	for	investigation	than	never	events	and	incident	leading	to	
death	and	severe	harm.	
73·1	
Reporters	who	report	device	incidents	should	receive	specific	feedback	after	analysis	 69·2	
Clinical	teams	external	to	the	hospital	should	investigate	reports	of	severe	patient	harm	 61·5	
Who	should	provide	feedback	for	harm	or	death	incidents	(Multiple	choice	options):		
National	patient	safety	experts,		
External	investigating	clinician	
Consultant/	attending	involved	in	patient	care		
Local	risk	manager	
	
34·6	
30·8	
26·9	
7·7	
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6.6.3 Role	of	reporting	systems	
The	agreed	role	of	reporting	systems	was	to	use	reports	as	a	method	to	identify	the	type	of	
safety	problems	that	exist	and	to	detect	rare	events	not	identified	by	other	methods	(96·4%	
and	92·3%	respectively).		Reporting	systems	ideally	would	be	used	to	share	solutions	to	
safety	problems	between	hospitals	with	shared	learning	being	a	role	most	emphasised	as	
the	purpose	of	reporting	(92.3%	agreed).	Experts	recommended	that	for	selected	rare	types	
of	events	such	as	never	events,	mandatory	reporting	could	be	used	to	detect	the	incidence.		6.6.4 Roles	reporting	systems	cannot	fulfil	
The	expert	panel	considered	what	were	the	most	valid	and	reliable	methods	for	measuring	
the	rate	of	harm	or	error	within	a	hospital	or	health	service.	The	majority	(80·8%)	agreed	
that	prospective	observation	of	care	processes	was	the	most	robust	method,	of	the	5	other	
methods	considered,	trigger	tool	retrospective	review	of	medical	case	notes	was	also	
highlighted.	There	was	substantial	agreement	that	reporting	system	data	should	not	be	
used	as	an	epidemiological	tool	to	measure	or	compare	how	safe	a	health	service	or	
hospital	is	(76·9%	and	(80·8%	respectively))	as	the	data	were	not	valid	for	this	purpose.	
Similarly	the	panel	approached	consensus	regarding	not	using	the	data	to	identify	unsafe	
healthcare	professionals	(65·4%).		6.6.5 Methods	to	maximize	learning	from	reporting	systems	
Ten	recommendations	were	made	by	the	expert	panel	to	improve	patient	safety	incident	
data	capture	and	maximize	the	potential	for	learning	from	patient	safety	incidents.	These	
recommendations	included	the	importance	of	standardizing	and	linking	datasets	(84·6%	and	
73·1%	agreed,	respectively),	educating	staff	on	national	priorities	for	reporting	and	
educating	staff	that	the	quality	of	reports	rather	than	quantity	(77·0%	agreed)	was	most	
useful	for	learning.	Anonymity	of	reporter	was	re-emphasized	(73·1%	agreed)	but	sharing	
data	and	using	reports	in	educational	programs	was	advised	(92·3%	favoured	this	
statement).	It	was	agreed	that	the	greatest	value	to	the	process	was	in	obtaining	solutions	
to	errors	through	reporting	from	frontline	staff	(84·6%)	
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Figure	6.1	What	can	reporting	systems	achieve	and	what	should	they	not	be	used	for?	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	6.2	Maximising	learning	and	improving	accountability	
	6.6.6 The	role	of	national	and	local	data	collection	and	safety	solutions	
There	was	consensus	as	to	what	types	of	events	should	be	collected	at	a	national	level.	
Incidents	with	the	potential	to	be	solved	nationally	such	as	device	failures	(88·0%	agreed),	
never	events	or	serious	untoward	incidents	(88·0%	agreed),	hospital	acquired	infections	
(80·8%	agreed)	and	medication	incidents	(76·0%	agreed)	were	examples	of	incidents	the	
panel	recommended	to	be	reported	and	analysed	locally	and	nationally.	In	contrast,	issues	
such	as	staffing	problems	were	more	relevant	locally	(72·0%	agreed).	Of	greater	importance	
was	the	concept	that	initiatives	to	prevent	harm	and	safety	solutions	should	be	generated	
locally	and	fed	nationally	rather	than	the	reverse	top-down	approach	(88·0%).	(Figure	6.1)	6.6.7 Voluntary	versus	mandatory	data	capture	
The	panel	recommended	that	never	events	or	serious	events	such	as	wrong	site	surgery	
(92·0%	agreed);	device	failures	(80·8%	agreed)	and	hospital-acquired	infections	(77·0%	
agreed)	should	be	mandatory	incidents	for	reporting.	All	other	incidents	should	be	
voluntarily	reported.	(Figure	6.2)	
Suitable	roles	for	patient	safety	reporting	systems	
• Identifying	safety	issues	
• Detecting	rare	events	
• Sharing	safety	solutions	
• Monitoring	never	events		
Unsuitable	roles	for	patient	safety	reporting	systems:	
• Measuring	how	safe	one	hospital	is	compared	to	another	
• Identifying	unsafe	healthcare	professionals	
• Measuring	the	incidence	of	harm	in	a	health	system	
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6.6.8 Investigation	of	incidents	and	accountability	
All	experts	recommended	(i.e.	100%)	that	hospitals	have	an	executive	board	member	
responsible	for	patient	safety	and	that	individual	hospitals	were	responsible	for	
investigating	their	own	reports	(84·6%	agreed)	with	never	events,	incidents	leading	to	death	
and	severe	harm	as	priorities	for	investigation	(73·1%	agreed).	Individual	specific	feedback	
after	investigation	was	highlighted	as	an	essential	component	of	the	system	particularly	for	
reported	deaths	(80·8%	agreed).	However	there	was	lack	of	consensus	about	what	
organisation	or	individual	should	provide	feedback	for	various	incident	types.	(Figure	6.2)	6.6.9 Staff	training	in	reporting	and	investigating	incidents	
The	panel	agreed	that	reporting	systems	would	have	increased	value	if	staff	were	better	
trained	to	identify	and	report	safety	incidents	(80·8%)	It	was	recommended	that	senior	
nurses,	doctors	and	other	healthcare	professionals	be	trained	to	investigate	incidents	
(71.0%	agreed).		
6.7 DISCUSSION	6.7.1 Consensus	statements	
This	study	reached	some	key	conclusions	regarding	PSRS.	Of	primary	importance	is	the	
consensus	that	PSRS	cannot	and	should	not	be	used	to	monitor	the	incidence	of	harm	in	our	
hospitals.	[366]	This	recommendation	carries	important	implications	for	governing	bodies	
wishing	to	identify	“unsafe”	hospitals	and	making	use	of	reporting	data	for	this	purpose.	
There	is	no	evidence	base	to	suggest	that	reporting	rates	reflect	measurable	differences	in	
outcome,	process	or	structure	in	hospitals.	[146]	There	was	agreement	that	reporting	rates	
related	more	to	the	safety	culture	of	an	institution,	in	keeping	with	other	literature.	[7]	All	
experts	agreed	from	this	study	that	other	methods	(such	as	prospective	observation	
studies)	were	superior	to	reporting	for	the	purpose	of	monitoring	adverse	event	rate	and	
the	relative	safety	of	practices.	However	there	was	agreement	that	for	rare	and	serious	
events	such	as	wrong	site	surgery,	where	staff	are	aware	of	a	mandate	to	report	that	
reporting	systems	may	be	useful	for	monitoring	in	this	instance.	Given	that	the	
denominators	of	incidents	are	unknown	it	is	difficult	to	speculate	what	the	sensitivity	of	
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reported	never	events	might	be.	[85]	Nevertheless,	for	rare	incidents,	prospective	
observational	methods	or	even	retrospective	methods	would	require	significant	resources	
to	record	infrequent	events	and	reporting	may	be	the	most	feasible	option	in	this	case.	
[356]	
The	expert	recommendation	for	reporting	systems	was	to	be	used	to	describe	the	types	of	
safety	issues	rather	than	the	rate	of	incidents	in	organizations.	An	example	of	this	would	be	
incident	reports	concerning	delayed	diagnosis.		Whether	a	hospital	reports	one	delayed	
diagnosis	per	month	or	ten,	it	shows	that	diagnostic	delay	is	a	safety	problem	requiring	
further	investigation.	[335]	It	is	possible	that	for	this	reason	experts	agreed	that	the	quality	
of	a	report	was	of	greater	value	than	the	quantity	of	reports.	[77]	Along	with	this	theme	was	
the	consensus	that	certain	events	were	more	useful	locally	than	nationally,	such	as	staff	
shortages.	Limiting	the	volume	of	national	reports	by	specifying	incidents	of	national	
interest	whilst	enabling	local	hospitals	to	continue	collecting	data,	might	allow	national	
bodies	to	focus	on	current	safety	priorities	and	be	selective	about	national	resource	
allocation.	Equally	for	staff,	reducing	the	burden	of	pre-requisite	reports	for	events	that	
provide	no	learning	may	reduce	resource	wastage	and	frustration.[367]	
The	panel	recommended	that	learning	from	error	should	be	the	main	aim	of	reporting	
systems.	Enabling	staff	to	propose	solutions	and	training	them	to	take	responsibility	for	
investigating	and	understanding	system	failures	was	felt	to	be	especially	important.	To	
improve	shared	learning	between	hospitals,	consistent,	minimum	datasets	were	proposed.	
Anonymity	of	reporters	was	re-emphasized,	concurring	with	the	draft	WHO	guidelines	and	
other	studies	as	being	a	cornerstone	of	reporting,	protecting	and	enabling	reporters	to	
share	experiences	without	fear	of	recrimination.	[286	368]	
The	issue	of	mandatory	versus	voluntary	reporting	was	discussed	and	has	been	a	subject	of	
interest	in	the	literature.	[369	370]	The	lack	of	any	valid	method	for	governing	how	well	
hospitals	comply	with	reporting	renders	the	mandatory	nature	of	the	report	slightly	
meaningless.	The	expert	panel	suggested	specific,	important	and	easily	defined	events	such	
as	wrong	site	surgery,	hospital	acquired	infections	and	device	failures	be	mandatory	for	
reporting.	Reinforcing	that	reporters	must	report	certain	events	may	increase	general	
awareness	of	their	importance	and	thus	help	embed	the	reporting	of	them	as	a	cultural	
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norm.	The	experts	were	asked	whether	hospitals	should	determine	their	own	reporting	
priorities	and	there	was	widespread	disagreement	with	this	as	a	policy.		
Feedback	is	an	essential	element	of	a	reporting	system.	The	importance	of	feedback	is	
widely	recognized	in	the	literature	as	an	integral	part	of	learning	from	error.	[112	336	368]	
The	expert	panel	reemphasized	this	view.	It	was	suggested	that	hospitals	should	make	
giving	feedback	their	own	responsibility,	rather	than	relying	on	a	national	process	and	that	
feedback	should	be	specific.	Since	the	volume	of	reported	incidents	is	great,	the	guidelines	
placed	focus	on	giving	specific	feedback	to	staff	who	reported	incidents	of	death	or	severe	
harm,	whilst	recognizing	that	all	types	of	incidents	are	valuable	for	learning.	Hospitals	
should	also	focus	on	generating	solutions	to	their	problems	that	can	then	be	fed	up	
nationally	and	shared.	Creating	a	“solution	centre”	or	national	repository	of	safety	ideas	
would	enable	this	process.	
All	experts	concluded	that	hospitals	require	an	executive	board	member	responsible	for	
patient	safety.		This	recommendation	will	enable	hospitals	to	focus	on	and	demonstrate	
that	learning	from	harm	is	a	top	priority.	Botje	and	colleagues	showed	that	having	quality	as	
an	item	on	the	executive	board	agenda	increased	efforts	to	improve	standards.	[371]	Safety	
is	everybody’s	responsibility	but	having	an	executive	directly	accountable	for	the	issue	
allows	safety	to	placed	firmly	on	the	executive	board’s	agenda.	[371]	Healthcare	quality	
comprises	three	strands:	clinical	outcomes,	patient	experience	and	patient	safety.	[372]	We	
suggest	that	appointing	safety	champions,	persons	actively	engaging	staff	and	allocating	
resources	for	safety	is	vital	to	ensure	that	the	safety	as	an	element	of	quality	is	not	
overlooked.	[373]	
This	study	has	highlighted	both	the	wealth	of	distinguished	academics	contributing	to	this	
field	as	well	as	the	degree	to	which	there	is	unity	in	thinking	regarding	what	reporting	
systems	can	and	cannot	achieve	(Table	6.1,	Table	6.3,	Table	6.4,	Table	6.5).	6.7.2 Topics	that	failed	to	reach	consensus	
There	were	some	areas	where	opinion	remained	divided	or	no	strong	conclusions	were	
reached	(Table	6.3,	Table	6.4,	Table	6.5)–	which	are	important	to	review	here.	The	experts	
rejected	setting	strict	criteria	for	what	to	report,	as	a	guideline,	although	they	agreed	that	
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there	should	be	mandatory	reporting	for	specific	“never	events”	or	serious	untoward	
events.	This	may	be	to	preserve	the	freedom	that	reporters	have	to	report	the	unusual	and	
new	types	of	event.		
There	was	consensus	of	over	65%	for	not	using	reporting	systems	to	identify	unsafe	
hospitals	or	healthcare	professionals	but	this	did	not	approach	our	threshold	criteria	of	70%.	
The	difficulty	in	ruling	out	reporting	systems	as	a	tool	for	monitoring	dangerous	practices	is	
possibly	due	to	the	lack	of	other	methods	to	do	this.	However	reporting	systems	were	
identified	as	unsuitable	instruments	for	measuring	how	safe	a	hospital	is	and	this	reached	
consensus.	Along	the	same	theme,	there	was	indecision	regarding	where	reports	of	health	
care	professional	misconduct	should	be	reported.		
With	respect	to	protecting	confidentiality,	this	construct	may	have	been	the	reason	why	
experts	did	not	agree	regarding	including	consultant/attending	names	in	data	collection	or	
national	identifying	numbers.	There	was	also	no	agreement	that	morbidity	and	mortality	
conference	outcomes	should	be	reported	nationally.	Although	experts	were	keen	for	
reports	of	severe	patient	harm	to	be	reported	nationally	the	suggestion	for	clinical	teams	
external	to	the	hospital	being	employed	to	investigate	severe	harm	reports	was	not	
approved.	This	may	be	related	to	confidentiality	but	equally	due	to	logistical	challenges	in	
implementing	an	external	investigation.	
6.8 Limitations	
This	study	has	certain	limitations.	Delphi	consensus	groups	can	produce	collective	answers	
but	this	does	not	always	mean	the	consensus	is	correct.	In	the	setting	of	uncertainty	
regarding	the	utility	of	reporting	systems,	a	Delphi	method	was	deemed	an	appropriate	
method	to	draw	together	a	wealth	of	expertise	to	address	the	question.	Consensus	methods	
should	not	be	a	substitute	for	rigorous	prospective	studies	however	conducting	such	studies	
to	answer	the	questions	posed	in	this	Delphi	would	not	be	feasible.	Only	50%	of	experts	
invited	to	participate	in	the	second	stage	agreed	to	do	so.	However	those	that	participated	
were	internationally	renowned	with	over	ten	years	experience	with	reporting	systems	and	
therefore	it	is	likely	those	who	responded	had	high	level	of	interest	and	expertise	in	the	
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topic.	The	second	round	of	the	Delphi	had	an	acceptable	response	rate	of	86·7%	thereby	
reducing	attrition	bias.		
This	Delphi	did	not	seek	the	views	of	front	line	healthcare	workers.	The	views	of	the	
reporters	themselves,	as	well	as	other	stakeholders,	should	influence	the	future	of	reporting	
systems.	Though	clinical	knowledge	was	not	a	specific	inclusion	criterion,	many	of	the	
reviewers	were	practicing	clinicians.	Although	all	experts	were	familiar	with	state	wide	or	
multi-centre	systems,	due	to	the	varying	nature	of	international	healthcare	provision,	not	all	
reviewers	will	have	had	the	same	level	of	experience	with	a	national	reporting	system.	
However	high	level	of	consensus	implies	that	this	was	not	a	great	obstacle	to	shared	
understanding	of	national	reporting	systems.		
6.9 CONCLUSIONS	
The	study	has	produced	international	expert	consensus-based	guidelines	regarding	national	
reporting	systems	and	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge	this	is	the	first	time	such	an	exercise	
has	been	carried	out.	These	recommendations	can	now	be	used	to	enable	existing	and	
future	systems	to	evolve	and	be	further	developed	–	with	the	ultimate	aim	to	maximize	
learning	from	error,	inform	health	policy	and	ultimately	improve	the	safety	and	quality	of	
health	
6.10 FUTURE	WORK	
Given	that	these	guidelines	recommend	not	using	reporting	systems	to	understand	the	
incidence	of	adverse	events,	this	thesis	shall	now	address	another	commonly	used	
retrospective	method	of	adverse	event	detection;	case	note	review.	
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7 AVOIDABLE	MORTALITY:	DEVELOPING	AND	VALIDATING	AN	
EXPLICIT,	RETROSPECTIVE,	MORTALITY	CASE	NOTE	REVIEW	TOOL	
7.1 	OVERVIEW	
After	in-depth	quantitative	and	qualitative	review	of	reporting	systems,	it	is	clear	that	
reporting	alone	is	not	an	adequate	method	for	monitoring	adverse	event	rates	in	hospitals,	
but	can	be	maximised	and	used	as	a	starting	point	for	thematic	understanding	of	safety	
themes	including	severe	harm	and	death	in	surgery.	Another	method	for	harm	detection	
that	has	been	widely	used	internationally	is	retrospective	case	note	review.	This	chapter	will	
discuss	retrospective	case	note	review	methodology	and	its	detection	of	a	specific	level	of	
harm:	death.	It	will	explore	avoidable	mortality	and	seek	to	develop	and	validate	a	case	note	
review	method	for	measuring	it.	
7.2 INTRODUCTION		 	7.2.1 What	is	avoidable	mortality?	
Avoidable	mortality	can	be	defined	as	a	death	that	should	not	occur	given	current	medical	
knowledge	 or	 technology.[374]	 Charlton	 and	 colleagues	 originally	 described	 avoidable	
mortality	in	1983	by	compiling	a	list	of	diseases	considered	treatable	and	then	investigating	
cause	 of	 death	 in	 England	 and	 Wales.[375]	 This	 led	 to	 developing	 a	 series	 of	 outcome	
indicators	 to	assess	diseases	where	death	was	avoidable,	 such	as	TB	and	appendicitis	and	
using	them	to	compare	healthcare	internationally.[376]		
Avoidable	mortality	has	since	then	been	used	to	evaluate	the	efficacy	of	health	care	systems.	
As	 emphasized	 by	 the	 recent	 Francis	 Report	 into	 care	 at	 the	 Mid-Staffordshire	 hospital,	
unexpected	mortality	is	now	an	important	measure	of	safety	and	quality	of	healthcare.	[377]	
Death	occurring	in	the	context	of	current	medical	knowledge	implies	circumstances	where	
errors	of	commission	or	omission	in	care	occurred.	Errors	leading	to	death	or	type	I	harm,	as	
previously	defined,	are	classed	as	adverse	events.	[4]	
Adverse	events	are	injuries	or	complications	that	occur	as	a	result	of	health	care	management	
and	not	as	a	result	of	the	patient’s	pathology,	causing	prolonged	hospital	stay,	morbidity	or	
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mortality.	[5]	The	estimated	international	incidence	of	adverse	events	in	hospitals	ranges	in	
published	work	from	3%	to	17%	of	patients	per	inpatient	stay.	[173	206	378-384]	
Measures	 of	 risk-adjusted	 mortality	 such	 as	 Summary	 Hospital	 Mortality	 Indicator	 and	
Hospital	 Standardised	 Mortality	 Ratio	 (SHMI	 and	 HSMR)	 are	 the	 current	 methods	 for	
assessing	unexpected	death	based	on	population	mortality	 statistics.	Numbers	of	patients	
that	have	a	stronger	probability	of	inpatient	death	based	on	comorbidities	and	disease,	i.e.	
expected	deaths,	are	weighed	against	actual	numbers	of	deaths	and	indices	are	created	to	
compare	 hospitals.	 These	 measures	 have	 previously	 been	 criticized	 for	 overestimating	
unexpected	or	avoidable	death.[34	385	386]	It	is	difficult	to	determine	within	these	measures	
the	degree	to	which	deaths	could	have	been	prevented	with	adequate	medical	care.	Hogan	
et	al	(2015)	recently	showed	in	a	national	retrospective	case	note	review	study	that	there	was	
no	statistically	significant	association	between	HSMR	or	SHMI	and	the	avoidability	of	death.	
[160]	To	assess	the	quality	of	healthcare,	it	may	be	more	useful	to	focus	on	deaths	that	have	
objective	evidence	of	being	related	to	adverse	events	or	complications.	[387]	7.2.2 Measuring	avoidable	death	
The	 avoidable	 nature	 of	 an	 inpatient	 death	 has	 traditionally	 been	 assessed	 through	
retrospective	 case	 record	 review	as	a	 validated	method	 for	measurement.	 [388]	The	best	
means	of	performing	such	a	review	is	unclear.	The	ideal	review	system	would	maximize	the	
adverse	event	detection	rate	and	provide	the	reviewer	with	an	enough	evidence	to	determine	
avoidability	of	death.	This	requirement	is	tempered	by	the	new	necessity	to	review	all	deaths;	
therefore	the	review	method	now	needs	to	be	efficient,	timely	and	pragmatic.		
There	are	two	types	of	case	note	review:	implicit	(or	holistic)	and	explicit.	The	implicit	review	
involves	a	trained	expert	reading	case	notes	in	full	and	accessing	any	further	supplementary	
information.		Current	methods	of	using	experienced	reviewers	to	provide	holistic	assessment	
of	mortality	case	notes	are	intuitively	sound	however	the	process	of	recruitment,	training	and	
reviewing	notes	is	prolonged.	Implicit	review	is	subjective	and	can	result	 in	 lower	levels	of	
inter-rater	 reliability	 than	 explicit	 methods.	 [389].	 It	 may	 be	 insensitive	 to	 detecting	
differences	in	care	quality	at	a	hospital	level	[390].	The	original	case	note	review	study:	the	
Harvard	Medical	Practice	Study	found	that	13.6%	of	adverse	events	 led	to	death	although	
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they	did	not	specifically	 study	 the	proportion	of	deaths	 that	were	avoidable.[200]	A	more	
recent	Dutch	study	using	retrospective	case	note	review	suggested	the	proportion	of	deaths	
that	 had	 an	 adverse	 event	 associated	 with	 them	 was	 4.1%.[383]	 Hogan	 and	 colleagues	
recently	 used	 holistic	 retrospective	 record	 review	 to	 assess	 the	 incidence	 of	 hospital	
avoidable	mortality	in	England	finding	a	rate	of	5.2%	of	mortality	cases.	[17]		
Explicit	systems,	such	as	the	Global	Trigger	Tool,	have	been	used	to	detect	adverse	events.	
The	Institute	for	Healthcare	Improvement	(IHI)	developed	a	Global	Trigger	Tool	for	Measuring	
Adverse	Events	(GTT)	and	has	been	validated	for	use	in	the	UK	as	the	Acute	Trigger	Tool	(ATT)	
(see	 appendices).	 The	GTT	 is	 a	 reliable	 and	 valid	method	 for	 detecting	 adverse	 events	 in	
hospitals	with	the	highest	sensitivity	 for	harm	detection	of	any	review	method	and	with	a	
good	level	of	 inter-rater	agreement	and	specificity	[391-393]	It	has	been	used	to	track	the	
rate	of	adverse	events	over	time	and	compare	hospital	event	rates.	Explicit	and	implicit	case	
review	methods	have	been	compared	in	previous	studies.	[394]	This	study	is	novel	in	that	it	
uses	explicit	methodology,	previously	employed	to	measure	adverse	events,	to	determine	the	
preventability	of	mortality.	7.2.3 Who	should	act	as	an	avoidable	mortality	reviewer?	
The	recent	Keogh	review	recommended	that	all	“excess	deaths”	(i.e.	unexpected)	be	
studied	in	detail	using	retrospective	case	note	review.[127]	Given	the	limited	number	of	
available	expert,	medical	reviewers,	it	would	be	useful	to	demonstrate	that	other	reviewers	
have	similar	reliability	in	assessing	avoidable	death.	Trained	nurses	are	a	potential	resource	
for	avoidable	mortality	review.	Nurses	already	perform	case	note	review	using	the	Acute	
Trigger	Tool	in	the	UK.	They	have	essential	clinical	skills	and	knowledge	to	read	and	
comprehend	the	course	of	events	during	a	patient’s	hospital	care.	Hutchinson	and	
colleagues	compared	case	note	review	methods	(implicit	and	explicit)	and	different	groups	
of	health	care	professionals.[394]	Nurses	and	doctors	recorded	care	differently	when	
reviewing	the	same	notes,	with	doctors	providing	more	information,	but	they	assessed	
quality	of	care	similarly.	Criterion	based	or	explicit	review	methods	produced	more	
concordant	results.	A	more	protocol	driven	method	may	increase	detection	of	adverse	
events	in	complex	clinical	events	and	is	likely	to	demonstrate	greater	inter-rater	reliability.	
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7.3 AIMS	7.3.1 Primary	aim:		
This	study	aims	to	assess	whether	an	efficient	and	reliable	explicit	case	note	review	method	
can	be	devised	for	detecting	avoidable	death,	so	that	it	could	be	applied	on	a	regular	basis	to	
investigate	excess	mortality	in	hospitals.	7.3.2 Secondary	aims:	
a)	To	determine	if	a	tool	can	be	developed	that	is	reliable	and	easy	to	use	so	that	it	takes	
less	time	but	is	as	valid	as	current	implicit	methods.		
	
b)	To	assess	the	feasibility	of	recruiting	and	training	nurses	for	mortality	case	note	review.	
7.4 HYPOTHESIS	
An	explicit	tool	can	be	developed	and	validated	for	use	by	nurses	and	physicians	to	
retrospectively	review	mortality	case	notes	to	assess	the	avoidability	of	death.	This	tool	will	
be	reproducible	and	more	efficient	to	employ	than	current	implicit	expert	review	processes.	
7.5 METHODS	
The	process	for	developing	a	new	review	tool	was	described	in	studies	by	international	
developers	of	case	note	review	methodology	such	as	the	Canadian	paediatric	trigger	tool.	
[395]	This	process	involves	the	following	steps:	
• Evaluate	existing	tools	and	customizing	one	or	more	to	meet	the	aims	of	the	study	
• Model	the	tool	and	compare	adverse	event	detection	rates	
• Develop	a	training	program	for	using	the	tool	
• Pilot	the	tool	to	establish	feasibility		
• Validate	the	tool	
The	road	map	for	creating	the	Imperial	Tool	is	described	in	Figure	7.1.	 	
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Figure	7.1	Method	for	developing	and	Assessing	Imperial	Tool	
	
Construct	validity	testing
1.	Reviewer	recruitement	and	training	in	both	case	note	review	methodologies 2.	Reviewers	randomly	assigned	case	notes 3.	Reviewers	randomly	assigned	review	method	either	Imperial	tool	or	implicit	method 4.	Review	process	continued	until	all		notes	reviewed	by	both	methods	(without	reviewers	reviewing	the	same	notes	twice)
Reliability	testing
Asssessing	the	inter-rater	reliability	of	two	experienced	reviewers	reviewng	the	same	notes	using	the	Imperial	Tool
Criterion	validity	testting
Assessing	adverse	event	detection	rate	between	the	two	tool	using	experienced	revieweres
Content	validity	testing
Subject	matter	experts'	evaluation	of	each	item	in	Imperial	tool	using	a	questionnaire	to	calucalte	the	content	validity	index
Imperial	Tool	development
1.	Expert	consultation	on	current	review	processes 2.	Review	of	current,	best,	explicit	case	note	review	methodology 3.	Modification	of	current	tools	to	create	Imperial	tool 4.	Pilot	testing	with	experienced	reviewers	and	tool	refinement
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7.5.1 Tool	development	
Initially	experts	of	the	current,	implicit,	case	note	review	methods	were	consulted	to	
understand	the	review	process	and	the	potential	areas	for	improvement.		
Following	this	existing	explicit	case	note	review	tools	were	reviewed	and	experts	consulted	
to	understand	their	use.		
Once	suitable	tools	were	identified	they	were	modified	to	create	the	Imperial	Tool	(IT).	The	
tool	was	piloted	with	expert	reviewers	for	face	validity.		Reviewers	were	asked	to	comment	
on	usability	and	functionality.	IT	went	through	several	iterations	until	content	saturation	
was	reached.		7.5.2 Validity	assessment	
Test	validity	is	defined	as	“the	degree	to	which	evidence	and	theory	support	the	
interpretations	of	test	scores”.	[396]	It	addresses	the	strength	of	the	test,	i.e.	how	well	the	
test	measures	what	it	is	designed	to	measure.	This	is	as	opposed	to	reliability;	which	is	the	
consistency	of	the	measurement.	There	are	several	elements	of	validity	to	measure	when	
assessing	a	test:	
• Construct	validity:	is	the	overall	extent	to	which	the	test	elements	measure	the	
concept,	given	the	theoretical	support	for	understanding	the	concept.		[397]	
• Content	validity:	an	examination	of	the	content	of	the	test	to	determine	whether	it	
covers	the	representative	elements	of	the	domain	that	is	being	measured.	This	is	
produced	by	careful	selection	of	items	and	then	assessed	through	expert	
review.[398]	
• Criterion	validity:	this	is	the	correlation	between	the	tests	and	other	measures	that	
are	already	valid.	There	are	two	types.	Predictive	validity	is	a	measure	of	how	well	
the	test	correlates	with	a	future	measure,	(such	as	IQ	test	and	future	academic	
performance.	Concurrent	validity	is	the	correlation	of	the	measurement	of	one	
construct	and	another	measure	of	the	same	type.	Concurrent	validity	is	the	test	
relevant	to	this	study.	
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7.5.3 Content	validity	testing	
Subject	matter	experts	evaluated	whether	the	IT’s	items	were	appropriate	for	the	
assessment	of	avoidable	mortality.	This	was	assessed	using	a	questionnaire.	(Table	7.1)	A	5-
point	Likert	scale	was	used	to	assess	the	level	of	agreement	and	the	content	validity	index	
(CVI)	was	obtained	by	calculating	the	proportion	of	ratings	of	3	or	higher:	
CVI=	((E-	(N/2))/(N/2))	
Where	E=	number	of	experts	who	rated	item	as	essential	and	where,	N=	number	of	experts.	
As	per	other	studies	assessing	CVI,	a	value	of	0.8	or	more	was	acceptable.[397	399]
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Table	7.1:	Content	Validity	Questionnaire		
For	the	following	items	please	make	an	assessment	on	the	relevance	of	the	item	to	assessing	
avoidable	mortality.	(1=strongly	disagree,	5	strongly	agree)	
Reviewer	occupation:	__________________	Level	of	training___________________________	
Item	 This	item	is	relevant	to	the	detection	of	
avoidable	mortality	
Was	there	evidence	of	failure	to	monitor	the	patient?	
(Examine	notes	for	8-12	hrs	before	either	death	or	
transfer	to	ICU	or	theatre	for	evidence	of	patient	not	
in	appropriate	HDU	setting,	or	not	having	appropriate	
nursing	observations/clinical	review)	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Was	there	evidence	of	Failure	to	Rescue?	
(Examine	notes	for	8-12	hrs	before	either	death	or	
transfer	to	ICU	or	theatre	for	a	change	in	HR,	RR,	BP,	
Saturations,	low	GCS	or	blood	tests:	that	were	not	
responded	to)	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Was	there	evidence	of	Inadequate	management	plan?	
(Examine	notes	for	evidence	of	misdiagnosis,	delayed	
diagnosis,	treatment	deficiency	e.g.	failure	to	
adequately	treat	sepsis	or	delayed	scans)	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Was	this	patient	a	readmission	within	28	days?	
(i.e.	premature	or	inappropriate	
discharge/complication)	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Did	any	aspiration	event	occur?	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Did	medication	error/fluid	mismanagement	occur?	
(e.g.	insulin	overdose/underdoes,	fluid	overload	or	
failure	to	prescribe	fluid,	warfarin	overdose)	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Was	there	a	diagnosis	of	DVT/PE	following	admission	
as	evidenced	by	imaging	+/-	D	dimers,	with	failure	to	
prescribe	prophylaxis?	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Did	a	hospital	acquired	pressure	ulcer	develop	or	
advance?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Did	a	hospital-acquired	infection	develop?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Did	a	problem	in	healthcare	lead	to	a	fall	taking	place?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Did	a	surgical/procedural	complication	cause	harm?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Did	an	unplanned	return	to	theatre	occur?	 1	
	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Did	a	cardiac	arrest	call	take	place?	
(Specifically	is	there	a	cardiac	arrest	sequence	
documented	in	the	notes	where	CPR	was	carried	
out?)	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Did	an	adverse	event	lead	to	the	cardiac	arrest?	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Did	any	other	adverse	events	occur?	
(free	text	section)	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
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7.5.4 Criterion	and	construct	validity	testing	
7.5.4.1 Imperial	tool	vs.	Acute	Trigger	Tool	
All	surgical	deaths	over	a	3-year	period	were	purposively	sampled	to	examine	deaths	with	a	
probable	higher	yield	of	adverse	events.	This	set	of	mortality	case	notes	was	reviewed	using	
the	IT	and	also	compared	with	the	ATT	in	order	to	establish	whether	there	was	significant	
difference	between	adverse	event	detection	rate	and	type	between	the	two.	The	reviewers	
used	for	this	purpose	were	two	expert	reviewers	trained	in	case	note	review	methodology	
and	who	were	regularly	reviewing	case	notes	to	assess	avoidable	mortality.	
7.5.4.2 Imperial	Tool	versus	current	implicit	method	
IT	was	then	compared	with	an	Implicit	review	method	using	a	mixed	group	of	physician	and	
nurse	reviewers	to	assess	whether	it	was	a	valid	tool	for	avoidable	death	assessment,	
whether	nurses	felt	confident	using	it	and	whether	it	was	more	efficient	than	the	implicit	
review	method.	Efficiency	was	determined	by	length	of	time	taken	for	review,	number	of	
adverse	events	detected,	and	confidence	of	the	reviewers.		
7.5.4.3 Construct	validity	of	ability	of	Imperial	Tool	to	detected	avoidable	death	
	Adverse	event	detection	rate	was	correlated	with	the	level	of	avoidability	of	death.	It	was	
hypothesised	that	they	should	have	a	strong	association.	Quality	of	care	was	also	correlated	
with	avoidability	of	death	and	a	strong	negative	association	was	expected,	if	the	test	had	
good	construct	validity.	7.5.5 Reliability	testing:	Imperial	Tool	vs.	Imperial	Tool	
The	reliability	of	IT	was	tested.	Two	expert	reviewers	used	the	IT	to	assess	a	random	sample	
of	mortality	and	the	inter-rater	reliability	was	tested	using	kappa	scores.		7.5.6 Method	for	selecting	and	training	reviewers		
7.5.6.1 Reviewer	selection	
These	inclusion	criteria	were	chosen	as	a	senior	level	of	clinical	experience	and	training,	as	
well	as	up	to	date	knowledge	was	deemed	appropriate	to	accurately	and	holistically	
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appraise	avoidable	death.	It	was	essential	that	the	reviewers	were	not	part	of	the	clinical	
team	who	treated	the	patient,	as	it	would	introduce	significant	bias	in	the	avoidability	
assessment.	
7.5.6.1.1 Inclusion	criteria	for	reviewers		
• Over	18,	with	capacity	to	consent	and	fluent	in	English	language	
• Able	to	commit	to	training	and	reviewing	process	
7.5.6.1.1.1 Nurses	
• Senior	nurses,	either	senior	band	5	or	band	6	and	above,	preferably	with	at	least	5	
years	general	ward	experience.	
7.5.6.1.1.2 Physicians	
• At	least	five	years	clinical	practice	in	either	medical/surgical/primary	
care/emergency	care/critical	care/anaesthesia	as	a	consultant.	
• If	retired,	have	been	out	of	medical	practice	no	less	than	5	years.	
7.5.6.1.2 Exclusion	criteria	for	reviewers		
• Reviewers	who	were	part	of	the	clinical	team	caring	for	the	patient	whose	mortality	
case	notes	are	being	reviewed.	
7.5.6.2 Reviewer	training	
A	customised	training	program	was	created	for	this	study.	All	nurses	and	physician	
reviewers	involved	in	the	study	undertook	a	day	training	course	comprised	of	a	taught	
seminars	and	practice	notes	with	selected	case	vignettes.	The	concepts	of	assessing	the	
avoidability	of	death	were	taught	as	well	a	systematic	approach	to	mortality	case	notes.	The	
participants	were	then	given	case	vignettes	to	explore	in	groups,	followed	by	open	
discussion	about	what	constitutes	avoidability.			Following	this	they	then	had	practice	
sessions	with	the	conventional	implicit	review	method	and	data	extraction	sheet	as	well	as	
the	Imperial	tool.	As	a	group	the	results	were	then	examined	and	discussed	where	
discrepancies	were	found.	A	satisfactory	level	of	adverse	event	detection	and	confidence	
with	the	review	process	was	achieved	by	comparing	the	trainee	reviewer’s	detection	rate	
with	an	experienced	reviewer.	Once	they	were	achieving	commensurate	levels	of	adverse	
event	detection	the	reviewer	was	considered	trained	and	the	enrolled	into	the	study.	
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7.5.7 Case	note	selection	
7.5.7.1 Inclusion	criteria	for	mortality	case	notes	
All	mortality	case	notes	where	the	patient	had	died	during	admission	from	Imperial	College	
Healthcare	Trust	were	listed	and	then	randomly	sampled.	They	were	required	to	fulfil	the	
following	criteria:	
• Deceased	patients	with	closed	records	(all	coding	completed)	
• Length	of	stay	at	least	24	hours	
• Over	18.	
• Admitted	between	2010	and	2013	
7.5.7.2 Exclusion	criteria	for	mortality	case	notes	
• Incomplete	records.	
• Paediatric	records/	maternity	records/	inpatient	Psychiatric	records.	
	7.5.8 Method	for	reviewing	notes	
7.5.8.1 Blinding	
• Reviewers	were	blinded	to	the	results	of	previous	assessments	so	as	not	to	bias	the	
result.	
• The	research	team	were	blinded	as	to	who	reviewed	the	notes	and	by	which	method	
when	collecting	the	results.	
• All	reviewers	were	given	a	randomly	generated	identification	number.	
7.5.8.2 Randomisation	
Randomisation	of	reviewers	and	mortality	case	notes	were	performed	using	a	random	
number	generator.	All	notes	and	reviewers	were	assigned	a	random	number	and	then	
allocated	to	groups.	
7.5.8.3 Control	groups		
The	same	mortality	case	notes	were	assessed	both	by	Imperial	Tool	and	implicit	review	
method.	Different	reviewers	performed	each	review.	The	reviewers	were	randomised	to	
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both	notes	and	tool	to	prevent	one	reviewer	becoming	more	proficient	at	one	review	
method	compared	to	another.	
7.5.8.4 Reviewing	process	
Trained	reviewers	were	randomly	allocated	a	set	of	mortality	case	notes	and	randomly	
allocated	either	the	Imperial	Tool	or	the	implicit	review	data	extraction	sheet.	They	noted	
time	at	start	and	finish	of	the	review.	All	notes	including	nursing	documentation,	blood	
results	and	investigations	were	available.		For	both	methods	the	reviewers	had	opportunity	
to	discuss	questions	with	the	expert	reviewer	and	research	team.	
Implicit	review	was	a	two-stage	process	as	used	in	national	studies	by	Hogan	et	al	(2012)	
[17].	Firstly	the	reviewers	read	the	mortality	case	notes	and	judged	whether	any	adverse	
events	occurred	or	whether	there	were	any	errors	in	the	care	pathway	that	are	deemed	to	
be	preventable.		
Secondly	reviewers	were	asked	to	assess	all	aspects	of	the	patients’	care	and	the	entire	
record	including	nursing	records	and	drug	charts.	Demographic	information	was	collected	as	
well	as	co-morbidities	and	functional	impairments.	
For	all	adverse	events	leading	to	death	the	timing,	and	contributory	factors	as	assessed	by	
the	reviewers	were	logged.	Reviewers	then	made	an	assessment	of	the	avoidability	of	death	
using	a	6-point	Likert	scale.	
7.5.8.5 Outcomes	of	interest	for	criterion	validity	testing	
7.5.8.5.1 Primary	outcome	measures	
• Comparison	of	time	taken	for	each	review	method	for	the	same	set	of	mortality	case	
notes	
• Comparison	of	avoidability	assessment	between	review	methods	
• Construct	validity:		
o Correlate	adverse	event	detection	rate	with	avoidability	of	death		
o Correlate	assessed	quality	of	care	with	avoidability	of	death	
	
7.5.8.5.2 Secondary	outcome	measures	
• Confidence	scoring	of	reviewers	after	each	case.	
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7.5.9 Statistical	analysis	
All	results	were	captured	in	a	pre-set	data	extraction	sheet	that	detailed	the	number	and	
type	of	adverse	events	detected,	the	degree	of	harm	and	the	preventability	of	the	death	
scored	on	a	5-point	Likert	scale	on	the	basis	of	the	reviewers’	review	process.	
Correlations	between	adverse	event	rates	were	calculated	Pearson	correlations,	and	Kappa	
scores	for	inter-relator	reliability	regarding	the	preventability	of	the	deaths	will	be	assessed.	
As	per	Landis	and	Koch	(1977)	a	hierarchical	kappa	statistic	scale	was	used	to	assess	
agreement:		
• Poor	=	<0.00	
• Slight	=	0.00-0.20	
• Fair	=	0.21-0.40	
• Moderate	=	0.41-0.60	
• Substantial	=	0.61-0.80	
• Almost	perfect	=	0.81-1.00[400]	
Statistical	significance	was	assessed	as	p	value	<0.05.	7.5.10 Consent	
Consent	to	enter	the	study	was	sought	from	each	reviewer-participant	only	after	a	full	
explanation	has	been	given,	an	information	leaflet	offered	and	time	allowed	for	
consideration.		Signed	reviewer-participant	consent	and	agreement	to	confidentiality	was	
obtained.	(see	Appendices)	7.5.11 Ethical	approval	
This	study	obtained	approval	from	the	Research	Ethics	Committee:	(reference:	13/LO/1374	
STDA3106,	Protocol	number:	IRAS	project	ID	133513).		
	
7.6 RESULTS	7.6.1 Tool	development	
The	expert	consultation	group,	comprised	of	local	reviewing	teams	and	departmental,	
academic,	experts	in	safety,	revealed	that	the	modified	Acute	Trigger	Tool	(ATT);	the	UK	
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version	of	Institute	for	Healthcare	Improvement	(IHI)	Global	Trigger	Tool	is	most	commonly	
used	in	the	UK	for	adverse	event	detection.[401]	The	ATT	is	comprehensive	and	modular	
and,	most	importantly,	nurses	are	familiar	with	its	use.	(see	Appendices)	Not	all	triggers	in	
the	ATT	were	deemed	appropriate	for	discerning	avoidable	death.	So	certain	elements	were	
selected.			
The	trigger	tool	was	used	in	combination	with	more	in	depth	or	“deep	dive”	questions	to	
investigate	preventable	hospital	mortality.	Kaiser	Permanente	(KP)	developed	a	quantitative	
method	where	nurses	with	physician	guidance	can	more	efficiently	review	notes	to	
determine	the	avoidable	nature	of	death.	They	were	able	to	use	this	method	to	identify	
adverse	events	and	use	the	tool	to	identify	quality	improvement	goals.	[387]	(see	
Appendices	)The	senior	patient	safety	team	at	KP	was	interviewed	regarding	the	strengths	
and	challenges	of	using	their	tool.	Elements	from	this	tool	were	chosen	as	the	foundation	on	
which	to	build	our	tool,	named	the	Imperial	Tool.		
The	tool	was	built	so	that	key	questions	pointing	to	adverse	events	and	triggers	could	be	
used	to	efficiently	identify	the	pertinent	portions	of	the	record.	These	portions	were	then	
analysed	using	the	“deep-dive”	questions	that	were	used	by	KP.	These	questions	aim	to	
determine	whether	preventable	harm	occurred	leading	to	death.	If	not	found	the	reviewer	
should	ignore	the	trigger	and	search	for	further	triggers.	Positive	triggers	do	not	indicate	
adverse	events.		
If	adverse	events	were	identified	without	triggers,	these	were	also	included.	
Data	were	extracted	using	a	structured	data	collection	form.	
7.6.1.1 Standardised	severity	scoring	of	adverse	events	(NCC	MERP)[237]	
An	objective	classification	of	harm	was	sought.	A	commonly	used	system	in	the	
internationally	is	the	national	coordinating	council	medication	error	reporting	and	
prevention	(NCC	MERP)	index,	which	is	reliably	used	to	detect	harm	in	other	settings	such	
retrospective	case	note	review.	[222]	
The	definition	of	harm	used	by	NCC	MERP,	and	by	the	Institute	of	Health	Improvement,	is	a	
standardised	framework	that	is	clinically	relevant	and	unambiguous.	The	severity	scale	is	
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based	on	patient	outcomes.	Categories	A-D	assess	threats	to	the	patient	that	do	not	cause	
harm,	i.e.	‘no	harm’	events.	Harm	encompasses	categories	E-I	and	is	defined	as	impairment	
of	the	physical	function	or	structure	of	the	body	and	or	resulting	pain.[237]	The	NCC	MERP	
definition	does	not	include	psychological	harm.	
It	is	simple,	objective	and	shows	good	inter-rater	reliability.[222]	
• Category	E:	 Temporary	harm	to	the	patient	and	required	intervention	
• Category	F:	 Temporary	harm	to	the	patient	and	required	initial	or	prolonged	
hospitalization	
• Category	G:			 Permanent	patient	harm	
• Category	H:		 Intervention	required	to	sustain	life	
• Category	I:	 Patient	death	
	
7.6.1.2 Standardised	determination	of	an	adverse	event		
An	adverse	event	implies	unintended	harm	to	a	patient.	As	previously	defined	this	is	an	
injury	or	complication	leading	to	morbidity,	mortality	or	increased	length	of	stay,	and	is	
caused	by	healthcare	management.[380]	These	include	the	following:	
• Event	where	the	perspective	of	the	patient	would	be	that	harm	occurred	to	them	
(NB	this	does	not	include	psychological	harm)	
• Event	was	not	an	unavoidable	part	of	the	natural	progression	of	the	disease	process,	
given	current	knowledge	and	treatment	methods,	e.g.	Pulmonary	embolism	post	
pelvic	oncological	surgery	
• Events	which	are	present	on	admission,	provided	that	it	was	harm	related	to	medical	
care,	e.g.	delayed	diagnosis	in	outpatients	
	
The	Imperial	Tool	prompted	reviewers	to	assess	for:	(a)	each	adverse	event	detected,	(b)	
how	severe	the	event	was	(as	judged	by	NCC	MERP	score)	and	(c)	whether	the	event	
contributed	to	the	patient’s	death.	
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7.6.1.3 Judgement	of	avoidability	of	death	
The	reviewers	were	asked	at	the	end	of	the	Imperial	Tool	to	make	a	judgement	based	on	
their	review	as	to	whether	the	death	was	avoidable	as	follows:	
“After	reviewing	all	questions,	“adequate	care”	during	this	hospitalization	could	have	
prevented	this	death,	i.e.	this	death	was	potentially	avoidable”	
This	was	judged	using	a	5-point	Likert	scale	choosing	from:		
• Strongly	agree	
• Agree	
• Neither	agree	nor	disagree	
• Disagree	
• Strongly	disagree.	
	
For	the	analysis,	death	was	considered	avoidable	if	the	reviewer	selected	“agree”	or	
“strongly	agree”	on	the	scale,	and	unavoidable	if	selected	“neutral”,	“disagree”	or	“strongly	
disagree”.	
7.6.1.4 Judgement	of	quality	of	care	
It	was	found	from	pilot	testing	that	frequently	reviewers	felt	that	although	death	was	
probably	not	avoidable,	quality	of	care	was	poor	or	vice	versa.		For	example	an	elderly	
patient	was	admitted	with	an	obstructing	cancer	that	was	inoperable	suffered	an	
unavoidable	death,	but	the	review	found	that	there	was	failure	to	treat	acute	kidney	injury	
or	monitor	the	patient.	The	patient’s	death	was	judged	to	be	unavoidable,	given	the	disease	
at	hospital	presentation	and	the	patient’s	frailty;	the	patient	had	a	poor	life	expectancy.	
However	the	quality	of	care	was	poor.	Therefore	to	express	this	and	to	understand	whether	
the	subjective	assessment	of	quality	care	made	by	reviewers	correlated	with	their	
assessment	of	preventability	of	death,	a	question	on	the	quality	of	care	was	added,	using	a	
validated	method.	[402]	
“Compared	to	national	standards	of	care,	irrespective	of	the	avoidability	of	the	death,	how	
good	was	the	care	given	to	this	patient?”		
This	was	judged	on	a	4	point	Likert	scale:	
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• Good	standard	of	care	
• Average	standard	of	care	
• Below	average	standard	of	care	
• Poor	standard	of	care	
7.6.1.5 Confidence	in	decision	making	
Reviewers	were	asked	how	confident	they	were	about	their	decision-making	regarding	
avoidability	of	death.	This	was	assessed	to	understand	both	the	confidence	of	nursing	
review	vs.	physician	review	and	also	how	easy	or	difficult	it	was	for	these	judgements	to	be	
made	using	the	tool.	
“How	confident	are	you	about	this	decision	regarding	the	avoidability	of	the	death?”	
Likert	scale:	
• Very	confident	
• Confident	
• Unsure	
• Very	unsure	
	
These	elements	were	combined	and	tested	with	review	experts	and	went	through	7	
iterations	until	the	final	tool:	the	Imperial	Tool	was	ready	for	formal	content	validity	
testing..(Figure	7.2)
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Figure	7.2	Avoidable	Mortality	Assessment:	Imperial	Tool	
Avoidable	Mortality	Assessment:	Imperial	tool	
	
Hospital				 	 	 	 	 	 	 Reviewer	ID__________________	
St	Mary’s	Hospital		
	
Patient	Demographics:	
	
Age:	________	 	 Sex:	______	 	 Date	of	admission______________	
	
Date	of	Death___________		 Patient	i.d.	allocated	by	study_______________	
	
	
Questions	 Response	
categories	
	
General	Investigation	and	Management	Problems	 	
Was	there	evidence	of	failure	to	monitor?	
(Examine	notes	for	8-12	hrs	before	either	death	or	transfer	to	ICU	or	theatre	for	evidence	
of	patient	not	in	appropriate	HDU	setting,	or	not	having	appropriate	nursing	
observations/clinical	review)	
No/Yes	
Did	this	failure	to	monitor	contribute	to	death?	 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
	
Was	there	evidence	of	Failure	to	Rescue?	
(Examine	notes	for	8-12	hrs	before	either	death	or	transfer	to	ICU	or	theatre	for	a	change	
in	HR,	RR,	BP,	Saturations,	low	GCS	or	blood	tests:	that	were	not	responded	to)	
No	/	Yes	
Did	this	failure	to	rescue	contribute	to	death?	 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
	
Was	there	evidence	of	Inadequate	management	plan?	
(Examine	notes	for	evidence	of	misdiagnosis,	delayed	diagnosis,	treatment	deficiency	for	
example	failure	to	adequately	treat	sepsis	or	delayed	scans)	
No	/	Yes	
Did	this	mismanagement	contribute	to	death?	 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
	
Was	there	evidence	of	Failure	to	Communicate?	
(Examine	notes	for	evidence	of	poor	communication	between	patient	and	staff	or	clinician	
to	clinician,	inadequate	documentation/clerking,	inadequate	supervision,	leadership,	for	
example	delayed	referral	to	specialist	team,	or	no	evidence	of	early	consultant	review)	
No	/	Yes	
Did	this	failure	to	communicate	contribute	to	death?	 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
	
	
Was	this	patient	a	readmission	within	28	days?	 No	/	Yes	
	
	
Did	any	aspiration	event	occur?	 No	/	Yes	
Did	this	aspiration	event	contribute	to	death?	 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
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Medication	error	and	fluid	mismanagement	 	
Did	medication	error/fluid	mismanagement	occur?	
(For	example	insulin	overdose/underdoes,	fluid	overload	or	failure	to	prescribe	fluid,	
warfarin	overdose)	
No/Yes	
	
Did	this	medication	error/	fluid	mismanagement	lead	to	harm?	
(Please	ignore	if	not	applicable)	
No		
(No	physical	harm	was	caused)	
	
	 E	
(Temporary	harm	to	the	patient,	
required	intervention)	
	
	 F	
(Temporary	harm	to	the	patient,	
required	initial	or	prolonged	
hospitalisation)	
	
	 G		
(Permanent	patient	harm)	
	
	 H		
(Intervention	required	to	sustain	life)	
	
	 I	
(Patient	death	due	to	harm)	
	
	 	
VT/PE	 	
Was	there	a	diagnosis	of	DVT/PE	following	admission	as	evidenced	by	imaging	+/-	
D	dimers?	
No/Yes	
	
Did	problem	in	healthcare	lead	to	the	DVT/PE?		
(For	example	failure	to	prescribe	lower	molecular	weight	heparin	or	TED	stockings?)	
	
No/Yes	
Did	this	DVT/PE	contribute	to	death?	 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
	
	
Hospital	Acquired	Ulcers	 	
Did	a	hospital	acquired	pressure	ulcer	develop	or	advance?	 No/Yes		
Did	this	hospital	acquired	pressure	ulcer	contribute	to	death?	 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
	
	
	
Hospital	Acquired	Infection	
	
Did	a	hospital-acquired	infection	develop?	 No/Yes	
Did	this	hospital-acquired	infection	contribute	to	death?	 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
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Fall	
Did	a	fall	take	place?	 No/Yes	
	
Did	a	fall	cause	harm?	
(Please	ignore	if	not	applicable)	
No		
(No	physical	harm	was	caused)	
	
	 E	
(Temporary	harm	to	the	patient,	required	
intervention)	
	
	 F	
(Temporary	harm	to	the	patient,	required	
initial	or	prolonged	hospitalisation)	
	
	 G		
(Permanent	patient	harm)	
	
	 H		
(Intervention	required	to	sustain	life)	
	
	 I	
(Patient	death	due	to	harm)	
	
	
Did	a	problem	in	healthcare	lead	to	the	fall?		
	
No/Yes	
Did	this	fall	contribute	to	death?	 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
	
	
Surgery	related	
	
Did	a	surgical/procedural	complication	cause	harm?	
(Please	ignore	if	not	applicable)	
No		
(No	physical	harm	was	caused)	
	
	 E	
(Temporary	harm	to	the	patient,	
required	intervention)	
	
	 F	
(Temporary	harm	to	the	patient,	
required	initial	or	prolonged	
hospitalisation)	
	
	 G		
(Permanent	patient	harm)	
	
	 H		
(Intervention	required	to	sustain	life)	
	
	 I	
(Patient	death	due	to	harm)	
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Did	an	unplanned	return	to	theatre	occur?	 No/Yes	
	 	
Did	an	adverse	event	lead	to	an	unplanned	return	to	theatre?		 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
Did	this	unplanned	return	to	theatre	lead	to	harm?	 No		
(No	physical	harm	was	caused)	
	
	 E	
(Temporary	harm	to	the	patient,	required	
intervention)	
	
	 F	
(Temporary	harm	to	the	patient,	required	
initial	or	prolonged	hospitalisation)	
	
	 G		
(Permanent	patient	harm)	
	
	 H		
(Intervention	required	to	sustain	life)	
	
	 I	
(Patient	death	due	to	harm)	
	
	 	
Cardiac	Arrest	 	
Did	a	cardiac	arrest	call	take	place?	
(Specifically	is	there	a	cardiac	arrest	sequence	documented	in	the	notes	where	
CPR	was	carried	out?)	
No/Yes	
	
Did	an	adverse	event	lead	to	the	cardiac	arrest?		 No/Yes	
Did	this	cardiac	arrest	contribute	to	death?	 No/Yes/Not	applicable	
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Other	 	
OTHER	Adverse	events	(Free	text)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Level	of	harm	associated	with	OTHER	adverse	events	
(Please	ignore	if	not	applicable)	
No		
(No	physical	harm	was	caused)	
	
	 E	
(Temporary	harm	to	the	patient,	required	
intervention)	
	
	 F	
(Temporary	harm	to	the	patient,	required	
initial	or	prolonged	hospitalisation)	
	
	 G		
(Permanent	patient	harm)	
	
	 H		
(Intervention	required	to	sustain	life)	
	
	 I	
(Patient	death	due	to	harm)	
	
	 	
193		
	 	
Compared	to	national	standards	of	care,	irrespective	of	the	
avoidability	of	the	death,	how	good	was	the	care	given	to	this	
patient	
Good	standard	of	care	
	
Average	standard	of	care	
	
Below	average	standard	of	care	
	
Poor	standard	of	care	
After	reviewing	all	questions,	“adequate	care”	during	this	
hospitalization	could	have	prevented	this	death,	i.e.	this	death	
was	potentially	avoidable	
Strongly	agree	
	
Agree	
	
Neither	agree	nor	disagree	
	
Disagree	
	
Strongly	disagree	
How	confident	are	you	about	this	decision	regarding	the	
avoidability	of	the	death?	
Very	confident	
	
Confident	
	
Unsure	
	
Very	unsure	
How	long	did	it	take	you	to	complete	this	review?	 	
	
Where	the	notes	complete?	
	
No/Yes	
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7.6.2 Content	validity	testing	
As	shown	in	Table	7.2	all	items	scored	above	0.8	and	were	therefore	deemed	valid	for	
assessing	avoidable	mortality.	There	were	no	additional	suggested	items	by	the	assessors.	
Table	7.2:	Content	validity	of	the	Imperial	Tool	
Item	 This	item	is	relevant	to	the	detection	
of	avoidable	mortality	
	
Median	(IQR)	
	
Content	
validity	index	
Was	there	evidence	of	failure	to	monitor	the	patient?	 5(0)	 1	
Was	there	evidence	of	Failure	to	Rescue?	 5(0)	 1	
Was	there	evidence	of	Inadequate	management	plan?	 5(0)	 1	
Was	this	patient	a	readmission	within	28	days?	 4(0)	 1	
Did	any	aspiration	event	occur?	 4(0.5)	 0.82	
Did	medication	error/fluid	mismanagement	occur?	 4(1.5)	 1	
Was	there	a	diagnosis	of	DVT/PE	following	admission	as	
evidenced	by	imaging	+/-	D	dimers,	with	failure	to	prescribe	
prophylaxis?	 5(1)	 0.82	
Did	a	hospital	acquired	pressure	ulcer	develop	or	advance?	 3(1.5)	 1	
Did	a	hospital-acquired	infection	develop?	 4(0.5)	 1	
Did	a	problem	in	healthcare	lead	to	a	fall	taking	place?	 4(0)	 1	
Did	a	surgical/procedural	complication	cause	harm?	 5(0.5)	 1	
Did	an	unplanned	return	to	theatre	occur?	 5(0)	 1	
Did	a	cardiac	arrest	call	take	place?	 5(0.5)	 1	
Did	an	adverse	event	lead	to	the	cardiac	arrest?	 5(0.5)	 1	
Did	any	other	adverse	events	occur?	 5(0.5)	 1	
	7.6.3 Adverse	event	detection	rate:	Imperial	Tool	vs.	Acute	Trigger	Tool	
There	were	38	surgical	deaths	in	the	hospital	over	a	3-year	period,	and	these	were	assessed	
by	both	IT	and	ATT	by	an	expert	reviewer.		
The	number	of	adverse	events	(AEs)	detected	per	case	note	by	IT	was	compared	with	ATT	
using	Spearman’s	Rho	correlation	R=0.63	(two-tailed	p	value	(p)=<0.001)	
The	median	number	of	AEs	detected	by	the	IT	was	3(interquartile	range	(IQR)=1)	and	for	the	
ATT	was	2(IQR=2).		Similar	frequencies	of	event	types	were	detected	by	both	tests.	(Figure	
7.3)	
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Figure	7.3	Bar	chart	showing	type	of	adverse	event	detected	by	the	Imperial	Tool	vs.	Acute	
Trigger	Tool	examining	surgical	deaths	
	
	
Figure	7.4	Box	plots	to	compare	number	of	adverse	events	detected	per	mortality	case	note	
by	Imperial	Tool	compared	to	Acute	Trigger	Tool	
	
There	was	no	statistically	significant	difference	found	between	the	frequencies	of	AEs	
detected	per	case	by	each	method	(calculated	using	Mann	Whitney	U)	(p=0.27).	(Figure	7.4)	 	
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7.6.4 Reliability	testing	Imperial	Tool	vs.	Imperial	Tool		
For	this	assessment	two	expert,	independent	reviewers	used	the	IT	to	assess	8	randomly	
selected	mortality	case	notes.	The	reviewers	assessed	the	notes	in	a	random	order	and	were	
blinded	to	each	other’s	results.	Two	reviewers	assessed	each	mortality	case	note	and	their	
avoidability	assessment	was	compared.	
The	inter-rater	reliability	between	the	two	reviewers	gave	a	Kappa	score	=0.63,	95%	
Confidence	Interval	(95%	CI)	of	0.245	to	1.00,	strength	of	agreement	“good”.		The	
avoidability	scores	between	the	two	reviewers	were	also	assessed	for	correlation	which	
gave	a	Spearman’s	Rho	(R)=	0.79	(p=0.02)	
The	number	of	adverse	events	detected	by	the	two	reviewers	was	correlated	as	R=0.87	
(p=0.005).	7.6.5 Tool	validation	Imperial	Tool	vs.	implicit	review	method	
Ten	independent	reviewers	were	successfully	trained	in	the	two	review	methods,	4	doctors	
and	6	nurses.	Twenty	randomly	selected	mortality	case	notes	were	assessed	by	each	
method	and	the	mean	time	taken	for	each	method	compared.	There	was	a	statistically	
significant	shorter	time	taken	to	review	notes	using	the	IT	compared	to	the	implicit	method.	
(Figure	7.5,	Table	7.3)The	mean	number	of	Adverse	Events	detected	for	each	method	was	
compared	along	with	the	overall	percentage	avoidability	of	mortality.		There	were	no	
statistically	significant	differences	between	the	two.	(Table	7.3)	
Table	7.3:	Results	from	comparison	of	Imperial	Tool	and	Implicit	method	
	 Imperial	Tool	
(n=19)	
Implicit	method	
(n=19)	
P	value	(two	tailed)	
Mean	time	taken	for	review	in	
minutes	(standard	deviation)	
	
41	(19)	 50	(24)	
	
0.04	
Mean	number	of	Adverse	Events	
detected	(standard	deviation)	
	
2(2)	 1(2)	 0.09	
Percentage	avoidability	 10.5%	 18.8%	 0.63	
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Figure	7.5	Box	plots	to	compare	time	taken	for	review	by	Imperial	Tool	compared	with	
implicit	method	
	
The	two	methods	were	compared	for	the	reliability	of	avoidability	of	mortality	assessment	
that	gave	a	Kappa=	0.313	(95%CI	-0.274	to	0.901)	with	strength	of	agreement:	‘fair’	The	IT	
was	assessed	for	construct	validity.	There	was	a	significant	correlation	between	IT	AE	event	
detection	rate	and	avoidability	of	mortality	assessment,	R=0.68	(p=0.001).	
There	was	a	strong	negative	correlation	between	the	quality	of	care	assessment	and	
avoidability	R=-0.61	(p=0.01).	The	reviewers	assessed	their	own	confidence	for	avoidable	
mortality	scoring.	For	94.7%	of	mortality	case	notes	reviewed	the	reviewer	felt	confident,	
with	47.4%	feeling	very	confident,	and	only	5.3%	feeling	unsure	about	their	assessment.	
7.7 DISCUSSION	
This	study	showed	that	it	is	possible	to	develop	and	validate	an	implicit	review	method	for	
mortality	case	note	review	to	assess	the	avoidability	of	death.	The	IT	was	developed	after	
consultation	with	implicit	tool	designers	and	was	tested	using	clinical	experts.	The	content	
validity	was	found	to	be	high.	The	tool	was	shown	to	have	equivalent	detection	rate	of	
adverse	events	compared	with	current	tool	ATT	and	found	to	be	reliable	and	consistent	
between	reviewers.	The	inter-rater	reliability	of	avoidability	judgement	for	imperial	vs.	
imperial	was	k=0.63,	95%	CI	0.245	to	1.00).	This	is	equivalent	or	better	than	compared	with	
previous	studies,	comparing	mortality	assessments	such	as	Hogan	et	al.	(k0.45	95%	
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confidence	interval	0.24-0.66)	or	the	inter-rater	reliability	observed	in	the	study	by	Lilford	et	
al	(2007),	assessing	reliability	of	case	note	review	(mean	k	range	0.32-0.70).	[160	403].	
The	IT	was	compared	with	current	implicit	review	methods.	The	validity	of	avoidable	
mortality	assessment	was	measured	by	comparing	avoidable	mortality	data.	There	were	no	
statistically	significant	differences	between	the	proportions	of	avoidable	deaths	detected	by	
each	method.	There	was	good	correlation	between	the	two	methods	for	avoidable	mortality	
score.	
The	IT	demonstrated	good	criterion	validity	with	a	strong	correlation	between	numbers	of	
adverse	events	detected	and	the	determination	of	avoidable	death	suggesting	that	the	tool	
detects	healthcare	related	harm	and	this	enables	distinction	of	the	preventability	of	death.	
There	was	also	a	strong	negative	correlation	between	quality	of	care	and	avoidability	of	
death	suggesting	that	where	care	is	poor,	healthcare	related	harm	occurs	more	frequently	
and	the	patient	is	at	higher	risk	of	mortality	that	could	be	avoided.		
This	study	suggested	that	the	IT	method	was	more	efficient	with	a	significantly	reduced	time	
taken	for	review.	
This	study	has	some	relevant	implications	for	future	retrospective	case	note	review	and	
avoidable	mortality	assessment	practice.	Previous	studies	have	demonstrated	that	
avoidability	of	death	can	be	reliably	assessed	using	implicit	case	note	review,	and	that	
explicit	methods	can	more	reliably	detect	adverse	events	than	implicit	methods.	[17	403]	
This	study	has	suggested	that	the	avoidability	of	death	may	be	determined	using	an	explicit	
method	and	that	this	method	is	equivalent	to	current	methods	and	potentially	more	reliable	
and	efficient.	This	study	is	the	first	to	validate	an	explicit	avoidable	mortality	case	note	
review	tool.	The	validity	of	the	tool	was	further	demonstrated	by	the	avoidability	scores	
correlating	well	with	adverse	event	detection	rate	and	inversely	with	quality	of	care	
assessment.	It	is	useful	to	know	that	the	nursing	reviewers	demonstrated	confidence	in	
their	decision-making	using	the	tool.	The	structured	nature	of	the	tool	may	enhance	
confidence,	particularly	among	nursing	reviewers	who	are	used	to	explicit	adverse	event	
detection	tools.	It	is	hoped	this	sort	of	assessment	would	better	facilitate	morbidity	and	
mortality	meetings	and	increase	the	rigour	of	current	clinical	governance.	
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7.7.1 Limitations	
This	study	has	certain	limitations	that	should	be	addressed	in	future	work.	This	study	was	
not	powered	to	compare	types	of	case	note	reviewers,	i.e.	clinicians	versus	nurses.	As	
mentioned	this	would	require	a	trial	to	assess	reliability	of	nursing	review.		Although	there	
was	a	significantly	shorter	time	taken	to	perform	a	review	using	the	IT	and	equivalent	
numbers	of	adverse	events	detected	compared	with	implicit	review,	the	study	was	not	
powered	for	this,	and	the	study	should	be	reproduced	with	larger	numbers	to	conclusively	
demonstrate	this.	Similarly	the	study	was	not	powered	to	assess	whether	more	adverse	
events	could	be	detected	using	either	method.	The	IT	needs	to	be	tested	in	different	
hospitals	to	understand	if	the	findings	can	be	replicated.	It	is	also	not	validated	to	compare	
relative	rates	of	avoidable	death	to	compare	hospital	performance.	Furthermore,	it	may	be	
that,	although	the	tool	is	validated	in	its	current	form,	additional	elements	may	need	to	be	
added	or	refined	to	enhance	its	application.	This	tool	is	not	a	substitute	for	more	in	depth	
root	cause	analysis	of	death,	but	merely	proposed	as	a	method	for	screening	notes	so	that	
potential	avoidable	deaths	are	highlighted.	These	deaths	can	then	be	subjected	to	more	
substantial	investigation.	
7.8 CONCLUSION	
This	study	has	described	a	reliable,	valid	and	feasible	method	for	assessing	avoidable	
mortality	in	a	structured,	explicit	method.	It	can	be	used	to	screen	notes	to	determine	
deaths	that	may	be	avoidable.		The	tool	may	lead	to	more	robust	assessment	of	hospital	
mortality.	
7.9 FUTURE	WORK	
This	tool	may	be	suitable	for	wider	scale,	regular	assessment	of	hospital	mortality.	The	study	
suggests	that	nursing	reviewers	can	use	the	tool	reliably,	as	opposed	to	current	methods	
using	expert	clinician	review.	It	also	suggests	the	tool	may	be	faster	to	use.	Future	work	has	
now	commenced	with	a	randomised	controlled	multi	centre	trial	powered	to	assess	the	
reliability	and	accuracy	of	the	tool	as	well	as	to	compare	nursing	and	clinician	reviewers.	It	
would	also	be	useful	to	assess	whether	junior	doctors	can	reliably	use	the	tool.	Using	the	
tool	may	provide	a	framework	for	understanding	care	pathways	and	how	care	can	be	
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compromised.	It	may	aid	as	a	training	tool	for	analysing	hospital	death	in	and	as	a	guideline	
for	morbidity	and	mortality	meetings.	Ultimately	the	goal	is	for	every	hospital	death	to	be	
assessed	in	a	reliable,	reproducible	and	standardised	fashion	so	that	firstly	a	true	
understanding	of	avoidable	death	rate	is	known,	and	secondly	that	common	adverse	events.	
Another	aspect	that	has	been	raised	from	this	study	and	the	previous	thematic	review	of	
surgical	incidents	is	the	preponderance	of	surgical	adverse	events	and	the	proportion	of	
avoidable	deaths	that	centre	on	surgery.[17	379	404]	As	discussed	this	may	be	due	to	the	
fact	that	surgical	complications	and	adverse	events	are	more	discrete	and	easier	to	separate	
from	the	natural	progression	of	disease	than	other	specialties.	Consistent	themes	emerge	
across	the	literature,	and	surgical	safety	has	a	long	established	research	field.[405	406]	The	
final	research	question	that	this	thesis	will	assess	is	what	surgical	interventions	have	been	
proven	to	be	effective	in	reducing	these	known	adverse	events	that	can	be	applied	to	
practice.		
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8 CONCLUSION	
8.1 CHAPTER	OVERVIEW	
This	chapter	sums	up	the	theories	and	hypotheses	described	within	the	various	studies	in	
this	thesis.	It	seeks	to	distil	the	main	findings	of	the	thesis	and	place	these	findings	within	
the	context	of	the	current	literature	and	future	research.		
8.2 BACKGROUND	SYNOPSIS		8.2.1 Measuring	adverse	events	with	a	focus	on	surgical	harm	and	avoidable	death	
Measuring	safety	in	healthcare	is	of	vital	importance	to	ensure	quality	standards	and	assess	
areas	of	improvement	so	that	patients	are	not	harmed.	There	are	a	growing	number	of	
means	to	assess	patient	safety	and	none	of	these	ways	are	without	disadvantage	or	bias.[7	
69]	The	reason	that	there	are	multiple,	imperfect	tools	is	because	safety	variables	are	
elusive,	difficult	to	define	and	therefore	proxy	measures	are	used.[508]	Assessing	process	
errors	of	commission	or	admission	involves	delineating	the	complex	interplay	between	
disease	and	care,	and	therefore	interpretation	or	extrapolation	of	findings	is	difficult.	Whilst	
measuring	negative	outcomes	in	the	form	of	adverse	events	does	not	necessarily	aid	
understanding	of	the	problematic	chain	of	events	that	can	be	modified,	it	is	a	starting	place.	
	Two	clinical	areas	of	study	that	lend	themselves	to	empirical	testing	of	safety	measurement	
tools	are	surgical	adverse	events	and	inpatient	mortality.	Surgical	complications	form	a	
group	of	distinct	adverse	events	that	show	potential	for	precise	detection.	Equally	death	as	
a	discrete,	infallible	endpoint	can	be	used	to	gauge	the	efficacy	of	a	measurement	
instrument.	Both	outcomes	are	of	significance	to	healthcare	providers	and	patients	alike	
and	therefore	topics	for	focus	in	this	thesis.	8.2.2 The	challenge	of	measuring	safety	using	voluntary	reporting	
Whilst	there	are	numerous	methods	available	to	measure	adverse	events,	few	have	had	as	
much	investment	or	focus	in	England	than	error	reporting	systems.	[61	77	509]	Although	the	
rates	of	national	reporting	have	increased	to	over	a	million	reports	per	annum,	
interpretation	of	these	reports	is	fraught	with	epidemiological	bias,	namely	underreporting,	
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tendencies	for	only	nurses	to	report,	and	a	predominance	of	no	harm	events	to	be	
reported.[87	112	510]	Understanding	themes	of	systemic	failures	by	using	the	current	NRLS	
classification	system	is	hindered	by	several	factors	related	to	data	capture	and	analysis:	
i)	Ambiguity	in	the	incident	taxonomy	and	lack	of	specialty	specificity	causes	
confusion	for	the	reporter.[9	210	335]		
ii)	Asking	healthcare	professionals	at	the	time	of	reporting	to	divine	process	errors,	
rather	than	naming	the	adverse	events	that	occur,	adds	to	the	reporter	burden	and	
reduces	accuracy.[511]		
iii)	Understanding	the	level	of	harm	recorded	is	thwarted	by	a	subjective	harm	
assessment	terminology,	and	a	tendency	for	staff	to	overstate	the	level	of	harm	to	
convey	their	concern	regarding	the	incident.	[236]		
iv)	Multiple	repositories	in	England	for	patient	safety	events	with	no	access	for	
clinicians	to	share	and	compare	data	reduce	the	utility	of	the	data	for	research.	Basic	
demographic	data	that	is	variably	captured	and	different	lists	of	reportable	incidents,	
means	that	the	system	is	limited	in	its	efficacy	for	monitoring	or	learning.		
v)	The	desire	for	inclusiveness	rather	than	specificity	when	collecting	reports	means	
a	large	volume	of	data	that	cannot	be	manually	read	and	there	are	no	existing	
computational	tools	to	explore	it.[73]	
The	conflicting	aims	of	reporting	to	both	regulate	safety	and	provide	safety	solutions	is	
reflected	in	the	tensions	in	the	current	system.	There	are	mandatory	and	voluntary	
reporting	requirements.	There	are	mixed	local	and	national	governance	needs	and	local	
accountability	for	error	combined	with	national	anonymity	and	this	makes	the	approach	of	
reporting	systems	disjointed	and	ineffective.	
The	above	challenges	notwithstanding,	this	large	repository	of	incident	reports	merits	closer	
inspection	and	submitting	the	data	to	in	depth	analysis	may	yield	useful	safety	information.	
This	thesis	sought	to	assess,	both	quantitatively	and	qualitatively,	the	NRLS	and	look	for	
appropriate	uses	of	the	data.	It	asked	whether	classification	and	data	mining	could	be	
improved	and	discussed	what	the	overarching	aims	of	the	national	reporting	systems	should	
be.	
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8.2.3 The	requirement	for	a	tool	to	measure	avoidable	death	and	the	case	for	retrospective	case	note	review	
It	could	be	perceived	that	there	is	sometimes	a	disconnection	between	the	medical	
profession	and	society	(comprising	patients,	families,	media,	managers	and	government)	
about	the	way	death	in	hospitals	is	viewed.	Around	60%	of	deaths	in	the	UK	occur	in	
hospital.[512]	For	the	majority	of	patients	who	die	in	hospital,	death	is	not	avoidable	and	
disease	overcame	current	medical	capabilities.[379]	Therefore	there	is	a	professional	
requirement	for	healthcare	staff	to	absorb	their	distress	due	to	patient	death	and	move	
forward.	A	societal	response	with	substantial	periods	of	reflection	and	questioning	would	be	
paralysing.[513]	Nevertheless	where	death	is	avoidable	the	medical	response	must	be	more	
closely	aligned	with	society.	Discerning	the	avoidability	of	a	death	is	not	always	easy,	and	in	
a	time-constrained	workplace	there	is	little	space	for	a	clinical	pause	to	review.	Nevertheless	
delving	into	all	deaths	in	a	systematic	fashion	order	to	be	able	to	understand	and	assess	
those	that	are	avoidable	should	be	part	of	our	normal	practice,	if	we	had	the	tools	to	enable	
this.[225]		
Avoidable	death	is	the	sharp	end	of	a	myriad	of	clinical	incidents	reported	to	the	NRLS,	a	
vast	and	often	impenetrable	vault	of	potentially	useful	data	about	patient	safety.	Using	
these	data	is	fraught	with	challenges,	namely	unreliability,	poor	collation	of	events	and	
misinterpretation	of	trends.		Teasing	out	useful	information	is	difficult.	Currently	all	
incidents	that	are	labelled	by	reporters	as	causing	death	are	manually	read	at	a	national	
level.	But	the	amount	of	detail	in	a	report	does	not	enable	in	depth	analysis.	Hospital	death	
has	been	an	important	area	of	public	and	government	concern	in	light	of	recent	
acknowledged	safety	failings	in	the	NHS.[514]	The	issue	of	whether	more	patients	die	
unexpectedly	at	the	weekend	or	not	is	a	recent	area	of	contention,	used	as	a	political	tool	
by	government	and	rejected	by	some	clinicians.	[515	516]These	arguments	hinge	around	
mortality	statistics.	HSMR	and	SHMI	are	two	commonly	used	mortality	statistics	in	England,	
and	some	objective	measure	of	excess	death	is	required	for	monitoring.	However	they	are	
crude	instruments	if	used	in	isolation	and	does	little	to	prevent	future	safety	lapses,	other	
than	leading	to	abrupt	closures	of	healthcare	providers.[517]	Poloniecki	and	colleagues	
looked	at	the	death	rate	in	a	transplantation	program	that	was	closed	due	to	safety	
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concerns.	[518]	They	reviewed	the	mortality	rate	using	a	variety	of	statistical	tests	and	
showed	that	most	would	not	have	detected	concerning	trends	early	in	the	series,	and	false	
alarms	would	have	been	triggered	at	other	points.	They	recommended	mortality	monitoring	
groups	to	better	assess	death.		However	their	recommendation	suggested	using	HES	data	
and	mortality	statistics	alone	rather	than	any	further	in-depth	analysis.[518]	What	mortality	
statistics	can	provide	are	data	regarding	unexpected	death,	given	the	population	being	
treated.	But	these	data	should	only	act	as	a	catalyst	for	systematic	and	regular	assessment	
of	why	excess	death	occurred	in	order	to	learn	lessons	and	improve	care.[519]	Indeed	
unexpected	death	does	not	equal	unavoidable	death	or	reduced	quality	of	care	and	
therefore	using	mortality	statistics	to	compare	hospital	quality	has	been	met	with	
criticism.[34	520	521]	Detecting	avoidable	death	is	of	more	use	in	terms	of	both	monitoring	
healthcare	quality	and	learning	from	mistakes,	than	assessing	unexpected	death.[160]	With	
a	mandate	from	the	Keogh	review	to	assess	all	hospital	deaths	in	England,	a	tool	is	required	
to	do	this	in	as	economical,	but	epidemiologically	robust	a	way	as	possible.[127]	Case	note	
review	is	a	retrospective,	fairly	inexpensive	and	relatively	unbiased	method	for	reviewing	
death,	made	famous	by	the	original	patient	safety	study	the	Harvard	malpractice	
study.[379]	This	found	that	0.25%	of	admissions	resulted	in	preventable	death.	Given	this	
volume	the	traditional	method	of	using	expert	senior	clinicians	to	review	every	single	
hospital	death	is	unfeasible.	Explicit	criterion	driven	case	note	review	tools	are	available	for	
nurse	reviewers	and	used	with	success.[401]	A	case	note	review	tool	that	is	reproducible,	
efficient	and	explicit	to	assess	avoidable	mortality	is	therefore	required	to	fill	the	gap	in	
mortality	assessment.	8.2.4 Summary	of	research	questions	
The	key	questions	of	the	studies	in	this	thesis	can	be	broadly	defined	thus:	
• What	are	the	published	interventions	that	have	reduced	rates	of	surgical	adverse	
events	to	date?	
• What	do	reported	adverse	event	rates	reveal	about	quality	of	care	in	hospitals,	and	
hospital	safety	culture?	
• Can	NRLS	reports	detect	surgical	safety	issues	that	require	intervention?		
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• Can	the	retrospective	case	note	review	methods	used	to	measure	surgical	death	and	
avoidable	death	be	improved	so	that	all	death	can	be	efficiently	and	reliably	
assessed?	
8.3 SUMMARY	OF	RESULTS	8.3.1 Few	surgical	safety	initiatives	are	objectively	improving	care	
Of	over	22000	studies	describing	improving	surgical	safety	only	91	were	of	sufficient	quality	
to	be	included	in	a	systematic	review	and	only	21	demonstrated	a	significant	decrease	in	
surgical	related	harm.[182]	These	were	improving	nurse	to	patient	ratios	and	having	ITU	
physician	involvement	for	surgical	post-operative	patients.	Sub-specialization	in	surgery	
reduced	error,	independently	of	the	volume-outcome	relationship.	Effective	process	
improvement	initiatives	included	submitting	surgical	outcome	data	to	national	audit,	using	a	
checklist	to	safeguard	against	error	and	adhering	to	a	care	pathway.	Using	certain	safety	
technology	significantly	enabled	reduction	in	harm,	and	team	training	had	a	positive	effect	
on	patient	outcome.		
Many	studies	did	not	demonstrate	any	measurable	benefit	in	safety,	and	this	may	be	due	to	
the	fact	that	safety	is	difficult	to	measure.	Surgery	offers	the	opportunity	to	pinpoint	safety	
issues	because,	particularly	with	elective	surgery,	negative	outcomes	are	more	easily	linked	
to	potentially	modifiable	system	errors.	Retrospective	case	note	review	lends	itself	to	being	
a	fruitful	avenue	for	surgical	complication	investigation	and	surgical	mortality.	The	NRLS	was	
probed	to	assess	whether	it	could	meaningfully	analyse	safety	risk.	A	review	of	literature	
was	also	deemed	important	to	assess,	what	are	the	commonly	reported,	harmful	surgical	
errors,	and	could	utility	of	reporting	be	enhanced	with	better	classification.	8.3.2 NRLS	data	trends	and	significance	
This	study	was	a	quantitative	analysis	of	all	reports	from	48	hospitals	in	England,	over	a	ten	
year	period	and	revealed	that	hospitals	that	report	more	incidents	have	no	particular	
characteristics.[168]	The	quality	of	care	is	neither	better	nor	worse	at	high	reporting	
hospitals	than	hospitals	that	report	fewer	incidents.	There	were	no	correlations	with	the	
following	quality	measures	SHMI,	CQC	survey	results,	litigation	payments,	or	with	structural	
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factors	such	as	the	size	of	the	hospital,	its	teaching	status	or	staff	ratios.	The	only	significant	
factor	found	was	that	litigation	claims	rose	if	reporting	rates	were	low.		This	may	indicate	
that	high	reporting	hospitals	are	more	aware	of	the	importance	of	a	safety	culture	and	
therefore	more	likely	to	mitigate	repercussions	of	error	such	as	litigation	claims.		These	
results	suggested	that	reporting	rates	should	not	be	used	to	assess	hospital	safety	or	quality.	
There	was	a	significant	association	found	when	incidents	that	caused	harm	were	assessed	
separately	from	the	overall	reporting	rate.	High	levels	of	harm	incidents	were	reduced	when	
clinician	to	bed	ratio	increased,	although	total	number	of	incidents	remained	the	same.	It	is	
difficult	to	extrapolate	from	this	finding	whether	more	doctors	working	reduces	harm	
caused	to	patients	but	it	shows	fewer	harm	incidents	are	reported	when	there	are	more	
doctors.		
The	study	found	that	clinicians	are	more	likely	to	report	death	then	their	nursing	colleagues,	
but	less	likely	to	report	over	all.	Obstetrics	and	Gynaecology	staff	members	were	more	likely	
to	report	a	no	harm	event,	and	significantly	more	no	harm	events	are	reported	in	the	
pharmacy	setting	than	any	other	environment.	
These	results	may	indicate	that	different	healthcare	professionals	focus	on	different	types	of	
safety	incident	and	focusing	on	these	areas	in	a	specialty	specific	fashion	may	increase	
engagement	and	value	in	the	reporting	process	rather	than	generic	reporting	initiatives.	
Using	the	NHS	staff	survey	and	comparing	the	results	at	a	hospital	level	found	some	
interesting	associations.	High	reporting	rates	correlated	with	hospitals	where	staff	felt	they	
were	encouraged	to	report,	where	there	was	confidentiality,	feedback	and	a	visible	change	
as	a	result	of	reports.	In	hospitals	where	staff	felt	punished	when	they	reported,	reporting	
rates	were	significantly	lower.	
This	suggests	that	creating	a	responsive,	confidential	learning	environment	will	increase	
staff	engagement	with	error	disclosure.	
This	study	led	to	further	research	questions	on	how	to	redevelop	the	data	collection,	
including	having	specialty	specific	classification	systems	and	using	other	data	methods	such	
as	case	note	review	to	augment	the	narrative	within	the	free	text.		
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8.3.3 Maximising	the	NRLS	through	simplified,	specialty-specific	classification	
The	current	classification	of	surgical	serious	harm	incidents	was	found	to	be	inadequate	or	
confusing	over	two-thirds	of	the	time.	There	was	no	significant	relationship	between	day	of	
the	week	and	number	of	serious	theatre	incidents	reported,	and	few	reporters	chose	to	
identify	themselves.	Literature	search	identified	18	papers	that	classified	adverse	events	in	
surgery	and	77	perioperative	events	were	compiled	to	produce	a	new	comprehensive	
classification	of	surgical	adverse	events.		
Using	this	classification,	over	half	of	the	serious	surgical	events	reported	were	related	to	five	
key	areas:	i)	wrong	site	surgery,	ii)	unanticipated	organ	injury,	iii)	cancelled	or	delayed	
operation	due	to	equipment	issue,	iv)	intraoperative	cardiac	arrest	and	v)	intra-operative	or	
post	operative	haemorrhage.	This	study	showed	that	it	was	possible	to	classify	surgical	
incidents	in	a	more	straightforward	fashion	that	enabled	key	areas	to	be	identified	for	
further	exploration.	
A	continued	theme	from	this	study	was	that	there	was	a	vast	quantity	of	unread	data,	of	
unknown	value	and	potentially	poor	quality.	This	raised	the	research	question	as	to	how	to	
assess	data	quality	in	the	narrative	section	of	the	reports	in	the	NRLS	and	whether	
computing	could	provide	a	solution	to	the	volume	problem.	
This	study	also	revealed	commonly	reported,	recurrent	adverse	events	in	surgery	in	keeping	
with	the	literature.[173	206	212	228	522].	
Analysis	of	NRLS	data	showed	that	whilst	providing	useful	indicators	of	types	of	adverse	
events	occurring	in	healthcare,	the	scale	of	healthcare	related	harm	was	not	as	easily	
measured	using	reporting.	This	prompted	exploration	of	the	role	of	reporting.	8.3.4 Tensions	between	monitoring	and	learning:	the	expert	view	of	the	role	of	reporting		
The	Delphi	review	of	30	international	patient	safety	experts	reached	consensus	on	40	
recommendations	on	the	role	and	use	of	reporting	systems.[523]	The	interview	stage	
quickly	revealed	that	there	was	frustration	amongst	experts	about	the	misuse	of	reporting	
data,	and	that	too	much	emphasis	was	being	placed	on	using	reporting	as	a	monitoring	tool	
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and	too	little	emphasis	on	feedback	and	learning.	However	they	agreed	it	might	be	the	only	
way	to	collect	data	on	serious	but	infrequently	occurring	events.		
Experts	agreed	reporting	system	should	not	be	used	as	an	epidemiological	tool	to	monitor	
the	rate	of	harm	over	time	or	to	appraise	the	relative	safety	of	hospitals.	They	agreed	
reporting	is	a	valuable	mechanism	for	identifying	organisational	safety	needs.	The	benefit	of	
having	pooled	data	as	a	national	system	was	clear	with	respect	to	medication	error,	device	
failures,	hospital-acquired	infections	and	never	events	as	these	problems	often	require	
solutions	at	a	national	level.	However	for	other	events	particularly	near	misses,	or	no	harm	
incidents,	the	benefit	of	national	system	was	less	clear	and	the	danger	was	being	
overwhelmed	with	data,	and	teasing	out	applicable	learning	points	would	be	challenging.	
Experts	recognized	that	more	training	was	required	for	senior	healthcare	professionals	in	
incident	investigation.	Overall	consensus	recommendation	was	for	hospitals	to	take	
responsibility	themselves	for	creating	safety	solutions	locally	that	could	be	shared	
nationally,	rather	than	waiting	for	a	top	down	approach,	a	de-centralisation	of	risk	
governance.	
With	a	clear	consensus	that	reporting	should	not	be	used	to	measure	the	rate	of	harm,	the	
next	study	then	focused	on	another	method	for	measuring	hospital	harm,	with	a	focus	on	
death	due	to	adverse	events.	8.3.5 Improvement	of	case	note	review	measurement	of	avoidable	death	through	a	new	tool.	
The	studies	thus	far	revealed	the	following:	reporting	was	not	an	adequate	method	of	
detecting	harm	and	death	in	hospitals	in	a	way	that	is	epidemiologically	valid.	Trends	in	
surgical	adverse	events	show	some	common	recurring	themes,	but	prevention	of	surgical	
harm	has	a	limited	evidence	base.	As	pressure	is	increased	to	be	accountable	for	surgical	
outcomes	and	death,	a	more	robust,	efficient	and	reproducible	method	is	required.		
Therefore	an	implicit	case	note	review	tool	was	developed	to	assess	the	avoidability	of	
death.	Imperial	Tool	(IT)	was	developed,	and	validated	using	nurse	and	clinician	reviewers	
on	both	elective	surgical	deaths,	unexpected	death	as	calculated	by	SHMI,	and	on	randomly	
selected	mortality.	It	showed	superior	inter-rater	reliability	compared	to	other	studies,	
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detected	equivalent	numbers	of	adverse	events	compared	to	traditional	review	methods	
and	was	significantly	quicker	to	perform.	[160]	
The	possibility	for	improving	the	investigation	of	death	and	surgical	harm	through	the	IT	and	
through	improved	reporting	analysis	is	the	anticipated	future	impact	of	these	studies.	
	
8.4 LIMITATIONS	
There	are	important	limitations	that,	although	addressed	in	the	individual	data	chapters,	
should	be	re-emphasised	when	interpreting	the	findings	of	these	studies.	
When	trying	to	discover	whether	any	of	the	commonly	reported	surgical	adverse	events	had	
known	solutions,	it	was	soon	apparent	that	most	studies	were	low	quality,	and	not	powered	
to	deliver	a	measurable	reduction	in	adverse	event	rate.	This	review	did	not	address	
interventions	that	reduce	potential	harm,	but	only	interventions	that	reduced	a	defined	
adverse	event	which	led	to	decreased	morbidity,	mortality	or	length	of	stay.	Improvements	
in	operative	technique	often	lead	to	decreasing	complication	rate,	however	these	studies	
were	too	numerous	and	diverse	to	be	included	in	this	review.	Due	to	heterogeneity	of	
papers	it	was	not	possible	to	perform	a	meta-analysis	to	assess	for	the	most	effective	
method	of	reducing	adverse	events	but	specifically	focussing	on	adverse	event	reduction	
rate	provided	an	objective	measurement	of	the	safety	effect	for	surgical	patients,	which	
allows	some	objective	judging	of	the	published	interventions	to	date.		
Studies	using	NRLS	data	can	only	reflect	what	is	reported	and	not	what	may	or	may	not	be	
true	in	practice.	Any	inferences	made	about	hospital	safety,	trends	in	surgical	adverse	
events	and	areas	for	improvement	must	be	tempered	by	the	understanding	of	the	
epidemiological	bias	of	reporting	results.	
Comparing	commonly	used	national	measures	of	hospital	quality	with	reporting	rates	is	
difficult	as	the	measures	themselves	are	not	without	criticism.	[160]	Reproducible,	routinely	
collected	data	representing	quantitative	factors	relating	to	hospital	care	were	used	to	
compare	with	reporting	rates.	It	should	be	acknowledged	that	currently	unmeasured	
aspects	of	safety	culture	and	quality	might	impact	on	reporting	rates	of	patient	safety	
incidents.		
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Increasing	the	clarity	of	classification	of	surgical	harm	by	creating	a	new	comprehensive	
classification	system	can	only	be	demonstrated	when	field-tested	appropriately.	Front	line	
users	reporting	in	real	time	are	required	to	fully	assess	whether	this	system	is	fit	for	
purpose.		All	classifications	of	adverse	events	are	superficial	interpretations	of	a	larger	chain	
of	errors.	It	should	be	reiterated	that	caution	is	used	when	interpreting	the	trends	observed	
and	that	NRLS	reports	remain	merely	the	starting	point	to	further	detailed	investigation.	
When	considering	the	consensus	statements	on	the	future	direction	of	national	reporting	
systems,	it	is	acknowledged	that	Delphi	consensus	groups	are	an	imperfect	method	to	reach	
conclusions,	however	it	was	deemed	the	most	suitable	way	to	draw	together	expertise	on	
the	subject	in	the	absence	of	a	more	quantitative	method	of	understanding	the	problem.	
Importantly	the	study	did	not	engage	frontline	staff	or	users	in	the	dialogue	regarding	future	
use	of	reporting	systems,	which	is	an	area	that	should	be	explored.	
The	Imperial	Tool	(IT)	for	retrospectively	assessing	the	avoidability	of	death	found	a	
significantly	shorter	review	time	and	equivalent	adverse	event	and	avoidability	detection	
rates	compared	to	current	methods,	however	it	was	not	powered	to	do	so.	The	IT	needs	to	
be	tested	in	different	hospitals	to	understand	if	the	findings	can	be	replicated.	It	would	also	
be	inappropriate	to	use	it	compare	relative	rates	of	avoidable	death	in	different	hospitals.	
When	it	is	scaled	up,	additional	elements	may	need	to	be	added	or	refined	to	improve	its	
application.	As	with	all	of	the	adverse	event	measurement	methods,	it	should	not	be	used	as	
a	stand-alone	tool	for	assessing	the	root	causes	of	error,	but	used	in	conjunction	with	more	
in	depth	investigation	of	identified	cases.		
8.5 FUTURE	RESEARCH		
As	the	systematic	review	into	surgical	safety	interventions	demonstrated,	there	is	a	gap	
between	validating	innovations	and	translating	them	into	measurable	benefits	for	patients.	
The	circular	challenge	is	that	measurement	is	inaccurate	and	therefore	proving	efficacy	is	
difficult.	In	addition,	improving	the	outcome	measurement	and	engaging	in	monitoring	the	
outcome,	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	safer	care.[524]	Commitment	to	completing	the	cycle:	
increasing	measurement	accuracy,	designing	interventions	that	aim	to	produce	a	
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measurable	effect	and	then	ensuring	the	effect	is	measured	correctly,	is	vital	to	produce	
empirically	safer	care.	
There	is	scope	for	redeveloping	the	national	reporting	process	in	England.	Reporting,	as	a	
mode	to	identify	system	failures,	is	now	embedded	in	hospital	culture.	If	it	can	be	honed	to	
produce	useful	data	the	investment	by	frontline	staff	in	the	process	will	not	be	wasted.		
A	future	system	should	be	designed	and	tested	with	a	specific	role	in	mind:	to	provide	a	
shared	resource	of	learning	at	a	local	level,	whilst	collecting	specific,	tightly	defined	lists	of	
specialty	specific	incidents	at	a	national	level.	It	should	aim	to	stimulate	hospitals	to	
reflectively	and	reflexively	learn	how	to	make	adaptations	to	reduce	risk.	This	would	fulfil	
both	learning	and	monitoring	arms	of	the	NRLS’s	remit.		
To	facilitate	better	use	of	NRLS	data,	classification	of	incidents	should	become	automated.	
This	can	be	facilitated	through	Natural	Language	Processing	(NLP),	using	machine	learning	
techniques.	This	is	explored	in	the	appendices	of	this	thesis.	Machine	learning	could	be	
applied	and	available	to	allow	rapid	dissection	of	reports	so	that	safety	managers	and	
clinicians	can	filter	and	group	incidents	more	easily	and	enable	rapid	warning	systems	for	at	
risk	specialties.[150]	
Predictive	text	functions	to	write	reports	more	easily	would	reduce	the	burden	on	the	
reporter.	Ownership	might	be	increased	by	the	introduction	of	specialty	specific	domains	
within	the	reporting	system	so	that	clinical	groups	are	engaged	in	their	own	problems	at	a	
local	level.	
Even	greater	research	potential	could	be	fulfilled	if	these	few	incidents	could	be	fed	into	an	
international	system.	Where	mobile	technology	has	enabled	developing	countries	to	leap	
frog	some	of	the	developed	worlds’	cumbersome	hardware	problems,	having	a	mobile	
international	patient	safety	databank	would	provide	some	useful	information	on	the	safety	
issues	globally,	epidemiological	constraints	not	withstanding.	This	would	require	
standardised	definitions	of	adverse	events;	which	are	clinically	meaningful	and	important	to	
clinicians	with	a	minimum	dataset	for	data	homogeneity.[110]	In	addition	having	an	
application	that	instantly	suggests	solutions	from	other	countries	when	certain	events	are	
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reported	and	provides	a	cachet	for	more	solutions	to	be	generated	and	shared	would	seem	
a	relatively	simple	intervention	that	could	be	tested.	
Some	initial	steps	in	this	process	would	be	the	development;	validation	and	roll	out	of	a	new	
reporting	platform,	and	a	simultaneous	roll	out	with	a	mobile	application	in	a	twinned	
hospital	in	a	different	economic	setting.		
From	an	NLP	perspective,	creating	patient	safety	ontology	would	be	an	essential	phase.	
Firstly	further	specialty	specific	classification	for	other	specialties;	in	a	similar	fashion	to	the	
theatre	adverse	event	classification	in	Chapter	5.	Then	machine-learning	classifiers	can	be	
tested	for	other	safety	concepts	and	categories.	When	events	the	classifier	cannot	identify	
are	detected	this	is	a	way	of	flagging	new	or	rare	events	of	note.		
As	electronic	clinical	notes	become	embedded	in	NHS	hospital	culture,	a	platform	for	real	
time	classification	or	identification	of	adverse	events	using	NLP	methods	to	track	harm	
would	be	a	logical	next	step.	Then	the	impetus	of	reporting	may	change	to	clinicians	being	
prompted	by	their	computing	software	to	dismiss	or	expand	upon	flagged	events,	thus	
increasing	both	the	epidemiological	value	of	reporting,	the	usability	and	the	
contemporaneous	nature	of	data	capture.	
The	Imperial	Tool	is	a	useful	device	to	further	measurement	of	adverse	events	in	hospital.	
Not	all	death	is	due	to	harm,	but	every	hospital	death	deserves	inspection.	Most	will	be	
inevitable,	but	some	may	be	avoidable.	Future	work	to	assess	national	roll	out	of	an	explicit	
case	note	review	tool	for	mortality	requires	a	randomised	controlled	trial.	Nursing	and	
clinician	reviewers	need	to	be	compared	to	assess	whether	nursing	review	is	reliable.		
A	study	powered	to	prove	that	the	IT	is	equivalent	or	superior	to	explicit	methods	is	needed.	
Junior	doctors	should	also	be	assessed	as	learning	to	review	deaths	as	a	matter	of	routine	
work	enhances	a	reflective	safety	culture.		The	Imperial	Tool	may	be	of	value	as	a	training	
tool	for	analysing	hospital	death	and	better	facilitate	morbidity	and	mortality	meetings	to	
increase	the	rigour	of	current	clinical	governance.		
Future	work	looking	at	integrating	community	deaths	into	the	data	would	be	an	interesting	
avenue	of	research.	The	public	perception	of	these	studies	is	also	crucial	to	creating	an	
atmosphere	of	constructive	learning.	Involving	patient	relatives	in	the	findings	from	death	
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review	particularly	with	respect	to	assessment	of	quality	of	care	is	an	important	
consideration.	Ultimately	safety	review	that	includes	the	patient	on	some	level,	whilst	
protecting	clinical	staff,	is	vital	to	improve	NHS	and	public	relations	in	England,	in	the	light	of	
substantial	concerns	due	to	safety	crises.		
8.6 CONCLUDING	COMMENTS	
The	diverse	range	of	tools	with	which	safety	is	measured	in	healthcare	creates	a	plethora	of	
areas	for	investigation.	The	two	key	areas	chosen	for	this	thesis:	voluntary	safety	reporting	
and	retrospective	case	note	review	are	beset	with	similar	challenges.	A	wealth	of	seemingly	
impenetrable,	untapped	data,	inconsistent	classification	and	language,	and	epidemiological	
bias	thwart	the	reliability	and	usefulness	of	both	tools.	This	thesis	sought	to	unravel	some	of	
these	problems	and	focussed	on	severe	harm	and	death	with	an	emphasis	on	surgical	safety	
issues.	This	focus	led	this	thesis	down	different	avenues	of	research	including	statistical	
studies,	qualitative	approaches,	as	well	as	developing	a	new	review	tool	and	new	
classification	system	for	avoidable	death	and	surgical	harm	respectively.	
Naturally	with	any	project	that	deals	with	such	a	wide	field	of	investigative	approaches,	one	
feels	that	more	questions	than	answers	are	produced	at	its	conclusion.	The	potential	to	
really	capture	when	health	care	is	unsafe	to	rewrite	the	processes	that	led	to	error	is	
obvious,	but	not	unless	the	current	tools	for	measurement	are	adapted	and	used	
appropriately.	The	future	of	the	NRLS	has	been	and	continues	to	be	shaped	by	NHS	England	
during	the	course	of	this	research	project,	and	I	eagerly	anticipate	what	a	future	reporting	
system	will	achieve.	The	pressing	need	for	accurate	and	balanced	review	of	in-hospital	
death	in	this	country	requires	reproducible	and	reliable	case	note	review	tools,	which	I	hope	
the	Imperial	Tool	can	assist	with.		
Finally,	due	to	personal	interest,	surgical	safety	is	at	the	heart	of	this	thesis,	and	the	way	in	
which	complications	are	defined	and	measured	is	of	great	importance	to	me	and	to	the	
future	sustainability	of	the	surgical	profession.	At	a	time	when	transparency	and	candour	
regarding	surgical	complications	continues	to	gain	momentum,	understanding	surgical	harm	
and	measuring	it	objectively	is	crucial.	Simplifying	terminology	and	encouraging	refinement	
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of	retrospective	case	note	review	methods,	may	help	to	focus	the	lens	through	which	
surgical	harm	is	viewed.	
8.7 IMPACT	OF	THIS	WORK	
Reporting	systems	can	be	a	useful	source	of	patient	safety	learning,	provided	that	adverse	
event	classification	systems	are	improved.		It	is	essential	that	the	data	are	not	used	to	
compare	the	safety	profiles	of	individual	hospitals.	If	reporting	systems	are	used	in	line	with	
the	newly	agreed,	international,	expert	consensus	statements	from	this	thesis,	then	
significant	learning	outcomes	can	be	achieved.		
Through	systematic	review	this	thesis	found	that	although	multiple	innovations	to	improve	
surgical	safety	have	been	implemented,	few	directly	reduce	harm	and	death	in	hospitals.	
This	is	significant	and	highlights	the	need	for	targeted	solutions.	
Methods	have	been	developed	here	to	maximise	the	measurement	and	understanding	of	
harm	in	healthcare	systems.	An	original,	validated	tool	for	assessing	the	avoidability	of	
death	through	case	note	review	has	been	devised	that	improves	the	quality	of	
measurement.	The	null	hypothesis	is	therefore	rejected.	
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9 	APPENDICES	
9.1 EXPLORING	THE	USE	OF	NATURAL	LANGUAGE	PROCESSING	TO	IMPROVE	THE	
CLASSIFICATION	OF	HARM	IN	NRLS	INCIDENT	REPORTS	
Patient	safety	incidents	comprise	any	event	that	could	lead	to	or	actually	resulted	in	
unnecessary	harm	to	a	patient.	[234]	Only	25%	of	patient	safety	incident	reports	are	classed	
as	reports	of	harm,	the	rest	being	no	harm	or	near	miss	reports.	[235]	Both	harm	reports	(or	
adverse	events)	and	errors	where	no	harm	occurred	are	useful	for	learning.	As	described	in	
Chapter	4	the	number	of	reports	captured	by	the	National	Reporting	and	Learning	System	
(NRLS)	in	England	has	increased	exponentially	to	over	a	million	reports	a	year.	[168]	These	
reports	contain	categorical	data	and	a	free	text	narrative	where	the	reporter	describes	the	
incident.	There	is	a	crucial	deficit	in	analysis	and	learning	because	the	free	text	narrative	is	
largely	unexplored	at	a	national	level,	except	for	a	few	events	that	lead	to	patient	death	or	
serious	incidents.	The	free	text	section	requires	manual	analysis	by	reviewers	with	clinical	
knowledge	and	the	large	volume	of	reports	makes	this	challenging.	For	unread	reports	
national	safety	analysts	must	rely	on	the	categorical	level	data	to	understand	the	level	of	
harm	that	patients	experience.		
It	is	crucial	to	develop	free	text	methodology	for	the	NRLS.	As	the	largest	incident	system	in	
existence	computing	tools	are	required	to	fully	exploit	the	knowledge	provided	by	front-line	
staff	observing	events	in	real	time.	
The	volume	of	unread	narrative	data	within	the	NRLS	creates	an	opportunity	for	developing	
and	testing	new	analytical	methods.	There	is	scope	to	adopt	a	computing	solution	to	the	
challenge	of	analysing	this	large	corpus	of	safety	intelligence.	
Reporters	classify	the	level	of	harm	caused	to	patients	using	the	NRLS	classification	system,	
which	is	a	subjective	assessment	of	severity.	It	is	recognized	that	the	severity	of	the	incident	
is	often	classified	incorrectly.	[236]	This	is	of	importance	as	the	rate	of	harm	derived	from	
the	categorical	data	is	used	to	make	inferences	about	hospital	safety	at	a	national	level	
without	referring	to	the	true	nature	of	the	event	as	described	by	the	free	text.	[127]	Harm	is	
a	potentially	complex	concept	for	a	computing	algorithm	to	detect,	but	for	manual	
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annotators,	it	is	relatively	simple,	provided	that	the	definition	of	harm	is	unambiguous.	
Because	incidents	that	cause	harm	are	of	such	intrinsic	importance	to	care	givers	and	
patients	alike,	it	was	chosen	as	a	starting	point	for	employing	Natural	Language	Processing	
methods.	It	is	also	of	sufficient	complexity	to	warrant	sophistication	in	computing	methods,	
rather	than	using	more	simplistic	searches,	and	therefore	enables	this	study	to	add	to	the	
field	of	research.	9.1.1 Aims	and	hypotheses	
This	study	aims	to	develop	a	method	of	automated	free-text	classification	for	patient	safety	
reports	to	detect	harm.	Current	classification	of	harm	using	the	NRLS	classification	system	is	
inaccurate.	Natural	language	processing	methods	can	be	used	to	analyse	NRLS	text	and	
detect	whether	a	patient	has	been	harmed	or	not.	9.1.2 Methods	
9.1.2.1 Data	source	
The	reports	used	for	this	study	were	randomly	selected	from	the	NRLS	database.	Healthcare	
workers	reported	these	incidents	to	the	NRLS	from	acute	hospitals	between	2003	and	2013,	
(i.e.	from	inception	of	data	collection	to	date	of	study).	
9.1.2.2 Classifying	harm:	current	reporter	classified	incidents	analysis	
Reporters	are	currently	offered	a	choice	of	harm	level	to	classify	the	incident.	The	possible	
classes	are	“no	harm”,	“low	harm”	“moderate	harm”,	“severe	harm”	and	“death”.		(Figure	
9.1)	
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Figure	9.1	Harm	classification:	NRLS	vs.	NCC	MERP		 	
NRLS:  No Harm 
  Low Harm 
  Moderate Harm 
  Severe Harm  
  Death 
 
NCC MERP: A Events occurred that have the capacity to cause error 
  B An error occurred but the error did not reach the patient 
  C An error occurred that reached the patient but did not cause harm 
D An error occurred that reached the patient and required monitoring to 
confirm that it resulted in no harm to the patient 
 
 
E Temporary harm to the patient and required intervention 
F Temporary harm to the patient and required initial or prolonged 
hospitalization 
G Permanent patient harm 
H Intervention required to sustain life 
I Patient death 
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9.1.2.3 Assessment	of	current	harm	classification	
From	the	2003-	2013	NRLS	dataset	2045	exemplar	text	reports	were	randomly	selected.	
These	were	then	annotated	and	classed	as	a	type	of	harm	by	a	team	of	clinical	experts	
(AMH,	GB,	IB,	JC).	A	two-person	independent	assessment	method	was	employed	and	data	
were	extracted	using	a	standardized	form.		
The	NCC	MERP	definition	of	harm	was	used.	This	scoring,	as	discussed	in	previous	chapters,	
was	chosen	because	it	is	a	standardised	classification	of	level	of	harm,	used	by	the	ATT	and	
therefore	familiar	to	reviewers.	[222]	For	the	purposes	of	this	study	no	harm	and	harm	
categories	have	been	grouped.		
NRLS	classification	of	harm	was	compared	with	manual	annotation	for	sensitivity	and	
specificity.	Inter-rater	reliability	analysis	using	a	kappa	statistic	was	performed	to	
understand	coding	consistency.	
9.1.2.4 Initial	methodological	approach	
Initial	experimentation	to	identify	harm	in	the	corpus	was	with	simple	word	frequency	
analysis.	I	hoped	to	develop	search	terms	for	harm,	a	method	used	successfully	by	
Hannaford	and	colleagues	to	identify	handover	errors	in	an	Australian	reporting	system.	
[238]	This	is	known	as	a	“bag	of	words”	method	in	linguistics.[239]	Firstly	a	list	of	words	in	a	
selection	of	free	text	narratives	was	generated	and	organized	in	order	of	frequency.	This	
was	to	assess	whether	there	were	frequently	occurring	words	that	denoted	harm	occurring.	
This	is	a	form	of	distributional	semantics,	which	is	an	area	of	research	that	develops	ways	of	
categorizing	words	based	on	the	way	they	are	distributed	in	the	corpus.	The	hypothesis	is	
that	words	or	phrases	with	similar	distributions	have	similar	meanings.		
Attempts	with	this	approach	showed	that	isolated	words	using	frequency	analysis	did	not	
denote	“harm”	or	“no	harm”.	For	example	injury	could	be	referred	to	in	many	contexts	such	
as	“potential	for	injury”,	“could	have	sustained	injury”,	“no	injury”,	or	“injury	occurred”.	The	
word	injury	was	not	a	particularly	high	frequency	word,	with	harm	being	alluded	to	in	more	
abstract	or	specialty	specific	ways.	It	was	very	difficult	to	suitably	select	incidents	and	class	
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them	according	to	whether	harm	occurred	without	some	more	sophisticated	methods.	
Therefore	Natural	Language	Processing	(NLP)	methods	were	investigated.	An	NLP	
researcher	(AB)	was	recruited,	who	was	invaluable	in	discussing	the	various	methods	
available,	finding	software,	running	the	NLP	algorithms	and	training	and	testing	the	
classifier.	All	of	the	computing	knowledge	and	NLP	design	in	this	study	is	due	to	his	expertise	
in	this	field.	My	role	involved	study	conception	and	design,	initial	methodological	approach,	
clinical	coding	of	fields,	along	with	other	coders:	GB,	JG	and	EB.	I	also,	with	AB	performed	
feature	selection	and	promotion	as	well	as	statistical	analysis	and	data	interpretation.	
9.1.2.5 Natural	Language	Processing	
Automated	free	text	classification	methods	using	NLP	have	been	employed	to	detect	
adverse	events	in	electronic	chart	reviews.	[240]	It	has	been	used	in	other	national	reporting	
systems	to	detect	specific	types	of	event	such	as	computer	related	incidents	or	serious	
incidents.	[73	241]	NLP	is	an	area	of	research	that	investigates	how	to	use	computers	to	
understand	and	use	natural	language	text.	[242]	In	linguistics	a	corpus	is	a	large	and	
structured	set	of	texts.	NLP	can	be	used	to	automatically	identify	specific	phenotypes	and	
retrieve	specific	information	from	corpora.	This	technique	is	becoming	increasingly	
important	as	a	way	of	digesting	electronic	clinical	data	and	has	great	research	potential.	
However	it	is	a	slowly	evolving	field.	This	is	for	a	few	reasons:	
9.1.2.6 Clinical	text	is	not	written	with	perfect	grammar	
Clinical	text	is	generally	written	in	note	form.	For	computers	to	understand	natural	
language,	a	degree	of	parsing	is	required.	Parsing	is	where	sentences	are	resolved	into	their	
grammatical	parts	or	syntactic	structure	in	order	to	reason	about	them.	Programs	work	out	
which	words	are	the	subject	of	a	verb	for	example.	There	are	unexpected	ambiguities	in	
natural	language	generally.		An	example	is:	“He	ate	the	cake	with	icing”.		A	correct	parse	
links	“with”	to	“cake”,	i.e.	the	cake	chosen	to	be	eaten	was	the	cake	with	icing	on	it.	An	
incorrect	parse	links	“with”	to	“ate”,	i.e.	he	used	icing	to	eat	the	cake,	instead	of	using,	say,	
a	fork.		
Probabilistic	parsers	use	knowledge	of	language	gained	from	hand	parsed	sentences	to	
produce	the	statistically	most	likely	sentence	analysis	and	therefore	more	accurately	filter	
		 257	
out	these	ambiguities.		There	are	now	annotated	corpora	available	from	which	to	produce	
parsers	that	can	then	be	applied	to	any	texts.	[243]	Sentence	construction	in	clinical	text	
may	miss	out	key	grammatical	constructs	making	this	task	harder.[244]	Existing	and	
commonly	used	parsers	such	as	the	Stanford	parser	do	not	perform	well	when	directly	
applied	to	clinical	texts.		A	recent	study	by	Jiang	and	colleagues	assessed	three	state-of-the-
art	parsers	on	clinical	text	and	found	it	to	be	poor	compared	to	general	English	text.[245]	
They	were	able	to	improve	this	performance	after	re-training	with	annotated	clinical	text.	
We	are	still	lacking	suitably	large	annotated	clinical	corpora	that	can	be	readily	applied	to	
clinical	data	for	example	to	NRLS	reports.	Therefore	the	only	way	to	parse	reports	would	be	
manually,	which	is	not	feasible	given	the	large	number	of	reports.	
9.1.2.7 Clinical	text	contains	jargon,	synonyms,	abbreviations	and	homonyms	
Clinical	text	is	difficult	to	parse	because	the	language	may	be	a	mixture	of	English	and	Latin,	
with	abbreviations	of	both.	Equally	there	are	synonyms	used	that	can	be	in	English	and	
Latin.	For	example	when	writing	that	a	medicine	should	be	given	every	day,	it	can	be	
expressed	as	either:	daily,	mane,	o.d.	(omni	die	or	every	day),	o.m.	(omni	mane	or	every	
morning)	or	o.n.	(omni	nocte	or	every	night).	All	of	these	terms	express	a	once	a	day	dose.	
There	are	large	ontologies	or	medical	dictionaries	of	vocabulary	available,	such	as	the	
systemized	nomenclature	of	medicine	clinical	terms	or	SNOMED	CT.[246]	SNOMED	CT	is	
sophisticated	software	that	provides	standardized	expressions	of	clinical	concepts	and	
terminology.	Although	this	was	released	in	2001,	its	use	tends	to	be	limited	to	theoretical	
studies	of	medical	language	at	present	and	its	implementation	as	a	reference	terminology	in	
electronic	records	has	been	slow.	[247]	This	is	because	it	struggles	to	map	synonyms,	such	
as	thoracocentesis	and	pleurocentesis	and	more	complex	medical	concepts.[248]	Even	
when	the	ontology	is	very	accurate	and	can	understand	local	jargon	and	abbreviations,	it	is	
still	required	to	map	certain	homonyms	by	understanding	their	context.	For	example	IUD	
can	mean	intrauterine	death	or	intrauterine	device	depending	on	the	context.	Words	can	be	
commonly	misspelt	by	clinicians	with	completely	different	meanings	if	taken	out	of	context	
such	as	ileum	(part	of	the	small	bowel)	and	ilium	(part	of	the	pelvic	bones).	Finally	
eponymous	terms	need	to	be	understood	such	as	Grave’s	disease,	and	not	confused	with	
clinician	or	patient	names.	
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9.1.2.8 Much	text	in	clinical	notes	is	irrelevant	to	the	studied	phenotype	
When	examining	clinical	notes,	for	example	to	detect	patients	with	venous	
thromboembolisms,	a	NLP	program	will	classify	clinical	notes	as	having	text	that	is	positive	
or	negative	for	this	phenotype.	But	some	of	the	text	will	be	neither	positive:	“patient	has	
PE”	(pulmonary	embolism)	nor	negative:	“No	PE	seen”	but	just	irrelevant:	“discussed	risk	of	
PE”.[249]	This	is	described	as	“noisy”	data,	where	if	one	considers	a	positive	signal	to	be	a	
true	detection	of	a	phenotype,	then	the	noise	is	irrelevant	data	drowning	out	the	sound	of	
the	signal.		
9.1.2.9 Detecting	harm	in	the	NRLS	free	text:	a	unique	NLP	challenge	
Detecting	harm	is	a	more	complex	challenge.		Firstly	there	is	a	wide	range	of	adverse	events.	
Secondly	the	way	the	events	are	expressed	in	the	text	is	often	inconsistent.		Thirdly	the	
categories	of	adverse	event	type	are	not	discreet.	For	example	not	all	falls	will	lead	to	
patient	injury	and	therefore	detecting	a	fall	does	not	incur	a	harm	classification.	The	system	
must	also	detect	either	harm	or	the	absence	of	harm.	Therefore	established	parsers	are	not	
appropriate	and	existing	classifiers	are	not	specific	enough	for	the	NRLS	free	text.	
9.1.2.10 Machine	learning		
To	overcome	these	problems	it	is	possible	to	employ	NLP	methods	using	machine-learning	
algorithms	for	language	processing.	This	is	essentially	where	an	algorithm	allows	a	computer	
to	learn	or	predict	a	classification	through	statistical	pattern	recognition.[250]	Statistical	
models	can	be	used	to	help	the	NLP	system	to	make	probabilistic	decisions	on	what	a	word	
or	phrase	means	based	on	pre-assigned	weighting.		
Generally	there	are	three	types	of	machine	learning	algorithms	that	can	be	used.	These	are	
supervised	learning,	unsupervised	learning	and	reinforcement	learning.		The	most	
appropriate	type	for	this	study	is	a	supervised	learning	approach.	This	is	where	the	
computer	builds	a	statistical	prediction	model	through	training	using	text	that	is	labelled	by	
domain	experts.[250]	Domain	experts	(such	as	clinicians	familiar	with	the	pathology)	show	
the	computer	what	is	relevant	or	not	by	highlighting	features	(specific	words	or	phrases)	
that	are	strongly	positive	or	negative	for	a	certain	class	in	order	to	guide	the	process.	The	
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computer	then	matches	cases	to	class	through	recognizing	features	with	an	inductive	
approach.	Confidence	in	predictions	can	be	measured.		
This	type	of	machine	learning	was	chosen	as	it	is	commonly	employed	for	classification	
problems	where	there	is	a	known,	approximate	set	of	values	and	data	can	be	separated	into	
specific	classes.	It	is	a	quicker	process	to	gain	accuracy	in	classification	than	unsupervised	
and	reinforcement	learning	as	there	is	less	reliance	on	random	clustering	and	deduction,	
and	more	human	guidance	by	definition.	
Supervised	machine	learning	techniques	have	been	used	in	pattern	recognition	applications	
such	as	decoding	functional	magnetic	resonance	images.	It	has	been	used	at	a	cellular	level	
to	classify	the	physiological	effects	of	chronotropic	drugs	on	cardiomyocytes.[250	251]	Chen	
and	colleagues	used	supervised	machine	learning	to	detect	real	versus	artefact	alarms	in	an	
intensive	care	setting.[252]	
Classifiers	that	are	trained	using	machine	learning	have	advantages	over	hand	written	rule	
based	decision	trees.		Classifiers	focus	on	common	cases	as	these	are	the	ones	with	the	
strongest	statistically	positive	signals.	They	can	also	infer	class	based	on	unfamiliar	or	
erroneous	input,	whereas	creating	decision	trees	to	make	soft	decisions	is	difficult.		
The	goal	of	using	machine	learning	to	train	the	computer	to	classify	is	to	minimize	the	error	
with	which	the	computer	selects	instances	of	each	class	in	a	given	corpus.	These	labelled	
corpora	are	called	“training	sets”	i.e.	examples	from	which	the	computer	tries	to	learn.	[253]	
However	memorizing	the	training	set	can	cause	the	problem	of	over-fitting,	where	the	
computer	learns	special	cases	that	do	not	fit	the	general	class	principles.	The	classifier	
therefore	also	needs	to	be	able	to	generalize	when	applied	to	non-training	corpora.[253]	
9.1.2.11 Linear	classifiers	and	features	
Features	in	the	context	of	machine	learning	are	individual,	measurable	properties	of	a	
phenotype	or	class.	In	linguistics,	features	can	be	parts	of	words,	words	or	phrases.	Features	
can	be	selected	using	a	statistical	process.	Features	require	pre-processing	by	humans	prior	
to	selection.	Some	features	are	single	words	and	some	are	multiple.	N-gram	models	are	
widely	used	for	NLP,	for	example	in	genomics,	as	used	by	Tomovic	and	colleagues	to	classify	
genome	sequences.[254]	An	n-gram	is	a	contiguous	sequence	of	n	items	from	a	given	
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sequence	of	text.	These	can	be	letters,	syllables,	or	words.	An	n-gram,	size	one	is	referred	to	
as	a	unigram,	size	two	as	a	bigram	and	so	on.	It	is	useful	to	model	text	in	this	way	as	it	
simplifies	the	script	and	allows	generalization	across	a	large	corpus.	Particularly	if	there	are	
common	misspellings,	synonyms	and	variants	of	the	same	lexeme	(meaningful	unit	of	
language),	then	grouping	allows	more	rapid	understanding	of	meaning.	
Statistical	classifiers	use	frequently	occurring	features	to	identify	class.	Linear	classifiers	are	
simple	and	classify	phenotype	based	on	the	value	of	a	linear	combination	of	features.[255]	
Features	are	represented	to	the	machine	by	a	vector	to	build	a	feature	vector.		This	is	a	
numerical	representation	of	a	set	of	features	that	build	an	n-dimensional	vector.	For	each	
case,	in	order	to	distinguish	class	using	a	binary	classifier,	there	may	be	an	assortment	of	
features	all	with	different	probabilities	of	being	in	one	class	or	the	other.	By	representing	
these	features	as	vectors	an	overall	prediction	of	whether	the	case	is	in	one	class	or	another	
can	be	calculated.	
9.1.2.12 Naïve	Bayes	classifiers	
Naïve	Bayes	classifiers	are	a	type	of	linear	classifier.	Bayes’	theorem	is	a	key	rule	in	
probability	theory.	It	describes	the	probability	of	an	event	based	on	the	conditions	that	may	
be	related	to	it.	Bayesian	probability	expresses	how	a	statistically	inferred	probability	of,	for	
example	a	phrase	being	related	to	a	type	of	harm,	is	conditional	and	can	be	updated	as	new	
evidence	is	added.	[256]	
Bayes’	theorem:	
	! "# = ! #" ! "! # 	
§ where	A	and	B	are	events	and	!(#) ≠ (	
§ where	! " 	and	!(#)	are	the	probabilities	of	observing	A	and	B	as	occurring	
independently	
§ where	!("#)	is	a	conditional	probability	i.e.	a	probability	of	observing	event	A	given	
that	event	B	is	true	
§ where	!(#")	is	the	probability	of	observing	event	B	given	that	event	A	is	true[257]	
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Naïve	Bayes	classifiers	are	simple	probabilistic	classifiers	that	apply	Bayes’	theorem	making	
the	assumption	that	there	is	independence	between	features.	
It	assigns	class	labels	to	features	by	representing	them	as	vectors.	The	NLP	system	makes	
probabilistic	decisions	about	whether	a	feature	belongs	to	a	specific	class.	Since	not	every	
single	word	or	phrase	in	a	dataset	as	large	as	the	NRLS	can	be	coded,	and	since	new	words	
and	phrases	are	added	with	every	report,	it	is	necessary	to	classify	using	estimates	based	on	
the	probability	of	the	instance	being	true.	The	classifier	picks	the	hypothesis	that	is	most	
probable	for	that	feature.	(Figure	9.2)	
A	Naïve	Bayes	classifier	was	chosen	because	it	is	simple;	it	doesn’t	over	fit	and	has	been	
successfully	used	for	other	clinical	text	classifiers.[73	258]	
9.1.2.13 Methodology	for	building,	testing	and	training	the	classifier	
A	statistical	text	classifier	using	Naïve	Bayes	was	developed	to	identify	harm	events	based	
on	the	free-text	description	in	the	incident	reports.	These	tools	have	been	previously	used	in	
document	classification	[259].	Weka	software,	from	the	University	of	Waikato	was	used	for	
this.[260]	Weka	is	a	freely	available	bank	of	machine	learning	algorithms	for	data	mining	
tasks,	which	contain	tools	for	building	new	machine	learning	schemes.	The	classifier	was	
built	and	tested	using	the	expertise	of	AB,	an	NLP	researcher.	AMH,	GB,	JG,	and	EB	acted	as	
domain	experts.	The	methodology	for	developing	the	classifier	is	explained	by	Figure	5.2.	
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Figure	9.2	Naïve	Bayes	approach	to	classification	of	harm
	
	
9.1.2.14 Expert-classified	incidents	
The	annotated	2045	text	corpus	was	then	divided	into	two	sets:	the	training	corpus	for	the	
classifier	and	the	testing	corpus.		
For	the	purposes	of	building	a	harm	classifier	the	annotated	corpora	were	grouped	into	“NO	
HARM”	or	“HARM”	categories,	with	“HARM”	including	all	severity	levels	including	death.	
Incidents	classed	as	categories	E	to	I	were	grouped	as	“HARM”,	whilst	incidents	not	classed	
as	E	to	I	were	grouped	as	“NO	HARM”.	
The	text	classifier	was	trained	and	tested	on	the	pre-coded	corpus	described	and	its	
performance	evaluated.	
9.1.2.15 Pre-processing	and	feature	extraction		
Initially,	along	with	the	harm	categories	assigned	by	the	clinical	coders,	any	phrases	within	
the	texts	that	provided	evidence	for	the	categorization	were	noted.	These	phrases	or	words,	
Use	Training	Corpus	to	
assign	scores	to	each	
pa2ern	
Number	of	“harms”	
matched	
Number	matched	in	
total	
Note	baseline	
probability	that	any	
given	report	is	a	harm:	
Number	of	“harms”	
matched	
Number	matched	in	
total			
Classify	by	combining	
the	scores		
Prob(harm)=baseilne	x	
score	for	ﬁrst	matched	
feature	x	score	for	
second	matched	
feature 		
Calculate	score	for	“no	
harm”	
Classify	as	harm	if	
Prob(harm)>Prob(no	
harm)	
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known	as	features	were	compiled	to	see	if	they	could	be	used	to	classify	harm.	However	
each	of	these	phrases	matched	few	enough	of	the	texts	that	it	was	not	possible	to	build	any	
classifier	on	this	basis.	
This	set	of	phrases	was	therefore	modified	into	a	more	useful	set	of	features.	(Figure	9.3)	
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Figure	9.3	How	features	were	developed
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Feature	development	
 
a) Combine similar phrases into one feature 
For example: "delay in treatment" and "treatment was delayed". 
 
b) Include different morphologies of the same lexemes ("fall", "falls", "fell", "fallen") and 
different forms of phrasing not found in the original set of phrases ("patient fell", "patient 
had fallen") 
 
c) Include synonyms ("drug", "medication"), spelling variants or ("pt", "patient"), and words in 
similar semantic categories ("hand", "arm", "wrist", "finger") 
 
d) Search for further synonyms 
For example: identifying drugs by the regular expression /(0-9)+mg of (a-z)+/ 
 
e) Identify homonymous terms and exclude or add context.  
For example: “IUD” could be used for Intra-Uterine Device or Intra Uterine Death 
 
f) Identify polysemes and exclude or add context. 
For example: harm class allocated to “dead” for “dead battery” vs. “dead patient” 
 
g) Express features as regular expressions  
For example:      (could|should|might) (have|of) been  (avoided|prevented|caused) 
units|unit (of)?blood|transfus\w+ 
 
h) Group larger features together 
For example administrative terms: 
label|record|letter|card|packet|envelope)s?|secretar\w+|(typed|typing|typis
ts?) 
|addressograhs?|dictat\w*|(admin|administration|administrator)|confidentia
l\w* 
|filed|filing|spel(t|lings?) 
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9.1.2.16 Training	the	classification	system	
The	features	were	used	to	generate	a	simple	classifier	to	distinguish	between	NO	HARM	and	
HARM	categories	using	an	iterative	process.	Throughout	this	exercise,	a	Naïve	Bayes	
classifier	was	used,	as	implemented	by	Weka	software.	The	classifier	was	used	to	assign	
categories	to	the	full	corpus	of	1.5×10⁶	texts	that	were	annotated	by	the	original	submitters	
as	HARM.	A	level	of	confidence	was	also	assigned	to	each	text,	and	two	much	smaller	
corpora	were	selected,	comprising	those	assigned	a	95%	or	greater	score	of	HARM,	and	
those	assigned	a	95%	or	greater	score	of	NO-HARM.	
These	corpora	were	tokenized,	whereby	the	texts	were	broken	into	words	or	phrases	or	
other	meaningful	groupings	or	“tokens”.	The	relative	frequencies	of	unigrams,	bigrams,	and	
trigrams	(one,	two	and	three	word	tokens)	were	compared.	The	sequences	of	tokens	that	
were	most	differentially	attested	between	the	corpora	(based	on	log-likelihood	that	the	
distribution	of	the	word	differed	between	the	corpora)	were	examined	manually,	and	those	
that	were	felt	to	be	most	clinically	meaningful	were	promoted	to	be	the	basis	of	new	
features.[255]	
The	performance	of	the	classifier	was	assessed	by	Weka	using	10-fold	cross-validation.	The	
classifier	was	trained	on	90%	of	the	corpus	and	then	was	tested	on	10%.	Then	the	data	were	
partitioned	in	a	different	way	by	the	Weka	software	and	tested	again	to	reduce	variability.	
Thus	the	classifier	was	validated	ten	times	with	ten	different	sets	and	then	the	result	for	
that	cycle	was	averaged.	
With	each	cycle,	features	were	modified	manually	with	clinical	supervision	to	create	a	new	
enhanced	feature	set.	When	the	improvements	in	performance	per	cycle	plateaued	the	
classifier	was	deemed	ready	for	use.	[253]	
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9.1.2.17 Testing	the	classification	system	
Table	9.1:	Abbreviations	used	in	classification	metrics	
Term	 Abbreviation	
True	Positive	 TP	
True	Negative	 TN	
False	Positive	 FP	
False	Negative	 FN	
Recall	or	Sensitivity	or	True	Positive	Rate	 TPR	
Precision	or	Positive	Predictive	Value	 PPV	
F	measure	 F1	
	
The	classifier	was	tested	on	the	testing	corpora	and	assessed	for	the	following:	
9.1.2.17.1 Within-class	classification	metrics:	
To	evaluate	the	classifier	on	a	class-by-class	basis:	three	standard	performance	measures	
were	used.	[253]:	
• Precision:	also	known	as	the	positive	predictive	value	!!) = *!*! + ,!	
• Recall:	also	known	as	the	sensitivity	or	true	positive	rate		*!- = *!*! + ,.	
• F	measure:	the	harmonic	mean	of	precision	and	recall		, = /*!/*! + ,. + ,!	
	
The	area	under	the	curve	for	the	receiver	operating	characteristic	(ROC)	curve	was	
calculated	for	each	cycle.	The	area	under	the	curve	is	equal	to	the	probability	that	a	
classifier	will	rank	a	randomly	chosen	positive	instance	higher	than	a	randomly	chosen	
negative	one.	It	serves	as	a	measure	of	aggregated	classification	performance.[261]	
9.1.2.17.2 Global	classifier	performance	metrics:	
The	overall	accuracy,	calculated	across	both	classes	was	assessed	using	a	weighted	average	
of	the	above	metrics.	
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9.1.3 Results	
9.1.3.1 Performance	of	current	reporter	classification	
Using	a	random	number	generator,	1000	reports	were	selected.	These	were	assessed	for	
level	of	harm	expressed	by	the	reporter	in	the	free	text	section	of	the	report.	The	level	of	
harm	detected	by	the	domain	experts	after	reading	the	free	text	was	compared	with	the	
level	of	harm	classified	in	the	NRLS	classification	system	with	the	results	as	shown	in	Table	
9.2	
	
Table	9.2	Table	to	show	performance	of	current	NRLS	classification	system	in	detecting	NO	
HARM	and	HARM	events.	
Class	 True	
Positives	
False	
Positives	
True	
Negatives	
False	
Negatives	 Precision	 Recall	
F	
measure	
NO	HARM	 541	 82	 155	 222	 0.868	 0.709	 0.781	
HARM	 155	 222	 541	 82	 0.411	 0.654	 0.505	
Weighted	
average	
	 	 	 	
0.766	 0.697	 0.719	
	
The	sensitivity	of	the	NRLS	to	detect	harm	using	the	current	classification	system	is	65.4%	
(95%	Confidence	Interval:	59.0%	to	71.4%)	
The	specificity	of	the	NRLS	to	detect	harm	using	the	current	classification	system	is	70.9%	
(95%	Confidence	Interval:	67.5%	to	74.1%)	
The	Kappa	statistic	of	agreement	between	reviewers	for	classification	of	level	of	harm	using	
NCC	MERP	=	0.806	(p<	0.001),	prior	to	arbitration.		
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Figure	9.4	Example	of	discrepancy	between	report	and	NRLS	categorization	
	
9.1.3.2 Text	quality	
From	the	NRLS	reports,	2045	randomly	selected	reports	were	assessed	and	labelled.	The	
text	quality	was	found	to	be	very	heterogeneous.	There	were,	for	example,	327	different	
forms	for	expressing	Clostridium	difficile	within	the	text.	(see	appendices)	Text	reports	
ranged	from	4	words	to	194	words.	The	text	often	revealed	a	great	deal	more	depth	of	
information	than	the	categorical	data	suggesting	that	text	mining	would	provide	a	more	
accurate	classification	than	the	current	NRLS	options.		
9.1.3.3 Performance	of	Naïve	Bayes	classifier	
The	classifier	went	through	seven	iterations	of	feature	sets	until	the	model	reached	peak	
performance.	Early	feature	sets	started	to	show	some	useful	feature	clusters	in	each	class	
that	were	presented	figuratively	to	aid	manual	selection.	(see	appendices)The	classifier	was	
		
Incident 1: Example of a harm report misclassified by the NRLS as “NO 
HARM” 
 
NRLS Harm level chosen:  “No Harm” 
 
NRLS Free Text: 
 
“Patient was brought to a and e as a collapse during admission patient suffered a cardiac arrest 
and after several resus attempts died. I was then informed by staff he had been in a and the 
previous evening with a collapse and discharged by the locum reg on checking previous CAS 
card it was documented that patient had severe dehydration and plan was discharge home . 
I was concerned re this incident and the following morning informed sister and dr of my 
concerns and gave them a copy of the cas cards from both days . The consultant on the day 
locum was informed at the time . .” 		
Incident 2: Example of a no harm report misclassified by the NRLS as 
“HARM” 
 
NRLS Harm level chosen: Moderate Harm 
 
NRLS Free Text: 
 
“Clinic overran by two hours as not enough doctors, and poor clinic planning. Escalated to 
manager.” 
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able	to	distinguish	between	harm	and	no	harm	incidents	with	a	precision=0.837,	
recall=0.821,	F-measure=	0.826	and	area	under	receiver	operating	characteristic	
curve=0.852.	(Table	9.3,	9,5,	9.6)	
	
Table	9.3:	Performance	of	the	classifier	with	accuracy	by	class	
Feature	
set	
Class	 True	
Positive	
Rate	
False	
Positive	
Rate	
Precision	 Recall	 F-Measure	 ROC	
Area	
1	 NO	HARM	 0.28	 0.118	 0.884	 0.28	 0.426	 0.699	
	 HARM	 0.882	 0.72	 0.276	 0.882	 0.42	 0.699	
	 Weighted	
Average	
0.423	 0.261	 0.74	 0.423	 0.425	 0.699	
2	 NO	HARM	 0.51	 0.181	 0.9	 0.51	 0.651	 0.763	
	 HARM	 0.819	 0.49	 0.342	 0.819	 0.482	 0.763	
	 Weighted	
Average	
0.583	 0.255	 0.768	 0.583	 0.611	 0.763	
3	 NO	HARM	 0.734	 0.211	 0.918	 0.734	 0.816	 0.831	
	 HARM	 0.789	 0.266	 0.479	 0.789	 0.596	 0.831	
	 Weighted	
Average	
0.747	 0.224	 0.814	 0.747	 0.764	 0.831	
4	 NO	HARM	 0.784	 0.241	 0.913	 0.784	 0.843	 0.834	
	 HARM	 0.759	 0.216	 0.522	 0.759	 0.619	 0.834	
	 Weighted	
Average	
0.778	 0.235	 0.82	 0.778	 0.79	 0.834	
5	 NO	HARM	 0.845	 0.266	 0.911	 0.845	 0.877	 0.849	
	 HARM	 0.734	 0.155	 0.596	 0.734	 0.658	 0.849	
	 Weighted	
Average	
0.819	 0.239	 0.836	 0.819	 0.825	 0.849	
6	 NO	HARM	 0.845	 0.266	 0.911	 0.845	 0.877	 0.849	
	 HARM	 0.734	 0.155	 0.596	 0.734	 0.658	 0.849	
	 Weighted	
Average	
0.819	 0.239	 0.836	 0.819	 0.825	 0.849	
7	 NO	HARM	 0.848	 0.266	 0.911	 0.848	 0.878	 0.852	
	 HARM	 0.734	 0.152	 0.6	 0.734	 0.66	 0.852	
	 Weighted	
Average	
0.821	 0.239	 0.837	 0.821	 0.827	 0.852	
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Figure	9.5	Chart	to	show	the	classifier	performance	trend	for	“NO	HARM”	classification	
	
	
Figure	9.6	Chart	to	show	the	classifier	performance	trend	for	“HARM”	classification	
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When	the	sensitivity	of	the	NRLS	classification	system	(69.7%)	was	compared	with	the	new	
Naïve	Bayes	system	(8.21%),	using	Chi	Squared	test,	it	was	significantly	improved	(p=0.035).	
Specificity	was	improved	from	76.6%	to	83.7%	but	this	was	not	significant	(p=0.442).	9.1.4 Discussion	
Efficient	methods	to	detect	harm	and	near	miss	events	within	safety	incident	reports	are	
vital	for	identifying	key	areas	that	require	safety	solutions.	Automated	text	mining	is	
essential	for	reports	as	the	key	data	are	contained	within	the	free-text	section	and	the	
volume	of	reports	makes	manual	classification	unfeasible.	The	positive	predictive	value	for	
the	current	NRLS	classification	system	detecting	harm	was	41.1%;	which	is	poor.	Detecting	
harm	reports	are	vital	for	understanding	patient	risk.	This	study	was	able	to	demonstrate	
that	by	using	a	Naïve	Bayes	the	classifier	was	able	to	accurately	classify	over	80%	of	
incidents	as	harm	or	no	harm.	This	is	a	great	improvement	over	the	current	classification	
system	and	has	shown	that	text-mining	methods	can	derive	meaningful	interpretations	from	
complex	and	heterogeneous	datasets.	This	builds	on	work	by	other	studies	that	showed	that	
in	other	reporting	systems	automated	free	text	methods	could	mine	data	[241	262	263].	
As	electronic	health	records	finally	become	established;	automated	phenotyping	or	
classification	to	enable	patient	cohort	identification	is	a	useful	field	of	
research.[264]However	as	discussed,	there	are	many	challenges	to	creating	generalized	
algorithms	that	apply	to	all	clinical	texts	without	specific	rules	or	supervision.	NLP	is	a	way	of	
mining	the	data	in	clinical	narratives.	[265]	
Bejan	and	colleagues	designed	an	NLP	system	that	automatically	identified	ITU	patients	that	
had	pneumonia,	by	identifying	pneumonia	phenotypes	in	notes.		They	approached	the	
problem	in	a	similar	way	to	our	methods	through	an	iterative	approach	to	feature	selection,	
combining	word	n-gram	features,	testing	their	performance	and	promoting	the	better	
performing	ones	to	the	next	round	of	feature	set	adding,	new	features	and	re-testing.	[266]	
This	manner	of	statistical	feature	selection,	we	also	showed	to	improve	precision	in	
classification.	
Ong	and	colleagues	used	machine	learning	techniques	to	detect	extreme-risk	events	in	an	
Australian	Incident	system.[73]	They	found	that	Naïve	Bayes	similarly	showed	reasonable	
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performance,	as	did	other	methods	such	as	Support	Vector	Machine	algorithms.	They	also	
found	in	their	assessment	that	reporters’	classification	was	unreliable,	which	is	why	this	
study	using	NRLS	data	chose	to	manual	re-class	harm	reports	prior	to	training	the	classifier.	
These	methods	can	be	applied	to	a	greater	array	of	different	types	of	events	and	will	enable	
rapid	detection	of	reporting	trends.	Importantly	this	classifier	can	provide	a	better	
understanding	of	true	proportion	of	harm	reported	versus	no	harm	reported	in	England	and	
Wales	and	therefore	help	direct	resources	and	focus	safety	research.	
9.1.4.1 Limitations	
Determining	harm	from	incident	reports	alone	is	limited	by	the	amount	of	detail	given	by	
the	reporter.	For	this	reason	for	some	reports	there	was	ambiguity	regarding	whether	the	
patient	was	harmed	or	not	by	the	incident.	The	Kappa	score	between	reviewers	is	0.806.	
The	automated	classification	accuracy	cannot	exceed	the	accuracy	of	manual	classification,	
and	so	this	slightly	limits	the	classifier,	however	it	is	vastly	improving	upon	the	current	
system.	The	corpora	are	relatively	small	and	it	may	be	that	performance	of	the	Naïve	Bayes	
is	reduced	when	the	number	of	reports	is	increased.	However	the	classifier	is	strengthened	
by	separating	the	reports	into	training	and	testing	corpora	as	this	prevents	the	model	being	
over-fitted	and	is	more	robust	as	a	result.	[267]	The	text	within	the	reports	is	generally	of	
poor	quality	with	multiple	punctuation,	spelling	and	grammatical	errors.	This	again	limits	the	
classifier.	However	despite	this,	accuracy	achieved	was	substantial	and	reflects	the	flexibility	
of	the	Naïve	Bayes	to	categorize	reports.	It	is	unlikely	that	a	time	pressured	healthcare	
worker	would	focus	on	grammatical	accuracy	when	writing	reports,	and	therefore	mining	
techniques	must	adapt	to	poor	quality	text.	
It	is	also	necessary	to	be	aware	that	as	healthcare	progresses	new	forms	of	harm	will	be	
discussed,	and	indeed	the	language	of	harm	will	evolve,	therefore	retraining	of	classifiers	is	
required	to	ensure	they	do	not	become	out-dated.[73]	
9.1.4.2 Future	potential	for	NLP	in	patient	safety	reporting	
Whilst	there	is	no	substitute	for	a	clinical	examination	of	reports,	NLP	of	reports	offers	
certain	advantages	in	the	context	of	a	large	system.	Accurate	and	timely	identification	of	
particular	types	of	events	streamlines	data	analysis	and	increases	understanding	of	areas	of	
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system	weakness	that	can	be	submitted	to	more	thorough	human	analysis.	What	
automated	classification	can	also	offer	is	the	potential	to	flag	new	or	rare	events.	Events	
that	the	classifier	cannot	identify	are	highlighted	for	manual	review.	This	helps	separate	
known	events	from	unknown	events;	which	may	accelerate	national	learning	regarding	
unidentified	areas	of	safety	vulnerability.	9.1.5 Conclusion	
This	study	demonstrates	the	potential	for	automated	text	classification	of	NRLS	incident	
reports	to	be	accurate	reflections	of	complex	clinical	event	descriptions	such	as	whether	an	
incident	caused	harm	to	a	patient	or	not.	There	is	opportunity	to	develop	classification	
further	to	increase	understanding	of	the	large	volume	of	unexplored	incident	reports	and	
provide	a	mechanism	for	rapid	analysis	and	feedback	of	events	for	front	line	staff	and	
healthcare	commissioners.	 	
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9.2 List	of	spellings	of	Clostridium	difficile	used	by	reporters	in	the	NRLS	(part	1)	
	
clostridium	difficil C'Diff clostridium	dif CDT	post
clostridium	
difficeile
clostridieum	
deficile
Clostridium	
difficult
clostridium	
difficille Clostridium.difficile
2Clostridium	
difficile C/Diff chlostrium	difficile C	-	DIFFACILE C	defficile
c	diff CDT+	Positive c	difficille
clostridium	
Diffiaile
clostridium	
difficilepatient
Clostridium	
Dificele clostridium	difficue
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9.3 List	of	spellings	of	Clostridium	difficile	used	by	reporters	in	the	NRLS	(part	2)	
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9.4 Word	cloud	to	depict	frequency	of	words	in	NO	HARM	group	
	
9.5 Word	cloud	to	depict	frequency	of	words	in	HARM	group	
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9.6 Delphi	interview	topic	guide	
“Reporting	of	patient	safety	incidents;	its	role	in	the	patient	safety	landscape”	
	
_______________________		 	 ________________		 	 ________________		
Name	of	interview	subject	 	 Role	of	subject	 	 	 	 Date	
	
Introductory	statement	for	Part	A:	the	role	of	reporting.	
Preventable	harm	to	patients	is	important	to	monitor,	and	prevent.		
One	method	for	trying	to	achieve	this	is	through	voluntary	reporting	of	patient	safety	
incidents.	
1. In	your	opinion	what	is	the	optimum	method	for	monitoring	error	and	learning	from	
mistakes?	
2. What	are	the	inherent	difficulties	in	monitoring	and	improving	systems	in	order	to	make	
them	safer	
3. What	role	should	the	reporting	of	events	take	within	the	enhancement	of	safety?	
4. Has	reporting	fulfilled	this	role	to	date?	
5. What	other	successful	methods	are	available	for	monitoring	and	learning	from	
error?	
6. What	are	the	strengths	of	reporting	systems	for	error?	
7. What	are	the	challenges	in	using	reporting	as	a	method	for	monitoring	error?	
8. What	are	the	challenges	in	using	reporting	as	a	method	for	learning	from	error?	
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Introductory	statement	for	Part	B:	How	to	make	reporting	systems	fit	for	purpose	
The	National	Reporting	and	Learning	System	(NRLS)	captures	approximately	500,000	
incident	reports	per	quarter	from	hospitals	in	England	and	Wales.	However	it	has	been	
shown	to	have	low	sensitivity	for	recording	harm,	detecting	only	5%	of	adverse	events	
found	through	case	note	review.	In	addition	of	the	incidents	that	are	collected	only	
incidents	leading	to	death	and	severe	harm	are	analysed.	
Monitoring	and	learning	from	error	is	a	top	priority	for	the	NHS	and	other	national	
healthcare	systems	
1. How	could	the	national	reporting	systems	be	improved	to	better	fulfil	its	role	within	
patient	safety?	
2. What	are	the	current	difficulties	experienced	by	staff	who	have	witnessed	or	been	
involved	in	an	incident	that	should	be	reported?	
3. What	are	the	barriers	to	filling	out	a	report?	
4. Is	voluntary	reporting	the	best	mode	for	capturing	reports?	
5. Should	all	types	of	incident	be	reported	including	incidents	where	no	harm	occurred,	
i.e.	“near	miss”	events?	
6. How	should	never	events	be	captured?	
7. What	types	of	incident	should	be	a	priority	for	reporting?	
8. Who	should	be	encouraged	to	report?	
9. What	role	do	patients	have?	
10. Should	reports	be	kept	anonymous?	
11. Who	should	take	responsibility	for	dealing	with	the	safety	issues	highlighted	by	the	
reports?	
12. What	sort	of	feedback	should	be	given	and	whom	should	it	be	given	to?	
13. Are	there	any	aspects	of	the	design	of	the	system	that	are	not	conducive	to	
reporting?	How	should	they	be	modified?	
Many	thanks	for	your	time.	
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9.7 Delphi	questionnaire	
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Introductory statement
Dear ${m:/ /LastName}
 
This quest ionnaire is  part  of  a research study regarding the Nat ional  Report ing and Learning System, the pat ient
safety inc ident  report ing system for  heal thcare in England and Wales.
 
The aim of  th is study is  to explore the v iews of  experts and to reach a consensus regarding the ro le and aims of
inc ident  report ing wi th in heal thcare.  
You have been ident i f ied as an expert  wi th in the f ie ld of  pat ient  safety inc ident  report ing based on your peer-
reviewed publ icat ions.   We hope that  you wi l l  agree to take part  in th is study as your v iews wi l l  s igni f icant ly
contr ibute to determining the future ro le of  report ing in heal thcare.
 
Al l  v iews expressed wi l l  be t reated as conf ident ia l .   Once the resul ts of  the survey have been analyzed,  the same
quest ions wi l l  be asked, but  wi th the v iews of  other experts anonymously inc luded so that  you have the
opportuni ty to revise your answer or  provide comments.
  
 
We are most grateful  for  your contr ibut ion to th is study.
 
With kind regards
 
Professor Ara Darzi
Department of Surgery and Cancer
Imperial  College London
Aims and scope of incident report ing in healthcare systems.
Measuring the incidence of adverse events in healthcare.
 
What methods of  measur ing the harm that  occurs in hospi ta ls are the most val id and re l iable,  in your opin ion?
(please drag opt ions into your preferred order;  1=most re l iable,  7=least)
Aim and scope of patient safety incident reporting in healthcare.
 
These quest ions aim to c lar i fy  the most effect ive use of  the informat ion col lected by report ing systems.
Retrospective, expert, medical case note review
Retrospective, medical case note review using 'trigger tools' or similar explicit criteria
Hospital Mortality Statistics (e.g. Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio (HSMR) or Standardised Hospital Mortality Index (SHMI))
Voluntary incident reporting systems
Mandatory incident reporting systems, detecting selected types of harm
Harm measured by hospital electronic database records (e.g. Hospital Episode Statistics, AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators).
Prospective observation of selected care processes. (e.g. prospective surveillance for pressure ulcers or hospital acquired infections)
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Based on your knowledge of  the capabi l i t ies and capaci ty of  current  report ing systems please indicate your level
of  agreement wi th the fo l lowing statements
   Strongly disagree Disagree
Neither Agree nor
Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
Reporting system data should be used to measure
the national incidence of harm (e.g. within the
National Health Service )
  
Voluntary reporting systems should be used to
measure the rate of harm in a hospital.   
Mandatory reporting systems should be used to
measure the rate of specific types of reported harm
(e.g. wrong site surgery) in a hospital.
  
Reporting systems should be used to identify unsafe
hospitals   
Reporting systems should be used to identify unsafe
healthcare professionals. (e.g. doctors and nurses)   
Reporting systems are a valid and reliable measure of
how safe a hospital is.   
Reporting systems should be used to identify the
types of safety problems that exist.   
Reporting system data should be used as indicators
of the safety culture of a hospital   
Reporting systems should be used to detect rare
events not picked up by other methods.   
Reporting systems should be used to share learning
between hospitals.   
Any fur ther comments that  you th ink may be re levant?
What should be reported
What should be reported to a patient safety incident system?
 
These quest ions aim to c lar i fy  what types of  inc ident  report  wi l l  provide the most effect ive learning mechanism
for pat ient  safety in hospi ta ls.
Please indicate your level  of  agreement wi th the fo l lowing statements regarding the type of  inc ident  report  that
should be col lected.
   
Strongly
disagree Disagree
Neither Agree
nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
Reporting systems should focus on events that cause harm to
patients.   
Reporting systems should only collect events where harm that
occurred was preventable.   
There should be mandatory reporting of “never events” or “serious
events” such as wrong site surgery.   
There should be specific criteria for what to report.   
Complaints about other members of staff, staffing or rota issues do
not constitute patient safety incidents and hence should not be
reported to an incident reporting system
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Hospital number
Patient age
Time and date of incident
Location of incident
Consultant/attending in charge of care
National identifying number (e.g. NHS number or social security number)
Specialty caring for patient
Other
Near misses or no harm events should not be reported   
Reports should objectively classify what harm was caused and not
the potential for harm   
Adverse event classification systems should be standardized to allow
comparisons.   
Reports should contain patient identifiers so they can be linked to
other datasets.   
Incident reports should describe what happened and not why it
happened.   
Fewer and better described incidents should be encouraged,
compared to more and less well described ones.   
Events from Morbidity and Mortality meetings should be reported to a
national system.   
Al l  report ing systems should have a minimum dataset ,  contain ing the fo l lowing opt ions:  (Tick a l l  that  apply)
Feedback and learning
Feedback to staff and learning from patient safety incident reports
These quest ions aim to determine how indiv idual  feedback to staff  on reported incidents and learning f rom
incidents can be opt imised.
Please indicate your level  of  agreement wi th the fo l lowing statements regarding feedback and learning f rom
reported incidents.
   Strongly disagree Disagree
Neither Agree nor
Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
Reporting systems should give individual feedback to reporters   
The quality of incident reports submitted to a reporting system
is more important for learning than the quantity of reported
events
  
Anonymous reporting data should be readily available to
research groups for analysis.   
Incident reports should be used in educational programs for
trainees to promote quality improvement   
Staff should be encouraged to propose solutions for events at
the time of the report   
All reporters should have the option to keep their report
anonymous so that they are not identified.   
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For which of  the fo l lowing types of  reported incident  is  indiv idual  feedback appropr iate and feasib le? (Please t ick
the type of  feedback that  is  most  sui table for  the report)
You can choose more than one opt ion.
Type of feedback required  
Automated, immediate
feedback acknowledging
the report
Specific feedback on the incident
after it has been
investigated/analyzed
Generic educational feedback related to the type of
event reported; e.g. links to national guidelines for
pressure ulcers
No
feedback
required
Never events or serious
events (e.g. wrong site
surgery)
 
Incidents leading to death  
All incidents leading to
harm  
Near miss incidents (no
harm occurred)  
Incidents regarding device
failures  
Incidents regarding
medication reactions  
Hospital acquired infection
incidents  
Who should provide indiv idual  feedback to reporters for  the types of  inc idents ment ioned?
   No feedback
Automated
response system
Local risk
manager
Attending/Consultant
managing the
patient's care
Clinician external
to the team
involved in the
incident
National patient
safety expert
Never events or serious events (e.g.
wrong site surgery)   
Incidents leading to death   
All incidents leading to harm   
Near miss incidents (no harm
occurred)   
Incidents regarding device failures   
Incidents regarding medication
reactions   
Hospital acquired infection incidents   
The fo l lowing types of  inc ident  should be indiv idual ly  invest igated and root  cause analysis performed. (  Please
rank in order of  pr ior i ty  for  invest igat ion)
Any fur ther comments that  you th ink may be re levant?
Medicines or devices failure reports
Incidents leading to death only
Incidents leading to death and serious harm
All incidents leading to harm
All incidents including events where no harm occurred (e.g. falls)
Never events or serious events (e.g. wrong site surgery)
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National versus local  learning
National versus local reporting and learning
These quest ions a im to  determine where learn ing f rom pat ient  safety  inc idents  is  most  va luable.
Please indicate your level  of  agreement wi th the fo l lowing statements regarding the level  at  which reports should
be col lected and learned f rom.
   Strongly disagree Disagree
Neither Agree nor
Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
All incident reports are useful to collect at
a national level.   
There should be national priorities for
reporting certain events.   
Initiatives to prevent harm should be
generated at a hospital level   
Hospitals should submit their solutions to
safety problems nationally for shared
learning.
  
Hospitals should be allowed to determine
what their own reporting priorities should
be
  
There are di fferent  ways to report  an incident .  For the fo l lowing incident  types please indicate which system is
most appropr iate for  the report  to be sent  to d i rect ly.  (Drag and drop into your preferred box)
Items National reporting system
Local/Hospital reporting system
Both national and local systems simultaneously
Separate national reporting systems
Medication errors and reactions
Device or equipment failures
Serious events or "never" events
Reports of misconduct by other
healthcare professionals.
Reports of staffing shortages or
risk assessments
Near misses
Hospital acquired infections
All patient safety incident reports
leading to patient harm
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In your opin ion what type of  report ing system should the fo l lowing types of  inc ident  report  be col lected by in
order to maximise moni tor ing and learning about pat ient  safety.
   Voluntary reporting system Mandatory reporting system Not for reporting system
Medication errors and reactions   
Device or equipment failures   
Serious events or "never" events   
Reports of misconduct by other
healthcare professionals.   
Reports of staffing shortages or risk
assessments   
Near misses   
Hospital acquired infections   
All patient safety incident reports
leading to patient harm   
Any fur ther comments that  you th ink may be re levant?
Accountabil i ty and training
Accountability and training for reported patient safety incidents
We would l ike to know your v iews on who should be t ra ined to report  and who should be accountable for  deal ing
with the problems reported.
Please indicate your level  of  agreement wi th the fo l lowing statements regarding accountabi l i ty
   Strongly disagree Disagree
Neither agree nor
disagree Agree Strongly agree
Hospitals should be accountable for
investigating their own reports   
The clinical team responsible for the
patient should investigate reports
related to their own patients
  
Within each clinical specialty there
should be a lead clinician with a safety
role to promote safety solutions
  
Hospitals should have an executive
board member responsible for patient
safety
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0-5 years
5-10 years
More than 10 years
Clinical teams external to the hospital
should investigate reports of severe
patient harm
  
Please indicate how wel l  you perceive the fo l lowing heal thcare professionals are t ra ined to ident i fy  and report
safety inc idents (Tick a l l  that  apply)
   Not trained Inadequately trained Adequately trained
Nurses   
Doctors   
Other healthcare professionals   
Administrative staff   
Which heal thcare professionals should be t ra ined and encouraged to  rout inely INVESTIGATE pat ient  safety
incidents.  (Please drag and group as appropr iate)
   Strongly Disagree Disagree
Neither agree nor
disagree Agree Strongly disagree
Senior Nurses   
Junior Nurses   
Senior Doctors   
Junior Doctors   
Medical students   
Other healthcare professionals   
Administrative staff   
Managerial staff   
Any fur ther comments that  you th ink may be re levant?
Your demographic information
In which country do you work?
How many years exper ience have you had in pat ient  safety and incident  report ing ( t ick the most appropr iate)
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Yes
No
Implementation
Management
Evaluation
Other
Local
National
Both
Have you been involved in the development of  a pat ient  safety report ing system?
What was your involvement in the report ing system? ( t ick a l l  that  apply?)
What was your level  of  involvement? ( t ick the most appropr iate)
Any fur ther comments that  you th ink may be re levant?
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9.8 Sample	Delphi	round	2	feedback	and	questionnaire		
Dear	Prof	Smith	
Many	thanks	for	providing	your	expert	opinion	regarding	the	role	of	incident	reporting.	We	wanted	
to	feedback	on	areas	where	there	was	consensus.	
There	are	also	some	key	issues	where	the	responses	approach	consensus	and	we	wanted	to	re-
canvass	opinion	where	your	responses	differed	from	other	experts.	
1 Statements	for	re-discussion	
a. AIMS	OF	REPORTING	SYSTEMS	
	
You	disagreed	with	this	statement.	Please	re-select	your	agreement	with	this	statement	
Strongly	disagree		 Disagree	 Neutral	 	 Agree		 	 Strongly	agree	
	
You	were	neutral	about	this	statement.	Please	re-select	your	agreement	with	this	statement	
Strongly	disagree		 Disagree	 Neutral	 	 Agree		 	 Strongly	agree	
9 3160
Voluntary	reporting	system	data	should	not	be	used	to	
measure	the	rate	of	harm	in	a	hospital
NeutralDisagreeAgree
27
1360
Reporting	systems	are	not	a	valid	and	reliable	measure	of	
how	safe	a	hospital	is.
NeutralDisagreeAgree
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You	were	neutral	about	this	statement.	Please	re-select	your	agreement	with	this	statement	
Strongly	disagree		 Disagree	 Neutral	 	 Agree		 	 Strongly	agree	
	
	
You	disagreed	with	this	statement.	Please	re-select	your	agreement	with	this	statement	
Strongly	disagree		 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree		 	 Strongly	agree	
	
	
You	were	neutral	about	this	statement.	Please	re-select	your	agreement	with	this	statement	
Strongly	disagree		 Disagree	 Neutral	 	 Agree		 	 Strongly	agree	
17
3152
There	should	be	specific	criteria	for	what	to	report
NeutralDisagreeAgree
14
2462
Reports	should	contain	patient	identifiers	so	they	can	be	
linked	to	other	datasets.
NeutralDisagreeAgree
281755
Events	from	Morbidity	and	Mortality	meetings	should	be	
reported	to	a	national	system.
NeutralDisagreeAgree
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You	were	neutral	about	this	statement.	Please	re-select	your	agreement	with	this	statement	
	
Strongly	disagree		 Disagree	 Neutral	 	 Agree		 	 Strongly	agree	
	
	 	
252055
Never	events	and	incidents	causing	death	and	severe	harm	
should	be	prioritised	for	investigation	and	root	cause	
analysis
NeutralDisagreeAgree
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b. NATIONAL	VS	LOCAL	HOSPITAL	REPORTING	
	
You	disagreed	with	this	statement.	Please	re-select	your	agreement	with	this	statement	
	
Strongly	disagree		 Disagree	 Neutral	 	 Agree		 	 Strongly	agree	
	
c. ACCOUNTABILITY	AND	TRAINING	
	
You	dis-agreed	with	this	statement.	Please	re-select	your	agreement	with	this	statement	
Strongly	disagree		 Disagree	 Neutral	 	 Agree		 	 Strongly	agree	
	 	
65% 
Medication	incidents	should	be	captured	by	a	voluntary	
system
AgreeDisagree
23% 
23% 
54
% 
Clinical	teams	external	to	the	hospital	should	investigate	
reports	of	severe	patient	harm
NeutralDisagreeAgree
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2. Statements	reaching	consensus	and	approaching	consensus:	
a. AIMS	OF	REPORTING	SYSTEMS	
Statements	of	consensus:	
• Reporting	systems	should	be	used	to	identify	the	types	of	safety	problems	that	exist	
• Reporting	systems	should	be	used	to	detect	rare	events	not	picked	up	by	other	
methods	
• Reporting	systems	should	be	used	to	share	learning	about	safety	incidents	between	
hospitals	
• Mandatory	reporting	systems	should	be	used	to	measure	the	rate	of	specific	types	of	
reported	harm	(e.g.	wrong	site	surgery)	in	a	hospital.	
	
Issues	approaching	consensus	
• Reporting	system	data	should	not	be	used	to	measure	the	national	incidence	of	
harm		
You	agreed	with	this	statement	
• Reporting	system	data	should	be	used	as	indicators	of	the	safety	culture	of	a	hospital	
You	agreed	with	this	statement	
b. WHAT	SHOULD	BE	REPORTED	
Statements	of	consensus:	
• There	should	be	mandatory	reporting	of	“never	events”?	or	“serious	events”?	such	
as	wrong	site	surgery	
• Reporting	systems	should	collect	near	misses	as	well	as	harm	events	
• Adverse	event	classification	systems	should	be	standardized	to	allow	comparisons	
• Reporting	systems	should	give	individual	feedback	to	reporters	
• There	should	be	a	minimum	dataset	including:	hospital	number,	patient	age,	time	
and	date	of	incident,	location	of	incident	and	specialty	caring	for	patient	
	
Comments___________________	
Issues	approaching	consensus	
• Fewer	and	better-described	incidents	should	be	encouraged,	compared	to	more	and	
less	well	described	ones.	
You	agreed	with	this	statement	
c. FEEDBACK	AND	LEARNING	
Statements	of	consensus:	
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• Anonymous	reporting	data	should	be	readily	available	to	research	groups	for	
analysis.	
• Reporting	systems	should	give	individual	feedback	to	reporters	
• Incident	reports	should	be	used	in	educational	programs	for	trainees	to	promote	
quality	improvement	
• Staff	should	be	encouraged	to	propose	solutions	for	events	at	the	time	of	the	report	
• All	reporters	should	have	the	option	to	keep	their	report	anonymous	so	that	they	are	
not	identified.	
• Analysis	of	all	incident	types	is	desirable	however	near	miss	incidents	are	less	of	a	
priority	for	investigation	and	root	cause	analysis	than	incidents	that	cause	severe	
harm,	death	or	never	events.	
	
Comments___________________	
Issues	approaching	consensus	
• The	quality	of	incident	reports	submitted	to	a	reporting	system	is	more	important	for	
learning	than	the	quantity	of	reported	events	
You	agreed	with	this	statement	
d. NATIONAL	VS	LOCAL	HOSPITAL	REPORTING	
Statements	of	consensus:	
• There	should	be	national	priorities	for	reporting	certain	events.	
• Initiatives	to	prevent	harm	should	be	generated	at	a	hospital	level.	
• Hospitals	should	submit	their	solutions	to	safety	problems	nationally	for	shared	
learning.	
• Reports	of	staff	shortages	should	be	reported	to	the	local	hospital	system,	but	not	at	
a	national	level.	
• Device	incidents	should	be	reported	both	nationally	and	locally	
• Never	events	should	be	reported	both	nationally	and	locally	
	
Comments___________________	
Issues	approaching	consensus	
• Near	misses	should	be	reported	locally	only	
You	agreed	with	this	statement	
• Reports	of	misconducts	or	staff	complaints	should	be	reported	locally	only	
You	agreed	with	this	statement	
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• Device	incidents	should	be	captured	by	a	mandatory	system	
You	agreed	with	this	statement	
	
e. ACCOUNTABILITY	AND	TRAINING	
Statements	of	consensus:	
• Hospitals	should	be	accountable	for	investigating	their	own	reports	
• Within	each	clinical	specialty	there	should	be	a	lead	clinician	with	a	safety	role	to	
promote	safety	solutions	
• Hospitals	should	have	an	executive	board	member	responsible	for	patient	safety	
• Senior	doctors,	nurses	and	managerial	staff	should	be	trained	to	routinely	investigate	
patient	safety	incidents	
	
Comments___________________	
Issues	approaching	consensus	
• All	staff	(doctors,	nurses,	administrative	staff,	allied	healthcare	professionals)	are	
inadequately	trained	to	identify	and	report	safety	incidents	
You	agreed	with	this	statement	
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9.9 Sample	consent	form	“Avoidable	Mortality,	Case	Note	Review	Study	”	
Please	initial	box		
	
1. I	confirm	that	I	have	read	and	understand	the	reviewer	information	sheet	
for	the	above	study	and	have	had	the	opportunity	to	ask	questions	which	
have	been	answered	fully.	
	
2. I	understand	that	my	participation	is	voluntary	and	I	am	free	to	withdraw	
at	any	time,	without	giving	any	reason,	without	my	legal	rights	being	
affected.	
	
3. I	understand	that	the	purpose	of	this	study	is	to	assess	methods	for	
evaluating	avoidable	mortality	and	not	for	the	purpose	of	making	
assessments	of	individual	healthcare	professionals	or	healthcare	teams	or	
hospitals.	
	
4. I	understand	that	if	I	have	serious	concerns	regarding	negligence	I	am	
obliged	to	refer	this	to	the	chief	investigator,	however	this	is	not	the	
primary	aim	of	the	study.	
	
5. I	agree	to	take	part	in	the	above	study.		
	
	
	
_______________________		 	 ________________		 	 ________________		
Name	of	Subject	 	 	 Signature	 	 	 	 Date		
	
	
________________________	 	 	________________	 	 ________________		
Name	of	Person	taking	consent	 	 	Signature		 	 	 	 Date		
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9.10 Participant	confidentiality	agreement	“Avoidable	Mortality,	Case	Note	Review	
Study”	
Please	initial	box		
	
1. I	agree	to	maintain	the	confidentiality	of	all	project	data	and	I	understand	that	any	disclosure	
of	confidential	data	relating	to	patients	or	healthcare	professionals	is	an	invasion	of	privacy	
and	may	result	in	disciplinary,	civil	and	or	criminal	action	against	me.	
	
2. I	agree	to	access	data	only	for	the	purposes	for	which	I	am	authorised	explicitly	and	on	no	
occasion	will	I	use	project	data	including	confidential	data	relating	to	patients	or	healthcare	
professionals	for	my	personal	interest	or	business	purpose.	
	
3. I	agree	to	comply	at	all	times	with	the	hospital’s	data	security	policies	and	data	protection	code	
of	conduct.		
	
4. I	agree	that	where	I	have	been	given	access	to	confidential	information	I	am	under	a	duty	of	
confidence	and	would	be	liable	under	common	law	for	any	inappropriate	breach	of	confidence	
in	terms	of	disclosure	to	third	parties.	I	would	be	liable	for	invasion	of	privacy	if	I	were	to	
access	more	information	than	that	for	which	I	have	been	given	approval	for.	
	
5. I	am	informed	that	the	references	to	personal,	confidential	and	sensitive	information	in	these	
documents	are	for	my	information	and	are	not	intended	to	replace	my	obligations	under	the	
Data	Protection	Act	1998.	
	
6. Should	my	involvement	in	the	study	discontinue	for	any	reason	I	understand	that	I	will	
continue	to	be	bound	to	this	confidentiality	agreement.	
	
_______________________		 	 ________________		 	 ________________		
Name	of	Reviewer	 	 	 Signature	 	 	 	 Date		
	
________________________	 	 	________________	 	 ________________		
Chief	Investigator	 	 	 	Signature		 	 	 	 Date		
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9.11 Participant	information	sheet	mortality	study	“Avoidable	Mortality,	Case	Note	
Review	Trial”	
Introduction		
You	are	being	invited	to	take	part	in	a	research	study.	Before	you	decide	it	is	important	for	you	to	
understand	why	the	research	is	being	done	and	what	it	will	involve.	Please	take	time	to	read	the	
following	information	carefully	and	discuss	it	if	you	wish.		
	
What	is	the	purpose	of	the	study?		
Deciding	 whether	 an	 inpatient	 death	 was	 avoidable	 or	 not	 is	 complex.	 It	 has	 traditionally	 been	
assessed	through	expert	retrospective	case	record	review.	
	
There	are	two	types	of	case	note	review:	implicit	(or	holistic)	and	explicit.	The	implicit	review	involves	
a	 trained	expert	 reading	a	 case	note	 in	 full	 and	accessing	any	 further	 supplementary	 information.	
Explicit	reviews,	such	as	the	Global	Trigger	Tool,	have	also	been	used	to	detect	adverse	events.	Explicit	
methods	 use	 a	 pre-defined	 protocol	 to	 look	 for	 specific	 events.	 Explicit	 and	 implicit	 case	 review	
methods	have	been	compared	before	in	order	to	assess	quality	of	care.	In	this	study	we	will	compare	
explicit	 and	 implicit	 review	 methods	 to	 assess	 the	 sensitivity	 and	 specificity	 for	 determining	 the	
preventability	of	mortality.	
	
There	are	a	limited	number	of	available	expert	reviewers,	and	it	would	be	useful	to	demonstrate	that	
non-expert	 clinical	 reviewers	have	 similar	 reliability	 in	assessing	avoidable	death.	A	more	protocol	
driven	method	may	safeguard	against	errors	and	explicit	 criteria	 for	 review	may	be	more	 likely	 to	
demonstrate	greater	inter-rater	reliability.		
	
We	 have	 developed	 an	 explicit	 review	 avoidable	 mortality	 checklist	 to	 provide	 an	 efficient,	
reproducible	method	for	deciding	whether	an	inpatient	death	was	avoidable.	
	
This	study	aims	to	assess	what	the	most	efficient	and	reliable	case	note	review	method	is	for	detecting	
avoidable	 death,	 so	 that	 it	 could	 be	 applied	 on	 a	 regular	 basis	 to	 investigate	 excess	mortality	 in	
hospitals.	It	will	also	evaluate	who	can	reliably	detect	avoidable	deaths.		
	
Why	have	I	been	chosen?		
You	are	have	been	chosen	because	you	have	expressed	an	interest	in	avoidable	mortality	research	
and	are	either	a	senior	nurse	or	doctor	working	for	or	retired	from	the	NHS.		
	
Do	I	have	to	take	part?		
It	is	up	to	you	to	decide	whether	or	not	to	take	part.	If	you	do	decide	to	take	part	you	will	be	given	
this	information	sheet	to	keep	and	be	asked	to	sign	a	consent	form.	If	you	decide	to	take	part	you	
are	still	free	to	withdraw	at	any	time	and	without	giving	a	reason.	A	decision	to	withdraw	at	any	
time,	or	a	decision	not	to	take	part,	will	not	affect	your	rights.	
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What	will	taking	part	involve?		
This	study	intends	to	assess	the	validity	of	an	avoidable	mortality	case	note	review	checklist.	If	you	
decide	to	take	part	you	will	be	randomised	into	either	an	implicit	or	explicit	review	group.	
You	will	be	trained	in	case	note	review	and	then	undertake	reviewing	of	randomly	selected	case	
notes	and	asked	to	score	the	avoidability	of	the	patient’s	death	in	these	notes.	
	
What	are	the	possible	benefits	of	me	taking	part?		
We	hope	that	the	results	of	the	study	will	show	what	method	is	best	to	assess	avoidable	mortality	
and	this	may	help	provide	evidence	of	areas	for	learning	in	the	future	which	would	lead	to	
improvements	in	patient	care.	You	will	be	trained	in	case	note	review	and	will	receive	a	certificate	of	
training.	
	
What	are	the	possible	harms	of	me	taking	part?	
This	study	has	not	been	deemed	to	pose	a	risk	to	participants.	You	will	be	reviewing	the	notes	of	
patients	who	have	died	in	hospital.	It	is	possible	that	some	of	the	errors	detected	in	the	notes	may	
cause	concern	to	the	reviewers,	but	we	do	not	anticipate	any	physical	harm.	
Imperial	College	London	holds	insurance	policies	that	apply	to	this	study.		If	you	experience	physical	
harm	or	injury	as	a	result	of	taking	part	in	this	study,	you	will	be	eligible	to	claim	compensation	
without	having	to	prove	that	Imperial	College	is	at	fault.		This	does	not	affect	your	legal	rights	to	
seek	compensation.		
	
What	if	I	need	to	raise	a	concern?	
This	study	is	not	designed	to	judge	the	quality	of	care	provided	to	the	patient.	It	is	designed	to	assess	
the	reviewing	tool	used.	The	tool	is	designed	to	detect	system	failures	that	could	have	been	
preventable	and	therefore	reviewers	are	likely	to	discover	errors	in	care	provision.	In	the	event	that	
you	become	concerned	regarding	the	care	of	a	specific	patient	that	you	would	like	to	discuss	or	feel	
constitutes	criminal	negligence,	concerns	can	be	raised	with	the	Chief	Investigator	who	will	direct	
concerns	to	the	most	appropriate	manager.			
	
Will	my	taking	part	in	this	study	be	kept	confidential?		
Any	information	that	is	collected	about	you	during	the	course	of	the	research	(such	as	your	name	or	
job	title	or	level	of	experience)	will	be	kept	strictly	confidential.	Any	information	that	you	collect	will	
also	be	kept	anonymous	and	confidential.		
	
What	will	happen	to	the	results	of	the	research	study?	
The	results	collected	in	this	study	will	be	analysed	and	the	findings	of	the	study	will	be	published	in	
peer-reviewed	scientific	journals.	If	you	would	like	to	be	notified	about	the	publication	date	and	
journal,	please	contact	a	member	of	the	team,	who	will	be	able	to	assist	you	further	(see	below).	
	
Who	is	organising	and	funding	the	research?	
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Imperial	College	London	is	organising	and	sponsoring	this	research	project.	NHS	England	is	funding	
this	project	as	part	of	the	NRLS	Research	and	Development	Program.	
	
Who	has	reviewed	the	study?	
This	study	was	given	a	favourable	ethical	opinion	for	conduct	in	the	NHS	Research	Ethics	Committee.	
REC	reference	13/LO/1374,	IRAS	Project	ID:	133513,	Clinical	Trial	No	NCT01998191	ClinicalTrials.gov	
	
Contact	for	Further	Information	
For	further	information,	or	any	other	enquiry,	please	feel	free	to	contact	Ms	Ann-Marie	Howell	who	
will	be	available	you	wish	to	speak	to	a	member	of	the	research	team:	
Ms	Ann-Marie	Howell	 	 a.howell@imperial.ac.uk	 Tel:	07766004708	
	
	
On	behalf	of	the	research	team,	we	would	like	to	thank	you	for	your	time	and	participation	in	this	
study.	
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9.12 IHI	Global	Trigger	Tool	UK	
IHI	Global	Trigger	Tool	(UK	version)	 Category	E:	 contributed	to	or	resulted	in	temporary	harm	to	the	patient	&	required	intervention	Category	F:
	 contributed	to	or	resulted	in	temporary	harm	to	patients&	required	initial	or	prolonged	
hospitalisation	
Category	G:	 contributed	to	or	resulted	in	permanent	patient	harm	
Category	H:	 required	intervention	to	sustain	life	
Category	I:	 contributed	to	the	patient’s	death	
Trigger	 	 +	 Event	Description	
and	Severity	E-I	
	 Trigger	 	 	 		 +	 Event	Description	and	Severity	E-I	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 General	care	module	 	 Medication	module	
G	1	 Lack	of	early	warning	score	or	early	
warning	score	requiring	response	
	 	 M	1	 Vitamin	K	 	 	
G	2	 Any	patient	fall	 	 	 M	2	 Naloxone	 	 	
G	3	 Decubiti	 	 	 M	3	 Flumazenil	 	 	
G	4	 Readmission	to	hospital	within	30	days	 	 	 M	4	 Glucagon	or	50%	glucose	 	 	
	 	 	 	 M5	 Abrupt	medication	stop	 	 	
G	6	
	
DVT/PE	following	admission	evidenced	
by	imaging	+/or	D	dimers	
	 	 	 Lab	test	module	
	 	 Haematology	
	 Surgical	care	module	 	 L1	 High	INR	(>5)	 	 	
S	1	 Return	to	theatre	 	 	 L	2	 Transfusion	 	 	
S	2	 Change	in	planned	procedure	 	 	 	 	
L3	
Drop	in	Hb	or	Hct	(>25%)	 	 	
S3	 Removal/Injury	or	repair	of	organ	 	 	 	 Biochemistry	
	 	 	 	 L4	 Rising	urea	or	creatinine	(>2x	
baseline)	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	
L5	
L6	
Electrolyte	abnormalities	Na+		
<120	or	>160	
K+			<2.5	or	>6.5	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 7	 Hypoglycaemia	
(<3mmol/l)	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 L8	 Raised	Troponin	(>1.5	ng/ml)	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Microbiology	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 :L9	 MRSA	bacteraemia	
	 	 	 	 	 	 L10	 C.	difficile	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 L11	 VRE	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 L12	 Wound	infection	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 L13	 Nosocomial	pneumonia	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 L14	 Positive	blood	culture	 	 	
	
	 Intensive care module 
I 1 Readmission to ICU or HDU 	 	
I 2 Unplanned transfer to ICU or 
HDU 
	 		 		 Patient identifier 		 Total events 		 	 		 Total length of stay 		 	 	
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9.13 Modified	Kaiser	Permanente	“deep-dive”	questions	related	to	avoiding	
preventable	harm		
Questions	 Response	categories	
Did	a	surgical/procedural	complication	cause	harm?	 No	/	E	/F	/G/	H/	I	
Related	notes	 Free	text	
	
Did	a	fall	cause	harm?	 No	/	E	/F	/G/	H/	I	
Did	a	hospital	acquired	pressure	ulcer	develop	or	advance?	 No	/	E	/F	/G/	H/	I	
Did	a	medication	error/event	cause	harm?	 No	/	E	/F	/G/	H/	I	
Did	a	hospital	acquired	infection	cause	harm?	 No	/	E	/F	/G/	H/	I	
OTHER	patient	harm	 Free	text	
Level	of	harm	associated	with	OTHER	patient	harm	 No	/	E	/F	/G/	H/	I	
Did	admission	result	from	harm	BEFORE	hospitalization	 No	/	E	/F	/G/	H/	I	
Was	there	evidence	of	Failure	to	Rescue?	
	
(Examine	notes	for	8-12	hrs	before	death+/transfer	to	ICU	for	
change	in	HR,	RR,	BP,	Saturations,	GCS:	that	was	not	responded	to)	
No	/	Yes	
Was	there	evidence	of	Failure	to	Plan?	
	
(Examine	notes	for	evidence	of	misdiagnosis,	delayed	diagnosis,	
treatment	deficiency)	
No	/	Yes	
Was	there	evidence	of	Failure	to	Communicate?	
	
(Examine	notes	for	evidence	of	poor	communication	between	
patient	and	staff	or	clinician	to	clinician,	inadequate	
documentation,	inadequate	supervision,	leadership)	
No	/	Yes	
Did	any	aspiration	event	occur?	 No	/	Yes	
After	reviewing	all	questions	“perfect	care”	during	this	
hospitalization	could	have	prevented	this	death	
Strongly	agree	
Agree	
Neither	agree	nor	disagree	
Disagree	
Strongly	disagree	
	
Source:	H.	Lau,	K.C.	Litman,	2011	Saving	Lives	by	Studying	Deaths,	The	Joint	Commission	Journal	on	Quality	and	Patient	Safety	[525]	
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9.14 Modified	Kaiser	Permanente	“deep-dive”	questions	related	to	appropriate	care	
setting	
Questions	 Response	categories	
Was	patient	initially	admitted	to	ITU?	 No	/	Yes	
Unit	where	patient	first	admitted	 ITU	
ITU	Step-down	
Medical/surgical	ward	
Clinical	observation	ward/decision	unit/	Medical	or	surgical	admission	ward	
Obstetrics	/	Gynaecology	
	
Other____________________________________________________	
	
Patient	admitted	from	 Home	
Nursing	home	
Other	hospital	
Hospice	
	
Other___________________________________________________	
Admitting	diagnosis	 	
	
Discharge	diagnosis	(if	this	is	a	readmission	
within	30	days	
	
	
	
Was	neoplasia	a	current	active	problem	on	
admission?	
No	/	Yes	
On	admission	was	the	patient	a	good	candidate	
for	hospice	care?	
No	/	Yes	/	Unsure	/	Already	a	hospice	patient	
Did	the	patient	have	a	hospice	referral	prior	to	
admission?	
No	/	Yes	/	already	hospice	patient	/	n/a	
When	was	hospice	care	assigned?	 On	admission		
<24	hours	of	admission	
>24	hours	of	admission	
Candidate	but	not	assigned	to	hospice	care	
n/a	
Was	patient	in	palliative	care	program	prior	to	
admission?	
No	/	Yes	/	already	palliative	patient	/	n/a	
When	was	palliative	care	assigned?	 On	admission		
<24	hours	of	admission	
>24	hours	of	admission	
Candidate	but	not	assigned	to	palliative	care	
n/a	
When	was	End	of	Life	Pathway	assigned?	 On	admission		
<24	hours	of	admission	
>24	hours	of	admission	
not	assigned	to	LCP	
When	was	DNAR	order	written	 On	admission		
<24	hours	of	admission	
>24	hours	of	admission	
not	written	
Advanced	directive	in	the	chart?	 No	/	Yes	
Unit	where	death	occurred	 ITU	
ITU	Step-down	
Medical/surgical	ward	
Clinical	observation	ward/decision	unit/	Medical	or	surgical	admission	ward	
Obstetrics	/	Gynaecology	
	
Other____________________________________________________	
Source:	H.	Lau,	K.C.	Litman,	2011	Saving	Lives	by	Studying	Deaths,	The	Joint	Commission	Journal	on	Quality	and	Patient	Safety	[525]		 	
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9.15 Search	strategy	for	Medline,	Embase	and	Cochrane	9.15.1 Medline	search	strategy	Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	In-Process	&	Other	Non-Indexed	Citations	and	Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	1946	to	Present	(part	1)	
Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	In-Process	&	Other	Non-Indexed	Citations	and	Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	1946	to	Present	
Number	 Search	 Results	
1	 surgery.ti,ab.	 684607	
2	 surgery/	 32058	
3	 surgeon/	 0	
4	 colorectal.ti,ab.	 75888	
5	 colorectal	surgery/	 1728	
6	 upper	gi.ti,ab.	 2402	
7	 lower	gi.ti,ab.	 628	
8	 orthop.ti,ab.	 872	
9	 orthopedics/	 15149	
10	 bariatric	surgery/	 2931	
11	 bariatric	surgery.ti,ab.	 4807	
12	 hepatobiliary	surgery.ti,ab.	 263	
13	 biliary	tract	surgery/	or	liver	surgery/	 0	
14	 transplant	surgery.ti,ab.	 701	
15	 cardiac	surgery.ti,ab.	 23374	
16	 thoracic	surgery.ti,ab.	 8275	
17	 cardiothoracic$.ti,ab.	 3793	
18	 heart	surgery/	 9900	
19	 thorax	surgery/	 0	
20	 vascular	surgery/	 0	
21	 vascular	surgery.ti,ab.	 9046	
22	 plastic	surgery.ti,ab.	 9320	
23	 plastic	surgery/	 22125	
24	 maxillofacial	surgery/	 6388	
25	 maxillofacial	surgery.ti,ab.	 3408	
26	 ophthalmic	surgery.ti,ab.	 996	
27	 ophthalmology/	 16766	
28	 eye	surgery/	 0	
29	 urology/	 7467	
30	 urology.ti,ab.	 11419	
31	 ear	nose	throat	surgery/	 0	
32	 surgical	equipment/	 4843	
33	 who	checklist.ti,ab.	 21	
34	 reoperation.ti,ab.	 16299	
35	 reoperation/	 61376	
36	 paediatric	surgery.ti,ab.	 636	
37	 pediatric	surgery/	 0	
38	 neurosurgery/	 12018	
39	 neurosurgery.ti,ab.	 11301	
40	 breast	surgery.ti,ab.	 1799	
41	 breast	surgery/	 0	
42	 medical	error$.ti,ab.	 2565	
43	 diagnostic	error$.ti,ab.	 2479	
44	 iatrogenic	disease.ti,ab.	 410	
45	 malpractice.ti,ab.	 7884	
46	 safety	culture.ti,ab.	 556	
47	 near	failure.ti,ab.	 15	
48	 near	miss.ti,ab.	 733	
49	 patient	safety.ti,ab.	 10957	
50	 safety	event	report$.ti,ab.	 18	
51	 safety	manage$.ti,ab.	 508	
52	 medical	error/	 11167	
53	 diagnostic	error/	 28883	
54	 iatrogenic	disease/	 12203	
55	 malpractice/	 24662	
56	 patient	safety/	 1250	
57	 risk	management/	 13835	
58	 adverse	event.ti,ab.	 10608	
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9.15.2 Medline	search	strategy:	Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	In-Process	&	Other	Non-Indexed	Citations	and	Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	1946	to	Present	(part	2)	
Number	 Search	 Results	
59	 42	or	43	or	44	or	45	or	46	or	47	or	48	or	49	or	50	or	51	or	52	or	53	or	54	or	55	or	56	or	
57	or	58	
108975	
60	 1	or	2	or	3	or	4	or	5	or	6	or	7	or	8	or	9	or	10	or	11	or	12	or	13	or	14	or	15	or	16	or	17	or	
18	or	19	or	20	or	21	or	22	or	23	or	24	or	25	or	26	or	27	or	28	or	29	or	30	or	31	or	32	or	
33	or	34	or	35	or	36	or	37	or	38	or	39	or	40	or	41	
903925	
61	 59	and	60	 9081	
62	 limit	61	to	(human	and	english	language)	 6654	
63	 limit	62	to	exclude	medline	journals	(Limit	not	valid	in	Ovid	MEDLINE(R),Ovid	
MEDLINE(R)	In-Process;	records	were	retained)	
6654	
64	 case	report.ti,ab.	 181368	
65	 ((63	not	case	report).ti,ab.)	 0	
66	 case	report/	 1589199	
67	 65	not	66	 0	
68	 surgery.ab,ti.	 684607	
69	 surgeon?.ab,ti.	 116521	
70	 surgical.ab,ti.	 594631	
71	 General	Surgery/	 32058	
72	 colorectal.ab,ti.	 75888	
73	 Colorectal	Surgery/	 1728	
74	 upper	gi.ab,ti.	 2402	
75	 lower	gi.ab,ti.	 628	
76	 orthop$.ab,ti.	 58520	
77	 Bariatric	Surgery/	 2931	
78	 Orthopedic	Procedures/	or	Orthopedics/	 26530	
79	 bariatric	surgery.ab,ti.	 4807	
80	 hepatobiliary	surgery.ab,ti.	 263	
81	 Biliary	Tract	Surgical	Procedures/	or	Hepatectomy/	 21884	
82	 Transplants/	 1779	
83	 transplant	surgery.ab,ti.	 701	
84	 cardiac	surgery.ab,ti.	 23374	
85	 Thoracic	Surgery/	 9900	
86	 Cardiac	Surgical	Procedures/	 32032	
87	 cardiothoracic	surgery.ab,ti.	 1229	
88	 thoracic	surgery.ab,ti.	 8275	
89	 Vascular	Surgical	Procedures/	 21800	
90	 vascular	surgery.ab,ti.	 9046	
91	 plastic	surgery.ab,ti.	 9320	
92	 Surgery,	Plastic/	 22125	
93	 Surgery,	Oral/	 6388	
94	 maxillofacial	surgery.ab,ti.	 3408	
95	 ophthalmology.ab,ti.	 14883	
96	 Ophthalmology/	 16766	
97	 Ophthalmologic	Surgical	Procedures/	 7589	
98	 Urology/	 7467	
99	 urology.ab,ti.	 11419	
100	 ENT.ab,ti.	 8725	
101	 Otorhinolaryngologic	Surgical	Procedures/	 3164	
102	 (head	and	neck	surgery).ab,ti.	 3000	
103	 surgical	technique.ab,ti.	 21396	
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9.15.3 Medline	search	strategy:	Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	In-Process	&	Other	Non-Indexed	Citations	and	Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	1946	to	Present	(part	3)	
Number	 Search	 Results	
104	 Surgical	Equipment/	 4843	
105	 surgical	equipment.ab,ti.	 236	
106	 theatre.ab,ti.	 4722	
107	 Operating	Rooms/	 9871	
108	 who	surgical	safety	checklist.ab,ti.	 19	
109	 retained	swab.ab,ti.	 6	
110	 Surgical	Procedures,	Operative/	 47777	
111	 Reoperation/	 61376	
112	 reoperation.ab,ti.	 16299	
113	 laparoscopic.ab,ti.	 58285	
114	 Laparoscopy/	 52950	
115	 Robotics/	 10570	
116	 robotic	surgery.ab,ti.	 1050	
117	 Digestive	System	Surgical	Procedures/	 8191	
118	 Medical	Audit/	 13939	
119	 medical	error$.ab,ti.	 2565	
120	 medication	error$.ab,ti.	 2805	
121	 diagnostic	error$.ab,ti.	 2479	
122	 iatrogenic	disease.ab,ti.	 410	
123	 malpractice.ab,ti.	 7884	
124	 safety	culture.ab,ti.	 556	
125	 near	failure.ab,ti.	 15	
126	 near	miss.ab,ti.	 733	
127	 patient	safety.ab,ti.	 10957	
128	 safety	event	report.ab,ti.	 2	
129	 safety	manage$.ab,ti.	 508	
130	 never	event.ab,ti.	 21	
131	 failure	to	rescue.ab,ti.	 189	
132	 risk	manage$.ab,ti.	 6536	
133	 adverse	drug	reaction.ab,ti.	 2005	
134	 Medical	Errors/	 11167	
135	 Medication	Errors/	 9399	
136	 Iatrogenic	Disease/	 12203	
137	 Malpractice/	 24662	
138	 Safety	Management/	 15220	
139	 Drug	Toxicity/	 5435	
140	 safe$.ab,ti.	 433274	
141	 exp	Safety/	 47311	
142	 err$.ab,ti.	 183212	
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9.15.4 Indexed	Citations	and	Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	1946	to	Present	(part	4)	
Number	 Search	 Results	
143	 adverse.ab,ti.	 241004	
144	 118	or	119	or	120	or	121	or	122	or	123	or	124	or	125	or	126	or	127	or	128	or	129	or	
130	or	131	or	132	or	133	or	134	or	135	or	136	or	137	or	138	or	139	
104131	
145	 68	or	69	or	70	or	71	or	72	or	73	or	74	or	75	or	76	or	77	or	78	or	79	or	80	or	81	or	82	or	
83	or	84	or	85	or	86	or	87	or	88	or	89	or	90	or	91	or	92	or	93	or	94	or	95	or	96	or	97	or	
98	or	99	or	100	or	101	or	102	or	103	or	105	or	106	or	107	or	108	or	109	or	110	or	111	
or	112	or	113	or	114	or	115	or	116	or	117	
1458664	
146	 144	and	145	 14302	
147	 Neurosurgery/	 12018	
148	 paediatric	surgery.ab,ti.	 636	
149	 147	or	148	 12651	
150	 145	or	149	 1466939	
151	 144	and	150	 14454	
	9.15.5 Embase	search	strategy:	Embase	1974	to	2012	Week	19	(part	1)	
Number	 Search	 Results	
1	 surgery.ti,ab.	 1562733	
2	 surgery/	 212851	
3	 surgeon/	 42591	
4	 colorectal.ti,ab.	 173507	
5	 colorectal	surgery	 7577	
6	 upper	gi.ti,ab.	 6476	
7	 lower	gi.ti,ab.	 1663	
8	 orthop.ti,ab.	 1232	
9	 orthopedics/	 32036	
10	 bariatric	surgery/	 11903	
11	 bariatric	surgery.ti,ab.	 11985	
12	 hepatobiliary	surgery.ti,ab.	 619	
13	 biliary	tract	surgery/	or	liver	surgery/	 8204	
14	 transplant	surgery.ti,ab.	 1633	
15	 cardiac	surgery.ti,ab.	 54317	
16	 thoracic	surgery.ti,ab.	 22537	
17	 cardiothoracic$.ti,ab.	 8950	
18	 heart	surgery/	 69115	
19	 thorax	surgery/	 22395	
20	 vascular	surgery/	 29399	
21	 vascular	surgery.ti,ab.	 24044	
22	 plastic	surgery.ti,ab.	 21204	
23	 plastic	surgery/	 76362	
24	 maxillofacial	surgery/	 11600	
25	 maxillofacial	surgery.ti,ab.	 7881	
26	 ophthalmic	surgery.ti,ab.	 2220	
27	 ophthalmology/	 36640	
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9.15.6 Embase	search	strategy:	Embase	1974	to	2012	Week	19	(part	2)	
Number	 Search	 Results	
28	 eye	surgery/	 13632	
29	 urology/	 24923	
30	 urology.ti,ab.	 28569	
31	 ear	nose	throat	surgery/	 3260	
32	 surgical	equipment/	 22075	
33	 who	checklist.ti,ab.	 59	
34	 reoperation.ti,ab.	 36208	
35	 reoperation/	 106723	
36	 paediatric	surgery.ti,ab.	 1521	
37	 pediatric	surgery/	 10521	
38	 neurosurgery/	 51958	
39	 neurosurgery.ti,ab.	 26620	
40	 breast	surgery.ti,ab.	 4213	
41	 breast	surgery/	 5882	
42	 medical	error$.ti,ab.	 5591	
43	 diagnostic	error$.ti,ab.	 5512	
44	 iatrogenic	disease.ti,ab.	 913	
45	 malpractice.ti,ab.	 16638	
46	 safety	culture.ti,ab.	 1286	
47	 near	failure.ti,ab.	 32	
48	 near	miss.ti,ab.	 1643	
49	 patient	safety.ti,ab.	 24500	
50	 safety	event	report$.ti,ab.	 35	
51	 safety	manage$.ti,ab.	 1301	
52	 medical	error/	 22764	
53	 diagnostic	error/	 67684	
54	 iatrogenic	disease/	 33064	
55	 malpractice/	 54009	
56	 patient	safety/	 34917	
57	 risk	management/	 40113	
58	 adverse	event.ti,ab.	 26140	
59	 42	or	43	or	44	or	45	or	46	or	47	or	48	or	49	or	50	or	51	or	52	or	53	or	54	or	55	or	56	or	
57	or	58	
287500	
60	 1	or	2	or	3	or	4	or	5	or	6	or	7	or	8	or	9	or	10	or	11	or	12	or	13	or	14	or	15	or	16	or	17	or	
18	or	19	or	20	or	21	or	22	or	23	or	24	or	25	or	26	or	27	or	28	or	29	or	30	or	31	or	32	or	
33	or	34	or	35	or	36	or	37	or	38	or	39	or	40	or	41	
2224375	
61	 59	and	60	 30425	
62	 limit	61	to	(human	and	english	language)	 22352	
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9.15.7 Cochrane	Library	search	strategy	
Number	 Search	 Results	
#1	 (surgery):ti,ab,kw	 76428	
#2	 surgeon	 8897	
#3	 MeSH	descriptor	Colorectal	Surgery	explode	all	trees	 120	
#4	 MeSH	descriptor	General	Surgery	explode	all	trees	 270	
#5	 MeSH	descriptor	Orthopedics	explode	all	trees	 287	
#6	 MeSH	descriptor	Bariatric	Surgery	explode	all	trees	 528	
#7	 MeSH	descriptor	Orthopedic	Procedures	explode	all	trees	 7194	
#8	 MeSH	descriptor	Organ	Transplantation	explode	all	trees	 5408	
#9	 MeSH	descriptor	Cardiac	Surgical	Procedures	explode	all	trees	 10154	
#10	 MeSH	descriptor	Thoracic	Surgery	explode	all	trees	 153	
#11	 MeSH	descriptor	Vascular	Surgical	Procedures	explode	all	trees	 10816	
#12	 MeSH	descriptor	Surgery,	Plastic	explode	all	trees	 96	
#13	 MeSH	descriptor	Surgery,	Oral	explode	all	trees	 133	
#14	 MeSH	descriptor	Ophthalmology	explode	all	trees	 80	
#15	 MeSH	descriptor	Urology	explode	all	trees	 59	
#16	 MeSH	descriptor	Otolaryngology	explode	all	trees	 40	
#17	 MeSH	descriptor	Reoperation	explode	all	trees	 1361	
#18	 MeSH	descriptor	Medical	Audit	explode	all	trees	 234	
#19	 MeSH	descriptor	Medical	Errors	explode	all	trees	 1979	
#20	 MeSH	descriptor	Diagnostic	Errors	explode	all	trees	 2D317	
#21	 MeSH	descriptor	Iatrogenic	Disease	explode	all	trees	 62	
#22	 MeSH	descriptor	Patient	Safety	explode	all	trees	 5	
#23	 MeSH	descriptor	Malpractice	explode	all	trees	 15	
#24	 (#1	OR	#2	OR	#3	OR	#4	OR	(	#5	AND	PR	AND	#6	)	OR	#7	OR	(	#8	AND	0R#9	)	OR	#10	OR	#11	OR	#12	OR	#13	OR	#14	OR	#15	OR	#16)	 86682	
#25	 (#17	OR	#18	OR	#19	OR	#20	OR	#21	OR	#22	OR	#23)	 4212	
#26	 (#24	AND	#25)	 1617	
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9.16 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies	9.16.1 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Structure	-	Staff	factors	(part	1)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Sorelli	PG	
2008	
Ann	R	Coll	
Surg	Engl	
UK	
2004-2005	
Inpatient	
General	surgery	
To	
discharge	
Decrease	delay	and	decrease	length	
of	stay	for	emergency	general	surgery	
patients	
Cohort	study	 Dedicated	emergency	
consultant	surgeon	
• Control	n=	798,	vs.	intervention	n=824		
• Increase	in	early	(within	48	h)	discharges	from	
327/798	(41%)	to	436/824(53%)	(p<	0.001).	
	
1622	
Dang	D	
2002	
Heart	Lung	
1994-1996	
USA	
ICU	
Vascular	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	post	abdominal	
aortic	surgery	
Cohort	study*	
(Comparative	study)	
Increasing	ITU	nurses	 • Low	intensity	nurse	staffing:	Increased	rate	of	
respiratory	complications	OR*	2.33	(95%CI*	
1.50-3.60)	
• Increased	cardiac	complications	OR	1.78	(95%CI	
1.16-2.72)	
• Other	complications	OR	1.74	(95%CI	1.15-2.63)	
2606	
Provonost	P	
1999	
JAMA	
1994-1996	
USA	
ICU		
Vascular	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	post	abdominal	
aortic	aneurysm	
Cohort	study*	
(Comparative	study)	
Daily	ITU	physician	
rounds	
• Control	(no	daily	round)	vs.	intervention,	
control	increased	risk	of	in-hospital	mortality	
OR	3.0	(95%CI	1.9-4.9)	
• Control	vs.	intervention	surgical	complication	
OR	1.5	(95%	CI	0.8-2.0)	
• Cardiac	complication	OR	1.4	(95%CI	0.5-7.8)	
• Septic	complication	OR	1.8	(1.2-7.0)	(p<0.05)	
2987	
Dimick	JB	
2001	
Crit	Care	
Med	
1994-1998	
USA	
ICU	
Upper	
gastrointestinal	
surgery	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	post	oesophageal	
resection	
Cohort	study*	
(Comparative	study)	
Daily	ITU	physician	
rounds	
• Control	vs.	intervention	adjusted	increase	in	
length	of	stay	7	days	(95%CI	1-15)	(p=0.012	
• Adjusted	in-hospital	mortality	rate	1.5	(95%CI	
1.3-28.3)	
• Surgical	complications	control	15%	(n=169)	vs.	
intervention	5%	(n=182)	OR	3.3(95%	CI	1.5-7.4)	
(p=0.003)	
• Post-operative	infection	control	5%	vs.	
intervention	4%;	OR	1.2	(95%	CI	0.4-3.5)	
• Septic	complication	control	5%	vs.	intervention	
2	OR	2.2	(95%	CI	0.7-7.5)	
• Cardiac	complications	control	15%	vs.	
intervention	15%	OR	1.0	(95%	CI	0.5-1.7)		
Respiratory	tract	infection	control	14%	vs.	
intervention	8%,	OR	2.0	(95%	CI	1.04-	
4.0)	(p=0.053)	
366	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval		 	
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9.16.2 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Structure	-	Staff	factors	(part	2)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	sub-
specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Amaravadi	
RK	
2000	
Intensive	
Care	Med	
1994-
1998	
USA	
ICU	
Upper	
gastrointestinal	
surgery	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	
post	oesophageal	
resection	
Cohort	study*	
(Comparative	
study)	
Increasing	ITU	
nurses	at	night	
• Control	(n=128)(Nurse	to	patient	<1:2)	vs.	
intervention	(n=225)	(>1:2)	
• Control	group	39%	increase	in	median	LOS	(95%CI	
19-61%)	(p<0.001),	adjusted	for		other	predictors	
39%	increase	LOS	(95%CI	-8	to	109%)	p=0.11)	
• Adjusted	in-hospital	mortality	OR	0.7	(95%CI	0.3-
2.0)		
• Respiratory	tract	infection	control	8%	vs.	
intervention	16%	OR	2.4	(1.2-4.7)	(p=0.012)	
• Post-operative	infection	control	4%	intervention	
5.5%	OR	1.4(0.5-3.8)	(p=0.5)	
• Septic	complication	control	1.8%	vs.	intervention	
6.2%	OR	3.7	(1.1-12.5)	(p=0.04)	
	
366	
Dimick	JB	
Am	J	Crit	
Care	
2001	
	
1994-
1998	
USA	
ICU	
Hepatobiliary	
surgery	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	
post	hepatectomy	
Cohort	study*	
(Comparative	
study)	
Increasing	ITU	
nurses	at	night	
• LOS	control	(n=240)	(nurse	with	3+patients)	median	
LOS	8(6-12)	vs.	intervention	(n=316)	(nurse:	patient	
1:1/1:2)	median	LOS	7	(6-10)	(p>0.05/NS)	
• Univariate	analysis		
• In	hospital	mortality,	control	OR	0.49(95%CI	0.18-
1.29)	
• Increased	LOS	control	OR	0.67	(-0.80	to	0.93)	
• Respiratory	tract	infection	control	OR	1.4	(0.6-3.5)	
(p=0.40)	
• Post-operative	infection:	control	2.9%	vs.	
intervention	3.	(p=0.96)	
• Septic	complication	control	2.7%	vs.	intervention	
5.4%	(p=0.27)	
569	
Hanson	C	
1999	
Crit	Care	
Med	
1994-
1995	
USA	
ICU	
General	surgery	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	 Cohort	study	 ITU	physician	input	
for	surgical	
patients	
• LOS	control:	23.6	(+/-2.3)	vs.	intervention	20.3	(+/-
2.0)	(p<0.05)	
• Number	of	complications/ICU	stay	control	1.7	(+/-
0.3)	vs.	intervention	0.5	(+/-0.1)	(<0.01)	
• In	hospital	mortality	control	6/100	vs.	intervention	
4/100	(NS)	
200	
Ghaferi	AA	
2010	
J	Am	Coll	Su	
2000-
2006	
USA	
Inpatient	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Reduce	failure	to	
rescue	
	
Cohort	study*	 Nurse	to	patient	
ratio	
	
• Increased	nurse	to	patient	ratios		were	associated	
with	reduced	failure	to	rescue	(OR	0.94,	95%CI	0.89	
to	0.99)	
16,900	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.3 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Structure	-	Staff	factors	(part	3)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	
setting/	sub-
specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Carthon	
JM	
2012	
J	Am	
Geriatr	
Soc.	
	
2006-
2007	
USA	
Inpatient	
Surgery	
30	days	 Nursing	levels	and	
surgical	outcome	
Cohort	study	 Nurse	to	
patient	ratio	
• One	additional	patient	per	nurse	was	associated	with	higher	30-day	
mortality	rate	OR	=	1.03,	95%CI	1.01-40.5	
548,397	
Kovner	C	
1998	
Image	J	
Nurs	Sch	
	
1993	
USA	
Inpatient	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Do	nursing	levels	
reduce	adverse	
events	after	surgery	
Cohort	
study*	
(correlation	
study)	
Nurse	to	
patient	ratio	
• Relationship	between	full	time	nurses	per	adjusted	patient	day	and	UTI	
post-surgery	-636.96	(95%CI	-852.78	to	-4721.15)(p<0.001)	
• Relationship	between	full	time	nurses	per	adjusted	patient	day	and	
pneumonia	-159.41	(95%CI	-252.67	to	-66.16)	(p=<0.001)	
• Relationship	between	full	time	nurses	per	adjusted	patient	day	and	
thrombosis	-33.22	(95%CI	-57.76		to	-8.68)(p<0.01)	
	
Not	
stated	
Kovner	C	
2002	
Health	
Serv	Res	
	
1990-
1996	
USA	
Inpatient	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Do	nursing	levels	
improve	post-
operative	outcome	
Cohort	
study*	
(correlation	
study)	
Nurse	to	
patient	ratio	
• Regression	Coefficient	full	time	nurses	per	adjusted	patient	day	and	
UTI:	beta	-0.0064(SE0.005)(not	significant)	
• Regression	Coefficient	full	time	nurses	per	adjusted	patient	day	and	
pneumonia:	beta	-0.0169	(0.0077)	(p<0.05)	
• Regression	Coefficient	full	time	nurses	per	adjusted	patient	day	and	
thrombosis:	beta	-0.0002(0.0082)	(not	significant)	Regression	
Coefficient	intern	hours	per	adjusted	patient	day	and	UTI:	beta	
0.0009(0.0114)	(not	significant)	
• Regression	Coefficient			intern	hours	per	adjusted	patient	day	and	
pneumonia:	beta	0.0427(0.0177)	(p<0.05)	
• Regression	Coefficient			intern	hours	per	adjusted	patient	day	and	
thrombosis:	beta	0.1004(0.0294)	(p<0.01)	
	
Not	
stated	
Cho	SH	
2003	
Nurs	Res	
	
Korea	 Inpatient	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Do	nursing	levels	
improve	post-
operative	outcome	
Cohort	study*	
(correlation	
study)	
Nurse	to	patient	
ratio	
• Adjusted	OR	for	RN	hours	for	odds	of	fall:	1.07	(95%CI	0.96-1.19)	
• Adjusted	OR	for	RN	hours	for	odds	of	pressure	ulcer:	1.11	(95%CI	0.97-1.27)	
• Adjusted	OR	for	RN	hours	for	odds	of	adverse	drug	event:	1.01	(95%CI	0.92-1.11)	
• Adjusted	OR	for	RN	hours	for	odds	of	pneumonia:	0.91	(95%CI	0.85-0.97)	(p<0.01)	
• Adjusted	OR	for	RN	hours	for	odds	of	UTI:	1.01(95%CI	0.93-1.08)	
• Adjusted	OR	for	RN	hours	for	odds	of	wound	infection:	0.97	(95%CI	0.91-1.04)	
• Adjusted	OR	for	RN	hours	for	odds	of	sepsis:	1.02	(95%CI	0.95-1.09)	
124,204	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval		 	
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9.16.4 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Structure	-	Staff	factors	(part	4)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Thomas	M	
2012	
Ann	
Thorac	
Surg	
	
2007-
2009	
USA	
Inpatient	
Thoracic	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Does	surgical	workload	affect	
outcome	post	pulmonary	
resection?	
	
Cohort	
study*	
(correlation	
study)	
Surgeon	
operative	
workload	
• Multivariate	analysis	increased	operating	hours	predicted	
complications:	increased	odds	of	complication	per	extra	
hour	worked	OR	1.036	(95%CI	1.000-1.073)	(p=0.03)	
• Increased	operating	hours	predicted	LOS:	average	
increase	0.16	days	for	each	operating	hour	(p=0.006)	
481	
Sochalski	J	
2008	
Med	care	
1993-
1991	
USA	
Inpatient	
Multicentre	
Surgery	(and	
Medicine)	
30	days	 Do	increases	in	medical	
surgical	nursing	levels	cause	
improvements	in	patient	
outcomes	
Case-control	 Nursing	staff	
levels	
• Linear	probability	regression	model	with	fixed	effects	and	
linear	splines	
• Acute	MI	mortality	declined	-	0.71	(0.34)	(p<0.05)	
percentage	points	for	hospitals	with	more	than	7	patients	
per	nurse	and	-0.19	(0.11)	(p=NS)	percentage	points	in	
hospitals	with	more	than	4	patients	per	nurse.		
• Failure	to	rescue	declined	-	0.08	(0.66)	(p=NS)	for	
hospitals	with	more	than	7	patients	per	nurse	and	
0.10(0.21)	(P	=	NS)	percentage	points	in	hospitals	with	
more	than	4	patients	per	nurse.	
	
109,066	
Rosen	AK	
2009	
Medical	
Care	
2000-
2005	
USA	
Inpatients,	
multi-centre	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Do	duty	hour	regulations	
improve	patient	safety	
indicator	rates	
Cohort	study	 Duty	hour	
reform		
• Medicare	and	VA	hospitals	studied.	More	vs.	less	teaching	
hospitals	studied	
• Continuity	of	care	event:	VA	OR	related	to	resident/bed	
1.08(0.69-1.70)	
• Continuity	of	care	event:	Medicare	OR	related	to	
resident/bed	0.95(0.85-1.07)	
• Technical	care	event:	VA	related	to	resident/bed	OR	1.02	
(0.72-1.44)	
• Technical	care	event:	Medicare	related	to	resident/bed	
OR	1.12(1.01-1.025)	(p=0.03)	
• 	
985,664	
Aiken	
LH	
2003	
JAMA	
1998-
1999	
USA	
Ward	
Surgery	
30	days	 Reducing	mortality	and	failure	
to	rescue	
Cohort	study	 Educational	
level	of	RNs	
RNs:	with	bachelor’s	degree	or	higher	ranged	from	0%	to	77%	across	
the	hospitals.		
• After	adjusting	for	variables:	10%	increase	in	the	RNS	with	
bachelor’s	degree	was	associated	with	a	5%	decrease	in	
mortality	within	30	days	of	admission,	OR	0.9	(95%CI	
0.91-0.99)	(p=0.008)	
• Failure	to	rescue	OR	0.95;	(95%	CI	0.91–0.99)	(p=0.02)	
342	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval		 	
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9.16.5 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Structure	–	Sub-specialisation	(part	1)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Snow	BW	
1996	
Pediatrics	
USA	 Inpatient	
Paediatric	
Urology	
	
10	days	 Improve	paediatric	urology	
outcome	
Cohort	study	 Sub-
specialization	
• LOS	control	(n=48):	mean	3.52	days	(no	SD	given)	vs.	
intervention	(n=136)	2.73	(p=0.00002)	
• Complications	control:	6/48	(12.5%)	vs.	intervention	
10/136	(7.35%)	(Not	significant)	
• 	
184	
Tu	JV	
2001	
J	Vasc	Surg	
	
1992-
1996	
Canada	
Inpatient	
Vascular	
30	days		 Improve	elective	
abdominal	aortic	
aneurysm	surgery	
outcome	
	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Sub-
specialization	
• After	adjusting	for	confounders	including	volume	control	
group	i.e.	non-specialist:	increased	odds	ratio	for	
mortality	1.62	(95%CI	1.18-2.23),	(p=0.003	
5,878	
Zorcolo	L	
2003	
Dis	Colon	
Rectum	
	
1990-
2000	
UK	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
30	days	 Improve	outcome	for	
emergency	colorectal	
surgery	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Sub-
specialization	
• Systemic	complications:	control	36/115	(31%)	vs.	
intervention	61/221	(28%)	(p=0.5)	
• Anastomotic	leak:	control	2/115	(5%)	vs.	intervention	
7/221	(5%)	(p=1)	
• Wound	infection:	control	19/115	(16%)	vs.	intervention	
15/221	(7%)	(p=0.007)	
• Other	surgical	complications:	control	7/115	(6%)	vs.	
intervention	10/221	(5%)	(p=0.6)	
• Morbidity	rate	control:	115	24.3%	vs.	intervention	221	
14.5%		
• Mortality	rate	control:	20/115	(17.4%)	vs.	intervention	
23/221	(10.4%)	(p=0.08)	
• 	
342	
Heldenberg	E	
2004	
Isr	Med	
Assoc	J	
	
1991-
1996	
Israel	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
12-90	
months	
Improve	outcome	post-
surgery	for	rectal	cancer		
Cohort	study	 Sub-
specialization	
• Early	complications	control:	42/54	(78%)	vs.	intervention	
15/21	(71%)	
• Strictures:	control	2	(5%)	vs.	intervention	4	(27%)	
(p<0.05)	
• Local	recurrence:	control	14(35%)	vs.	1	(7%)	(p=<0.05)	
• Systemic	recurrence:	control	8	(20%)	vs.	intervention	3	
(20%)	
• (only	15	of	intervention	and	40	of	control	were	followed	
up	for	strictures	and	recurrences)	
• 	
75	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval		 	
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9.16.6 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Structure	–	Sub-specialisation	(part	2)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	
design	
Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Biondo	S	
2010	
Arch	Surg	
	
1993-2006	
Spain	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	post	
emergency	colorectal	resection	
	
Cohort	
study	
Sub-specialization	 • Control	mean	number	of	ops	per	surgeon	22.6	
(SD22.8)	vs.	intervention	46.0	(SD	56.0)	(p=0.12)	
• Morbidity	rate	control	410/	678	(60.5%)	vs.	
intervention	192/368	(52.2%)	(p=0.01)	
• Anastomotic	dehiscence	control:	54	/446	(12.1%)	vs.	
intervention	17/274	(6.2%)	(p=0.01)	
• Re-operation:	control	98/678	(14.5%)	vs.	
intervention	54/368	(14.7%)	(p=0.92)	
• Mortality	control:	192/678	(28.3%)	vs.	intervention	
66/368	(17.9%)	(p<0.001)	
• Median	LOS	control	16	(4-235)	vs.	intervention	16	
(5-153)	(p=0.91)	
• 	
1046	
Smith	JA	
2003	
Br	J	Surg	
1991-1994	
UK	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
5	years	 Increasing	outcome	for	surgical	
management	in	colorectal	
cancer	
Cohort	
study	
Specialization	 Specialists	vs.	non-specialists	
• Lower	postoperative	mortality	rate	(odds	ratio	0·67	
(95%	Confidence	Interval	0·53	to	0·84))	
• Lower	anastomotic	leak	rates	(odds	ratio	0·46	(95%	
Confidence	interval	0·31	to	0·66))	
• Higher	local	recurrence-free	survival	(hazard	ratio	
0·56	(0·44	to	0·71))		
• Better	long-term	survival	(hazard	ratio	0·76	(95%	
Confidence	interval	0·71	to	0·83))	
• 	
5173	
Sitzler	PJ	
2005	
Colorectal	
Dis	
	
1994-1999	
Australia	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
Not	stated	 Reducing	length	of	stay.	 Case	
control	
Specialty	colorectal	
surgery	unit	
The	groups	well	matched	with	respect	to	age,	sex,	pathological	
staging	and	elective	vs.	urgent	surgery.		
• Postoperative	length	of	stay	shorter	for	specialty	
cohort	(9	vs.	12	days	(not	clear	whether	
mean/median),	p	=	0.01)		
• Mortality(?30	day)	control	3/106	vs.	intervention	
4/100	(p=0.95)	
• Major	complications	control	12/106	vs.	intervention	
8/100	(p=0.89)	
• Minor	complications	control	36/106	vs.	intervention	
16/100	(p<0.0001)	
	
206	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	 	
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9.16.7 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Structure	–	Sub-specialisation	(part	3)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	sub-
specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	
design	
Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Di	Carlo	
2001	
Dis	Colon	
Rectum	
1975-1995	
Canada	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
To	
discharge	
Improving	outcomes	in	
diverticular	fistulas	
Cohort	
study	
Specialization	 • Preoperative	LOS	median	intervention	3	(range,	
1-28)	days	vs.	control	8	(range,	0-29)	days;	p	<	
0.001,		
• Postoperative	LOS	median	intervention	11	
(range,	5-40)	days	vs.	control	14	(range,	2-80)	
days;	p	=	0.001	
• Total	LOS	median	intervention	14	(range,	6-62)	
days	vs.	control	24	(range,	6-100)	days;	p	<	0.001.		
• Rate	of	wound	infections	intervention	2/37(5.4%)	
vs.	control	11/85	(12.9%)	(p=0.34)	
• Complications:	intervention	27%	vs.	control	
41.2%	(p=0.14)	
	
122	
Ashkan	K	
2003	
Ann	RCS	
(Eng.)	
1996-2000	
UK	
Inpatient	
Neurosurgery	
18	month	 Improving	length	of	stay	for	
intracranial	aneurysm	
patients	
	
Cohort	
study	
Sub-Specialization	 • Morbidity	control	54/68	vs.	intervention	27/69	
• Mortality	control	4/68	vs.	intervention	3/69	
• LOS	median	control	17days	(6-57)	vs.	
intervention	13days	(5-30)	(p	=	0.002).	
	
137	
Agada	FO	
2004	
Clin	
Otolaryngol	
2001-2008	
UK	
Inpatient	
Thyroid	
6	months	 Reduce	iatrogenic	events	in	
thyroid	cancer	surgery	
Cohort	
study	
Sub	specialization	for	
thyroid	disease	
• Recurrent	laryngeal	nerve	palsy	rate	3/39	control	
vs.	intervention	0/108	
• Haematoma	rates	control	2/39	(5%)	vs.	
intervention	2/108	(2%)		
• Permanent	hypo-parathyroidism	rates	control	
3/13	(8%)	vs.	intervention	1/56	(2%).		
147	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval		 	
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9.16.7.1 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Structure	–	Benchmarking/audit	(part	1)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	
design	
Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Sandblom	
G	
2000	
Eur	J	Surg	
1984-
1997	
Sweden	
Theatre	
General	
surgery	
3	years	 Reducing	recurrence	rate	after	hernia	
surgery	
Cohort	
study	
Benchmarking	and	
auditing	surgeons	on	their	
outcomes	
• The	recurrence	rate:	control	(1984):	13%	
vs.	intervention	(1994):	0%	
• The	cumulative	reoperation	rate	for	
recurrence	at	three	years	was	10.8%	(95%,	
CI:	9.3	to	12.2%)	1986–1988	
• 1986–1988	vs.	1992–1997		(p	<	0.001)		
Mean	hospital	stay:	control:	3.5	days	vs.	intervention	
0.9	days		(no	SDs	given)	
1,232	
Morton	J	
2006	
Surg	
Endosc	
1999-
2001	
USA	
Inpatient	
Upper	GI	
To	
discharge	
Is	submitting	data	to	a	voluntary	
associated	with	improved	outcomes	
compared	to	national	datasets	
Cohort	
study	
SAGES	outcome	project	 • Intervention	group	had	a	higher	rate	of	
teaching	hospital	affiliation	(71	vs.	48%,	p	<	
0.001).		
• Intervention	fundoplications:	higher	rate	of	
comorbidities,	including	Barrett	
oesophagus	(2.3	vs.	1.1%,	p	=	0.005		
• Total	Complications:	control	(n=9952)	8.9%	
vs.	intervention	(n=579)	7.3%	intervention		
• Wound	infection	control	0.8%	vs.	
intervention	0.7%	(NS)	
• Median	LOS:	control	2	vs.	intervention	2	
(no	SD	given	(p>0.05)	
• Mortality	control	0.48%	vs.	intervention	0%	
(p=0.1)	
• 	
100,131	
Khuri	SF	
2008	
Ann	Surg	
2001-
2004	
USA	
Inpatient	
Multisite	
General	
Surgery	and	
Vascular	
	
30	days	 What	is	the	effect	of	implementing	
NSQIP	to	the	private	sector	
Case-
control	
NSQIP	 • Postoperative	total	morbidity	control	
14.47%	vs.	intervention	13.21%	(p	=	0.002)	
• Surgical	site	infections	control	9.53%	vs.	
intervention	8.66%	(p=0.02)	
• Renal	complications	control	1.52%	vs.	
intervention	1.16%	(p	=0.004)	
• Mortality	control	2.20%	vs.	intervention	
2.19%	(p=0.34)	
• 	
54,450	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.8 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Structure	–	Benchmarking/audit	(part	2)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	country		 Study	setting/	sub-
specialty	
Study	Length	 Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Hall	BL	
2009	
Ann	
Surg.	
2005-
2007	
USA	
Inpatient	
Surgery	
30	days	 Improve	post-operative	
mortality	and	morbidity		
Retrospective	
cohort		
NSQIP	 For	118	hospitals	post	NSQIP:(2006–2007),		
• 66%	of	hospitals	improved	risk-	adjusted	mortality	(mean	
O/E	improvement:	0.174;	P	<	0.05)		
• 82%	improved	risk	adjusted	complication	rates	(mean	
improvement:	0.114;	P	<0.05).		
• The	mean	absolute	change	in	O/E	was	improvement	of	-
0.114	for	morbidity,	-0.174	for	mortality.	
• 	
300,251	
	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.9 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–	Care	Pathway	(part	1)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Tan	JJ		
2005	
Asian	J	Surg	
	
2000-2001	
Singapore	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
30	day	 Reduce	post	op	morbidity,	
length	of	stay	and	readmission	
rates	
	
Retrospective	
cohort	
Care	
pathway	
• Post-operative	morbidity	control	(n	=204)	
33%	vs.	intervention	(n=204)	20%	
(p=0.003)	
• Readmission	rate	control	13%	vs.	
intervention	6%	(p=0.02)	
• Mean	LOS	control	12.1	vs.	intervention	
10.4	days	(p=0.105),	(no	exact	figures	
given)	
• Re-admission:	control	13%	vs.	
intervention	6%	(p=0.029)		
	
408	
Westvik	HH	
2006	
J	Surg	Res	
	
1991-2002	
USA	
Inpatient	Vascular	 To	
discharge	
What	factors	decrease	post	op	
complications	post	carotid	
endarterectomy	
	
Retrospective	
cohort	
Care	
pathway	
• Logistic	regression:	Perioperative	stroke:	
Having	no	critical	care	pathway:	p=0.038,	
OR	1.39	95%	CI	(1.02-1.90)	
• Logistic	regression:	Perioperative	cardiac	
complications:	p=0.001	OR,	1.50	95%	CI	
1.19-1.89	
14,288	
Muehling	BM	
2008	
Eur	J	
Cardiothoracic	
Surg	
	
Not	stated	
Germany	
Inpatient	
Thoracic	
To	
discharge	
To	decrease	morbidity	and	
mortality	post	lung	resection	
Randomised	
controlled	trial	
Care	
pathway	
• Pulmonary	complication	control	10/28	
(36%),	trial:	2/30	(7%)	p=0.009	
• Subgroup	FEV1<75%	control	group	
postoperative	complications	5/9	(56%)	
vs.	1/13	(8%)	p=0.023	
• Median	LOS	control	11(7-34)	trial	11	(8-
33)	
58	
Muller	MK	
2009	
Langenbecks	
Arch	Surg	
	
Not	stated	
Switzerland	
Inpatient		
General	surgery	
30	day	 Reduce	post-operative	
morbidity	after	three	routine	
operations	
	
Cohort		
(retrospective	
control)	
Care	
pathway	
• Complication	rate:	case	7%	vs.	control	
14%	p=0.07	
• Mean	LOS	control	7.6	vs.	case	5.8		
(p<0.001)	
• 	
485	
Parrado	CL	
2008	
Qual	Manag	
Health	Care	
	
2000-2005	
Spain	
Inpatient	
Urology	
1	year	 Outcome	after	laparoscopic	
radical	prostatectomy	
	
Retrospective	
Cohort	
Care	
pathway	
• Mean	LOS	control	4.82	(3.34);	
intervention	3.91	(1.01)	95%	CI	(2.26,	
0.48)	Not	significant	
• Complications	16%	control,	10%	
intervention	(95%	CI	for	the	difference	
24.8,	13.8)	
86	
Trussell	J	
2008	
Am	J	Surg	
Not	stated	
USA	
Inpatient		
Cardiothoracic	
Not	
stated	
Reducing	post	op	surgical	site	
infection	
Retrospective	
cohort	
Care	
pathway	
• Infection	rate	control	3.5%;	intervention	
1.5%	(p=0.001	OR=2.1)	(no	exact	figures	
given)	
1482	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval		
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9.16.10 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–	Care	Pathway	(part	2)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	
Of	
Pts.	
Lee	BT	
2008	
J	Am	Coll	
Surg	
	
2005-2008	
USA	
Inpatient	
Breast	Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Reduce	post	op	
complications	and	length	of	
stay	
Retrospective	cohort	 Care	
pathway	
• Unilateral	reconstruction	cohort:	Mean	LOS:		
case	4.2	(95%	CI	3.8-4.6)	intervention	4.3	
(3.7-4.8)	p=0.332	
• Bilateral	reconstruction	cohort	Mean	LOS	
Case	4.7	(95%	CI	4.4-5.0)	intervention	4.2	
(3.8-4.6)	p=0.095	
• Unilateral	Infection	rate:	case	1/50	
intervention	2/25	
• Bilateral	infection	rate:	case	3/50	
intervention	3/1	
• No	significant	difference	(other	NS	
complications	listed)	
150	
Stephen	AE	
2003	
Surgery	
1997-2000	
USA	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
To	
discharge	
Reduce	length	of	stay	and	
complications	
Cohort	 Care	
pathway	
• Mean	LOS:	control	6.6	(SD	3.3),	intervention:	
3.7	(SD	1.5)	p=<0.001	
• Mean	LOS	with	readmissions	control	6.9	(SD	
4.1)	intervention	4.2	(SD	2.8)	p=	<0.001	
• Complications	control	13	(25%)	intervention:	
10	(12%)	p=0.058	
138	
Kariv	Y	
2007	
Dis	Colon	
Rectum	
	
2000-2004	
USA	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
19	months	 Improve	outcome	after	ileal	
pouch-anal	anastomosis	
Cohort	(prospective	database	
looked	at	retrospectively)	
Care	
pathway	
• Median	LOS	control:	5	vs.	intervention	4	
(p=0.012)	(IQR	not	given)	
• Median	LOS	including	re-admission	control	5	
vs.	intervention	5	(p=0.071)	(IQR	not	given)	
• Reoperation	rate	control	10/97	vs.	
intervention	9/97	(p=0.8)	
• Wound	infection	control	7/95	vs.	intervention	
3/95	(p=0.19)	
• Anastomotic	leak:	control	18/95	vs.	
intervention	25/95	(p=0.58)	
• (Other	complication	data	available)		
194	
Raue	W	
2004	
Surg	
Endosc	
2001-2003	
Germany	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
30	days	 Improve	outcome	after	
laparoscopic	
sigmoidectomy	
	
Prospective	cohort	 Care	
pathway	
• Median	LOS	control:	7	(4-14)	vs.	intervention:	
4	(3-6)	(p=<0.01)	
• Local	infection:	control	3/29	(11%);	
intervention	0/23	
52	
	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	 	
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9.16.11 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–	Care	Pathway	(part	3)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Teeuwen	PH	
2010	
J	Gastrointest	
Surg	
	
2003-2008	
Netherlands	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
30	day	 Improve	outcome	for	
colorectal	surgery	
Cohort	(historical	
matched	controls)	
Care	
pathway	
• Median	LOS	control:	9(3-138)	vs.	intervention	
6	(3-50)	(p=0.021)	
• Median	readmissions	control	1.6%	(2/122)	vs.	
intervention	3.3	(2/61)	(p=0.60)	
• Reoperation:	control	17.2%	(21/122)	vs.	
intervention	14.8%	(9/61)	(p=0.83)	
• 30	day	mortality	control	1.6%	(2/122)	vs.	
intervention	0/61	(p=0.55)	
• Complications	control	63/122	vs.	intervention	
12/61	(p=<0.01)	
	
183	
Polle	SW	
2007	
Dig	Surg	
	
2003-2005	
Netherlands	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
30	day	 Improve	outcome	for	
colorectal	surgery	
Cohort	(historical	
control)	
Care	
pathway	
• Morbidity	control	16/52	(30.8%)	vs.	
intervention	15/55	(27.3%)	(p=0.831)	
• Major	complications	control;:	8/52	(15.4%)	vs.	
intervention	8/55	(24.6%)	p=1.000	
• Minor	complications	control	8/52	(15.4%)	vs.	
intervention	7/55	12.7%)	p=0.784	
• Reoperation	control:	5/52	(9.6%)	vs.	
intervention	7/55	(12.7%)	p=0.516	
• Median	LOS	control	6.0	(2-36)	vs.	intervention	
4.0	(2-33)	p=0.002	
• Median	LOS	including	readmissions	control	
6.5	(2-36)	vs.	intervention	4.0	(2-33)	p=0.027		
• 	
107	
Ren	L	
2012	
World	J	Surg	
	
2007-2010	
China	
Inpatient		
Colorectal	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	for	
colorectal	cancer	
resection	
Randomised	
controlled	trial	
Care	
Pathway	
• Post-operative	complications	control:	28/298	
(9.4%)	intervention	29/299	(9.7%)	(p=0.900)	
• Mean	LOS:	control	6.6	(+/-2.4)	vs.	intervention	
5.7	(+/-1.6)	p<0.001	
597	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	 	
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9.16.12 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–	Care	Pathway	(part	4)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts.	
Holtzman	J	
1998	
Med	Care	
	
1992-1995	
USA	
Inpatient	
Renal	Transplant	
30	day	 Improve	outcome	for	renal	
transplant		
Prospective	
Cohort		
Care	
Pathway	
• Mean	LOS	cadaveric	kidney	recipients:	control	
17.5	(SD	14.9)	vs.	intervention	11.8	(SD	11.8)	
(p=0.008)	
• Complications	or	infections	control:	57.1%	vs.	
intervention	18.5%	p<0.001	
• Mean	LOS	live	donor	transplants:	control	11.2	(SD	
8.7)	vs.	intervention	10.5	(SD	5.6)	non-significant	
• Complications	or	infection	24.5%	vs.	intervention	
28.6%	non-significant		
• 	
348	
Stanley	AC	
1998	
J	Vasc	Surg	
	
1994-1997	
USA	
Inpatient	
Vascular	
6	months	 Improve	outcome	after	infra-
inguinal	bypass	
	
Retrospective	
cohort	
Care	
Pathway	
• Complications	control:	8%	vs.	intervention	16	%	
(p=0.13)	
• Median	LOS	control:	9	(3-40)	vs.	intervention	7	(2-
37)	(p=0.02)	
Six	month	mortality	control	3%	vs.	intervention	4%	(p=0.9)	
136	
Leibman	
BD	
1998	
Urology	
	
1994-1997	
USA	
Inpatient	
Urology	
7	day	 Improve	outcome	after	radical	
retropubic	prostatectomy	
	
Retrospective	
cohort	
Care	
Pathway	
• Mean	LOS	control	5.83	vs.	intervention	4.04		(no	
SD	given)	(p<0.05)	
• 	Reoperation	rate	0	
• Wound	infection	control:	0/75	vs.	intervention	
2/668	(p=1.00)	
743	
Chang	PL	
1999	
J	Urol		
	
1996-1998	
China	
Inpatient	Urology	 To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	post	
urological	surgery	
Cohort	 Care	
Pathway	
• Mean	LOS	control	5.5	(no	SD)	vs.	intervention	4.9	
(no	SD	given)	(p=<0.01)	
• Complications	control	18	(1.4%)	vs.	intervention	7	
(0.5%)	(p=0.02)	
• Readmissions	control	17(1.3%)	vs.	intervention	11	
(0.8%)	(p=0.18)	
• 	
2661	
Pearson	S	
2000	
Aust	N	Z	J	
Surg	
	
1996-1998	
Australia	
Inpatient	
Orthopaedic	
6	months	 Improve	outcome	post	total	
knee	arthroplasty	
Retrospective	
cohort	
Care	
Pathway	
• Median	LOS	control	9	vs.	intervention	7	
(p<0.0001)	
• Complications	control:	15/58	(25.9%)	vs.	30/119	
(25.2%)	(Not	significant)	
• Readmissions	control:	17.5%	vs.	intervention	9.2%	
(Not	significant)	
• 	
	
177	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.13 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–	Care	Pathway	(part	5)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	sub-
specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	
Of	
Pts.	
Vitaz	TW	
2001	
J	Spinal	Disord	
	
1996	
USA	
Inpatient	
Neurosurgery	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	post	spinal	
cord	injury	
Cohort	 Care	
Pathway	
• Pneumonia	control:	35	vs.	intervention	
40,	p=0.05	
• Overall	LOS	35.9	(+/-16.7)	vs.	
intervention	24.2.	(+/-	13.5)	p<0.05	
40	
Chang	SS	
2002	
J	Urol	
	
1990-2001	
USA	
Inpatient	
Urology	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	post	
retroperitoneal	lymph	node	
dissection	
	
Retrospective	
cohort	
Care	
Pathway	
• Mean	LOS:	control	6.4	vs.	intervention	
4.2	(p=0.0001)	(No	SD	given)	
• Complications	control	14/46	(30%)	vs.	
intervention	10/72	(14%)	(p=0.036)	
• 	
118	
Choong	PF	
2000	
Med	J	Aust	
	
1997-1998	
Australia	
Inpatient	
Orthopaedic	
28	days	 Improve	outcome	post	fractured	
neck	of	femur	
	
Prospective	cohort	 Care	
Pathway	
• Mean	LOS	control	8.0	vs.	intervention	6.6	
(p=0.03)	
• Complication	control	36%	vs.	
intervention	24%	(p=0.40)	
• Re-admission	control	11%	vs.	
intervention	4%	(p=0.28)	
111	
Tomaszek	SC	
2010	
Eur	J	
Cardiothorac	
Surg	
	
2004-2008	
USA	
Inpatient		
Upper	
gastrointestinal	
surgery	
30	days	 Improve	outcome	post	
oesophagectomy	
Retrospective	
cohort	
Care	
Pathway	
• Anastomotic	leak	rate	control:	33/276	
(12.0%)	vs.	intervention	3/110	(2.7%)	
p=0.01)	
• Median	LOS:	control	9	(4-107)	days	vs.	
intervention	7	(5-54)	days	(p<0.001)	(no	
IQR	given)	
386	
Khoo	CK	
2007	
Ann	Surg	
	
2003-2004	
UK	
Inpatient		
Colorectal	
14	days	 Improve	outcome	post	elective	
colorectal	cancer	resection	
	
Randomised	
controlled	trial	
Care	
Pathway	
• Median	LOS	control	7	(4-63)	vs.	
intervention	5	(3-37)	(p<0.001)	
• Median	LOS	including	readmission	
control	7	(4-63)	vs.	intervention	5	(3-37)	
(p<0.001)		
• Pressure	sores	control	3/35	vs.	
intervention	0/35	
• Anastomotic	leaks	control	3	(8.6%)	vs.	
intervention	1	(2.9%)	
81	
Gatt	M	
2005	
Br	J	Surg	
	
Not	stated	
UK	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
30	days	 Improve	outcome	after	
colorectal	resection	
	
Randomised	
controlled	trial	
Care	
Pathway	
• Median	LOS	control:	7.5	(6019)	vs.	
intervention	5	(4-9)	(p=0.027)	
• Complications	control:	15/20	vs.	
intervention	9/19	(p=0.076)	
39	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	 	
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9.16.14 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–	Care	Pathway	(part	6)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	sub-
specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	
Of	
Pts	
Delaney	CO		
2003	
Dis	Colon	
Rectum	
	
Not	stated	
USA	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
30	days	 Improve	outcome	after	
laparotomy	for	elective	
intestinal	resection	
	
Randomised	
controlled	trial	
Care	
Pathway	
• Mean	LOS	control	5.8	(+/-4.8),	vs.	
intervention	5.2	(+/-2.5)	(p=0.12)	
• Mean	LOS	including	readmission	control:	
7.1	(+/-4.8)	vs.	intervention	5.4	(+/-2.5)	
(p=0.022)	
• Complications:	control	10/33	(30%)	vs.	
intervention	7	(22%)	(p=0.58)	
64	
Serclova	Z	
2009	
Clin	Nutr	
	
2005-2007	
Czech	
Republic	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
30	days	 Improve	outcome	after	open	
bowel	resection	
	
Randomised	
controlled	trial	
Care	
Pathway	
• Median	LOS	10	(95%	CI	9.5-11.3)	vs.	
intervention	7	(95%	CI	7.0-7.7)	(p<0.001)		
(no	readmissions)	
• Complications	control:	25/52	(48.1%)	vs.	
intervention	11/51	(21.6%)		(p=0.003)	
105	
Muller	S	
2009	
Gastroenterology	
	
2004-2006	
Switzerland	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
30	days	 Improve	outcome	after	elective	
open	colorectal	surgery	
	
Randomised	
controlled	trial	
Care	
Pathway	
• Median	LOS	control:	9	(6-30),	vs.	
intervention	5	(2-30)	(p<0.0001)	
• Complications	control:	37/75	vs.	
intervention	16/76	(p=0.0014)	
156	
Munitiz	V	
2010	
Br	J	Surg	
	
1998-2008	
Spain	
Inpatient		
Upper	
Gastrointestinal	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Improve	outcome	after	
transthoracic	oesophagectomy	
Cohort	study	 Care	
Pathway	
• Median	LOS:	control	13	(8-106)	vs.	
intervention	9	(5-98)	(p=0.012)	
• Mortality	control	4/74	(5%)	vs.	
intervention	1/74	(`1%)	(p=0.010)	
• Overall	complications	control	28/74	(38%)	
vs.	intervention	(23/74	(31%)	(p=0.120)	
• 	
148	
Sheffield	KM	
2011	
J	Am	Coll	Surg	
	
2005-2010	
USA	
Inpatient	
General	surgery	
6	months	 Improve	outcome	for	
cholecystectomy	patients	
Cohort	study	 Care	
Pathway	
• Mean	LOS	control:	5.4	(+/-4.3)	vs.	
intervention	4.4	(+/-3.0)	(p=0.01)	
• Readmission	rate	control:	
150/455(33.0%)	vs.	intervention	11/112	
(9.8%)	(p<0.0001)	
• Complications	for	acute	cholecystectomy	
control:	41/218	(18.8%)	vs.	13/87	(14.9%)	
(p=0.42)	
567	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	 	
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9.16.15 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–	Care	Pathway	(part	7)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts	
Archibald	LH	
2011	
Dis	Colon	Rectum	
	
2006-2010	
USA	
Inpatient	
Colorectal		
30	days	 Improve	outcome	after	
colorectal	surgery	
Cohort	study	
(historical	
control)	
Care	Pathway	 • Mean	LOS	control	8.4	vs.	intervention	6.9	
(p<0.0001)	(no	SD	given)	
• Re-operation	control	105/1673	(6.3%)	vs.	
intervention	95/1358	(7.0%)	(p=0.43)	
• Readmission	control:	192/1673(11.5%)	vs.	
intervention	183/1358	(13.5%)	(p=0.11)	
1358	
Ronellenfitsch	U	
2012	
Obes	Surg	
	
2007-2009	
Germany	
Inpatient	
Bariatric	
surgery	
14	days	 Improve	outcome	after	
bariatric	surgery	
Cohort	study	
(historical	
control)	
Care	Pathway	 • Median	LOS	control:	7	(4-30)	vs.	intervention	
6	(4-14)	(p=0.007)	
• Complications:	control	7/64	(10.9%)	vs.	
intervention	6/65	(9.2%)	(p=0.98)	
129	
Weber	
2011	
European	J	
Surgical	Oncology	
2009-2010	
USA	
Inpatients	
Breast	Surgery	
30-day	 Discharge	patients	day	
1	post	op	mastectomy	
Cohort	study	 1-day	plan	MDT	led	
short	stay	protocol.	
• LOS(not	including	re-admission)	1	day	control	
9.6%	vs.	intervention	82.7%	(444/537)	
• 30-day	complication	rate	control	13/270	
(4.8%)	vs.	intervention	33/537	(6.1%)	(p=0.52)		
• Intervention	group	0.9%	had	to	be	readmitted	
(5/537),	and	1.5%	(8/537)	at-	tended	the	
urgent-care	department.		
537	
Sweeney	AB	
2002	
Postgrad	Med	J	
1983-2000	
UK	
Inpatient	
Vascular	
To	
discharge	
Reducing	length	of	stay	
for	vascular	patients	
Cohort	studies	 Integrated	care	
pathways	
• Fem-popliteal	bypass	patients	(n=28)	had	162	
pathway	variances	recorded	(mean	5.8)	
• AAA	repair	(n=12):	104	variances	(mean	8.7)	
• Carotid	endarterectomy	(n=19)	84	variances	
(mean	4.4).		
• Average	LOS	open	AAA	control	16.2	vs.	
intervention	14.8	
• Average	LOS	CE	control	9.0	vs.	intervention	
7.8	
• Average	LOS	FPB	control	17.0	vs.	10.75	
	
59	
Sarkar	
2011	
J	Trauma	
2004-2008	
USA	
Inpatient	
Trauma	
To	
discharge	
Decrease	in-hospital	
mortality	for	trauma	
patients	
Cohort	
(historical	
control)	
Safety	program	 • In-hospital	mortality	rate	for	Injury	Severity	
Score	>24:	30%	vs.	intervention	18.3%	(p	=	
0.011).		
• Age	>65	years	control	23.5%	vs.	intervention	
30.6%	in	2008	(p	=	0.0002).		
• 	
3,810529	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.16 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–	Care	Pathway	(part	8)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	
design	
Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	Pts	
Ryckman	
2009	
Jt	Comm	J	Qual	
Patient	Saf.	
2005-
2007	
USA	
Inpatient	
Paediatric	
Surgical	
30	days	 Reduce	surgical	site	
infection	
Cohort	
study	
Surgical	site	
infection-
prevention	
bundle	
• Class	I	(clean)	II	(clean	contaminated):	SSI	rate	decreased:	
control	1.5/100	procedure	days	vs.	intervention	0.54/100	
procedure	days		
• 	
Not	
stated	
McCulloch	P	
2010	
BMJ	
2007-
2008	
Ward	
General	surgery	
To	
discharge	
Can	process	
redesign	reduce	
error	
Case	
control	
series	
Care	pathway	 • Patient	safety	incidents:	control	156/607	(26%)	vs.	intervention	
152/602	(25%),	Chi	Squared=	1.502	(p=0.22)	
• 	
969	
James	
2012		
J	Bone	Joint	
Surg	Am	
1999-
2010	
USA	
Theatre	
Orthopaedics	
To	
discharge	
Reducing	wrong	
site	surgery	
Cohort	
study	
‘Sign	your	
site”	initiative	
• Wrong	site	surgery	control:	44/609,715	(0.0072%)	vs.	
intervention	27/435,382	(0.0062%).	(p	=	0.550;	Fisher	exact	
test,	two-tailed).		
• Non-spinal,	wrong	site	surgery	control:	24/568,438	(0.0042%)	
vs.	intervention	11/398,873	(0.0028%)	(p	=	0.303)	
• 	
1,291,396	
Beaupre	LA	
2006	
Qual	Safe.	
Health	Care	
1996-
2000	
Canada	
Ward	
Orthopaedics	
To	
discharge	
Reducing	morbidity	
and	inpatient	
mortality	in	elderly	
hip	fracture	pts.	
Cohort	–
control	
study	
Clinical	care	
pathway	
• Comparison	of	incidence	rates	/1000	persons	of	in	hospital	
complications	
• Post-operative	heart	failure	control	37/678	(5.46%)	vs.	
intervention	9	/663	(1.36%)	OR	0.24(95%	CI	0.11-0.50)	
(p<0.001)	
• Post-operative	cardiac	arrhythmias	control	36/678	(5.31%)	vs.	
intervention	8/663	(1.21%)	(p<0.001).	OR	0.22	(0.10-0.47)	
• Post-operative	delirium	control	51%	vs.	intervention	22%	(p<	
0.001).		
• Post-operative	pressure	ulcers:	control	22.1/678	vs.	
intervention	3.0/663	OR	0.20	(95%CI	0.06-0.70)	(p=0.002)	
• Urinary	tract	infection	control;	212.4/687	vs.	intervention	
180.0/663	OR	0.82	(95%	CI	0.63-1.07)	(p=0.13)	
• Pneumonia	control	78.2/678	vs.	intervention	87.5/663,	OR	
1.13	(95%CI	0.77-1.67)	(p=0.55)	
• Mortality	control:	52/678	(8%)	vs.	intervention	48/663	(7%)	
• Risk	adjusted	in-hospital	mortality	OR	1.1	(95%CI	0.70-1.8)	
• Median	LOS	control	22(11-48)	vs.	intervention	24(9-55)	
(p=0.33)	
Inpatient	rehabilitation	median	LOS	control	28	(14-46)	vs.	intervention	22	
(12-42)	(p=0.04)	
	
1341	
	
	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.17 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–Checklist	(part	1)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	
design	
Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	
Of	Pts	
Sewell	M	
2011	
Int	Orthop	
	
2008-2009	
UK	
Theatre	
Orthopaedics	
30	days	 Reduce	adverse	
events	in	
orthopaedic	
surgery	
Prospective	
Cohort	
study	
Increase	use	
of	WHO	
Checklist	
• Early	complications	rate	control:	8.5%	vs.	intervention	7.6%	
(RR12.2;	95%	CI	9.0-16.6)	
• Mortality	rate	control	1.9%	vs.	intervention	1.6%(RR0.88;	95%	
CI	0.34-2.26)	
• Neither	significant		
	
965	
Zavalkoff	SR	
2011	
Pediatr	Crit	
Care	Med	
	
2008	
Canada	
PICU	
Paediatric	
Cardiothoracic	
To	ITU	
discharge	
Reduce	adverse	
events	caused	by	
poor	handover	
Prospective	
cohort	
study	
Handover	
checklist	
• Cases	free	from	adverse	events	control:	1/15	(6.7%)	vs.	
intervention	5/16	(31.2%)	(p=0.1)	
31	
de	Vries	EN	
2010	
N	Engl	J	Med	
	
2007-2009	
Netherlands	
Perioperative	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Reduce	adverse	
events	in	surgery	
Prospective	
multicentre	
cohort	
study	
SURPASS	
Checklist	
• Complication	per	100	control	27.3	(95%	CI	25.9	to	28.7)	vs.	
intervention	16.7	(95%	CI	15.6	to	17.9)	absolute	risk	reduction	
of	10.6	(95%	CI	8.7	to	12.4)	(p<0.001)	
• Complication	rate	(number	patients	with	1or	more)	control	
15.4%	vs.	intervention	10.6%	(p<0.001)	
• Mortality	control:	1.5%	(95%	CI	1.2-2.0)	to	0.8%	(95%	CI0.6	to	
1.1),	absolute	risk	reduction	0.7	(95%	CI	0.2-1.2)	
• Mean	LOS	control:	9.1	vs.	intervention	8.5	(p=0.15)	(no	SD	
given)	
• 	
7580	
Askarian	M	
2011	
Qual	Manag	
Health	Care	
	
Not	stated	
Iran	
Theatre	
General	surgery	
To	
discharge	
Reduce	elective	
general	surgical	
complications	
Prospective	
cohort	
study	
WHO	
checklist	
• Complication	rate	control	(n=144)	22.9%	vs.	intervention	
(n=150)	10%	(p=0.03)	
294	
Weiser	TG	
2010	
Ann	Surg	
	
Not	stated		
International	
Theatre	
Noncardiac	
emergency	
surgery	
	
30	days	 Reduce	emergency	
surgical	death	and	
complications	
Prospective	
multicentre	
cohort	
study	
WHO	
checklist	
• Complication	rate	control	(151/842)	18.4%	vs.	intervention		
(102/908)	11.7%	(P=0.0001)	
• Death	rate	control	3.7%	vs.	intervention	1.4%	(p=0.006)	
1750	
Bliss	LA	
2012	
J	Am	Coll	
Surg	
2007-2011	
USA	
Theatre	
Surgery	
30	days	 Improve	30	day	
outcome	for	
surgery	
Cohort	
study	
(historical	
control)	
Theatre	
checklist	
• Complication	rate	control:	490/2079	(23.6%)	vs.	6/73	(8.20%)	
(p<0.001)	
2152	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.18 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–Checklist	(part	2)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	
design	
Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts	
van	Klei	WA,	2012,		
Ann	Surg	
2007	to	2010	
Netherlands	
Theatre	
Surgery	
30	days	 Evaluate	WHO	Checklist	effect	
on	mortality	
Cohort	
study	
WHO	Checklist	 • 30-day	mortality	rate	control	(n=14362)	3.13%	
vs.	intervention	(n=	11151)	2.85%	(p=0.19)	
• Adjusted	mortality	rate	OR	0.85;	95%	CI,	0.73–
0.98).		
• Death	and	full	checklist	completion	OR	0.44	
(95%	CI,	0.28–0.70),		
• Death	and	partial	completion	OR	1.09	(95%	CI,	
0.78–1.52)	and		
• Death	and	Non-compliance	OR	1.16	(95%	CI,	
0.86–1.56)		
25,315	
Robb	WB	2012	
J	Gastrointestinal	
Surg.	
1999-2008	
Ireland	
Theatre	
Upper	GI	
Intra-
op.	
Reduction	of	conversion	rates	
in	laparoscopic	
cholecystectomy.	
Cohort	
study	
10	step	intra-
operative	surgical	
checklist	
• Overall	conversion	rate	to	open	
cholecystectomy	control24/277	(8.7%)	vs.	
intervention	8/360	(2.2%)	(p=0.001).		
• Conversion	rates	in	patients	with	grades	III	and	
IV	gallbladder	(complex	disease)	
• Control	7/43	(16.3%)	and	17/36(47.2%)	vs.	
intervention	1/49	(2/0%)	and	7/37	
(18.9%)(p=0.041	and	p=0.02)	
• NB	senior	surgeon	in	control	group	had	
performed>360	laparoscopic	
cholecystectomies)	
• 	
637	
Haynes	AB	
2009	
NEJM	
2007-2008	
Multi-
national	
Theatre	
Surgery	
30	days		 Reduce	surgical	mortality	and	
morbidity		
Cohort	
study	
WHO	checklist	 1. Mortality	control	(n=3733)	1.5	vs.	intervention	
(n=3955)	0.8%	afterward	(p	=	0.003).		
2. Inpatient	complications	control:	11.0%	vs.	
intervention	7.0	(p<0.001).	
3. Overall	surgical	site	infection	control	6.2%	vs.	
intervention	3.4%	(p<0.001)	
4. Overall	unplanned	reoperation	control	2.4%	vs.	
intervention	1.8%	(p=0.047)	
5. Overall	post-operative	pneumonia	control	1.1%	vs.	
1.3%	(p=0.46)	
6. LOS	not	addressed	
7688	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.19 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–Mixed	Methods	(part	1)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	
and	
country		
Study	
setting/	
sub-
specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts	
Brooke	
BS	
2012	
Surgery	
2004-
2006	
USA	
Inpatient	
Surgery	
30	days	 Improve	outcome	
post-surgery	
Cohort	study*	
(Comparative	
study)	
Following	National	Quality	Forum	
safe	practices	
• Full	compliance	complication	rate	(unadjusted)	12.4%	
vs.	partial	compliance	10.9%	(p<0.05)	
• 		Full	compliance	mortality	rate	due	to	complications	
(unadjusted)	8.12%	vs.	partial	compliance	9.74%	
(p<0.05)	
• Full	compliance	30	day	all	causes	mortality	rate	
(unadjusted)	2.45%	vs.	partial	compliance	3.09%	
(p<0.05)	
• Full	compliance	hospitals:	increased	complication	rate	
cf.	with	partial	compliance	OR	1.13	(95%	CI	1.03-1.25)	
• Full	compliance	hospitals:	decreased	failure	to	rescue	
rate	cf.	with	partial	compliance	OR	0.82	(95%	0.71-0.96)	
• Full	compliance	hospitals:	decreased	mortality	rate	cf.	
with	partial	compliance	OR	0.80	(95%CI	0.71-0396)	
	
79,462	
Kalina	
M	
2009	
Pediatr	
Emerg	
Care.	
	
2003-
2004	
USA	
Inpatient	
Paediatric	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Reduce	adverse	drug	
events	for	paediatric	
trauma	cases	
Cohort	study	 MDT	decision	making,	
medication	reporting	system	
• Medication	prescribing	errors	control:	25	vs.	
intervention	15	(p=0.05)	
• Medication	administration	errors	control:	19	vs.	
intervention	9	(p=0.05)	
• LOS	control:	1.8	(+/-0.9)	vs.	intervention	2(+/-	1.9)	
(p=not	significant)	
• 	
259	
Aga	H	
2012	
BMJ	
Open	
	
1994-
2006	
UK	
Inpatient	
General	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Reducing	adverse	
events	for	peptic	ulcer	
patients	
Retrospective	
cohort	study	
Audit	and	benchmarking	
consultant	input,	reduced	time	to	
theatre	and	increase	HDU/ITU	
provision	
• Mortality	rate	control	(1994):	251/3872	vs.	intervention	
83/2481		
• Consultant	input	control:	40.0%	vs.	intervention	73.4%	
• Operations	within	2hours	control:	10.3%	vs.	
intervention	28.1%		
• ITU/HDU	use	control:	87/165	(52.7%)	vs.	intervention	
54/64	(84.4%).	
• Linear	regression	analysis:	decrease	in	deaths	and	
increased	consultant	input	(p=0.005),	operation	within	
2hours	(p=0.088),	HDU/ITU	(p=0.026).	
42736	
	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.20 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–Mixed	Methods	(part	2)	
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	
sub-specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	
design	
Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	
Of	
Pts	
Bull	A		
2011	
J	Hosp	
Infect.	
	
2009	
Australia	
Inpatient	
Colorectal	
To	
discharge	
Reducing	surgical	site	infection	
for	emergency	and	elective	
colorectal	patients	
	
Cohort	
study	
Care	pathway	(warming,	
normoglycaemia,	O2,	antibiotics),	
checklist	
• Infection	rate	control:	15%	(95%	CI	10.4-
20.2)	to	7%	(95%	CI	3.4-12.6)	(not	clear	how	
calculated	
• Standardized	infection	ratios	
(observed/expected)	control:	2.1,	vs.	
intervention	1.3	
275	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.21 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–Technology		
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	
setting/	sub-
specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts	
Novis	
2010	
J	Vasc	Surg	
	
2007-
2008	
USA	
Inpatient	
Surgery	
90	days	 Reduce	venous	thromboembolism	
for	surgical	inpatients	
	
Cohort	study	
(historical	
control)	
Computerized	risk	
assessment	
program	
• 30	day	DVT	rate	control:	6/400	(1.5%)	vs.	
intervention	1/400	(0.3%)	(p<0.12)	
90	day	DVT	rate	control:	8/400	(2.0%)	vs.	intervention	
5/400	(1.3%)	(P<0.58)	
800	
Ryan	S	
2010	
IJS	
2010		
Ireland	
Handover	
Surgery	
4/12	 Does	electronic	handover	reduce	
length	of	stay	
	
Prospective	
cohort	study	
Electronic	handover	 • Median	LOS	control:	5	vs.	intervention	4	(p=	
0.047)	compared	with	paper	handover.		
88	
Lilly	CM	
2011	
JAMA	
2005-
2006	
USA	
ICU	
Surgery	(and	
Medicine)	
To	
discharge	
Impact	of	tele-ICU	intervention	on	
mortality,	length	of	stay	and	
preventable	complications	
Cohort	study	
Prospective	
clinical	practice	
study	
	Tele	intensive	care	
unit	(i.e.	remote	
care)	
• Hospital	mortality	rate	control	208/1529(13.6%)	
(95%	CI	11.9-15.4)	vs.	intervention	
562/4761(11.8%)	(95%	CI,	10.9-	12.8)	adjusted	
OR	0.40	(95%	CI,	0.31-0.52).		
• Ventilator-associated	pneumonia	control	
76/584	(13%)	vs.	intervention	1.6%	vs.	13%,	
respectively,	(OR,	0.15;	95%	CI,	0.09-0.23)		
• Catheter-related	bloodstream	infection	control	
19/1529	(1.0%)	vs.	intervention	29/4761(0.6%)	
(OR,	0.50;	95%	CI,	0.27-0.93)	
• Acute	kidney	injury	control	174/1452	(12%)	vs.	
intervention	540/4565	(12%)	
• Mean	LOS	control	13.3	(17.1),	median	LOS	
control	7.9	(0.2-15.0)	vs.	intervention	mean	LOS	
9.8(10)	median	LOS	6.8(0.2-12.0)	(p<0.001)		
6290	
Cima	
2011	
Jt	Comm	J	
Qual	
Patient	Saf.		
2009	
USA	
Theatre	
Surgery	
Not	
stated	
Reducing	retained	surgical	
sponges	
Randomized	
controlled	trial	
Data-matrix-coded	
sponge	system	
• Retained	swab	control:	average	1/64	days	vs.	
intervention	0	(p	<	.001).		
• 	
87,404	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.22 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–Training	(part	1)		
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	
setting/	sub-
specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	design	 Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts	
Young-Xu	
2011	
Arch	Surg	
	
2006-
2008	
USA	
Theatre	
Surgery	
30	days	 To	reduce	surgical	
morbidity	
Retrospective	
cohort	
Medical	Team	Training	
Program	
• Risk	adjusted	morbidity	control,	reduced	from	88	per	
1000	operations	to	76	per	1000	operations	(p=0.01),	
vs.	intervention	reduced	from	97	per	1000	to	82	per	
1000	(p=0.001)	Rate	ratio	1.20	(95%	CI	1.19-1.22)	
(p=0.001)	
	
119,383	
Brannick	MT	
2009	
Acad	Med	
2006-
2007	
USA	
Simulated	
Surgery	
Not	
stated	
Decrease	errors	in	
judgement,	inattention	to	
detail	and	problem	
understanding	
Randomized	
controlled	trial	
Training	program	 • Mean	number	of	procedures/trainee	control	819.17	
(SD	71.49)	vs.	intervention	847.17(88.98)	
• Mean	complications	control	26.08	(SD	7.35)	(3.19%)	
vs.	intervention	18.00	(SD	2.53)	(2.14%)	
• Surgical	complications	decreased	over	the	course	of	
the	study	correlation	between	complications	and	time	
in	months	was	r	=	-0.47,		
14913	
McCulloch	P	
2008	
Qual	Saf	
Health	Care	
2008	 Theatre	
General	
Surgery		
12	weeks	 Effect	of	Non-technical	
skills	training	on	technical	
performance	and	
outcome	
Cohort	study	 Non-technical	skills	
training	classroom	
course	
• 48	pre-intervention,	55	post	intervention.	
• Operative	technical	errors	declined	from	1.73	to	0.98	
(u=1071,	p=0.009)	
• Non-operative	procedural	errors	declined	from	8.48	
to	5.15	per	operation	(t=4.383,	p=<0.001.	
• Mean	LOS	control	2.23	(0.7)	vs.	intervention	2.02	(0.6)	
(NS)	
• Complications	control	5/48	vs.	intervention	3/55	
103	
Stather	
2010	
Thorac	
Cardiovasc	
Surg	
2009	 Ward	
Paediatric	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Iatrogenic	pneumothorax	
post	chest	drain	removal.	
Cohort	study	 Re-education	and	
updated	guidelines	
including	using	
occlusive	dressing	
• 4	patients	(4.2%)	had	a	pneumothorax	post	chest	
drain	removal,		
• 1	patient	required	insertion	of	a	further	chest	drain	
for	pneumothorax,		
• One	patient	requiring	an	additional	drain	for	
recurrent	pleural	effusion		
• Pre	intervention	vs.	6/39	(15.4%)	pneumothorax	rate	
post	drain	removal	
• Chi-squared	significant	difference	(p=0.0045)	
132	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
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9.16.23 Extraction	tables	for	selected	studies:	Process	–Training	(part	2)		
Author	
Year	
Journal	
Year	and	
country		
Study	setting/	sub-
specialty	
Study	
Length	
Study	Aim	 Study	
design	
Intervention	 Outcome	 No.	Of	
Pts	
Goh	ES	
2009	
Int	J	Health	
Care	Qual	
Assur	
	
Singapore	 Theatre	
Ophthalmology	
30	days	 Reducing	complications	in	
cataract	surgery	
	Cohort	
study	
Regular	audit	of	
complication	rates		
• Posterior	capsule	rupture	rates	control:	3.34%	
vs.	intervention	1.53%	(p	<	0.007,	Wilcoxon	
Signed	Ranks	test)		
Not	
stated	
Stringer	B	
2009	
Pub	Health	
reports	
Canada	 Theatre	
Multi-site	
Surgery	
	
5	months	 Reducing	needle	stick,	glove	
tears	through	hands	free	
technique	
Cohort	
study	
Video	to	educate	staff	
on	hands	free	
technique	
• Hands	free	technique	use	increase	
• Decreased	adverse	events	(needle-
stick/contamination)	by	35.0%	
• OR	0.65	(95%CI	0.43-0.97)	
10,596	
Cima	
2009	
Jt	Comm	J	
Qual	Patient	
Saf.	
2005	
USA	
Theatre	
Surgery	
To	
discharge	
Reducing	retained	foreign	
objects	post	op	
Cohort	
study	
Education	program	 • Pre-intervention	average:	Retained	foreign	
object	every	16	days.		
• Post	intervention:	Average	Retained	foreign	
object	69	days	
• Sustained	for	more	than	two	years.	
Not	
stated	
LOS=	Length	of	stay,	OR=	Odds	ratio,	95%CI	=	95%	Confidence	Interval	
		
